

# FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

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1981–1988  
VOLUME IV

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SOVIET UNION,  
JANUARY  
1983–MARCH 1985

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

# **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988**

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## **Volume IV**

# **Soviet Union, January 1983-1985**

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United States Government Publishing Office  
Washington

U.S. Department of State

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**Office of the Historian  
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## About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or

deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

### *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the Department of State in Washington and the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by

the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1981-1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes in this subseries is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified



records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* volumes have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were “Not found attached.”

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chiefs of the Declassification and Publishing Divisions. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of

abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

### *Declassification Review*

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2015

and was completed in 2019, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 13 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 20 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985.

**Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D.** General Editor **Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.** The Historian  
Foreign Service Institute  
February 2021

# Preface

## *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. This volume documents U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. Due to the importance of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Reagan administration, the Reagan subseries includes an extensive examination of U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in four volumes: [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983\*](#); [\*Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985\*](#); [\*Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985-October 1986\*](#); and [\*Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989\*](#). In conjunction with these volumes, several other volumes in the subseries will provide the reader with a fuller understanding of how U.S.-Soviet relations impacted the global character of the Cold War and U.S. strategy during the Reagan era. For documentation on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, see [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XI, START I\*](#), and [\*Volume XII, INF, 1984-1988\*](#). [\*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume V, European Security, 1977-1983\*](#), documents the NATO dual-track decision and TNF/INF negotiations through 1983. Documentation dealing with nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing, chemical and biological weapons, and space arms control, including anti-satellite systems, will be published in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XI, Global Issues I\*](#). The development of the Strategic Defense Initiative and ABM-related issues and other strategic considerations are addressed in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-\*](#)



[1988, Volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984](#), and [Volume XLIV, Parts 1 and 2, National Security Policy, 1985-1988](#). For selected documentation on the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II](#).

*Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume IV*

This volume documents the development of the Reagan administration's policies toward the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. With Reagan's signature of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75 on January 17, 1983, the administration's approaches and policies toward the Soviet Union were codified in a specific four-part agenda: arms control, human rights, regional issues, and bilateral relations. This volume examines the efforts of administration officials, namely Secretary of State George Shultz, President's Assistants for National Security Affairs William Clark and later Robert McFarlane, and NSC Staff member Jack Matlock, to implement the four-part agenda in dealing with the Soviet Union. The documentation demonstrates how administration officials developed policies related to the four-part agenda, mainly in the National Security Council (NSC) and Department of State, and then promoted these various tracks during meetings between Shultz, and on occasion Reagan, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in various fora. Although no high-level meeting took place between Reagan and either Soviet General Secretaries Yuri Andropov or Konstantin Chernenko during their short tenures, the documents provide a window into how the Reagan administration viewed the Soviet leadership and formulated policies to deal with whomever was in charge.

The volume also documents the bureaucratic struggle Shultz faced against the NSC in implementing the four-part agenda laid out by NSDD 75 and in gaining access to President Reagan. After some wrangling, by June 1983 an understanding emerged between Shultz and Clark, which allowed Shultz regular weekly meetings with Reagan. When Jack Matlock joined the NSC Staff as primary adviser on the Soviet Union, Shultz gained a like-minded ally in approaches to dealing with the USSR. While some administration officials, such as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, consistently argued that negotiating with the Soviet Union seemed futile, Shultz, Matlock, and others pushed President Reagan to see the value in keeping lines of communication open with the Soviets. Even during tragic events, such as the Soviet downing of the KAL 007 airliner in September 1983, Shultz kept his meeting with Gromyko a few days later in Madrid and used this as an opportunity to admonish the Foreign Minister for this inexplicable act and the inability of the Soviet Union to admit fault on the international stage.

The volume documents several Cold War flashpoints during the contentious months of 1983. The announcement in March 1983 of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) caused concern for the Soviet Union because it shifted the strategic balance from the theory of mutually assured destruction toward a defensive nuclear posture. Aside from the downing of the KAL airliner, the Euromissiles crisis came to a head with U.S. deployments of INF missiles to several NATO allies in late November 1983. While the bulk of the documentation dealing with these negotiations is covered in two other volumes, the scheduled deployments permeated all other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1983. The volume also presents selective documentation related to the 1983 Soviet "War Scare" and the November 1983 NATO nuclear exercise, Able Archer (see [Appendix A](#)).

The volume attempts to demonstrate that even with these challenges, Shultz and others pressed to keep moving ahead with the four-part agenda and promote greater dialogue in U.S.-Soviet relations.

After the Soviet walkout of the INF negotiations in Geneva in late 1983, the administration focused throughout 1984 on developing a framework to restart arms control negotiations; the documents in this volume demonstrate the difficulties involved in opening new talks with the Soviet Union. Reagan's SDI program continued to cause problems. The Soviets believed SDI would "militarize space," and therefore the debates over how SDI would be dealt with during negotiations were a major point of contention during this period. When Shultz and Gromyko met in January 1985, they finally reached an agreement on a new round of umbrella negotiations. The Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), scheduled to begin in Geneva in March 1985, would have three tracks, START, INF, and Defense and Space. The documents in the volume trace how various positions from the Department of State, NSC, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency impacted the decision to move forward with the three arms control tracks. While the other parts of the four-part agenda remained in play during this period and were discussed in bilateral meetings, restarting arms control talks seemed to trump the other areas of concern. Little did the U.S. or Soviet negotiators know that on the eve of these new NST negotiations, Chernenko would die, and a younger, more ambitious Soviet leader would emerge and dramatically change the course of U.S.-Soviet relations.

### *Acknowledgments*

The editor wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, especially Lisa Jones and Cate Sewell. A special thanks to the Central Intelligence Agency staff for providing access and assistance with Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project, and to the History Staff of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence for arranging full access to CIA records. The editor wishes to acknowledge the staff at Information Programs and Services at the Department of State for facilitating access to Department of State records and coordinating the review of this volume within the Department. Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor extends thanks to the family and executor of the Estate of former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for granting Department of State historians access to the personal papers of Secretary Weinberger deposited at the Library of Congress. Additional thanks are due to officials of the Library of Congress Manuscript Division for facilitating that access.

Elizabeth C. Charles collected, selected, and annotated the documentation for this volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, and Adam Howard, then General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. The volume was reviewed by David Geyer and then Historian Stephen Randolph. Kerry Hite and Chris Tudde coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Coordination Division. Kerry Hite also performed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

**Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D.** Historian

## Sources

*Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume IV,  
Soviet Union January 1983-March 1985*

The White House Staff and Office Files at the Reagan Library provide a key source of documentation on high-level decision-making toward the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. The Executive Secretariat files, a subset of this collection, include the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting Files; National Security Decision Directives (NSDD); the Head of State File; and the USSR Country File. Other relevant Staff and Office File collections include the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate; USSR Files; Director of Soviet Affairs Jack Matlock Files; and files of President's Assistants for National Security Affairs William Clark and Robert "Bud" McFarlane. Key collections of other members of the NSC Staff are the files of John Lenczowski, Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer, which focus on various aspects of policy development, arms control, and negotiations with the Soviet Union. In some instances, NSC records related to NSDDs and NSC and NSPG meetings have remained in the institutional files of the NSC in Washington. The text of the declassified NSDDs are available on the Reagan Presidential Library website.

The Department of State records most vital for this volume are in the following Executive Secretariat S/S Lot Files: Lot 91D257: Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum; Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989; Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989; Lot 93D188:



Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990; Lot 94D92: NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985; and Lot 96D262: Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983. The files of Lawrence Eagleburger in Lot 84D204 and Kenneth Dam in Lot 85D308, as well as the Policy Planning Staff Memoranda in Lot 89D149 and files of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Office of Soviet Affairs, in Lot 91D231 provide an excellent insight into high-level decision-making in the Department. The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department includes cable traffic between the Embassy in Moscow and Washington, as well as other related cables.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

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*Lot Files.* These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland

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Lot 03D314: EUR Records, Arthur Hartman Files

Lot 84D204: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967–1984

Lot 85D308: Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files

Lot 89D149: S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff

Lot 89D250: A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of  
Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill  
Lot 90D137: Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972-1989  
Lot 91D231: Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs,  
Office of Soviet Affairs, 1978-1989  
Lot 91D257: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top  
Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum  
Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive  
Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents,  
1984-1989  
Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive  
Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989  
Lot 93D188: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records,  
Memorandum of Conversations, 1981-1990  
Lot 94D92: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, NODIS  
and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985  
Lot 96D262: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special  
Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983

**Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley,  
California**

Intelligence Directorate  
NSC Records

White House Staff and Office Files

Frank Carlucci Files

William Clark Files

Kenneth deGraffenreid Files

Files of the Executive Secretariat, National Security  
Council

Agency File

Cable File

Country File: Europe and Soviet Union

Head of State File

Meeting File

National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) File

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) File

National Security Study Directives (NSSD) File

System Files, System II Intelligence File  
System Files, System IV Intelligence File  
Subject File  
Files of the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate,  
National Security Council  
Files of the Political Affairs Directorate, National  
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# **Abbreviations and Terms**

**ABM**, anti-ballistic missile  
**ACDA**, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**ALCM**, air-launched cruise missile  
**ASAP**, as soon as possible  
**ASAT**, anti-satellite  
**ASBM**, air-to-surface ballistic missile  
**ASEAN**, Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
**ASW**, anti-submarine warfare  
**AWAC**, Airborne Warning and Control  
**BMD**, Ballistic Missile Defense  
**BW**, biological weapon  
**C**, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State  
**CA**, covert action  
**CAB**, Civil Aviation Board  
**CBI**, Caribbean Basin Initiative  
**CBM**, Confidence-Building Measures  
**CC**, Central Committee  
**CD**, Conference on Disarmament  
**CDE**, Conference on Disarmament in Europe  
**CEMA**, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance  
**CI**, Counterintelligence  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CINCSAC**, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command  
**CJCS**, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**CM**, cruise missile  
**CODEL**, Congressional Delegation  
**COM**, Chief of Mission  
**CP**, Communist Party  
**CPPG**, Crisis Pre-Planning Group  
**CPSU**, Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
**CSCE**, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

**CTB**, Comprehensive Test Ban  
**CW**, chemical weapon  
**D**, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State; Democrat  
**DAO**, Defense Attaché Office  
**DATT**, Defense Attaché  
**DCM**, Deputy Chief of Mission  
**DDI**, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency  
**DDO**, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency  
**DIA**, Defense Intelligence Agency  
**DIRNSA**, Director of the National Security Agency  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DST**, Defense and Space Talks  
**EC**, European Community  
**EconOff**, Economics Officer  
**EE**, Eastern Europe  
**EEC**, European Economic Community  
**EmbOff**, Embassy Officer  
**EOB**, Executive Office Building (houses the Vice President's Office)  
**ERW**, enhanced radiation weapon  
**EST**, Eastern Standard Time  
**EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; after September 15, 1983, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs  
**EUR/SOV**, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State  
**Exdis**, Exclusive Distribution  
**FAA**, Federal Aviation Administration  
**FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation  
**FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
**FBS**, forward-based systems  
**FCO**, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)  
**FM**, Foreign Minister

**ForMin**, Foreign Ministry; Foreign Minister  
**FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany  
**G-7**, Group of 7, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States  
**GDR**, German Democratic Republic  
**GLCM**, ground-launched cruise missile  
**GOJ**, Government of Japan  
**GPS**, George P. Shultz  
**GRU**, Soviet military intelligence agency  
**HA**, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State  
**HPSCI**, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
**HUMINT**, human intelligence  
**I&W**, Indications and Warning  
**IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency  
**ICAO**, International Civil Aviation Organization  
**ICBM**, intercontinental ballistic missile  
**IG**, Interagency Group  
**IMEMO**, Institute of World Economy and International Relations  
**IMF**, International Monetary Fund  
**INF**, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces  
**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
**IOC**, International Olympic Committee  
**JCC**, Joint Commercial Commission  
**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**JMC**, Joint Military Commission  
**KAL**, Korean Airlines  
**KGB**, Committee for State Security in the Soviet Union  
**L**, Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State  
**LANDSAT**, Land-Use Satellite  
**Limdis**, Limited Distribution  
**LRINF**, Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces  
**LTA**, Long-Term Agreement on grain

**MAD**, mutual assured destruction  
**MBFR**, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions  
**memcon**, memorandum of conversation  
**MFA**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
**MFN**, most favored nation  
**MIRV**, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle  
**MOU**, Memorandum of Understanding  
**MX or M-X**, missile experimental (intercontinental ballistic missile)  
**NAC**, North Atlantic Council  
**NAM**, Non-Aligned Movement  
**NASA**, National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**Niact**, Night Action  
**NID**, National Intelligence Daily  
**Nocontract**, Not Releasable to Contractors  
**Nodis**, No Distribution  
**Noform**, No Foreign Dissemination  
**NORAD**, North American Aerospace Defense Command  
**NPT**, Non-Proliferation Treaty  
**NSA**, National Security Agency  
**NSPG**, National Security Planning Group  
**NSC**, National Security Council  
**NSDD**, National Security Decision Directive  
**NSSD**, National Security Study Directive  
**NST**, Nuclear and Space Talks  
**NTM**, National Technical Means  
**NUF**, non-use of force  
**OAS**, Organization of American States  
**OBE**, overtaken by events  
**OECD**, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
**Orcon**, Originator Controlled  
**OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense  
**OVP**, Office of the Vice President

**P**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs  
**P-II**, Pershing II missile  
**PDB**, President's Daily Brief  
**PFIAB**, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
**PM**, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
**PNE or PNET**, Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions  
**POLAD**, Political Adviser  
**PolCouns**, Political Counselor  
**Poloff**, Political Officer  
**PRC**, Policy Review Committee  
**PROFs notes**, internal White House and NSC electronic messages  
**R**, Republican  
**R&D**, research and development  
**reftel**, Reference Telegram  
**RFE**, Radio Free Europe  
**RL**, Radio Liberty  
**RR**, Ronald Reagan  
**RW**, radiological weapons  
**S**, Office of the Secretary of State  
**S/P**, Policy Planning Council, Department of State  
**S/S**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
**S/S-O**, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
**S/S-S**, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
**S&T**, Science and Technology  
**SACG**, Senior Arms Control Group  
**SACPG**, Senior Arms Control Policy Group  
**SALT**, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
**SCC**, Special Coordinating Committee; Standing Consultative Commission  
**SCG**, Special Consultative Group (NATO)  
**SDI**, Strategic Defense Initiative

**Secto**, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Secretary of State while away from Washington  
**septel**, separate telegram  
**SFRC**, Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
**SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe  
**SIG**, Senior Interagency Group  
**SIG/I**, Senior Interagency Group on Intelligence  
**SIG-IEP**, Senior Interagency Group-International Economic Policy  
**SLCM**, surface-launched cruise missile; submarine-launched cruise missile; sea-launched cruise missile  
**SNDV**, strategic nuclear delivery vehicle  
**SNIE**, Special National Intelligence Estimate  
**Specat**, Special Category  
**SRINF**, Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces  
**START**, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
**TASS**, official Soviet news agency  
**TNF**, Theater Nuclear Forces  
**Tosec**, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while away from Washington  
**TTBT**, Threshold Test Ban Treaty  
**UK**, United Kingdom  
**UN**, United Nations  
**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly  
**US**, United States  
**USA**, United States of America; United States Army  
**USAF**, United States Air Force  
**USAFSB**, United States Army Field Station Berlin  
**USCINCEUR**, United States Commander in Chief, European Command  
**USDel**, United States Delegation  
**USDOC**, Department of Commerce  
**USG**, United States Government  
**USIA**, United States Information Agency  
**USN**, United States Navy

**USNMR SHAPE**, United States National Military  
Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers,  
Europe

**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**USTR**, United States Trade Representative

**VOA**, Voice of America

**VP**, Vice President

**WH**, White House

**WHSR**, White House Situation Room

**WP**, Warsaw Pact

**Z**, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time)



## Persons

- Abrahamson, James A.**, Lieutenant General, USAF;  
Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
- Abramowitz, Morton I. (Mort)**, U.S. Representative to  
the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations  
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Research, Department of State, from February 1, 1985
- Abrams, Elliott**, Assistant Secretary of State for Human  
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until July 1985
- Adelman, Kenneth L. (Ken)**, Director, Arms Control  
and Disarmament Agency from April 1983
- Akhromeyev, Sergei F.**, Marshal of the Soviet Union  
and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces from  
September 1984
- Allen, Richard V.**, President's Assistant for National  
Security Affairs until January 1982
- Andreas, Dwayne**, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for  
International Trade Policy; U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-  
USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC)
- Andropov, Yuri**, General Secretary of the Communist  
Party of the Soviet Union from November 12, 1982,  
until February 9, 1984
- Arbatov, Georgii**, Director, Institute for U.S. and Canada  
Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
- Armacost, Michael**, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs from May 1984
- Azrael, Jeremy**, member, Policy Planning Council,  
Department of State, from 1984 until 1985
- Babrak Karmal**, President of Afghanistan from  
December 1979
- Bailey, Norman**, Director, Planning and Evaluation,  
National Security Council, from April 1981 until 1983;  
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,

International Economic Affairs Directorate, from June 1983 until October 1983; thereafter, consultant to the National Security Council Staff

**Baker, James A., III (Jim)**, White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President until February 1, 1985; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury

**Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr., (Mac)**, Secretary of Commerce

**Baraz, Robert**, Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**Barker, Robert**, Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Intelligence, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1983 until 1986; Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.S.-USSR Nuclear Testing Experts Meetings

**Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr A.**, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States, to March 1983; thereafter Chief of the U.S.A. Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs from March 1983

**Bishop, Maurice**, Prime Minister of Grenada until October 19, 1983

**Block, John R. (Jack)**, Secretary of Agriculture

**Bosworth, Stephen W.**, Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from January 3, 1983, until April 7, 1984

**Bova, Michele**, Director, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from 1984

**Boverie, Richard**, Major General, USAF; National Security Council Staff

**Bremer, L. Paul, III (Jerry)**, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until March 27, 1983

**Brezhnev, Leonid**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until his death on November 10, 1982

**Brock, William E., III**, U.S. Trade Representative from 1981 to 1985

**Burt, Richard (Rick)**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs-designate from May 10, 1982, until February 17, 1983; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (European and Canadian Affairs from September 15, 1983), from February 18, 1983, until July 18, 1985

**Bush, George H.W.**, Vice President of the United States

**Byrd, Robert, W.**, Senator, (D-West Virginia), Senate Minority Leader

**Carter, James Earl (Jimmy)**, President of the United States from January 20, 1977, to January 20, 1981

**Casey, William J. (Bill)**, Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981

**Chain, John T., Jr.**, General, USAF; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1, 1984, until June 14, 1985

**Chernenko, Konstantin**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from February 1984 until March 1985

**Clark, William P. (Judge)**, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from February 1982 until November 1983; Secretary of the Interior from November 1983 until February 1985

**Cobb, Tyrus (Ty)**, Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff

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**Courtney, William H.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State

**Craxi, Bettino**, Prime Minister of Italy from August 1983

**Crocker, Chester**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

**Dam, Kenneth W. (Ken)**, Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982, until June 15, 1985

**Deaver, Michael K.**, Deputy White House Chief of Staff and Special Assistant to the President until 1985

**deGraffenreid, Kenneth E.**, Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff

**Dobriansky, Paula J.**, Deputy Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984; thereafter Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate

**Dobrynin, Anatoly**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

**Dolan, Anthony R. (Tony)**, Speechwriter, White House Office of Speechwriting until 1985

**Dunkerley, Craig**, Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

**Eagleburger, Lawrence (Larry)**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1982 until May 1984; Career Ambassador from April 1984

**Ermarth, Fritz W.**, National Intelligence Officer for USSR, Central Intelligence Agency, and member, National Intelligence Council Staff, from 1984

**Foley, Thomas**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington); House Democratic Whip

**Fortier, Donald R. (Don)**, Director, Western Europe and NATO, National Security Council Staff, from September 1982 until June 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Political-Military Affairs, National Security Council Staff, until December 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Policy Development from December 1983

**Gandhi, Rajiv**, Indian Prime Minister

**Garthoff, Douglas F.**, Policy Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Department of Defense

**Gates, Robert (Bob)**, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from January 1982 until April 1986; also, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, from September 1983

**Genscher, Hans-Dietrich**, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany

**George, Clair E.**, Director of the Office of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, from July 1983 until July 1984; Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, from July 1984

**George, Douglas (Doug)**, Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from June 1982

**Glitman, Maynard W. (Mike)**, Negotiator for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

**Goodby, James E.**, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) from 1983 until 1985

**Gorbachev, Mikhail S.**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1985

**Gordievskiy, Oleg**, Colonel, Committee on State Security (KGB), USSR; secret agent for British Security Service from 1974 until his defection to the United Kingdom in 1985

**Grechko, Andrey A.**, Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense from 1967 until 1976

**Gregg, Donald P.**, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

**Grinevsky, Oleg A.**, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe from 1983 until 1986

**Grobel, Olaf**, Director, Office of Theater Military Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

**Gromyko, Andrei**, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

**Hartman, Arthur A.**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union

**Hill, M. Charles**, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from March 28, 1983, until January 1, 1985; thereafter Executive Assistant to the Secretary

**Horowitz, Larry**, Executive Assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy

**Howe, Sir Geoffrey**, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from June 1983

**Howe, Jonathan T.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until July 1, 1984

**Iklé, Fred C.**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

**Isakov, Viktor**, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy in Washington

**Kamman, Curtis, W.**, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until August 1985

**Kampelman, Max**, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe until 1983; head of U.S. human rights mission to Europe in 1984; head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva; Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

**Keel, Alton B. (Al)**, Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget

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**Kennedy, Edward M. (Ted)**, Senator (D-Massachusetts)

**Kennedy, Richard T.**, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs from 1983

**Keyes, Alan**, staff member, National Security Council in 1983

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**Kimmitt, Robert M.**, Executive Secretary and General Counsel, National Security Council Staff, from 1983

**Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.**, U.S. Representative to the United Nations until April 1985

**Kohl, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

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**Mitterrand, Francois**, President of France

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**Moreau, Arthur S.**, Admiral, USN; Assistant to the  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1983 until  
1985

**Mulroney, Martin Brian**, Prime Minister of Canada  
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**Nakasone Yasuhiro**, Prime Minister of Japan from  
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**Pascoe, Boris L. (Lynn)**, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

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**Powell, Colin L.**, Major General, USA; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

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**Reagan, Ronald**, President of the United States

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**Sakharov, Andrei**, Soviet nuclear physicist and dissident

**Scowcroft, Brent**, Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces; member of the Dartmouth Group

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**Shultz, Helena (Obie),** wife of George Shultz

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**Velikhov, Yevgeny P.**, Vice President, Soviet Academy of Sciences

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**Wolfowitz, Paul, D.**, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

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## **Note on U.S. Covert Actions**

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

### *Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency*

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council (NSC) to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively executive branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice, but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.<sup>1</sup>

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and

Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas, and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”<sup>2</sup>

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the



Department of State and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.<sup>3</sup> In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA's activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare.<sup>4</sup> The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the Departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

*NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee*

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of NSC directives, the responsibility of the DCI for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the CIA's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.<sup>5</sup>

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve

covert action programs initiated by the CIA.<sup>6</sup> The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.<sup>7</sup>

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.<sup>8</sup>

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November,

he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.<sup>9</sup>

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counterinsurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging this responsibility.<sup>10</sup>

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.<sup>11</sup>

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its



predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.<sup>12</sup>

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation that had not been reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,<sup>13</sup> which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and politically sensitive covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal

meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d' etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.<sup>14</sup>

### *Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group*

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a finding and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.<sup>15</sup>

Executive Order (EO) 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group (OAG), composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.<sup>16</sup>

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action. President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the OAG with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.<sup>17</sup> Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely—the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers).

The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's



EO 11905 on United States Foreign Intelligence activities.<sup>18</sup> In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC-Intelligence (SCC-I) to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in EO 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced EO 11905 and its amendments. EO 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.<sup>19</sup>

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for “world-wide” or “general” (or “generic”) covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the U.S. Government. A new type of document—known as “Perspectives”—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential findings or Memorandum of Notification (MON). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while the Department of State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing “world-wide” finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

The Carter administration initially used MONs to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically specific operations under a previously approved worldwide or general objective outlined in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the Committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence Committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the Committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence Committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and

minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence Committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>1</sup> NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in [\*Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257\*](#).

<sup>2</sup> NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, [\*Document 292\*](#).

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, [\*Document 298\*](#).

<sup>4</sup> NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in [\*Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 90\*](#).

<sup>5</sup> William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see [\*Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 171\*](#).

<sup>6</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147-148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50-51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see [\*Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212\*](#) and [\*250\*](#).

<sup>7</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>9</sup> See [\*Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. X, Cuba, 1961-1962, Documents 270\*](#) and [\*278\*](#).

<sup>10</sup> For text of NSAM No. 124, see [\*Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68\*](#).

NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed in [\*Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56\*](#).

<sup>11</sup> For text of NSAM No. 303, see [\*Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 204\*](#).

<sup>12</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>13</sup> For text of NSDM 40, see [\*Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, Document 203\*](#).

<sup>14</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 54-55, 57.

<sup>15</sup> P.L. 93-559.

<sup>16</sup> EO 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

<sup>17</sup> The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the SCC. The SCC's jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, non-intelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System", January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59-62.



<sup>18</sup> EO 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities", May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719-720.

<sup>19</sup> EO 12036, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities", January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194-214. Since EO 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the EO to the "SCC" were effectively references to what was known in practice as SCC-I.

<sup>20</sup> P.L. 96-450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by P.L. 96-450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., "Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions," Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp.1-2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA'S Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280-281.

# **Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985**

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## **Contents**

# **January 1983-April 1983 “Dobrynin seemed like he wanted to run. But the Secretary is a jogger”: Shultz and the Four-Part Agenda**

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## **1. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, January 19, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/19/83-01/21/83); NLR-748-23-40-10-7. Secret; Sensitive. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt wrote Shultz on January 18: “Per our conversation earlier today, I have recast the US-Soviet paper as a memo from you to the President.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1982-83 U.S.-Soviets Background Info) In his memoir, Shultz recalled that in this memorandum to Reagan: “I set out to him for the first time what was to become our four-part agenda: human rights, arms control, regional issues, and bilateral relations.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 162)

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## **2. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, January 25, 1983, 1348Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/1983-02/02/1983). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Clark forwarded and summarized the telegram in a memorandum to the President on January 29. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. (Ibid.)

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## **3. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, January 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/83-02/02/83); NLR-748-23-40-9-9. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Dobriansky. Printed from an uninitialed copy; however, next to his name in the "From" line, Clark wrote: "Could we discuss this with George before he leaves for China? WPC." Reagan responded: "Yes. There is merit in much of what he proposes. RR." In a memorandum to Clark on January 22, Dobriansky forwarded a draft of Clark's memorandum and noted that Blair, Kraemer, Robinson, and Stearman not only strongly concurred in her assessment, but also "made significant contributions to the critique of Shultz's memorandum." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/19/83-01/21/83))

**4. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, January 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/83-02/02/83); NLR-748-23-40-7-1. Secret; Sensitive.

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**5. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, January 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/24/83-01/27/83). Secret, Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Boverie and Blair. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**6. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, January 28, 1983, 12:30 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/11/83-02/20/83). Secret. Drafted by Burt on January 29; cleared by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a covering note attached to another copy, Eagleburger wrote: "Bill Clark—The Secretary asked

that I make a specific effort to brief you on his talk with Dob. Here is the memcon; I'll be glad to go into more detail if you wish. LSE." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967-1984, Lot 84D204, Chron, January, 1983)

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**7. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, February 4, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum is unsigned. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**8. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, February 7, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a cover note to Reagan, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: While I do not concur in all points of this staff memo, it provides a basis for discussion—hopefully during some of your unscheduled time today—to discuss 'next steps.' Do you wish to meet on this? Bill." A typewritten note from the unidentified "JH" reads: "I am not certain the above note was the WC note

attached to the JL paper when taken to the President via the usher."

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## **9. Editorial Note**

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## **10. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, February 15, 1983, 5:10-6:50 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, February 1983. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Residence at the White House. Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: "Almost forgot—Geo. Shultz sneaked Ambassador Dobrynin (Soviet) into the W.H. We talked for 2 hours. Sometimes we got pretty nose to nose. I told him I wanted George to be a channel for direct contact with Andropov—no bureaucracy involved. Geo. tells me that after they left the ambas. said, 'this could be an historic moment.'" (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 198) In a covering note to Shultz on February 17, Eagleburger reported: "As your schedule is such that your only chance for reading is this morning, I am forwarding the memo to you without having read it myself. I would appreciate a chance to give you my comments on it later today. LSE." Shultz wrote in the margin: "I gather this is being redone in light of our discussion. G." In a February 19 covering note

to Reagan, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: I attach the memorandum of conversation between Sec. Shultz and Amb. Dobrynin." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (2))

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### **11. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, February 15, 1983, 7-8:15 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union-Sensitive File-1983 (02/15/1983-07/14/1983). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on February 17; cleared by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office after Shultz and Dobrynin returned from meeting with Reagan in the White House. See Document 10.

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### **12. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, February 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/21/83-03/02/83). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an undated, unsigned covering memorandum to Reagan, Clark summarized Shultz's message and commented: "I am skeptical that the Soviets have any intention of permitting the Pentecostals to leave."

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### **13. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

San Francisco, March 3, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/03/83-03/07/83). Secret; Sensitive. A draft of this memorandum, dated March 2, was prepared by Napper on March 1; cleared by Simons and Palmer. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive File, March 1-15, 1983) On March 4, telegram Secto 2003 from Shultz in California reported that the memorandum was "hand-carried to the White House office in San Francisco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830002-0359)

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### **14. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, March 8, 1983, 11 a.m.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-85-0023, USSR 091.112 (Jan-) 1983. Secret. Drafted by Garthoff on March 11. The meeting took place in Room 3E880 at the Pentagon.

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### **15. Editorial Note**

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**16. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, March 9, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Lenczowski.

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**17. Editorial Note**

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**18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Wick) to President Reagan**

Washington, March 16, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/04/83). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by B.B. Morton on March 4 and cleared by Simons and Palmer according to a March 10 covering memorandum. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive March 1-15 1983)

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**19. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, March 16, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union March. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 14 memorandum to Shultz, forwarded through Eagleburger, Burt summarized the purpose of sending this memorandum forward to Reagan. Eagleburger wrote in the margin: "G.S.: This is a good memo. LSE." (Ibid.) Lenczowski forwarded the memorandum to Reagan on March 25 (see Document 25).

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## **20. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, March 16, 1983, 5 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer on March 18; cleared by Seitz and McManaway. Palmer initialed for both clearing officials. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. A typed notation indicates that McManaway "cleared cable with ident. text." The text of the memorandum of conversation was sent to Moscow in telegram 80054, March 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

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## **21. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, March 21, 1983



Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and Napper on March 8; cleared by Palmer. Napper initialed for Simons. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 21.

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## **22. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, March 23, 1983, 4:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer; cleared by Eagleburger, Seitz, and Hill. Eagleburger initialed for Seitz and Palmer initialed for Hill. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

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## **23. Editorial Note**

## **24. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983  
August 10, Secretary's Meetings with the President.  
Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger.  
Although the memorandum is undated, Hill initialed it on  
March 25. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on  
the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

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**25. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the  
National Security Council Staff to President Reagan**

Washington, March 25, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet  
Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5).  
Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum  
is unsigned. Prepared by Lenczowski. Clark wrote in a  
covering memorandum: "Mr. President: Preparatory to your  
2:30 meeting with George Shultz, it might be well you  
review the attached two papers. Bill." A stamped notation  
indicates the President saw both memoranda.

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**26. Editorial Note**

**27. Note of a Meeting Between President Reagan and  
Secretary of State Shultz by the Executive Secretary  
of the Department of State (Hill)**

Washington, March 25, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 25, 1983. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the text from an entry in Hill's handwritten notebooks. An image of the note is Appendix B. After his meeting with Reagan on March 25, Shultz returned to the Department and briefed Hill.

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**28. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, March 25, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (4). Secret. Sent for information. A notation in an unknown hand at the end of the memorandum reads: "Sven Kraemer and Ken DeGraffenreid concur."

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**29. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, March 25, 1983, 1527Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830166-0101. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Secretary of Defense, USNATO, and the Mission in Geneva; sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, US MBFR Delegation Vienna, USNMR SHAPE Belgium,

CINCSAC Offutt AFB in Nebraska, USCINCEUR Germany, and the Consulate in Leningrad.

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**30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, March 28, 1983, 1528Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830170-1044. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, USUN, USNATO, London, Paris, Bonn, the Mission in Geneva, Secretary of Defense, USNMR SHAPE Belgium, USCINCEUR Germany, US Delegation MBFR Vienna, and Mission in Geneva for the INF and START delegations.

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**31. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, March 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/24/83-03/25/83). Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Palmer and cleared by Blackwill. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D 188, Sec/Dobrynin 2/15/83) Clark forwarded the memorandum and summarized its main points in an undated memorandum to the President. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet

Diplomatic Contacts (3/5)) Reagan initialed the memorandum from Shultz, indicating he saw it.

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### **32. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, April 1, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83). Secret; Sensitive. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt forwarded a draft to Shultz on March 31. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, March 17-31) Clark forwarded the memorandum to the President on April 5. See Document 35 and footnote 5 thereto.

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### **33. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, April 2, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83-04/15/83); NLR-748-24-10-2-8. Secret. Reagan initialed the attached FBIS press report, which summarized U.K. Foreign Minister Pym's rebuttal to Gromyko's press conference. (FBIS 58, April 2, 1983; "Pym Attacks Gromyko's Rejection of Reagan's Proposals")

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### **34. Editorial Note**



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**35. Memorandum From Norman Bailey, John Lenczowski, and Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, April 4, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83) (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Urgent Action. In a cover note to Poindexter, McFarlane wrote: "The attached memo, which Shultz sent over by courier, is being staffed (close-hold) by Norman Bailey in coordination with John Lenczowski, Doug McMinn and Don Fortier. The Secretary's proposal that no one else be involved until the day of the announcement (Brock, Block, Regan etc) won't work. Still we can find a way to do it discreetly."

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**36. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, April 6, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Lenczowski. A note in an unknown hand at the top of the page reads: "For discussion with Geo. Shultz at 4 pm."

# 1. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 19, 1983

## SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations in 1983

The recent NSPG discussion of US-Soviet relations underscored the fact that increased Soviet activism since Andropov's rise to power confronts us with a situation requiring strength, imagination and energy.<sup>2</sup> This memo sets forth a strategy for countering this new Soviet activism by using an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in the US-Soviet relationship is possible. Even if no improvement ultimately takes place, the dialogue itself would strengthen our ability to manage the relationship and keep the diplomatic initiative in our hands.

As we proceed, we must keep in mind that our challenge is not to launch a bold, new initiative, but to build on the good beginning we have made in the patient, steady, yet creative management of a long-term adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. I look forward to an early opportunity to discuss this topic with you in greater detail.

*Enduring Features of US-Soviet Competition:* The US-Soviet competition has deep roots in the fundamentally different nature of the two societies and in Moscow's readiness to use its growing military power in ways that threaten our security. Thus there is no realistic scenario for a breakthrough to amicable relations with the Soviet Union.

To be sure, the Soviet system is beset by serious weaknesses. But it would be a mistake to assume that the Soviet capacity for competition with us will diminish at any time during your Presidency. While recognizing the adversarial nature of our relationship with Moscow, we must not rule out the possibility that firm U.S. policies could help induce the kind of changes in Soviet behavior that would make an improvement in relations possible.

We have made considerable progress toward a more effective Soviet policy through our long-term rearmament program, actions to revitalize our Alliances, a new ideological offensive on behalf of our fundamental values, and arms control proposals that have made clear our seriousness in the search for peace.

*The Challenge of US-Soviet Relations in 1983:* There is already evidence of greater foreign policy energy and sophistication under Andropov, and the Soviets will clearly be on the offensive in 1983. In Europe, we can expect that the Soviets will make the fullest possible use of Western hopes raised by the succession to redouble their appeals to Western publics on issues such as INF. In Asia, Moscow will use renewed talks with the Chinese to press its diplomatic offensive, while hinting at new flexibility on Afghanistan. I believe that we can best preempt this increased Soviet maneuvering with increased diplomatic and public activism of our own, including through an intensified dialogue with Moscow. If this dialogue does not result in improved US-Soviet relations, the onus will rest clearly on Moscow; if it leads to actual improvement, all the better.

*Preconditions for Effective Dialogue:* To proceed with an intensified dialogue while protecting our security interests, we need to fulfill the following preconditions: (1) continued rebuilding of American economic and military strength; (2)



continued revitalization of our Alliances; (3) stabilization of relations with China; (4) continued regional peacekeeping efforts (Middle East and CBI); and (5) continued competition in ideas.

*The Purposes of Intensified US-Soviet Dialogue:* Such a dialogue could serve our interests by: (1) probing for new Soviet flexibility (get Andropov to put his money where his mouth is); (2) controlling events (reaffirming our determination to play a central role on all issues while preventing opening of gaps between us and our Allies); (3) maintaining Allied and domestic support for our policy in the face of a redoubled Soviet “peace offensive”.

*Substance of the Dialogue:* As we intensify dialogue, it is neither necessary nor advisable to abandon the policy framework we have established. We must continue to insist that US-Soviet dialogue address the full range of our concerns about Soviet behavior: the military buildup, international expansionism, and human rights violations. We must be prepared for evolution of our substantive positions in the give and take of negotiations, but we must not lower our basic requirements for improved US-Soviet relations.

*A. Arms Control:* We must not abandon the high standards we have set for potential agreements—real reductions, equality in the important measures of military capability, verifiability, and enhanced stability. We must at the same time win the battle for public opinion by making clear that it is the USSR, not the U.S., that is impeding progress toward agreements.

Our most formidable arms control challenge will be in *INF*: at stake is whether or not we can sustain the integrity and vitality of the Western Alliance. In *START*, we should hold

firm on the conceptual framework of our approach, including substantial reductions and warheads as the principal unit of account. We must negotiate seriously, taking as the point of departure the apparent Soviet willingness to accept the principle of reductions.

*B. Regional Issues:* The fact that we have engaged Moscow on regional issues—Afghanistan and southern Africa—positions us to sustain diplomatic pressure and exploit whatever opportunities may emerge in the context of the Soviet political process this year. Given the many signals we have heard on Afghanistan, we should test Soviet intentions by another round of our bilateral talks, and possibly by tabling a bold framework for a comprehensive settlement.

We must also deal effectively with the Soviet “Asian offensive” by adding substance to the US-PRC dialogue and holding firm on our requirements for a Kampuchean settlement. This will be one of the objectives of my China trip.<sup>3</sup>

On other issues, we may wish to renew bilateral discussions with Moscow on Namibia/Angola to press for Cuban troop withdrawal. In some cases, we may need to reinforce warnings about possible unacceptable Soviet behavior in the Third World, such as delivery of MiGs to Nicaragua. In the Middle East, we want to continue to avoid dialogue that could help Moscow regain a role in the peace process.

*C. Human Rights and Western Values:* We must continue to seek improvement in Soviet behavior: relief of prisoners of conscience, resolution of divided-family cases and the Pentecostalist situation, and a significant increase in Jewish emigration. Our focus should be on private diplomacy

leading to results, not counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow. We must also press our democracy offensive and ensure that human rights remains a major component of our policy toward Poland and in the CSCE context.

*D. Economic Relations:* Any steps we take must not contribute to Soviet military power, subsidize the Soviet economy, or undercut our efforts to develop a new framework for East-West economic relations. We must also manage domestic pressures for increased trade so that the timing of any steps we take is geared to our overall US-Soviet strategy. A possible mechanism for managing these pressures would be to restore government-to-government economic contacts through a session of the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC).

*E. Bilateral Relations:* Small steps have a modest but real role to play in the relationship, and we should seek opportunities to use them. We should be careful to ensure that benefit is mutual and reciprocal and that our actions advance our objective of broadening access to Soviet society. We could implement Charlie Wick's suggestion to negotiate a new umbrella cultural agreement; this would prevent Soviet cultural groups from making their own arrangements with U.S. sponsors, while denying us reciprocal access to the USSR.

*The Process of Dialogue:* We should begin to put in place the building blocks for a productive summit, but without committing ourselves prematurely. Four levels of dialogue should be considered:

—*Summitry:* The dialogue process should be constructed to lead to a summit if relations warrant, but without initially defining a summit as the only possible outcome. Should we

later decide on a US-Soviet summit, you should probably meet with the Chinese first.

—*Ministerial-Level Contacts*: We could consider another meeting between Gromyko and me, possibly in Moscow if a meeting with Andropov could be guaranteed. Another option would be a neutral site. We might also consider a possible Weinberger-Ustinov meeting.

—*Dialogue through Ambassadors*: We should make maximum use of both Dobrynin and Art Hartman, and possibly try to regularize their access to Gromyko and me. We might also recall Art for consultations this spring and send him back with a message from you to Andropov.

—*Dialogue between “Departments and Desks”*: We could accept Dobrynin’s proposal of intensified dialogue between specialists on US-Soviet relations from the State Department and the Soviet MFA.<sup>4</sup>

*Conclusion*: In sum, 1983 will be a year of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviet Union. We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for an intensified dialogue with Moscow along the lines I have described. Such a dialogue would protect our security interests while giving the Soviets incentives to address our concerns—as long as we do not waver on the essentials of the policy approach we have established over the past two years. The Soviets may ultimately prove unwilling to satisfy our criteria for an improvement in the relationship. If so, we will nonetheless have done our part, and the responsibility for continued tensions will rest squarely with Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/19/83-01/21/83); NLR-748-23-40-10-7. Secret; Sensitive.

Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt wrote Shultz on January 18: "Per our conversation earlier today, I have recast the US-Soviet paper as a memo from you to the President." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1982-83 U.S.-Soviets Background Info) In his memoir, Shultz recalled that in this memorandum to Reagan: "I set out to him for the first time what was to become our four-part agenda: human rights, arms control, regional issues, and bilateral relations." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 162)

<sup>2</sup> See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 258](#).

<sup>3</sup> Shultz visited China February 2-6. In his memoir, Shultz recalled working in early 1983 with Reagan "to develop further our approach to the Chinese. Our aims with China needed more definition: to resolve the most troublesome problems, stabilize relations, and make use of our common interests against Soviet actions in Cambodia and Afghanistan and against deployment of Soviet missiles aimed at Asian countries. We would do what we could to edge the Chinese regime toward a more open and just society. We would also work to develop an important intelligence exchange with the Chinese." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 385-386)

<sup>4</sup> See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 250](#).



## **2. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, January 25, 1983, 1348Z

973. For the Secretary From Hartman. S/S Check With Deputy Secretary Dam About Any Wider Distribution. Subject: US/Soviet Relations.

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. We have now seen enough of the Andropov regime's foreign policy to detect implications for our own policy and for our relations with the Soviets. This message draws some conclusions about where we should be trying to go in our overall relations with the Soviets and how we can get there.

3. It is becoming increasingly clear that the Andropov approach is not marked by significant experimentation or initiative. Internally, Andropov is making major efforts to make the economy run better, but he is using traditional and conservative methods—an emphasis on discipline and an anti-corruption drive. In foreign policy, he has departed in no way from the Brezhnev policy. He seems to be going out of his way to knock down speculation that he will be more flexible on Afghanistan or Poland; and even on issues of less importance to the Soviet Union, like Southern Africa, there appears to be no relaxation of the hard line. If anything, the best candidate for change, at least in the near term, would seem to be an acceleration of Soviet overtures to China—a development that is not in our interests. I remain nevertheless convinced that a priority item in Soviet policy under Andropov is their relationship with us. In

short, we are confronting a regime which will be every bit as hard to deal with as the Brezhnev regime, which is more vigorous and probably more intelligent, but which has a certain dependency on its relations with the U.S.

4. Against such a background, it seems to me we should go back to first principles. The first principle of our relationship with the Soviet Union is our own security. Whatever the condition of other elements of our relationship our basic approach must be designed to lessen the danger of nuclear war. The two mistakes of the 1970's were (1) to emphasize arms control without a parallel emphasis on defense and (2) to count on arms control to carry too much of the weight of the entire relationship. Fortunately, we are not prone to those mistakes today. If we are not careful, however, trends in public opinion on nuclear issues, particularly in Europe, could undermine our ability to correct these mistakes.

5. It is with this context in mind that I say we must now give a heightened emphasis to arms control, and I think this issue deserves high priority on your own global agenda. I say this because arms control is the only currently available catalyst toward starting a process of improvement in the overall relationship. I say it because arms control is an essential element of that first principle of security. And I say it because arms control is now perceived by publics to be the weakest aspect of our policy toward the Soviet Union—a weakness which the Soviets are exploiting in Western Europe with growing effect. Since the deployment timetable makes INF a more urgent matter than START, it is INF that I want to address here. In my view, our INF negotiating position of zero-zero is reaching the end of its usefulness.<sup>2</sup> The time has come to change it.



6. I was in Western Europe during the period before and after the NATO double decision;<sup>3</sup> I have been in Moscow during the Soviet efforts to tear that decision apart. The Soviet strategy is quite plain; it has not changed from Brezhnev to Andropov. The Soviets do not want an arms control solution to INF (in contrast to their policy toward START). They want to prevent our deployment without affecting theirs. They are trying to achieve this by manipulating both their negotiating position in Geneva and their overall propaganda; their aim is to sweet-talk (and threaten) Western European, and particularly German, public opinion. Their negotiating position is like an onion. It began as absurdly extreme; but as they have peeled extraneous layers off one by one, it is beginning to look attractive to the Europeans even though it remains a sham. So far the Soviets have accomplished this at very little cost; European public pressure is now focussing on U.S., not Soviet, "rigidity" even though the Soviets have not proposed the destruction of a single SS-20. I expect that, after the German election,<sup>4</sup> we shall see some more extraneous layers peeled off. If we don't move now to anticipate this, I'm afraid our deployment schedule will be in real trouble.

7. I remember vividly how the INF debate and ultimate decision developed between 1977 and 1979. The origin was Western Europe's fear that, without U.S. weapons in Europe to respond to the SS-20, the U.S. might hesitate to defend a Europe threatened by the SS-20. The decision to deploy GLCM's and Pershing-II's was not primarily a military decision (after all, we had the military means to respond to an SS-20 attack; we had our whole strategic arsenal). The decision to deploy was primarily a political decision: to give the Europeans confidence that we would treat a nuclear attack on them as if it were an attack on ourselves. As I remember it, there was no great sanctity

about the numbers in INF. The number 572 was chosen because (1) 572 was less than the projected SS-20 warhead arsenal (to equalize the SS-20's was considered "de-coupling" since the nuclear exchange could then take place solely in Europe) but (2) 572 was enough to establish U.S. credibility in defending Europe.

8. I recall all this history to make the point that the double decision was perceived on both sides of the Atlantic primarily as a means of strengthening U.S. credibility in Europe and, therefore, strengthening the Atlantic alliance. However we come out on INF, we should keep that objective firmly in mind: we want a solution that strengthens—or at least doesn't weaken—the alliance. The security of the U.S. is less dependent on the number of intermediate-range missiles we can deploy on European soil than on the cohesion of the alliance and the credibility of our commitment to defend our allies against an attack.

9. The greatest danger in the current INF debate is the threat to alliance unity. One thing is becoming clear: our holding to zero-zero much longer will imperil that unity. Zero-zero (like the 1979 decision itself) was an alliance, not just a U.S. decision; if our allies begin to come off it—as I believe to be happening—then alliance unity itself is called into question. For their part, the Soviets will not accept zero-zero; they are not about to dismantle their entire SS-20 force, even at the price of NATO's carrying out some or all of its INF deployments. That would not be all bad if we could be sure our deployment would go ahead on the basis of Soviet rejection of zero-zero. But will the Germans, or even the British, permit deployment without our seeking to narrow the negotiating gap? While I'm not dealing with those countries anymore, I strongly doubt it. George Bush should get a feel for this during his trip.<sup>5</sup> If they don't agree to the deployment, we are then faced either with a

crisis with our two major allies or with a face-saving “delay” in deployment while negotiations continue (which will guarantee that the missiles are never deployed). Either way the Soviets win.

10. I therefore believe we must put flexibility into our negotiating position while there is still some credibility in our deployment option. We should come forward with a formula which provides more flexibility than zero-zero. In fact, we might produce different formulas at different stages—doing some onion-peeling ourselves for European public opinion. Our aim should be to present alternatives which are so reasonable that our allies can have no plausible excuse for non-deployment if the Soviets reject them. Whatever our formulas, zero-zero can and should remain our stated ideal solution and ultimate objective. If we get an agreement on the basis of our new approach, we will have reinforced alliance unity, reduced the SS-20 program, and created a catalyst for movement in other areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

11. On the question of when to offer a new U.S. approach, I leave it to the experts. The Soviets might not remove another layer of the onion until after the German election. Thus, we can probably wait till then. There may be German reasons for waiting, too, since a U.S. move before March 6 might strengthen those in the FRG who are least committed to the double decision. In any case, I think we should not delay much beyond March 6, since at that point will begin the period of maximum Soviet propaganda activity.

12. Movement along the lines I have proposed can provide a good basis for the accelerated bilateral dialogue that we discussed several weeks ago. If we move on INF, your next talk with Gromyko—whether here or elsewhere—could be

the occasion for introduction of the idea or—if already tabled in Geneva—for emphasis to Soviet leaders of the significance for the whole relationship of an early INF agreement. The question of whether to come to Moscow would depend on the weight we attach to getting directly at Andropov. After such a round we could better determine where to take the process next.<sup>6</sup>

**Hartman**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/1983–02/02/1983). Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Clark forwarded and summarized the telegram in a memorandum to the President on January 29. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In a speech on November 18, 1981, Reagan first proposed the zero option on intermediate-range nuclear forces: “The United States is prepared to cancel its deployment of Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles if the Soviets will dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1981*, p. 1065) In his January 25, 1983, State of the Union address, Reagan said: “For our part, we’re vigorously pursuing arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. Supported by our allies, we’ve put forward draft agreements proposing significant weapon reductions to equal and verifiable lower levels. We insist on an equal balance of forces.” He continued: “In the case of intermediate-range nuclear forces, we have proposed the complete elimination of the entire class of land-based missiles. We’re also prepared to carefully explore serious Soviet proposals. At the same time, let me emphasize that allied steadfastness remains a key to achieving arms reductions. With firmness and dedication,

we'll continue to negotiate. Deep down, the Soviets must know it's in their interest as well as ours to prevent a wasteful arms race. And once they recognize our unshakable resolve to maintain adequate deterrence, they will have every reason to join us in the search for greater security and major arms reductions." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, p. 109) The 1981 and 1983 speeches are in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Documents\*](#) 69<sup>2</sup> and 139<sup>2</sup>, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> For information on the December 12, 1979, dual-track decision, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1980, pp. 16-17. Documentation is scheduled for publication in [\*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983\*](#)<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> The West German election was scheduled for March 6.

<sup>5</sup> Vice President Bush visited various European capitals from January 30 to February 10 to discuss INF issues with NATO allies. (Telegram 3038 to Berlin, January 6; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830007-0977)

<sup>6</sup> For Dobriansky's critique of Hartman's position, see [Document 5](#).



### **3. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 28, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1983

George Shultz forwarded you a memorandum (Tab A) outlining how to handle U.S.-Soviet relations in 1983.<sup>2</sup> His memorandum sets forth a strategy for “countering new Soviet activism by using an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test whether an improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship is possible.” George posits that a “process of dialogue” (Depts./Desks, Ambassadors, Ministries, Summitry) would help us gauge the seriousness of Andropov’s proclaimed intentions to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, and could permit us to seize the high ground domestically and internationally, and foster Allied unity.

Specifically, he argues that the Administration should continue its present arms control policy, resume a dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues (Afghanistan, Africa, Middle East), and continue to seek improved Soviet human rights behavior. On economic and bilateral issues, the Administration should pursue careful and controlled forward steps—no dramatic expansion, only carefully paced positive change. Lastly, he suggests that the whole dialogue process would lead to a summit if relations warrant.

While there may be some initial public relations benefit to explore the possibility of “across the board” improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, I believe that we should have no illusions about the nature of the Andropov regime. Thus, I

have serious reservations about the proposed timing and method of implementation in State's memo.<sup>3</sup> I am specifically concerned that the U.S. would soon be forced to dissipate its leverage by making piecemeal concessions in bilateral negotiations which would not result in any meaningful Soviet response, but which would further intensify rather than mollify domestic and Allied pressures to do more. In sum, this course of action would be sure to arouse even more public expectations and would make it difficult for us to maintain a firm policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union; moreover, Soviet activism is largely in the field of public propaganda. This is difficult to counter through dialogues which normally remain private.

Instead, I suggest that we use existing channels to smoke out real Soviet intentions and their willingness to be flexible on critical issues *before* embarking on a campaign to improve our bilateral relations. The private Shultz-Gromyko exchanges should continue to concentrate on eliciting concrete Soviet views on how military, political and economic aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations can be specifically improved. Right now, I do not see any important areas for give in our basic positions: in arms control, any signal of readiness for compromise on INF would be interpreted by the Soviets as a sign of weakness—a sign that we fear we will be unable to deploy our missiles in Europe; on regional issues, we might be willing to reach some small compromises on individual issues, but we would not make major changes in our positions on Afghanistan, Central America or the Middle East. Since there is no basis for major reciprocal deals, I, therefore, do not see the justification for undertaking a major effort to intensify the dialogue.

If it appears that there is real possibility for progress, then we can respond accordingly. However, if, as is probable, the



Soviet positions still offer no room for genuine breakthroughs, it is essential that we be able to maintain firm policy positions and intensify our efforts to portray the USSR as an obstacle to peace. Creating false expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations might buy us some time and temper domestic and Allied pressure in the short term, but in the long term, public expectations would pressure us for more and more concessions making it exceedingly difficult to sustain a firm and resolute course.

I have grave reservations not only about the overall thrust of the proposed strategy for “improving U.S.-Soviet relations”, but I also disagree with some of the specific policy initiatives set forth.

1. On *regional issues*, State sees the possibility of new Soviet flexibility on *Afghanistan* and proposes tabling a bold framework for a comprehensive settlement. There actually seems to be little willingness to compromise in the Soviet position and a proposed settlement by us could lead to negotiations which would take the heat off the Soviets and erode U.S. credibility with Pakistan.

2. Bringing Moscow into renewed bilateral discussions on *Namibia/Angola* as State proposes has pitfalls which we should avoid. I suggest that we continue to deal with the problems of Cuban presence in Angola through the frontline African states.

3. State recommends the restoration of government to government *economic contacts* through the Joint Commercial Commission (JCC). This proposal would send a dramatic signal of changed trade policies and procedures to the business community and would seriously hinder our efforts to forge Allied consensus on East-West economic relations. Any unilateral actions at this time would be

counterproductive as the East-West Economic Study is not completed. Instead, trade should continue to be conducted through private channels. Restoration of the JCC can only be seriously contemplated if meaningful improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations appear imminent.

4. In accordance with the terms set forth in NSDD 75 (U.S. Policy Toward the USSR), a U.S. dialogue with the Soviets should address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations and not just *arms control*.<sup>4</sup> However, in addition to what State mentions, arms control—without becoming the centerpiece—should be addressed in these discussions with the expressed purpose of gauging Soviet seriousness of purpose on reductions, equality, verification and compliance. That is, Soviet behavior in INF and their willingness to fundamentally alter their present negotiating stance offers an excellent litmus test of true Soviet intentions vis-a-vis the U.S. If the Soviets are not prepared to relinquish the current clearcut nuclear superiority they enjoy in the European theater, no modicum of dialogue or even of piecemeal agreements in the political/economic sphere would decrease the Soviet threat to Western security.

5. A “*process of dialogue*” at all levels (Departments/Desks, Ambassadors, Ministries, Summitry) would not be fruitful but counterproductive, as it would serve primarily Soviet interests. We should seek a better balance between contacts through Dobrynin and our Ambassador in Moscow.

6. Finally, a *summit meeting* is envisioned by State as the ultimate objective of the dialogue proposal. I see little point in summitry until the Soviets have made a major move which clearly demonstrates a willingness to reduce threats to us and the rest of the free world.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/83-02/02/83); NLR-748-23-40-9-9. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted by Dobriansky. Printed from an uninitialed copy; however, next to his name in the "From" line, Clark wrote: "Could we discuss this with George before he leaves for China? WPC." Reagan responded: "Yes. There is merit in much of what he proposes. RR." In a memorandum to Clark on January 22, Dobriansky forwarded a draft of Clark's memorandum and noted that Blair, Kraemer, Robinson, and Stearman not only strongly concurred in her assessment, but also "made significant contributions to the critique of Shultz's memorandum." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/19/83-01/21/83))

<sup>2</sup> Tab A is attached; printed as [Document 1](#).

<sup>3</sup> On an attached routing slip, McFarlane commented: "Judge—The staff's memo would have you take a position almost 180 degrees against that of the Secretary of State. If you are going to do that, it is not unreasonable that you have a program of your own. The paper doesn't really give you that. I think we have to bear in mind that Shultz is saying—like the President—now we have built the leverage, now let's see if we can use it. It's just that our staff (with good cause) believes that State will mess it up." He concluded: "On the whole, I would think this is the kind of paper which is better discussed in person than acted upon after reading. Recommend that you send both memos to the president with yours unsigned but with a note on the top to the effect 'Could we discuss this with George before long?' Bud." According to Shultz: "Shortly after my paper reached the White House, Bud McFarlane let me know that the NSC staff over there was 'fly specking' it. 'There are so

many ideologues around here that they are picking it to pieces,' he said." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 162)

<sup>4</sup> Dated January 17; see [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 260\*](#)<sup>5</sup>.

#### **4. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 28, 1983

##### **SUBJECT**

U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1983

The President has asked me to respond to your thoughtful and suggestive memorandum of January 19 on the means of improving U.S.-Soviet relations in the coming year.<sup>2</sup> (S)

I believe you are correct in assuming that the recent changes in Soviet leadership portend a more intense and more sophisticated Soviet challenge to U.S. interests. I have no problem at all with your excellent suggestions concerning such topics as our stand in arms reduction talks, regional issues, and human rights issues. Some questions, however, arise in connection with your proposal for significantly increased U.S.-Soviet dialogues. (S)

The Soviet leadership has always favored continuing multi-level dialogues with the United States because they offer Moscow opportunities for identifying and exploiting differences of opinion that exist in every democratic society and government. (Such differences probably also exist on the Soviet side but, given the closed nature of Communist society and government, we are unable to exploit them.) It is with this in mind that during the past two years we have sought to confine U.S.-Soviet political contacts largely to the ministerial and ambassadorial levels. We have staunchly rejected all Soviet efforts to establish an independent link to the White House which would enable it, as in the past, to play NSC against State, and State against

NSC. Our assumption has been that if and when Moscow is prepared to make meaningful concessions on outstanding differences between us, these will be communicated to you through Gromyko or Dobrynin. It is then and then only that a dialogue on lower levels (departmental desks and "experts") should get underway. If and when a variety of outstanding issues can be brought near a point of resolution through such meetings then a summit between heads of state may be profitably arranged. (S)

In the light of these considerations your proposal for a possible summit and for more intense dialogues between specialists of the State Department and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs strikes me as somewhat premature. The record of meetings which Al Haig and you have had with Gromyko indicates no readiness on the Soviet part whatever to contemplate concessions on outstanding political and regional differences between us. The same holds true of such "expert" level meetings as were held on Afghanistan and Namibia last year. Would it, therefore, not make more sense for you to schedule another meeting with Gromyko (and Andropov, if possible) to determine whether Moscow's position on any outstanding issue has altered to the point where meaningful expert level talks could be usefully contemplated? (S)

If it appears that there is genuine possibility for progress, then we can respond accordingly. However, if, as is probable, the Soviet positions will continue to offer no room for genuine breakthroughs, it is essential that we be able to maintain firm policy positions and intensify our effort to portray the USSR as an obstacle to peace. Creating false expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations through intensified dialogues might buy us some time and temper domestic and Allied pressure in the short term, but in the long term, public expectations would pressure us for more



and more concessions making it exceedingly difficult to sustain a firm and resolute course. (S)

**William P. Clark<sup>3</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/28/83-02/02/83); NLR-748-23-40-7-1. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 1](#).

<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Clark signed the original.

**5. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 28, 1983

SUBJECT

Cable from Ambassador Hartman

Attached (Tab I) is Ambassador Hartman's cable on the ongoing arms control negotiations and the projected tenor of U.S.-Soviet relations.<sup>2</sup> I take strong exception to the overall thrust of the Ambassador's argument, namely that the zero-zero option has "outlived" its usefulness and should be abandoned.

Ambassador Hartman's cable begins by citing the most fundamental objective of U.S.-Soviet relations as the lessening of the danger of a nuclear war. This assertion is self-evident; yet, the Ambassador's idea on how to accomplish this objective is faulty. The implication of his argument is that moving away from the zero option would buttress deterrence through the establishment of some, albeit imperfect, arms control regime, and prospective improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, which he alleges hinge upon the successful conclusion of the talks in Geneva. Despite Ambassador Hartman's disclaimers notwithstanding, his argument is a straightforward rehash of the failed approach to arms control pursued during the 1970s.

Deterrence is more likely to fail if the existing strategic-nuclear asymmetries favoring the Soviet Union are not

redressed. Meaningless agreements which do not restore at least parity at both the intercontinental and theater levels would not restrain Soviet international behavior but would make Moscow more prone to gamble in a crisis period. Our fundamental policy objective, which simultaneously would provide us with high-quality deterrence, is the restoration of parity at both the intercontinental and theater levels through the combination of arms control and new deployments. Because the Soviets presently enjoy an overwhelming superiority in long-range, Euro-based nuclear systems, a non-zero solution would effectively perpetuate this asymmetry.

Ambassador Hartman sought to strengthen his assertion with background on INF history, Soviet propaganda efforts and the likely impact on Alliance unity of U.S. adherence to a zero-zero option. He envisions that the Soviets would continue to peel their “propaganda onion,” unraveling more and more suggestions. The Ambassador further anticipates growing European intransigence with U.S. “rigidity”, which would place INF deployment in jeopardy.

He correctly notes that the original impetus for INF deployment came from the Europeans, namely Chancellor Schmidt,<sup>3</sup> who among others, was convinced that regional imbalances were impermissible in an age of strategic parity and had to be rectified. The original purpose of INF deployment was to reassure the Europeans and eliminate the growing fear of “decoupling”. According to Hartman, what was intended to reinforce Atlantic unity, now has turned into a divisive issue. Moreover, he contends that even if we persist deployment is unlikely given the current European mood. His prescription is to trade-in our increasingly shaky deployment option, while it is partially credible, get an arms control agreement with the Soviets which is supposed to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and

buttress deterrence, and remove an irritant from badly strained trans-Atlantic relations. He proposes that we move soon, lest Soviet propaganda would lead the Europeans to reject the projected deployment with all the attendant damaging consequences to U.S. prestige, NATO's unity, etc.

I find two fundamental errors in Ambassador Hartman's argument. First, it is basically irrelevant how the INF decision came about. At this point in time, whether we like it or not, the issue has been made a litmus test of NATO's viability. Non-deployment without the establishment of a genuinely balanced and stable theater arms control regime would cast major doubt on the Alliance's ability to implement any controversial decisions. It would also further embolden the already strong pacifist and anti-American forces in Europe, effectively insuring the eventual demise of NATO as a viable security organization. Moreover, I disagree fundamentally with Ambassador Hartman's reading of the European mood. The recent statements by Mitterrand are very supportive of INF; the Italians are still holding firm; and despite recent statements by the British and Germans, it remains more than likely that they would honor their deployment commitments.

I recommend that we hold firm on the zero-zero option and further intensify efforts to demonstrate our sincerity and good faith to the Europeans—an approach the Administration is already taking with Ambassador Dailey's efforts and Vice President Bush's trip.<sup>4</sup> If, as I expect, the Soviets do not seriously alter their untenable position, we should deploy the first INF units as scheduled. It is *then and only then* that fundamental change in the Soviet position might take place. If such a change does not materialize we should complete the full deployment. However, if at this juncture, the Soviets seriously

restructure their INF position in a more balanced fashion, we might consider moving away from the zero-zero option toward an arms control regime which would establish theater-nuclear parity through asymmetrical reductions (the Soviets retire most of their systems and we deploy some INF units).

Presently, any indication that we are unilaterally ready or even seriously considering the abandonment of the zero-zero option would be extremely deleterious as it would embolden the anti-deployment forces in Europe, embarrass some of the European governments in a manner reminiscent of Carter's neutron bomb fiasco, and remove any incentives for the Soviets to compromise.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/24/83-01/27/83). Secret, Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Boverie and Blair. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 2](#).

<sup>3</sup> Helmut Schmidt was Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1974 to 1982.

<sup>4</sup> Reagan had appointed Peter H. Dailey, who was serving as the U.S. Ambassador to Ireland, to chair an interagency committee on arms control, INF, and public diplomacy, in coordination with European governments. (Telegram 27340 to Bonn, January 30; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830053-0142) For information on Bush's trip, see [footnote 5](#), [Document 2](#).

<sup>5</sup> At the end of the memorandum, Dobriansky added a typewritten message: "Please note: While I recognize that the Vice President's trip may have significant bearing on

the outcome of this issue, I still felt compelled to express my views at this time. PD.”



## 6. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 28, 1983, 12:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin  
DCM Alexander Bessmertnykh  
The Secretary  
Under Secretary Eagleburger  
Assistant Secretary Burt, Designate

Dobrynin joined the Secretary for lunch and an informal, wide-ranging discussion of US-Soviet relations. After a private meeting with Dobrynin the Secretary and Dobrynin joined others for lunch. Present on the American side were Lawrence Eagleburger and Richard Burt and on the Soviet side, Alexander Bessmertnykh. The Secretary briefly summarized the private meeting by saying that the two had agreed to meet regularly on US and Soviet questions, including arms control, regional issues and bilateral questions. They had surveyed the various exchanges now under way in Geneva, Madrid and Vienna, as well as the discussions that had been held earlier on non-proliferation and southern Africa.<sup>2</sup> They had agreed that a Foreign Ministers' meeting should probably be held sometime before the next UNGA, but that it was too early to suggest a specific date. They had also agreed on the general desirability of a U.S.-Soviet summit, but that it was the U.S. view that such a meeting achieve concrete results. The Secretary asked Dobrynin whether this was a fair summation of their private dialogue and Dobrynin agreed.

Dobrynin then went on at length about his conception of the best way to do business on arms control. He felt little

progress in arms control negotiations had been made thus far. It was important to have a channel in which to resolve difficult problems; this could be the Shultz-Gromyko channel. The negotiators in Geneva did not have sufficient flexibility to resolve major problems. Nitze tried but did not succeed.<sup>3</sup> The experience of the past ten years showed that when major problems arose, the Foreign Ministers were required to meet and resolve them. It was then left to the negotiators to put the results into treaty language.

The Secretary did not rule out the possibility of discussing INF and START in the Shultz-Gromyko channel, but noted the US preference for conducting the negotiations in Geneva and added that with new rounds beginning in both negotiations, that it made sense now to see what developed in the talks before deciding how to treat arms control in any future Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

Turning to the issue of bilateral relations, Dobrynin proposed that progress between the two sides might be made by expanding areas of bilateral cooperation. During recent consultations in Moscow, Dobrynin said, Andropov asked him what the Reagan Administration had done in a positive sense in US-Soviet relations. Had the Americans agreed to even one thing? Dobrynin said he had to answer no. Dobrynin pointed out that over the course of the past year a number of bilateral agreements had lapsed. He suggested that perhaps we should now consider making an inventory of bilateral agreements, with each side listing bilateral agreements and less formal undertakings under such categories as "cancelled," "lapsed," "ongoing," and "close to agreement." The Secretary agreed and suggested that such lists might be discussed at his next meeting with Dobrynin—perhaps in late February. Dobrynin agreed and said that he would be in touch with Eagleburger next week on this project.

Dobrynin said there were a number of other bilateral talks in the national security area that were also worth exploring, such as discussion of radiological weapons, chemical weapons, conventional arms transfers, and Indian Ocean naval deployments. The Secretary was noncommittal.

Dobrynin then listed a number of broader issues that in his opinion were topical, including the CSCE meeting in Madrid, South Africa, the Middle East, nonproliferation, and the Warsaw Pact's recent Prague Declaration. Concerning Madrid, Dobrynin said only that he had recently met with US delegation chief Max Kampelman. Dobrynin characterized the several bilateral exchanges on South Africa as "not bad." The Secretary noted that these exchanges so far had resulted in little, but agreed that they probably should be continued as circumstances warranted.

On the Middle East, which Dobrynin characterized as a "sacred area" for the United States, the two sides should consider bilateral talks that would be given little or no publicity. The Secretary said that he and Gromyko had already discussed the Middle East at length, as had Secretary Haig and Gromyko, and indicated that the United States was not prepared to go beyond those discussions.<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary agreed with Dobrynin that the Washington bilaterals on nonproliferation had been useful and should be continued. Dobrynin said he would like to talk about the Prague Declaration, which contained many good ideas.<sup>5</sup> He complained that so far, Washington had ignored the proposals contained in the communique. The Secretary said he would be willing to listen if Dobrynin wished to discuss that matter at their next meeting.

The Secretary stressed there were other regional issues of importance to the United States that must remain on the agenda. These included Poland, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and Central America. Dobrynin said that he would be willing to address these in future meetings.

In addition, the Secretary continued, human rights issues were in our view also central to the relationship. They were an "historic issue" for the United States. During the Vice President's meeting with Andropov in Moscow last November,<sup>6</sup> Andropov had underscored the importance of noninterference in internal affairs. We understood that concern. But for the United States, human rights was a question of major importance, and would remain so. These issues, such as the situation of Soviet Jewry, should be handled in a practical way, without publicity. Dobrynin commented that issues of this sort were most easily resolved in a climate of overall improvement in the relationship and noted the negative impact that the Jackson Amendment had had on Soviet emigration.<sup>7</sup>

Summing up, Dobrynin characterized arms control negotiations as by far the most important area for progress, and indicated that in addition to surveying bilateral agreements, START and INF should be on the list of discussion topics for the next meeting.

The Secretary said that although the primary negotiations should remain in Geneva, he would not object if Dobrynin wished to discuss START and INF. While not as important, confidence-building measures comprised an area where relatively early accomplishments were possible. At the same time, human rights and regional issues must also remain on the agenda.



At the conclusion, Eagleburger reminded everyone that Bessmertnykh would soon be leaving for Moscow to head the U.S. department in the Soviet MFA. All Americans present wished him luck.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/11/83-02/20/83). Secret. Drafted by Burt on January 29; cleared by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a covering note attached to another copy, Eagleburger wrote: "Bill Clark—The Secretary asked that I make a specific effort to brief you on his talk with Dob. Here is the memcon; I'll be glad to go into more detail if you wish. LSE." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967-1984, Lot 84D204, Chron, January, 1983)

<sup>2</sup> In Geneva, U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations began on November 30, 1981. From November 11, 1980, to September 9, 1983, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was holding a Second Review Conference in Madrid. In Vienna, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR) had been ongoing since 1973.


<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy Geneva "Walk in the Woods" proposal in June/July 1982. Documentation on the proposal is scheduled for publication in [\*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983\*](#).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 138\*](#).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in Prague from January 4 to 5.

<sup>6</sup> See [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Documents 234-235\*](#) and

237 .

<sup>7</sup> The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act denied Most-Favored-Nation status to countries with non-market economies (particularly those of the Soviet bloc) that restricted their citizens' right to emigrate. President Ford signed the Trade Act with the amendment on January 3, 1975. Documentation is in [\*Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974-December 1976\*](#) .



## **7. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 4, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

The Prospects for Progress in US-Soviet Relations

Is there a possibility of achieving a constructive change in US-Soviet relations or not? The short answer is that we don't know; in part because of the change in Soviet leadership, but also because we haven't tried.<sup>2</sup> There is a good reason for that. It was your view—correctly in my judgement—of the state of our relations at the end of the decade of the seventies that the Soviets may well have considered us a nation in decline and that before we could have any realistic hope of getting them to bargain seriously with us toward the resolution of the many problems before us, we had to make clear that we had reversed that trend. In short, we had to demonstrate that we still possessed the will and the capability to defend our interests and once more, to lead the free world. Toward that end you set out to restore our defenses, to reassure our allies, to solve our economic problems at home and in sum, to show by action that we were coming back and had to be taken seriously. At the end of two years it seems to me that you have succeeded and that there is a very solid basis for concluding that the Soviets may be reconciled to the fact that by the end of the decade we will have passed them again. The corollary is that now, at a position of maximum relative strength, they ought to cut the best deal that they can. In this respect, they are not unlike the Japanese in 1941. They—like the Japanese—have two choices. Either

they can attempt to inflict a devastating military defeat upon us, or they can seek to restrain our military buildup through negotiation. Which of the two is the most appealing course can be argued. This memo proceeds from a fundamental judgement, borne of a reading of Soviet history and reinforced by recent military setbacks they have suffered (e.g., the woeful performance of their hardware in Lebanon) that the Soviets will not risk a military conflict with us.

There are also internal incentives at play which could lead the new Soviet leader to conclude that an arms control agreement—not just endless negotiation—is in his personal interest. For example, Andropov came to power relying, like all of his predecessors, on the support of the military. Historically it has been necessary in the Soviet Union to give the military its due—more spending—in order to keep that support. But at times, the military has been willing to accept arms control as a reasonable alternative because it has constrained US defense programs in the process. Now, at a time when you have launched a solid rebuilding program, such an incentive is at hand. And as you have pointed out, the other pressing demands on the Soviet economy give him a separate set of reasons for cutting back the rate of increase in military spending. (Note: I do not intend to say that a significant real cut is likely—at best we might achieve a reduction in the rate of increase.)

Separate from these military/economic incentives in Andropov's mind are the personal political realities. He is not yet President and it is reasonable to ask why. Is it not because he faces competition? Before his accession there was speculation that Chernenko was a strong contender for the top position. He is still a prominent player with his own following. Chernenko is a Brezhnev protege and generally labeled as a detentenik. There is still a certain attractiveness

among Soviet intellectuals for this approach and Andropov cannot dismiss their power and influence. For this reason there is considerable incentive for him to outflank them with an agreement of some kind.

Against this view one can paint the well-known image of Soviet single-minded militarism which requires eternal confrontation without even the suggestion of compromise. My point is that it is irrelevant to debate which view is correct for as long as we keep our guard up. More importantly what do we have to lose by trying to open some doors? Two years ago I wouldn't have said that for indeed at that point, we had a lot to lose; we would have appeared to be supplicants, rushing into a very tough card game with no winners. But that's no longer true. We're on the march, and Andropov knows it.

So what should we do? The first question is where should we concentrate our effort—on what subject do we and they have an overlapping interest in an agreement? The answer seems to me clearly arms control and more specifically the INF talks. There is also some promise in START but that can wait. On INF, we have a schedule—the clock is running—and it gives us substantial leverage and imputes a sense of urgency in Moscow.

The next question is how to open the dialogue. Should we use traditional diplomatic channels either in Moscow or in Geneva or try a private channel. The latter seems to me preferable and perhaps unavoidable. The reason it is preferable is because Andropov likes secrecy—indeed he has made a career out of it. It also makes it easier for him to manage his internal bureaucraties. The same factors apply in our government for different reasons. It has become virtually impossible for us to keep the substance of our negotiations private once they are circulated within the

government. And we have a separate but related problem. This concerns the very deeply-felt ideological bias which exists within your Administration against arms control. This small group of professionals—centered in the Defense Department—believes that arms control generically is bad. To be fair we have a legacy of 12 years experience which supports their claim. In gross terms, the military balance has worsened during the SALT era. But I think that we must have the maturity to understand that much of the reason for our failure in the past has to do with our inability to keep the “stick” as powerful as the “carrot” owing to post-Vietnam and Watergate vulnerabilities. In short, just because we came out badly in the past doesn’t mean that we will suffer the same fate again. We have to be tough negotiators and sustain our defense buildup. But back to the point, these individuals will resist any serious negotiation and if given the opportunity, will undermine it with leaks. Consequently a private channel may offer the only means to proceed.

Concerning what is to be said, there is a good reason not to be so anxious as to lay out an entire proposal in the first overture. Rather it would be better to make the first contact with a short letter expressing in serious tones your recognition that our relations appear to be evolving toward renewed confrontation. It would express your acknowledgement that we will no doubt continue to disagree on fundamentals, but that this should not be allowed to abort our common interest in maintaining peace and, where possible, resolving problems. You might then note that you view Andropov’s accession as an occasion on which perhaps a new page can be turned in US-Soviet relations and that if he is so inclined you want him to know that you are seriously interested in making real progress toward reducing the level of nuclear arms. If he is

interested, you would welcome his reply in the same channel.

With regard to how that message would be sent, there are several choices. We could use the hotline. While the circle of awareness within the Soviet Union is small for such messages, we cannot be sure that it would not include some who Andropov would rather not include. If our objective is to allow Andropov the maximum latitude as to whom he chooses to involve, we should seek the personal delivery to him of your letter by a trusted individual. There are various options on this score; suffice to say that it can be done without great risk of compromise.

Once that contact is made with Andropov it is possible that he will reply and ask that talks be opened. At that time he will indicate his interlocutor. If it is Dobrynin, then it would be my recommendation that we have him open talks with George Shultz but here in the White House (in the Map Room with total privacy as has been done in the past). From there we would see what develops.

Launching such an undertaking holds some risks. If made public it would engender criticism from the right on general principles and from a disaffected bureaucracy as well. Still on the whole I believe it would be worthwhile because it would make clear that you are not ideologically against solving problems with the Soviet Union; it would show that you are at least willing to try. To assure the substantive quality of the talks and assure their ultimate supportability, you would include as the backstopping group for this effort, the statutory members of the NSC (the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense), the Chairman of the JCS, Bill Casey and your National Security Advisor.

Mr. President, it seems to me that we have reached a point where you must decide where you will invest your time and political capital in the next two years. You may be able to accomplish two or three truly lasting things in foreign affairs. In my judgment, forging peace in the Middle East and securing an arms control agreement with the Soviets represent the best and most exigent opportunities. You may have other thoughts. The purpose of this memo is to raise one possibility and, thereby, stimulate a discussion at your convenience, during which we can begin to lay out a strategy. I have discussed this with no one.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum is unsigned. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Reagan wrote in the right-hand margin: "we have tried."

<sup>3</sup> It is unclear if Clark wrote this on his own, as he suggests. Lenczowski wrote extensive comments in the margins of another copy of this memorandum. (Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File February 1983) It is unclear, however, whether Lenczowski saw the memorandum before it went to the President or whether he was looking at a copy. See [Document 8](#).



## **8. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

The Memorandum to the President on U.S.-Soviet Relations

If I may be blunt about it, this memo is seriously flawed and contains recommendations that are not in the interests of U.S. security.<sup>2</sup> The assumptions underlying its analysis are at best questionable and at worst (which is most of the time) faulty. Among these are:

—The assumption that the U.S. is as responsible as, if not more responsible than, the USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions and differences. This is implicit in the assertion that “we haven’t tried” to see if better U.S.-Soviet relations are possible. It is also implicit in the author’s statement that it would be politically useful to prove to the world that the President is not “ideologically against solving problems with the Soviet Union” (as if he has not done so already in his INF and START proposals).

—The assumption that the Soviets believe that “we are on the march again”—i.e., that our military buildup is on track, will inevitably overtake them in a few years, and is forcing them to come to arms control accords with us. Apparently the Soviets cannot see the efforts in our Republican Senate to cut

back that buildup (which, in any event, will not match the concurrent Soviet buildup).

—The assumption that since the Soviets are at a position of maximum relative strength vis-a-vis the U.S., they are in the best position possible to negotiate an arms control agreement and therefore have a real incentive to do so. This is half-true. The Soviets will always negotiate an agreement that restrains U.S. defense programs. But they will never cut a deal that serves U.S. interests in any meaningful way unless they are forced to do so. We have not forced them whatsoever. In fact, in the only arena where we could plausibly make a case that we are forcing them—the INF deployments in Europe—the *Soviets* are the ones who have us up against the wall, and they know it.

—The assumption that the Soviets have something to fear from the U.S. defense buildup, and that our impending INF deployment imposes on them a “sense of urgency.” This assumption is based on a mirror-image perception of the Soviet Union—a perception that is totally false. The Soviets know that there is no military threat coming from the U.S. They know that when the U.S. was really anti-communist in the 1950s, we would not even help the Hungarian freedom fighters. They know that there is even less of a political constituency today to do anything similar, much less threaten the USSR itself.

—The assumption that the Soviets have “suffered recent military setbacks” (the “woeful performance of their hardware in Lebanon”). Need it be said that the *Soviets* have not suffered any setbacks?

—The assumption that these “setbacks” reinforce their policy of not risking military conflict with us. The only reason why they don’t want to risk military conflict with us is that they do not need to take such risks. Their political strategy is doing quite a good job of eroding the strength of the West, while pursuing their policy of attrition in the Third World.

—The assumption that there are “interest groups” in the USSR and that the military is one of these. This is expressed in relation to the military’s support of Andropov (as if such support were analogous to constituent group support in the U.S.) and its alleged willingness to engage in arms control talks at this stage (as if there are other times when it is against such talks). This whole theory assumes that the military wants something different than what the Party wants, i.e., more military spending, and that the military is usually a force opposed to detente. This theory has serious flaws (such as a lack of evidence to support it). It is, once again, a mirror-image-based theory that ignores mountains of evidence to the contrary (not the least of which is the total infiltration of the military by Party political commissars who maintain strict political controls). This theory further ignores all the evidence that the military has a major interest in pursuing the policy of detente—both to restrain U.S. defense programs and to acquire Western technology which permits them to maintain, without reform, their command economy, which in turn allows them to keep the highest priority on military spending. (The other flaws of this theory require more lengthy explanation.)

—The assumption that the Soviets have domestic economic reasons (like ours) to cut back their

military spending. This is another mirror-image fallacy that has little or no evidence to support it. The Soviets are perfectly willing to starve their own people (witness the current pervasive rationing system and malnutrition) to retain military superiority.

—The assumption that there is a conflict between proponents and opponents of detente, and that the “detenteniks” (a label the author ascribes to Chernenko) are falling all over each other in a competition to see who can be more detentist vis-a-vis the U.S. There is utterly no evidence to show this. Nor is there any evidence to show that we can help Andropov in his domestic political position by reaching an agreement with him (except, perhaps, if we make so many concessions that he can boast of his unique negotiating skills to his comrades). (I can explain elsewhere at greater length why the proponents-opponents of detente theory is false.)

—The assumption that we can easily sustain our defense buildup while engaging in the kind of negotiations with the Soviets that the author recommends. The author ignores the fact that a respectable case can be made to demonstrate that the entire arms control process makes it very difficult to convince the people that a defense buildup is necessary or that we even face any kind of threat from our negotiating “partners”.

—The assumption that negotiating through a private channel serves U.S. security interests. It is the Soviets, in fact, who are the greatest proponents of private channels. The author’s comments on this subject almost suggest that he trusts Andropov more

than he trusts our most security-minded people at DOD. In fact Andropov himself could not have written a better recommendation to the President.

—The assumption that we and the Soviets have a “common interest in maintaining peace.” This assumption, as formulated here, which is a truism when it refers to avoiding nuclear war, nevertheless tends to equate the U.S. and the USSR politically. It tends to ascribe blame for tensions if not equally, then largely on the U.S. It fails to explain how murdering a million Afghans represents a “common interest in peace.”

—The assumption that we are dealing with an individual, Mr. Andropov, who has individual discretion to make major policy changes. (This assumption is reflected in the author’s view that Andropov’s accession to power represents a new opportunity for better relations.) The fact is that we are dealing with a *system* where individuals have little impact or discretion. If Andropov were to deviate measurably from the Party line as defined by the system, he would represent a threat to his colleagues, who would oust him as they did Khrushchev. To operate from this assumption is to entertain the illusion that Andropov has it within his power to pursue a genuine policy of accommodation with the U.S. It is to believe that the possibility exists that Andropov might really turn out to be something other than a Communist. To believe that individuals (as opposed to the system) can really make a significant political difference is the first step in the process of wishful thinking about the nature of Soviet communism.

With so many questionable or false assumptions, this memo proceeds from a most shaky base. What aggravates its soundness even more is that many of these assumptions are deliberate disinformation themes that the Soviets use to confuse Western policymakers. The original question posed by the memorandum—"Is there a possibility of achieving a constructive change in U.S.-Soviet relations?" remains not only unanswered but not seriously examined. The key question here is not even addressed, namely, "constructive change in U.S.-Soviet relations" according to whose definition of "constructive"? What is "constructive" for the Soviets is not necessarily constructive for U.S. national security.

What this memorandum recommends, in effect, is that the U.S. act to improve relations with the USSR on Soviet terms. It asks us to accept as true the charge that the U.S. is substantially if not largely responsible for the arms race and that the Soviets have as much to fear from us as we from them. It denies that the President's zero-option proposal is a good faith arms control proposal, in spite of the fact that by itself it represents a concession to the Soviets in strictly military terms. It is overly sanguine about our defense buildup and our political will to defend ourselves and lead the Free World. Indeed the President has demonstrated his own will to do so—but can we say as much for Congress, most of the probable Democratic presidential candidates or various important East-West trade constituencies? Or speaking of the electorate as a whole, what conclusions have the Soviets reached when they viewed the victory of the nuclear freeze initiative (a Brezhnev proposal, after all) in every state referendum where it appeared?<sup>3</sup> It would appear that any attempt to make the kinds of negotiating concessions recommended by this memo would only solidify in Soviet minds their view that the political-moral-spiritual strength of America as a



whole is not as great as the election of President Reagan would have had them believe.

The author concludes with the notion that a U.S.-Soviet arms agreement would be a lasting accomplishment for the President in foreign affairs. However, he fails to warn the President that previous agreements have not been such jewels in crowns of his predecessors. A Middle East peace would indeed be a feat. But nowhere is the President's Democracy Initiative mentioned—or his related efforts to upgrade U.S. public diplomacy and make America strong and respected again. Indeed these are the real feats this President is accomplishing—and they stand on the solid ground of strengthening U.S. interests and values and not the shaky ground of problematic compromises with an adversary that has shown no evidence of changing its avowed purpose of destroying our civilization.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a cover note to Reagan, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: While I do not concur in all points of this staff memo, it provides a basis for discussion—hopefully during some of your unscheduled time today—to discuss 'next steps.' Do you wish to meet on this? Bill." A typewritten note from the unidentified "JH" reads: "I am not certain the above note was the WC note attached to the JL paper when taken to the President via the usher."

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum from Lenczowski is in response to [Document 7](#). See also [footnote 3 thereto](#).

<sup>3</sup> In a message to the UNGA Second Special Session on Disarmament read by Gromyko on June 12, 1982, Brezhnev

proposed a freeze on nuclear arsenals and pledged that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 349-352.

## 9. Editorial Note

According to the President's Daily Diary, on February 12, 1983, President Ronald Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan hosted Secretary of State George Shultz and his wife, Helena ("O'Bie"), at the White House for dinner and a movie from 6:50 p.m. to 10:35 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) During the evening, the two men discussed the state of Soviet-American relations, including the Secretary's channel with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. No formal record of this meeting has been found. However, Shultz described the evening in his memoir as follows: "I returned to Washington on February 10, after a long trip to Japan, China, and South Korea. Snow was falling when my plane touched down at Andrews Air Force Base. The blizzard continued for days. By Saturday afternoon, February 12, Washington was covered by one of the heaviest snowfalls of the century. Traffic had virtually come to a halt. People were skiing in the streets. My telephone rang. It was Nancy Reagan inviting O'Bie and me to the White House for dinner. The snow had prevented the Reagans from going to Camp David. When we arrived that evening, the president and first lady were relaxed and talkative. The family dining room on the second floor of the White House imparts a sense of history, especially when the group is small and the atmosphere informal. The Reagans were gracious hosts. They like good conversation, a good story. If the president heard a story he liked, he never forgot it. And I would hear it again and again, further embellished and perfected with each telling.

"President Reagan was fascinated by China and expressed openly his ideas about the Soviet Union. He recognized how difficult it was for him to move forward in dealing with either of these countries. He realized, I thought, that he

was in a sense blocked by his own White House staff, by the Defense Department, by Bill Casey in the CIA, and by his own past rhetoric. Now that we were talking in this family setting, I could see that Ronald Reagan was much more willing to move forward in relations with these two Communist nations—even travel to them—than I had earlier believed. Reagan saw himself as an experienced negotiator going back to his days as president of the Screen Actors Guild. He was self-confident about his views and positions. He had never had a lengthy session with an important leader of a Communist country, and I could sense he would relish such an opportunity.

“‘I will be meeting with Dobrynin again late Tuesday afternoon [February 15],’ I told him. ‘What would you think about my bringing Dobrynin over to the White House for a private chat?’

“‘Great,’ he responded. ‘We have to keep this secret,’ he said. ‘I don’t intend to engage in a detailed exchange with Dobrynin, but I do intend to tell him that if Andropov is willing to do business, so am I.’

“Monday morning at 7:40, a call came to me from Bill Clark. His nose was out of joint. He was very negative about a meeting between Reagan and Dobrynin. ‘I argued against the meeting to the president,’ he told me. President Reagan, however, had his own ideas and wanted to get more involved. The efforts of the staff at the NSC to keep him out, I thought, were beginning to break down. Mike Deaver made arrangements to send a White House car over to the State Department’s basement garage to bring Dobrynin and me over to the relatively unwatched East Gate of the White House without the press’s knowledge.

“When Ambassador Dobrynin walked into my office at 5:00 P.M. on Tuesday, I greeted him with the question ‘Anatoly, how would you like to go see the president? Why don’t we just go back down in my elevator, get in the car, and go over there?’ Dobrynin immediately agreed, surprised but elated. Off we went.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 163–164)

## 10. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 15, 1983, 5:10-6:50 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

President Ronald Reagan  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin of the USSR

The meeting between the President and Ambassador Dobrynin went on for about an hour and three-quarters. It was spirited throughout and the entire time was spent on content as distinct from pleasantries of one sort and another. The time can be divided into segments.

1. The President expressed his readiness to see important problems we have with the Soviet Union addressed and resolved if reasonable solutions can be arrived at. He made it plain that he was talking about genuine content and not simply words of good feeling. It seemed to me that he was very convincing in the way he expressed himself. Dobrynin responded that while he didn't realize that he would have this opportunity to see the President, he had been instructed by Andropov to say through the scheduled meeting with GPS that Andropov's view was similar.

The President said that personal channels often needed to be established in order to have things happen and that as far as he was concerned, the Soviets could look upon me, Shultz, as the personal channel.

2. Dobrynin reviewed the scope of issues that confront us, running from arms control to regional issues (the only one he mentioned was the Middle East) to bilateral issues. Then the discussion moved into the INF and START Talks. For one-half to three-quarters of an hour, the President and



Dobrynin engaged each other on these subjects and, without reviewing the arguments used, it must have been apparent to Dobrynin that the President was quite well informed and, while reasonable, very tough-minded. The President has a very pleasant way of stating his point of view, but he came across as clear and strong. He also made it apparent through the content of the discussion that he was ready to work for constructive solutions.

3. The President developed at considerable length the reasons why human rights issues are important to him: on the basis of the human beings involved on the one hand; on the other, the political impact in the United States of treatment that would not be tolerated here. He pointed up the difficulty of managing a relationship with the Soviet Union when practices we would not tolerate are so visible and untended. There was considerable discussion of the Pentecostals in the Embassy. Dobrynin's only argument was that if people who came to an Embassy found that was the way out of a country, then the Embassy would be overwhelmed. The President asked Dobrynin why it was that they were so anxious to keep people in the country who wanted to leave. The President also developed the human rights and political impact points in terms of the situation in Poland. The President expressed his view that this was a subject that he was perfectly ready to work at quietly and that results would be greeted with appreciation but not with any sense of victory. He expressed his opposition to the Jackson-Vanik approach to this subject.

4. At the end, considerable time was spent in reviewing the scope of issues before us and in saying to each other that it was important to find operational ways to implement the desire of both the President and the General Secretary to solve problems reasonably.

5. It seemed to me that Dobrynin was clearly impressed with the fact of the meeting and, even more, with the strength and reasonableness of the President. He was surprised that the meeting happened. He said that he was honored, and it was a privilege to be received by the President. He commented that it just might possibly have been an historic occasion—that whether we were talking about two years or six years, in either case it was quite possible to get things accomplished and that he would give Andropov a full and detailed report of the entire conversation.<sup>2</sup>

In my discussion with Dobrynin after we left the President,<sup>3</sup> Dobrynin picked up on the personal channel and suggested that a meeting of Shultz and Gromyko between the UN sessions would be a necessity if this relationship were to develop and that I ought to consider a trip to Moscow at some point so that I could have a lengthy session with Andropov. He also mentioned that when Gromyko comes for the UN session, we should consider returning to what he regarded as the traditional Gromyko call on the President. I reminded Dobrynin of the importance of Art Hartman's access to Soviet officials.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, February 1983. Top Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Residence at the White House. Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: "Almost forgot—Geo. Shultz sneaked Ambassador Dobrynin (Soviet) into the W.H. We talked for 2 hours. Sometimes we got pretty nose to nose. I told him I wanted George to be a channel for direct contact with Andropov—no bureaucracy

involved. Geo. tells me that after they left the ambas. said, 'this could be an historic moment.'" (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 198) In a covering note to Shultz on February 17, Eagleburger reported: "As your schedule is such that your only chance for reading is this morning, I am forwarding the memo to you without having read it myself. I would appreciate a chance to give you my comments on it later today. LSE." Shultz wrote in the margin: "I gather this is being redone in light of our discussion. G." In a February 19 covering note to Reagan, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: I attach the memorandum of conversation between Sec. Shultz and Amb. Dobrynin." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (2))

<sup>2</sup> Dobrynin's memoir provides a more detailed account of this meeting than this short memorandum of conversation. He wrote: "This was not only my first private meeting with Reagan, but it was his first substantive conversation as president with any senior Soviet representative and—as far as I know—at any time in his long career as an aggressive opponent of communism and the Soviet Union. The very decision to hold our meeting was remarkable, as Reagan made it only in the third year of his presidency, which showed his personal desire finally to examine Soviet-American affairs more closely." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 517–521)

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 11](#).

## 11. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 15, 1983, 7-8:15 p.m.

### SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *UNITED STATES*

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director, EUR/SOV, Department of State

#### *U.S.S.R.*

Anatoliy F. DOBRYNIN, Soviet Ambassador

Oleg M. SOKOLOV, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington

Viktor F. ISAKOV, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington

*The Secretary* said he would briefly summarize the meeting with the President and invited Ambassador Dobrynin to comment if he differed with what the Secretary said.

The President knew of the series of meetings between the Secretary and Dobrynin, and had decided it would be useful were he to meet directly with the Ambassador to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. The President has very definite views, as Dobrynin had discovered; they were not always the views ascribed to him. He had spent longer than the Secretary thought he would; of course Dobrynin had spoken too. The net result was that Dobrynin, for Andropov, and the President for himself had agreed that both countries should make a genuine effort to solve problems so that the bilateral relationship could progress. We could not say how far this would go, but we want to improve it. The discussion with the President had covered a four-point agenda.

(1) *Arms control* has many aspects: START, INF, MBFR, and related CBMs. It is an area of great importance, and we should try to identify aspects where progress may be possible. We should be ambitious where we can, for instance on START and INF.

(2) There are a number of *regional issues*. Dobrynin had mentioned the Middle East, and the President had mentioned Poland, Afghanistan, and Central America. Southern Africa, while perhaps somewhat different in character, is also important. We are unlikely to be able to resolve our differences; but on some we might do something. We should try to make progress. We had tried on Afghanistan, but without results. Our talks on southern Africa had not been wholly unproductive, but not much had been accomplished. They were more in the nature of informational meetings.

(3) *Economic topics* perhaps fit best in the framework of bilateral relations, but they also could be looked at on the basis of individual issues.

(4) The President had put great emphasis on *human rights*. Dobrynin had seen how important these questions were to the President and how important they were to the relationship between the two countries. The President had made very clear that his approach was a quiet one; he wishes to talk, not to have newspaper stories or claims of "victory."

This represents a sweep of the issues discussed; we should try for progress in all areas, recognizing that we cannot do everything at once, but seeing if we can get something done on the agenda across the board. The closing note of both the President and the Ambassador had been that both parties are interested in a genuine effort to improve

conditions; Dobrynin, in fact, had expressed optimism that this could happen.

*Dobrynin* said that, with the addition of working more closely in this channel, the Secretary had given a fair summary.

The meeting was the President's idea, *the Secretary* added, and was not on his calendar. We have no intention of making a statement on it, but knowing how Washington works a question is conceivable. We plan to answer that the meeting took place; that Dobrynin had called on the President with the Secretary, in connection with his series of talks with the Secretary; that the President had suggested the meeting; and that we would have no further comment. *Dobrynin* said that it is not the Soviet practice to comment on such matters, but what the Secretary had said about the U.S. approach was acceptable.

*The Secretary* said that with the President, and then together in the car on the return to the Department, he and Dobrynin had talked about a meeting of the Secretary with Gromyko, and then of a meeting of Gromyko with the President at the time of the UNGA. *Dobrynin* noted that the latter would restore normal practice. Moreover, *the Secretary* continued, they had talked about the Secretary's meeting Andropov if the Secretary were to travel to Moscow. They had also discussed Ambassador Hartman's access to people in Moscow, a topic they had talked about before.

*The Secretary* then turned to matters at hand, saying time was too short for him to discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin his Far East trip at length. But, to summarize, he had found Afghanistan and Kampuchea much on people's minds; further, arms control is not just a U.S. and European issue,



but is much on minds in Asia as well. *Dobrynin* asked if this meant the Asians were prepared to take part in arms control, not now perhaps, but in some other forum at some time in the future. He realized the Secretary could not speak for them—for the Japanese and Chinese—but wondered whether they would be willing to negotiate in the future. The *Secretary* replied that he did not get to that point with them. However, he had been impressed in Korea, China and Japan with the interest in what the Soviets are doing. In side meetings his people had with subordinate officials, they were impressed with how much the hosts knew about arms control negotiations underway, and how well informed they were.

*The Secretary* suggested that they go through the work of their staffs on the bilateral lists (attached).<sup>2</sup>

He began with a brief review of the four pages of agreements still in force, saying that he was glad to note the 1973 taxation convention, since it had been his responsibility in the Nixon Administration.

*Dobrynin* turned to page 5, which lists agreements up for renewal in 1983/1984 (transportation, atomic energy, fisheries, grains, housing, world ocean, economic-industrial-technical cooperation). The Soviets favor continuing these agreements. We could look at them later, or, if the Secretary had comments on all or any of them, he was prepared to discuss them. In any event the Soviets are in favor of renewing them. The U.S. side had added grains to this list; the Soviets had reminded us of the others. On grains, he asked if the U.S. was proposing renewal. The Soviets did not want to force themselves on us; if the U.S. dropped it, they would let it go. The rest they thought worthwhile to renew. If the U.S. thought one or another

should be dropped, we should say so. The rest can be sent to the working level for further work.

*The Secretary* commented that we find the seven agreements generally constructive. Given Dobrynin's statement, we would begin to review them through our interagency process. We would develop positions—presumably positive—on each and as this work proceeds we will get back to the Soviets. *Dobrynin* asked if this meant the basic U.S. intention was positive. *The Secretary* replied that it did.

*Dobrynin* said that the third category listed (agreements in force, but where more active implementation would be useful) really had no substance now (agriculture, environment, health, artificial heart). The Soviets would like to invite us to give more life to these agreements. We should consider renewal of working groups, for example. If the Secretary agreed in principle, and after the U.S. had completed its internal process, then we could proceed to meetings between small delegations or work with the Soviet Embassy to put life back into the agreements. There were four of these agreements. If the U.S. was not negative, we could go ahead.

*The Secretary* said this was a worthwhile field on which to exchange ideas, but there is the question of how far and how fast to proceed, and the question of whether to engage higher level officials in these exchanges. *Dobrynin* said level is not really a question. It is not a matter for Gromyko and the Secretary. It is a question of letting people who know each other, who are old friends, get together to find out what can be achieved. Agriculture is an example; let our working people find out what can be done—draw on their experience—and then report to their superiors.

*Dobrynin* continued that the Soviets are proposing working groups from Moscow or from here, for an active exchange. This is not a new avenue; it is a matter of restoring substance to agreements now in disuse. No publicity is necessary. Delegations can be sent by the Secretary of Agriculture, for instance, or there can be experts on the environment that sit down together. This is only renewal of what went on before.

*The Secretary* said it is not a question of who goes where, but there is an issue of level of representation. We will consider the matter and get back to the Soviets at the working level. *Dobrynin* suggested that the embassies might be the appropriate channel.

*Dobrynin* turned to the fourth category (agreements expired or in suspense). *The Secretary* commented that we need to examine further what might be worked on in this category. *Dobrynin* noted that civil air, maritime, science and technology, and energy agreements had been proposed by the Soviets; the rest (space, trade, culture, Kama and consulates) by the U.S. The Soviets are prepared to look at all of them. He asked how the Secretary proposed to proceed. *The Secretary* commented that all were worth reviewing, but without commitment at this point.

*Dobrynin* said commercial flights under the civil air agreement had been stopped; with regard to the maritime agreement, it is a question of implementation; the U.S. had added the references to the trade, culture, Kama and consulate agreements. What did the Secretary have in mind?

*Eagleburger* commented that where we added items to the list of agreements from which we are working, it was solely for the purpose of making the list complete. *Dobrynin* said

the intention was to add items to make things more active; what did adding the Trade Agreement mean? *Eagleburger* said our only purpose was to assure that we had before us a complete list of all agreements—nothing more than that.

*The Secretary* commented that all these items have merit; we need to pick and choose among them, and assign priorities. Once this has been done, *Dobrynin* said, you can instruct the Soviet desk on next steps and we can then talk further.

*Dobrynin* then turned to the fifth category (regular consultations), which includes Foreign Ministers at the UNGA, pre-UNGA working level, delegations at IAEA meetings, incidents at sea, grains, Nazi war crimes. He suggested that meetings of Foreign Ministers between UNGA sessions should be added. *The Secretary* commented meetings only once a year is insufficient, and agreed to *Dobrynin's* suggestion.

On pre-UNGA consultations, *Dobrynin* noted that these take place between the MFA and State, and asked if we had anything else in mind. *Simons* noted that our intention was to record what exists; *Dobrynin* responded that we should also try to move forward.

We are discussing non-proliferation, *Dobrynin* pointed out. *The Secretary* said this was a useful step, and we are looking toward another meeting. *Simons* noted we seem close to agreement on another separate bilateral session in June.

*Dobrynin* said that the incidents at sea consultations are useful. On the grains consultations, the Soviets agree to them if the LTA is agreed, but they would drop it if not.

*Dobrynin* then turned to the sixth category (recent consultations) which lists Afghanistan, southern Africa, CSCE, and nuclear non-proliferation. He said the Soviet side agreed to continue all of them.

*The Secretary* noted we had had consultations on Afghanistan that went nowhere. The UN process is now going on. If it works, fine; we do not need to be involved in everything.

*Dobrynin* replied that there is no need for a meeting each month, but if we need a meeting we should agree to have one. The matter is now going through the UN. There is no big movement, but things are positive. Still, there is a possibility to continue bilaterally as well. He understood that this was Ambassador Hartman's field. When and how is up to the U.S. to decide.

*The Secretary* said that on so-called regional issues, we should work to see where emphasis might prove productive. Leaving Afghanistan aside, southern Africa is somewhat different. Afghanistan is snuggled close to the Soviet Union. Southern Africa is a long way from both of us: we both have an interest, we are both involved, and the world is interested. It could be an example of effective collaboration, and would be to everyone's benefit. This may also be true of other issues nearer or farther away. On southern Africa, though, he had to say he was disappointed that our talks have not produced more. They have been informational, but not operational.

*Dobrynin* said he would pass the Secretary's comments to Moscow.

*The Secretary* continued that on CSCE we understand each other. When he and the Vice President had been in Moscow,

Andropov had lectured them that this was none of our g.d. business. The President had just told Dobrynin our views. The Soviets might not agree with them, but they are our views.

*Dobrynin* said our CSCE delegations are in touch, and that is not the problem; *the Secretary* agreed. These contacts could be improved, however, *Dobrynin* said. The big question is that in previous administrations, as Eagleburger well knew, the Secretary and Gromyko might decide that an additional push could be useful at some point, and would then act to break deadlocks.

*The Secretary* noted that on issues where we had recently consulted, the last three (southern Africa, CSCE and non-proliferation) had resulted from his New York meetings with Gromyko,<sup>3</sup> whereas the first (Afghanistan) had been agreed to before his time.

*Dobrynin* said he had mentioned the Middle East to the President, and previously discussed it with the Secretary. He asked why we should not add it to the list. He was not speaking here on behalf of Gromyko, but there had been a meeting between Hartman and Korniyenko, and even though it was inconclusive, why not add it to the list?

*The Secretary* said he and Gromyko had discussed the issue in New York, and agreed to be back in touch if there were anything further worth reporting. *Dobrynin* suggested again that it be added. *The Secretary* agreed.

*Dobrynin* then turned to the seventh category of consultations under discussion (deep seabed mining aspects of LOS, nuclear non-proliferation, Pacific maritime boundary, bilateral consular matters).



Deep seabed mining talks had taken place, Dobrynin said, and were good, though outside the Law of the Sea Treaty context. Non-proliferation talks were okay too. We need to find a solution on the Pacific maritime boundary. *The Secretary* said this would be a tough one, but needs to be resolved. *Dobrynin* agreed.

Dobrynin said that on consular talks we have gone back and forth on the issue of an agenda, thus far without results. *The Secretary* said he had a possible solution, and proposed that we schedule a preliminary informal session in Moscow and a formal opening in Washington one month later. We need to confront the officials involved with two scheduled meetings, thus forcing them to use the first to get ready for the second. *Dobrynin* said this sounded good if the first meeting was for discussion of substance and not just the agenda, and was to be continued in Washington. *The Secretary* noted that it is hard to begin discussions without an agenda. *Dobrynin* said he would support the Secretary's proposal with Moscow. *Eagleburger* said that when we had a response, we could schedule the meetings.

Dobrynin then turned to the Soviet-proposed category on arms control talks (conventional arms transfers, CTB, CW, Indian Ocean, ASAT, RW, non-proliferation). All except No. 7 (non-proliferation) had been stopped, and the Soviets would like to resume. He asked if the Secretary had any comment on the first six.

*The Secretary* said he had two comments:

—On TTBT, which is not included, the U.S. owes the Soviet side a proposal, and is about to make one. Rick Burt has been designated to be in touch.

—On the others, returning to what had been discussed with the President, we had identified arms control, regional issues and human rights (as a kind of special category) as areas for discussion. We ought to list these categories separately, and see where things can progress. We should look at what is most promising, but also most worthwhile. We should not confine ourselves just to the easiest issues, but include also the most important questions, even where we know they will be difficult. We need to develop a sense of priorities, of places where we need a political impulse to make something happen. We need to get back to each other on things we have identified, to construct an agenda. Dobrynin had told the President, and Gromyko told the Secretary that arms control is at the top of the Soviet priority list. There is no question that it is an important category, but there are other important categories as well.

*Dobrynin* said there is no question of the importance of the three negotiations (INF, START, MBFR) now underway, but he invited comment as to whether the U.S. was ready to talk on any of the others. The Soviet side was prepared to talk on all seven listed in this category. His government was prepared to talk, but he did not know if the U.S. government was. If not it was all right, but the Soviets want answers. Perhaps not today, but the matter is important. Non-proliferation was being discussed, but some of the other issues were also ready to be discussed. He was not pressing, but wished to report to his government which issues we should continue on. He and the President had agreed that the three negotiations must be included, but success on the others is also important.

*The Secretary* replied “maybe.” We would get to the Soviets on TTBT. On the seven others, we would get back to them.

He noted that the Soviets never mention MBFR. Dobrynin said the Soviets agreed it is important.

*The Secretary* said that on INF we feel the Soviets believe we will not deploy the missiles. But we will, in the absence of a negotiated agreement. *Dobrynin* replied that the Soviets also think we will. *The Secretary* said that our position is that we are prepared to make a reasonable agreement, but equality does not mean the Soviet Union being equal to everyone combined. We think the U.S. and the USSR are the relevant standard, with SS-20's, Pershing II's, and GLCMs the main items. We do not think the proposal Dobrynin described to the President is responsive or acceptable.

*The Secretary* said he did not want to repeat the argument, but wondered whether it was worthwhile to push on INF given the Soviet analysis. Nitze is ready to listen to any suggestions, or to discuss principles. *Dobrynin* said principles had been discussed more than enough. *The Secretary* said perhaps they should be discussed some more. But we also need to look at whether START is more significant, or whether it is time to turn to MBFR. Certainly there is a relationship between nuclear weapons under discussion in INF and the conventional weapons we are talking about in MBFR, and perhaps this relationship cannot really be handled by the individual negotiators. Perhaps in trying to respond to the President, Dobrynin, with his experience, and without our going around the negotiators, could suggest ways to move forward. The Secretary concluded that he was looking for a way of sorting out issues on a broad agenda to see how to get someplace, to see what political impulse is needed.

*Dobrynin* said not just the Soviets, but also the U.S., needed to suggest, through our channels. If the Secretary had

some ideas, he should not hesitate to put them forward. On INF the Soviets have made three proposals, and the U.S. has stuck to the zero option. He did not know what to think when the U.S. said it was open to serious suggestions. The Soviets thought the U.S. would deploy the missiles, because it is sticking to a zero option that is totally unacceptable to the Soviets. If the U.S. stood on it, it will put the missiles in, he said, and the Soviets and the U.S. and your generals and at least some U.S. Allies know it. But if the U.S. wants some way out of the impasse, compromise will be required.

*The Secretary* noted that our position was not take-it-or-leave-it, as the Vice President had made clear. *Dobrynin* said we should use back channels. *The Secretary* replied that the Soviets and the U.S. should evaluate what would be the most fruitful arena for a political impulse, whether in INF or somewhere else.

*Dobrynin* said that in the three negotiations, including INF where we are working under an artificial deadline imposed by the U.S., we should try for a breakthrough, but this did not mean the others are hopeless. *The Secretary* reminded him that we are negotiating in good faith, as we are sure the Soviets are.

But, *Dobrynin* replied, the U.S. Ambassador had made clear that the U.S. did not like the three Soviet proposals, and the Secretary had said they were not acceptable. The Vice President and the Secretary could say the U.S. position was not take-it-or-leave-it, but the Soviets had made proposals to reopen the talks, in an attempt to find a way out. They proposed going from what they have to 162, almost half.

*The Secretary* said it was not clear to him whether systems reduced were to be destroyed or removed. *Dobrynin* said this could be discussed if the cards were on the table. *The*

*Secretary* specified he had not meant to say the offer was acceptable, but our friends in China and Japan had made clear they are worried that an agreement would only move the missiles which would then be pointed at them.

*Dobrynin* said the Asians could discuss this with the Soviets.

*The Secretary* suggested that further staff contacts take place on the lists. *Dobrynin* responded that this would not solve the basic issues. The Secretary continued that they had had a broad, penetrating discussion between 5:00 and 8:15 p.m., which covered a lot of ground. We agreed on some things; on others we compared notes; on others we need further work. We should let our staffs work with some urgency, and hope to meet again, perhaps next week, if not early in March after the Queen's visit.<sup>4</sup> He would give Dobrynin feedback, and would expect feedback from Dobrynin on what the President had said.

*Dobrynin* said the President had raised one question (i.e., Pentecostals) which he would try to clarify to Andropov. The President had raised it as a good will step; he took this to mean the President did not mean the whole field of emigration, though he had mentioned that too. *The Secretary* said he would try to interpret the President's remarks. We have many human rights concerns, including Jewish emigration; the President's specific reference is an example of those concerns. The President had also mentioned Jackson-Vanik, making clear he did not like that approach.

*Dobrynin* concluded that it was, however, for each separate side to determine according to its own law how to deal with its citizens.

Dobrynin said our colleagues should work hard, looking toward a meeting next week. *The Secretary* said he would try to get back in touch next week; he was to leave again March 2.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union-Sensitive File-1983 (02/15/1983-07/14/1983). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on February 17; cleared by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office after Shultz and Dobrynin returned from meeting with Reagan in the White House. See [Document 10](#).

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Documents 221](#) [↗](#) and [222](#) [↗](#).

<sup>4</sup> Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom visited the west coast of the United States from February 26 to March 7.

<sup>5</sup> Shultz traveled to California from March 2 to 7 in conjunction with the Queen's visit.



## 12. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 28, 1983

### SUBJECT

Soviet Message on Embassy Pentecostals

Dobrynin is ill, and called to ask that I receive his Minister-Counselor, Sokolov, briefly this afternoon. Sokolov brought with him the text of a message from Moscow on the Pentecostals in our Embassy there. The text is attached.<sup>2</sup>

The message begins with the standard Soviet line that we are responsible for both the problem—keeping Soviet citizens in the Embassy—and the solution—making them leave. It also reiterates previous statements that the Soviets will not “persecute” them if they leave. Then, in what Sokolov described as “the constructive part” of the message, it says that if they return to their home town in Siberia, “the question of their leaving the USSR will be considered,” with “account taken of all the circumstances involved.”

Formally, this does not go beyond what the Soviets have said before. Nevertheless, the Soviets are obviously trying to be responsive to your deep interest in the Pentecostals’ plight. Thus, although the written message keeps their formal line intact, they may in fact be offering a kind of assurance that emigration will be permitted if the families return home first.

There are two problems with this. First, the families have had several lifetimes of broken promises, and it may take a great deal more than this sort of vague and masked

assurance (if that is what it is) to convince them to leave their refuge in the Embassy and apply for emigration from home. Second, given the vagueness of the message, we should be skeptical too.

I will be reviewing the issue of how we should respond, and will want to get the views of Ambassador Art Hartman, who will be here for consultations next week. I will then be giving you my recommendations.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/21/83-03/02/83). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an undated, unsigned covering memorandum to Reagan, Clark summarized Shultz's message and commented: "I am skeptical that the Soviets have any intention of permitting the Pentecostalists to leave."

<sup>2</sup> The text of the Soviet message is attached but not printed.

### **13. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

San Francisco, March 3, 1983

**SUBJECT**

USG-Soviet Relations—Where Do We Want To Be and How Do We Get There?

I have now had the discussions with Dobrynin which you authorized me to undertake.<sup>2</sup> Dobrynin has come into these talks with a series of proposals for introducing new movement into the bilateral relationship. They are along familiar Soviet lines, with the focus on arms control and reviving bilateral agreements or processes that died largely as a result of Soviet misbehavior. In the background has been a series of statements by you and by Andropov on US-Soviet relations, with both of you saying you are willing to move forward, but that it is up to the other to take the first step. Meanwhile the Soviet “peace offensive” to derail INF deployments in Europe has continued.

From my talks with Dobrynin there have emerged a few tentative signs of Soviet willingness to move forward on specific issues—the Pentecostals and technical-level exchanges on consular matters. But the Soviets have not yet been seriously tested, and my feeling is that the time has come to use my channel through Dobrynin for that purpose. Before I proceed, however, we should take a look at our broader, longer-term strategy for dealing with them. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss both that strategy and the immediate steps we might take to implement it.

### *Minimum and Maximum U.S. Objectives*

Our minimum objective for US-Soviet relations over the next few years is to make clear that we are determined to resist Soviet efforts to use their growing military power in ways which threaten our security. The Soviets must recognize that, while we are serious in our arms control proposals, we also have the will and capacity to correct the imbalances which their military buildup has created. There must be no doubt in Moscow or elsewhere that we will not permit a resumption of the Soviet geopolitical expansionism in the Third World which we saw in the 1970s. Finally, the Soviets must understand that we are not prepared to insulate the bilateral relationship from these issues or our concerns about Soviet human rights behavior. In sum, it must be clear that we see the US-Soviet relationship as fundamentally adversarial and that we are fully prepared to compete effectively and vigorously.

There may also be a chance to go beyond this minimum objective and make some progress toward a more stable and constructive US-Soviet relationship over the next two years or so. This can occur only if the Soviet leadership concludes that it has no choice but to deal with this Administration on the basis of the comprehensive agenda we have established over the last two years. Some of the factors that will shape this critical decision of the Soviet leadership are beyond our effective control. These include the outcome of the succession process, the overall performance of the Soviet economy, and the ability of the new leadership to deal with the long-term malaise of Soviet society.

There are, however, a number of areas in which our actions, and particularly the degree of progress we make in achieving priority objectives beyond the US-Soviet bilateral

relationship, will be critical to the decisions of the Soviet leadership. Thus, sustaining the momentum of the efforts we have begun in the following areas represents an essential pre-condition for inducing the Soviets to deal seriously with the agenda we have established:

(1) Rebuilding American economic and military strength: With economic recovery now under way, we must redouble our efforts to rebuild American military strength. In particular, we need to solve the MX basing problem and obtain congressional approval for our strategic forces modernization program.

(2) Maintaining the vitality of our alliances: In this category, our two priority objectives should be a successful outcome in INF and the development of a new framework for East-West economic relations.

(3) Stabilizing our relations with China: Building on the basis established during my trip to Beijing,<sup>3</sup> a summit later this year would solidify our own relations with Beijing, despite continuing differences on Taiwan, and inhibit improvement in the Sino-Soviet relationship.

(4) Continuing regional peacekeeping efforts: We have no illusions about the prospects for rapid success in the Middle East or a regional settlement in southern Africa. However, U.S. diplomatic activism in key third world areas reduces Soviet maneuver room and can help control destabilizing activities by the Soviets and their allies. To the extent that we are able to make real progress in resolution of regional problems, the Soviets are progressively frozen out of areas of key importance to us.

(5) Continuing vigorous competition in ideas: We want to have obtained congressional funding for the democracy initiative and a supplemental for the radios, establish our new party political foundations(s) and generally put our offensive in support of Western values into high gear.

If we are able to achieve real progress in these areas, we will have demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that it cannot expect a radical departure in U.S. policy of the kind that has occurred too often in the past decade. Thus, 1983 will represent a critical test of whether a U.S. Administration can not only put in place the kind of US-Soviet policy we have established—but see it through.

While the Soviet response to a successful demonstration of our resolve is not entirely predictable, I believe that the Soviet leadership might conclude that it had no alternative but to come to terms with us. In that event, opportunities for a lasting and significant improvement in US-Soviet relations would be better than they have been for decades. If the Soviets remained intransigent, we would have nonetheless taken the essential steps needed to ensure our security.

### *The US-Soviet Agenda—What Can We Realistically Aim to Achieve?*

If the above analysis is correct we can realistically expect to confront the following opportunities and risks in specific areas of the US-Soviet agenda:

#### *A. Arms Control*

Here we have taken the approach that it is meaningful agreements that count, and you have established high



standards: real reductions; equality in the important measures of military capability; verifiability; and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance. These criteria form the basis of our proposals in INF and START, and must continue to do so as we consider our negotiating positions over the coming year or so. We should be patient; we should be deliberate; and we should be alert to openings from the Soviet side. Given the strength of the Soviet "peace offensive," our positions should also enable us to assume the strongest possible public posture. It must always be evident that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that is impeding progress toward agreements.

In INF, we should: (1) adhere to the arms control criteria we have established; (2) demonstrate to the Soviets and western publics that we are seriously searching for an agreement; and (3) undertake the necessary preparations for initial INF deployments at the end of the year.

In START, we should hold firm to the new conceptual framework that underlies our proposal, with its emphasis on substantial reductions and warheads as the principal unit of account. We should continue to negotiate seriously, taking as our point of departure the fact that the Soviets appear to have accepted the principle of reductions.

Prospects for agreements in START and INF before the end of 1984 are highly problematical; nevertheless, we should continue to press the Soviets for early progress on the basis of our proposals. We should also urge new Soviet movement in other arms control areas—in MBFR, in CSCE, in CBMs and in our proposals for verification improvements to the TTBT and the PNET. In MBFR we are now studying ways to break the deadlock over data. In CSCE, the Soviets could conceivably be willing to meet our requirement for

concrete movement in human rights as part of an overall agreement that would include a CDE.

We should keep the pressure on Moscow for serious responses to our proposals in these areas, to keep the onus for lack of progress on the Soviet Union. We will be negotiating in good faith. But if it is not possible to achieve agreements, it will be important to have maintained the high standards of your approach to arms control and to have won the battle for public opinion by making clear that it is the USSR, not the U.S., that was to blame.

### *B. Regional Issues*

Our minimum objective over the next few years is to ensure that there is no new successful aggression by the Soviet Union or its allies in the Third World. This will require that we follow through on the security commitments we have made to Third World friends and allies and that we remain ready to use American military strength to keep the peace. It may also require that we reinforce warnings to the Soviet Union concerning the consequences of unacceptable behavior in the Third World, such as delivery of MIGs to Nicaragua.

The fact that we have engaged Moscow on key regional issues—particularly Afghanistan and Southern Africa—positions us to sustain diplomatic pressure and exploit whatever opportunities may emerge in the context of the Soviet political process in the intermediate term. In this connection, we should consider ways of using our bilateral dialogue to move the Soviet Union towards constructive involvement in negotiations that might lead to acceptable settlements of these issues. A litmus test of Soviet seriousness in response to our concerns would be whether

they are moving seriously toward real pullback from one of the inroads gained in the 1970s.

### *C. Human Rights and Western Values*

We should continue to seek improvement in Soviet behavior: release of prisoners of conscience including Anatoliy Shcharanskiy; resolution of divided-family cases and the Pentecostalist situation; and a significant increase in Jewish emigration. Our objective should be to have achieved significant progress on one or more of these fronts by the end of 1984. Where it would enhance the chances of success, our focus should be on private diplomacy leading to results, not counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow. We also want to increase our ideological impact inside the Soviet Union through expanded exchange programs and access of Americans to Soviet society.

In this area we must recognize that there is a natural tension between open discussion of and attacks on Soviet misdeeds and quiet discussion that will produce results on specifics. The Soviets never tire of suggesting that things are better accomplished in the shadows when it comes to human rights. On the other hand, they also know that we neither can nor want simply to turn off our public expressions of indignation and support for freedom. As we proceed, there will thus be a constant interplay between the public approach for which our values call and quiet diplomacy focussed on results. This interplay means that human rights issues must be handled in a somewhat special way.

In connection with human rights, the dilemmas of our Poland policy are likely to become more acute. On the one hand, we cannot relax our insistence that real improvement

in our relations with Poland can take place only if there is improvement in the human rights situation in that country. On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly evident that prospects for a revival of the Solidarity period are dim for the foreseeable future. There is no certain prescription for resolving this dilemma, given the limitations of our influence over events in Poland. Nevertheless, our Poland policy must continue to be based on determination to support the Polish people in their desire to exercise fundamental human rights—with the kind of rewards for specific human rights progress which you set forth in your December speech.<sup>4</sup>

#### *D. Economic Relations*

Our primary objective over the next year should be to develop and begin to implement a new framework for East-West economic relations; this would ensure that Western economic strength does not contribute to Soviet military power or subsidize the Soviet economy. It would also manage domestic pressures for increased trade so that the timing of any steps we take in the area of bilateral economic relations is geared to our overall strategy for US-Soviet relations.

#### *US-Soviet Bilateral Dialogue*

Bilateral dialogue with the Soviets has an important place in this overall strategy. Our exchanges with the Soviets are a constant testing process, in which we probe for possible new Soviet flexibility on the issues, while insisting that real progress must involve concrete Soviet actions to address our concerns. These exchanges put us in control of that process—in a position to bring it to a halt at every step if the Soviets are unwilling to proceed with real give-and-

take. In particular, they allow us to ensure that our dialogue with Moscow does not generate momentum toward a summit that would be difficult to rein in, should we find it in our interest do so. Further, these exchanges permit us to make sure that anything we are prepared to do is reciprocated. Finally, they give us a greater capacity to control international events, by reaffirming to the Soviets and others that we intend to play a role commensurate with our renewed strength and self-confidence. An active US-Soviet dialogue will be critical to our efforts to maintain allied and domestic support for our policy in the face of a redoubled Soviet "peace offensive." And if the Soviet leadership does conclude that it must seriously address our concerns, there should be an active bilateral dialogue underway to enable us to exploit fully this opportunity to advance U.S. interests.

We now need to decide whether to intensify this dialogue, and if so how. If we proceed in this direction, we will inevitably arouse concerns that we are returning to business-as-usual, and generate charges that our Soviet policy is more bark than bite. I believe that these problems are manageable, because we will not relax our insistence on balance and Soviet performance as we proceed. Continuing to work from the US rather than the Soviet agenda, and to require deeds rather than just words, is the way to manage the problem, but we should recognize it will remain with us.

If that makes sense to you, I have some ideas about next steps. My thought would be to see Dobrynin again and present him with a four-part work program of specifics covering each of the areas on the US agenda: arms control, regional issues, human rights and bilateral topics. This would serve to drive home to him that old bilateral agreements and arms control are not and cannot be the

only central issues in US-Soviet relations if we are to achieve serious progress. Furthermore, the specifics would challenge the Soviets to concrete responses, as part of the testing process we envisage:

—Arms Control: I could offer to discuss START/INF issues with Gromyko at a meeting soon after the current round of Geneva negotiations ends, making clear that I would of course address our overall agenda and not just arms control; I would say we want to work more intensively on MBFR, without further elaboration; I would point to TTBT verification improvements and nuclear CBM's where we have introduced specific proposals; and I would be downbeat on prospects for reviving the defunct arms control negotiations for which the Soviets are pushing.

—Regional Issues: I could note we are still looking at Southern Africa for positive Soviet action; reiterate our basic positions on Afghanistan (total Soviet withdrawal, Afghan independence and self-determination, return of refugees); and offer to send Ambassador Art Hartman to see Gromyko's Deputy again for another routine exchange of information and views of the Middle East. Such discussions provide a useful and low-cost means of keeping the Soviets at bay on this issue in our bilateral relationship.

—Human Rights: After reiterating your strong interest in human rights and your preference for "quiet diplomacy," I would welcome the message on the Embassy Pentecostalists, but indicate that we still face the practical problem of how to convince the families to take up the offer; refer to indications that



movement on Shcharanskiy now seems possible; and suggest serious and confidential talks about what might be possible on human rights in connection with CSCE at Madrid, where the Soviets could conceivably be willing to meet our requirement for concrete movement in human rights as part of an overall agreement that would include a CDE.

—Bilateral Issues: Here several alternatives are possible. I could say we propose beginning with a single step both sides can agree is useful and which you approved in NSDD-75<sup>5</sup> —negotiation of a new cultural exchanges agreement—and have the rest of the bilateral issues we talked about earlier under review. I could also suggest that we would be prepared to renew discussions on opening a US Consulate in Kiev and a Soviet Consulate in New York. This could give us an invaluable listening post and do little for the Soviets (because of their UN Mission). The disadvantage of both the cultural agreement and the Kiev/New York consulates is that we would be undoing Afghanistan sanctions. The advantage is that in both cases we would be improving our access to Soviet society. I will, of course, adjust what I say to Dobrynin on these bilateral issues to your view of how significant a signal we wish to send Moscow.

### *Conclusion*

The next few years will be a period of new challenges and opportunities in our relations with the Soviets. We have in place a sound policy, which gives us the foundation for further progress toward a more stable, if competitive, US-Soviet relationship. Bilateral exchanges are an important

part of it, but only a part. The approach outlined above would protect our security interests while establishing realistic benchmarks by which to measure progress. But it can succeed only if we do not waver on the essentials of the policy approach you have established these past two years. The Soviets may ultimately prove unwilling to see an improvement in the relationship on those terms. If so, we will nonetheless have done our part in good faith, and the responsibility for a continuation of the present tensions will rest squarely with them.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/03/83-03/07/83). Secret; Sensitive. A draft of this memorandum, dated March 2, was prepared by Napper on March 1; cleared by Simons and Palmer. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive File, March 1-15, 1983) On March 4, telegram Secto 2003 from Shultz in California reported that the memorandum was "hand-carried to the White House office in San Francisco." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830002-0359)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to meetings with Dobrynin on February 12 and February 15. See [Documents 9](#), [10](#), and [11](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [footnote 3](#), [Document 1](#).

<sup>4</sup> On December 10, 1982, Reagan signed two proclamations for Poland on human rights and for a Day of Prayer. In his remarks, he offered: "If the Polish government introduces meaningful liberalizing measures, we will take equally significant and concrete actions of our own. However, it will require the end of martial law, the release of political prisoners, and the beginning of dialog with truly

representative forces of the Polish nation, such as the church and the freely formed trade unions, to make it possible for us to lift all the sanctions.” For the full text of his remarks, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book II, pp. 1589-1591.

<sup>5</sup> See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 260](#)<sup>6</sup>.

## 14. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 8, 1983, 11 a.m.

### SUBJECT

SecDef Meeting with Ambassador Hartman (U)

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *DoD*

Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European & NATO Policy, Ronald  
Lauder  
Major General Smith  
Mr. Douglas Garthoff

#### *VISITOR*

Arthur A. Hartman, US Ambassador to the USSR  
Alexander Vershbow, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of  
State

### *FRG Elections.*

(C) SecDef Weinberger expressed satisfaction with the results of the recent elections in West Germany.<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Hartman agreed but pointed out that problems would persist with respect to implementation of NATO's LRINF modernization program.

### *Andropov.*

(C) SecDef asked the Ambassador for his views on how the new General Secretary was doing. Was he not in a kind of probationary period? The Ambassador noted that Andropov's image-makers had done quite well in projecting the General Secretary as an urbane and sophisticated man. He pointed out that Andropov has not been shown on

Soviet TV recently, however, apparently as a result of health problems. Ambassador Hartman said that he had not met Andropov personally since the Brezhnev funeral. He felt that Andropov was the most intellectual Soviet leader since Lenin. In response to Ambassador Hartman's statement that he thought Andropov would want to concentrate on internal problems first, SecDef asked how he thought such efforts would impact on the Soviet military and the Soviet defense program. Ambassador Hartman replied that it was clear to him Andropov depended on the military to maintain his political position. If, for example, he undertook broad economic reforms that impacted adversely on military programs, the military would certainly object, and probably would do so effectively. The Ambassador said it is not clear yet how strong Andropov will become. While he may act strongly with respect to issues like discipline and corruption, we will be able to assess the depth of his strength only when he undertakes more important decisions.

### *Summitry.*

(C) SecDef inquired whether there had been any recent talk of summitry in Moscow. The Ambassador replied that he thought the Soviet position was similar to ours. They do not want a summit unless it has been well prepared. Several members of the Central Committee have recently said that it is necessary to get issues treated at the top level if any progress is to be made. The Ambassador also said he had heard some grumbling about Foreign Minister Gromyko's attitudes on this subject. In response to SecDef's question about the status of Ambassador Dobrynin, the Ambassador stated that he had no firm information but felt the rumors Dobrynin might return to Moscow originated with Dobrynin himself.

### *US-Soviet Relations.*

(C) In response to SecDef's question about how the bilateral relationship looked from Moscow, the Ambassador replied that it was not good on the propaganda level. But on the personal level, he felt the Soviets still wanted a dialogue. He mentioned the periodic meetings on incidents at sea as an example of a form of dialogue that they wish to see continued. He did not feel, however, that there would be any gesture of accommodation from the Soviet side with the possible exception of a symbolic act in the human rights arena, regarding Sharansky for example.

(C) The Ambassador recommended that now was a good time to test the new Soviet leadership to see where progress might be made in bilateral relations. This could be done, he argued, while of course continuing to strengthen our defense to adequate levels. SecDef asked if the Ambassador felt that emphasis on confidence-building measures—an area of interest to both the President and SecDef personally—would be a good place to undertake actions. The Ambassador replied that this was a good idea, but cautioned that the Soviets are suspicious that we would view such measures as a substitute for START and INF agreements.

### *START-INF.*

(C) Ambassador Hartman stated that he felt the Soviets wanted a START agreement but would not be willing to reduce as drastically as we have proposed. He felt that the Soviets regard the US START position as one-sided in favor of the US. He believed the greatest US leverage derived from our cruise missile programs, and he also felt that we should be concerned about potential Soviet cruise missiles



as well. In response to SecDef's question about how he viewed the possibility for an INF agreement, the Ambassador replied that the Soviets had little incentive to sign any agreement that allowed new US LRINF deployments in Europe unless it was part of a larger pattern of progress on strategic arms limitations. He said he did not feel they would ever accept the true zero option, even if we were the first to make an accommodating move in the negotiations.

(S) The Ambassador said he was gratified by the staunchness of support from the Allies in the Catholic southern part of Western Europe (France and Italy), but felt that the problems we had in the northern European countries already reflected accommodations made to the LRINF imbalance the Soviets have created with new SS-20 deployments. Ambassador Hartman asked how many SS-20s were currently operational. SecDef replied that there were now 351 SS-20s in service. Ambassador Hartman offered the opinion that Andropov's December 1982 LRINF proposal was a mistake when measured against Soviet interests.<sup>3</sup> He felt that by equating the Soviet SS-20s to the strategic deterrent forces of the UK and France, the Soviets are opening the door for the West to focus attention on how best to deter attack on the non-nuclear Allies in Western Europe.

### *Middle East.*

(C) SecDef asked whether the Ambassador felt that the deployment of SA-5s to Syria was an effort by the Soviets to force their way back into the negotiating arena. The Ambassador replied that the war last year had put them on the spot, and they now felt they had to run new risks in order to regain their position in the region. Their only way

to do so was to intensify relationships with their few remaining friends there.

### *Afghanistan.*

(C) SecDef expressed the opinion that the Soviets probably would like to get out of the current Afghanistan stalemate, but he did not see how they could do so. The Ambassador agreed that they seemed basically to be stuck. They probably could not obtain sizable Afghan support for a political solution acceptable to Moscow.

### *Support of the Moscow Embassy.*

(U) Replying to SecDef's offer to help the Ambassador in any way DoD could do so, the Ambassador asked if he could have some copies of the new booklet, "Soviet Military Power, 1983", before he departed for Moscow on 12 March. The Secretary replied affirmatively. (Note: a dozen copies were delivered to the Soviet desk at State for the Ambassador on 10 March.)

### **Douglas F. Garthoff<sup>1</sup> Policy Assistant for Soviet Affairs**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-85-0023, USSR 091.112 (Jan-) 1983. Secret. Drafted by Garthoff on March 11. The meeting took place in Room 3E880 at the Pentagon.

<sup>2</sup> West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's "conservative coalition won a decisive mandate" in the March 6 election. An important issue in the election campaign was whether to accept deployment of U.S. missiles in West Germany in December. Kohl's Christian Democrats won 244 seats and

their coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party, took 34 seats, “guaranteeing the coalition a solid majority.” (James M. Markham, “A Bigger Majority: Socialists Suffer Worst Defeat Since 1961—Missiles Were Issue,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1983, p. A1)

<sup>3</sup> See [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 254\*](#).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Garthoff signed “DF Garthoff” above his typed signature.

## 15. Editorial Note

On March 8, 1983, President Ronald Reagan delivered an address to the National Association of Evangelicals at their national convention in Orlando, Florida, in which he referred to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” While most of the speech dealt with domestic and spiritual issues, the section on the Soviet Union and the nuclear freeze movement has received the most historical attention. In his diary on March 8, Reagan wrote: “My speech was well received—3 standing ovations during the speech. I talked of parents rights (squeal rule) abortion, school prayer and our need for a strong defense.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 203)

White House Speechwriter Anthony Dolan drafted the speech. On March 4, Sven Kraemer of the NSC Staff received a draft of the speech for his review. In a memorandum to Richard Boverie, Kraemer noted: “The great bulk of the speech deals with domestic issues involving church, state and spiritual values. I have made no comments on those aspects.

“Beginning on page 12, there is a strongly worded characterization of the Soviet ideology and of Soviet practices. All the statements made are true and need to be said, but I believe senior NSC levels will need to review their tone.

“I have proposed a number of revisions for pages 13 through 15 in order to make clear the high ground of the Administration’s arms reductions proposals and to soften the direct attack on the entire freeze movement.

“At the end of the afternoon I passed my revisions on informally to Tony Dolan with a note indicating the revisions have no official NSC status at this time.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, March 1983, Chron File: [No. 12-13]) Kraemer’s focus was on arms control and national security, not on ideology or the “evil empire” remark. In fact, he made other edits to the sentence containing the “evil empire” phrase, but did not note anything about this language. Most of Kraemer’s revisions were incorporated into the speech.

In the defense section toward the end of the speech, Reagan stated: “And this brings me to my final point today. During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that’s their name for religion—or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

“Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930’s. We see it too often today.

“This doesn’t mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to

remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

“At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

“The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

“I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets’ global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

“A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us



completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.”

After recounting the story of a speech he had heard years ago about communism, Reagan continued: “So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I’ve always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

“I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration’s efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world’s nuclear arsenals and one day, with God’s help, their total elimination.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pages 362–364)

In his memoir, Shultz commented on the reaction to this speech: “The ‘evil empire’ phrase would take on a life of its own. Calling the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’ transformed this into a major speech, even though it had not been planned or developed through any careful or systematic process. No doubt Soviet leaders were offended, and many of our friends were alarmed. How conscious of the implications of their words the president and his speechwriters were, I do not know. Whether or not he was wise to use this phrase to describe the Soviet Union, it was

in fact an empire and evil abounded.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 267)

Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin wrote in his memoir: “What seemed most difficult for us to fathom were Reagan’s vehement public attacks on the Soviet Union while he was secretly sending—orally or through his private letters—quite different signals seeking more normal relations. On March 8, less than a month after our first White House conversation [see [Documents 10](#) and [11](#)] when he seemed to be trying to open a working relationship with the Soviet leadership, he publicly described the Soviet Union, in a phrase both memorable and notorious, as the evil empire.” He continued: “The speech was not designed to be a history-making event in foreign policy, and according to Shultz no one outside the White House, including him, had a chance to review the text in advance, but the phrase quickly spread throughout the world.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pages 526–527)

Sergei Tarasenko, who was an adviser in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, noted: “At the Foreign Ministry, we were quite indifferent to this remark because we understood that it was normal. If you look at the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was normal for our leaders to exchange rather unflattering remarks about each other. We called you names; you called us names. It was part of the game. If you look at our propaganda, we used awful names—imperialist, capitalist, and the nest of all this evil—so for us, it was nothing. I barely noticed it.” (Strober and Strober, *Reagan: The Man and His Presidency*, page 228)

Jack Matlock, who in March 1983 was Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Prague, but in July 1983 returned to Washington as Special Assistant to the President and

Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff said of the speech: "It amazed me that people got so upset. You could say, 'This isn't tactful or diplomatic, but it's true. They did lie and cheat, and if you don't recognize that to start with, people are much more apt to think you don't understand them.'

"Actually, as it turned out, it was a brilliant stroke, because later, when he was asked about it, when they were changing, he could say, 'Yes, they were, but that was another time, another place.' It in effect legitimized the changes in the Soviet Union, so when Reagan finally turned up in Red Square [in May 1988], kissing babies and saying, 'You're on the right track,' it had an enormous impact." (Strober and Strober, *Reagan: The Man and His Presidency*, page 229)

For more on Reagan's address to the National Association of Evangelicals, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 143](#)<sup>2</sup>.

## **16. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 9, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

Secretary Shultz's New Memorandum on U.S.-Soviet Relations

The memorandum to you from George Shultz at Tab A<sup>2</sup> is an almost identical repetition of his January 19 memo to you.<sup>3</sup> It is so similar that the outlines of both memoranda are the same, many sentences are repeated verbatim, and the recommendations are almost the same only with minor modifications. The only difference is that the words "intensified dialogue" are given less prominence in the text, which has been lengthened.

Like the old version, the new one calls for a strategy of intensified dialogue on bilateral issues and in specific areas: arms control, regional issues (Afghanistan, Southern Africa), human rights, and economic relations. George's reason for persisting with this recommendation is that he has detected in his recent meetings with Dobrynin "a few tentative signs of Soviet willingness to move forward on specific issues—the Pentecostals and technical level exchanges on consular matters." Thus, he feels that dialogue, initially through his channel with Dobrynin, could serve to see that the Soviets are "seriously tested" and "challenged."

While State's final recommendations downplay the importance of summitry, all the logic that was used to justify a summit in the previous memo remains. The *new*

recommendations include: discussing new subjects such as MBFR; quiet diplomacy to encourage progress in the Shcharansky case; confidential talks to trade improvement in human rights for a CDE; and negotiations to open a U.S. Consulate in Kiev and a Soviet Consulate in New York.

There are several problems with this memorandum. Principally it fails to reflect a full understanding of the nature of the Soviet threat and the way the Soviets operate. What is systematically ignored here is the fact that the Soviets are engaging in low-intensity, political conflict with the West—an attack whose thrusts we have failed to deter. What is also ignored is that our existing policy of deterrence, which posits that the enemy should lose more by an attack than he could hope to gain, applies solely to the military sphere and not to the proxy-military and non-military forms of attack.

As a result the memo reflects a misunderstanding of what it takes to get the Soviets to come to terms with us. State believes that all it is likely to take is a “successful demonstration of our resolve” as manifested by renewed economic and military strength, revitalized alliances, a new relationship with China, regional peacekeeping efforts and an ideological offensive. There is some truth to this—but only partly so. With the exception of possible political losses inflicted on the Soviets by our young and fragile ideological offensive, none of this will cause the Soviets to lose more than they gain by attacking the Free World in their low-intensity fashion. Thus, the references to warning the Soviets about the “consequences of unacceptable behavior” ring hollow—no meaningful consequences are proposed.

State’s memo also contains several questionable assumptions. One is that the U.S. is as responsible as the

USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions. This is implicit in the memo's last sentence which suggests that we should do our part to demonstrate our peaceful intentions—as if we have not done so for years. Another questionable assumption is that we can easily sustain public support for our defense buildup and demonstrate our resolve by engaging in precisely the dialogue which the Soviets want us to do—the kind that generates false public expectations of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations, which in turn induce public pressures on us to make concessions. Yet another questionable assumption is that there has been any kind of indication of Soviet willingness to make concessions on any of the issues that separate us. The reference to flexibility on the Pentecostals, for one, has no basis in fact.

Altogether, this memo is another State Department attempt to explain how increased dialogue can help pressure the Soviets into more acceptable behavior. The many reasons given as to how dialogue can pressure the Soviets to do anything are weak, and unconvincing, as they reflect a wishful-thinking perception about the nature of the Soviet system and its willingness to compromise. If we follow its recommendation for intensified dialogue, especially at a time of possible defense cuts, and unilateral disarmament and freeze movements, we will be sending all the wrong signals to the Soviets. We will be “improving” U.S.-Soviet relations on Soviet terms, and not on our terms and thus portraying an image of political weakness that is the exact opposite of the image of revived spiritual strength that your election symbolized.

In spite of your earlier decision and rejection of the same recommendation to intensify dialogue, State asserts that: “We now need to decide whether to intensify this dialogue.” This persistence merits an appropriate response: I believe that you and I should meet with George, so that he can



discuss his recommendations and address the problems we have with them.<sup>4</sup> However, before the meeting takes place I would like to present you with an alternative set of recommendations which we could simultaneously address.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Lenczowski.

<sup>2</sup> Printed as [Document 13](#). Under a March 8 memorandum sent for action to Clark, Lenczowski forwarded a copy of the March 3 memorandum from Shultz to the President writing: "In response to this latest version, I am tempted to attach the cover memo you sent the President with the old version and recommend that you send the Secretary a Xerox of the previous response you made to him on behalf of the President. However, since he has made some refinements in his old version, the President deserves a refined critique." Lenczowski also indicated that Dobriansky concurred with the March 3 assessment; Dobriansky initialed her concurrence on Lenczowski's memorandum.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 1](#).

<sup>4</sup> See [Documents 17](#) and [26](#).

## 17. Editorial Note

On March 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan chaired a meeting in the Cabinet Room from 2:09 to 3:11 p.m. “to discuss the State Department’s recommendations for U.S.-Soviet relations.” Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State George Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman, National Security Council Staff member John Lenczowski, Chief of Staff James Baker, Counselor Edwin Meese, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark, and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane attended. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Richard Pipes, who had served on the NSC Staff as Soviet adviser but returned to teach at Harvard in December 1982, also attended the meeting. No official record of this meeting has been found.

A March 10 agenda from Clark to participants, prepared by Lenczowski, noted that the meeting would review the Department of State’s recommendations as laid out in Shultz’s January 19 and March 3 memoranda to Reagan. (See [Documents 1](#) and [13](#).) The background portion of the agenda, drafted by Lenczowski, stated: “Both memoranda are seriously flawed. Their recommendations are based on false and questionable premises, and a misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet system and its goals. This meeting has been called so that State can further air its views.” Reagan initialed the agenda, indicating he saw it. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/10/83–03/21/83))

In a March 10 memorandum to Clark, Lenczowski wrote: "One point that you might raise in today's discussion is the pressure the U.S. is facing not only from the Soviets, the freeze movement and the unilateral disarmament movement, but from our *allies* to make concessions in our arms control talks. Yesterday, Italian Foreign Minister Colombo asked the President 'to get those [INF] negotiations going again.'

"The critical premise underlying this recommendation is the same premise behind State's call for increased dialogue: This is that the U.S. is as responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions and the lack of progress in the negotiations as the USSR. *This premise is false.*"

"To follow Colombo's recommendation, or to start intensified dialogue would be to accept that this premise is true and that it is *our* responsibility to do more to reduce tensions that we allegedly helped create. It would also be a clear signal to the Soviets of the American political weakness and our vulnerability to their manipulation of Western public opinion.

"If you would like me to verify this at the meeting from a Sovietologist's point of view, you might want to ask me to do so in this way:

"'John has recently published a major book on Soviet perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. John, how would the Soviets view a move by us to enter an intensified dialogue?'

"I would briefly respond by saying that they see it as a sign of political weakness." (Ibid.; brackets are in the original)

In his memoir, Shultz described the meeting as follows: "When I walked into the Oval Office, President Reagan took me aside. 'I don't want these people to know about

Dobrynin,' the president said to me, referring to his private meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin and our subsequent effort to allow the Pentecostals, who had taken refuge in our Moscow embassy, to gain the freedom to emigrate. His remark reinforced my growing sense that the president was a prisoner of his own staff. The Oval Office was filled with people—Jim Baker, Ed Meese, Bill Clark, Bud McFarlane, as well as faces I didn't recognize. I started off by saying that I wanted to speak candidly, 'But I don't even know who all these people are.' I looked at one man I did not know.

"Bill Clark jumped in, 'This is Richard Pipes. He's an NSC member. He's on the payroll.'

"I could see the president didn't like the large cast of characters. The mood was intense and acrimonious. I could also see that he wanted to do what I wanted to do, but Bill Clark was standing in the way. I addressed my remarks to President Reagan, saying that he had already established the basics. The United States had improved its military strength, and our economy was moving forward. Our alliances were in good shape. Our work in China had caught the Soviets' attention, and democracy was gaining in Central America. 'It is time to probe and test,' I said.

"We should push for Afghanistan and Southern Africa as regional problems where progress might emerge. 'On bilateral issues, we can discuss the umbrella cultural-exchanges agreement, proposed consulates in Kiev and New York City, and an appraisal of the eight existing agreements with the Soviets and where they stand. If this goes well, we can start looking at a Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Moscow, and then Gromyko would come here to meet you at the time of the UN meetings in October,' I said.

“When I had finished talking to the president, Bill Clark called on Richard Pipes. I knew his name and recognized his scholarly distinction—and his hard-line reputation regarding the Soviets. Clark then called on Leslie Lenkowski [*John Lenczowski*], as another ‘Soviet expert.’ After they had their say, I remarked, ‘Perhaps we should also ask our ambassador in Moscow for his opinion.’ The attitude of Clark’s cadre was that *after* the Soviets have changed, *then* maybe we can do something with them. I was irritated. Toward the end of the meeting, I said that I understood the view of all these staff people was that I should ‘stop seeing Dobrynin and leave things as they are.’ Everyone in the room protested that this was not the correct interpretation. The meeting broke up. I was annoyed by the fiasco, and it showed.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 267-268)

Richard Pipes provided a contrasting account in his memoir: “In early March 1983 Shultz had State produce a paper on ‘U.S.-Soviet Relations: Where Do We Want to Be and How Do We Get There?’ [See [Document 13](#).] Ignoring NSDD 75, which was less than three months old, Shultz, hoping by means of this new paper to persuade the president that the time had come to change course in our dealings with Moscow, requested to see him. The meeting was set for March 10. Departing from customary procedure, either at the president’s request or his own initiative, Clark made it into a State-NSC confrontation. He invited me to attend.

“Shultz left in his memoirs a distorted picture of this encounter to make it appear as if the president had agreed with his recommendation but was thwarted by Clark and the NSC staff, whose ‘prisoner’ he allegedly was. This interpretation is widely off the mark, as I can attest from my detailed notes of the meeting.

“Present were fourteen persons. Shultz opened with a warning that what he was about to say was extremely sensitive and would cause much harm if leaked. At this point Reagan, with a mischievous smile, pulled up the corner of the tablecloth and addressing an imaginary microphone planted by Andropov, said: ‘This goes for you, too, Iurii!’ The secretary was not amused.

“Before making his case, Shultz shot a look at me, saying, ‘I know everyone in this room but you.’ Clark informed him who I was, whereupon he proceeded to outline a series of initiatives we could take with Moscow, such as raising the issues of Afghanistan and Poland as well as proceeding with renegotiating various agreements that were due for renewal (transportation, atomic energy, fisheries, etc.). At a certain point he stopped and glaring at me, said, ‘Your taking notes makes me very nervous.’ Clark assured him I had been a trustworthy member of the NSC staff for two years.

“Reagan listened to Shultz’s proposals with growing impatience, yawning, and at one point almost dozing off. When Shultz finished, he spoke his mind. ‘It seems to me,’ Reagan said, ‘that in previous years of détente we always took steps and got kicked in the teeth.’ Our attempts to get the Russians to cooperate led nowhere. We should exercise caution in dealing with them and make no overt appeals. When they remove irritants in our relations, we will respond in kind. In other words, Reagan was saying, no initiatives of our own, only responses to Soviet positive initiatives.

“Clark then turned to me, requesting my opinion. Addressing Shultz, who sat directly across from me, I asked whether he proposed to take these steps one by one or all at once. Shultz stared me straight in the eye but made no



response. I repeated the question and again received no answer. I suppose he was offended that having addressed the president of the United States, he was subjected to questioning by an academic.

“Reagan then stepped in once more. If the Russians allowed the Pentecostals holed up in our Moscow embassy to leave the country, we could agree to fishery negotiations. We would respond similarly if they released Anatoly Shcharansky from prison. Should such goodwill gestures be made, we would not ‘crow’ but quietly reciprocate. At this point, he articulated what for him was a rather novel idea and which, I must assume, I had planted in his mind: ‘I no longer believe they are doctrinaire Communists—they are an autocracy interested in preserving their privileges.’

“When the meeting, which lasted an hour, was about to break up, a defeated and visibly irritated Shultz muttered to himself but so that others could hear: ‘What I get is: eschew bilateral talks, be careful with Dobrynin, and ‘bang away’ at Cuba, Afghanistan, and the Pentecostals. Personally, I don’t think this is good.’” (Richard Pipes, *VIXI*, pages 206–207)

After the meeting, Shultz returned to the Department of State and met with Eagleburger. As Shultz later recalled: “Eagleburger told me that Bud McFarlane had been outraged by the meeting. Bud had not known that Clark had loaded the dice with his naysayers. ‘Bud gave me a memo before the meeting to read and destroy that was right down our alley,’ I said. ‘It was his idea of how the president should respond, positively, to my suggestions. Clark wouldn’t send it forward. The president was posturing in front of those guys. That’s why he told me he didn’t want to talk about Dobrynin.’ That was part of the problem: the president could not simply talk to me alone in

the Oval Office. Key people in his administration *would have to know* that the president wanted a change; he would have to say it openly and publicly. 'If the president doesn't express himself, the bureaucracy won't react. All I can do now is just pick up the ball and say go or no go.'

"At 7:25 that evening, Bill Clark telephoned. He talked as if nothing unusual had happened that afternoon. He told me that the president would 'let me know tomorrow,' whatever that meant. After the conversation, I said to Ray Seitz [Executive Assistant to Shultz], 'How can the president understand what I was trying to present this afternoon? Yet there's going to be some kind of communication from the president tomorrow about all this. Clark wants to keep State on a tight rein. It's like a sergeant I had in the Marine Corps who said, 'Don't fall out till I say fall out! Fall out!'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 268)

After his frustration at the March 10 meeting, Shultz had a private discussion with Reagan on March 11: "I told President Reagan privately that I needed to have direction from him on Soviet relations. I went through with him again what I was trying to achieve. 'Go ahead,' he told me. Despite this I could see that the president was concerned, and Clark even more so, that if he gave a green light to the State Department, I would run off and initiate actions that would change the atmosphere with the Soviets when they perceived no change was warranted. So I would need to be careful. There was no road map. I would need to make my own. I would have to keep going over my proposed route with the president privately, receiving his agreement and then seeking ways to have him make his own administration *follow through* on his decisions." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 268-269)

**18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Wick) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 16, 1983

SUBJECT

Promoting Political Change in the USSR

NSDD-75 set as a basic task of U.S. policy the promotion of political change within the USSR. It noted that, along with radio broadcasting, our most important means for ideological penetration and promotion of democratization in the USSR are exchanges activities and the exhibits program. The NSDD stated that we should reverse a pattern of dismantling those programs, instead expanding those which can serve our objective of promoting change in the Soviet Union. It called for an official framework for handling exchanges and obtaining reciprocity to prevent the Soviets from gaining unilateral advantage from their activities in the U.S. and their control of our access to the Soviet people.

This paper recommends an approach to negotiating an official framework which would achieve a significantly higher level of reciprocity and ideological penetration of the Soviet Union by the United States.

*Problem and Opportunity*

Vladimir Bukovsky has written that he became a dissident when he visited the US National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959—the one at which Khrushchev and Nixon debated in a model US kitchen. But, we have had no US exhibits in the

Soviet Union since 1979. We have allowed other ideologically effective aspects of the exchanges agreements to lapse as well. Thus, in the past three years we have dismantled much of what we had created.

One of the main advantages of those agreements was that they opened great fields of operation to us, such as exhibits, where we had a clear advantage over the Soviets. They also provided the means to obtain reciprocity. We now face a growing Soviet effort to work around us with private U.S. institutions and individuals.

Armand Hammer in partnership with Jerry Weintraub recently established an organization to bring Soviet cultural and other attractions to the U.S., with no known guarantee of reciprocity. We are also aware the Soviets are working with some other impresarios or individuals on possible performing arts tours, including a visit by the Moscow Circus this fall. The ready access that Soviet propagandists have to U.S. media without reciprocity is well known. The Soviets arranged a series of Soviet film weeks at the prestigious Smithsonian Institution last fall.

Under current circumstances we have no ready means of enforcing reciprocity in such endeavors. The present visa law does not permit us to refuse visas for that purpose. The result is that, according to the FBI, there is an increasing percentage of KGB agents in the groups the Soviets are unilaterally sending to the U.S. We can better control this problem with a better handle on visa issuance. We are seeking changes to visa procedures that would permit us greater latitude in refusing visas for policy reasons. That could facilitate control over visits by obvious propagandists, but it would still be a clumsy weapon, poorly suited to dealing with highly visible cultural visits. We should, nevertheless, use our anticipated new ability to

refuse visas as leverage to get a more satisfactory overall official exchanges framework permitting us to compete more effectively in the ideological conflict in which we are engaged.

Our previous exchanges agreements with the Soviet Union basically repeated the form and content of the first, concluded in 1958, and were never altogether satisfactory. In approaching a new official agreement we would review the old agreements and our current interests to determine what our negotiating targets should be without regard for what we may perceive as Soviet negotiating requirements. (We would, of course, prepare an estimate of Soviet positions as part of the preparations for negotiations.)

In developing our negotiating targets, our aim will be to improve our penetration of Soviet society. During the negotiations on a new overall framework for exchanges, we would concentrate on the following specific areas in which the U.S. has the clear advantage or in which, through enforcement of strict reciprocity, we need to offset a current advantage held by the Soviets:

USIA Thematic Exhibits—Our exhibits, when in the USSR, provide the U.S. Government its best opportunity to acquaint millions of people in all walks of life throughout the Soviet Union with the many aspects of American life: our democratic system, our foreign and domestic policies and our hopes and aspirations for peace and prosperity for all peoples of the world. As a communication medium, in contrast to radio broadcasting, our exhibits bring the Soviet people into a two-way face-to-face dialogue with our American Russian-speaking guides who staff the exhibits. The Agency's exhibits had such overwhelming ideological impact that the exchange of thematic exhibits under the previous official exchanges agreements became anathema

to the Soviet authorities. Thus, it is clear that if the U.S. Government once again is to take advantage of this most effective ideological weapon against the Soviet Union, it will be able to do so only by adopting the same negotiating position we used during previous negotiations—no USIA thematic exhibits, no official exchanges agreement.

Radio and TV—Currently, Soviet propagandists have easy access to U.S. media without reciprocity. We will insist on greatly improved access to Soviet nation-wide electronic media to reach the largest possible audience with our message. For example, we have in mind setting an annual minimum for US and Soviet appearances on political discussion programs on each other's television.

Publications—The U.S. has always enjoyed a clear advantage in the popularity and appeal of our Russian-language *America Illustrated* magazine in the Soviet Union compared with its Soviet counterpart in the U.S., *Soviet Life*. In fact, the note you sent Charlie with the "special introductory offer" for *Soviet Life* (mailer attached at tab A)<sup>2</sup> illustrates how they have to push their product. Our magazine goes like hot cakes in the Soviet Union. Under a new agreement we would seek to negotiate a higher level of distribution of our magazine inside the USSR.

Educational and Academic Exchanges—With these exchanges we reach elite audiences, build long-term contacts inside institutions producing future Soviet leaders and help build and maintain the base of US expertise on the Soviet Union.

Performing Arts—Performing groups presenting the finest of American theater, dance and music in modern, classical and popular genre can provide large numbers of Soviet



citizens with a view of the exciting possibilities of free cultural development, a process denied by their system.

**American and Soviet Films**—The Soviets have been able to put on film weeks in a number of major American cities, but we have received no reciprocity for this. Under a new exchanges agreement we would insist on reciprocal film weeks in the Soviet Union.

**Access to Soviet Elites**—Soviet officials, propagandists and academics have almost unlimited access to our institutions, for which we will insist on reciprocity under the framework of a new agreement.

Should you decide to seek to negotiate a new framework for exchanges along the above lines, we will find the Soviets receptive in certain respects, although there will be a long fight on specifics. Soviet authorities believe that they derive political benefits from agreements with us.

Ironically, they also know that official agreements serve a very practical purpose—in their rigidly planned bureaucratic society official agreements make it easier to obtain the necessary budgets to finance the concrete expenditures encountered by the Soviet ministries and organizations engaged in exchanges-type activities in the U.S. and the USSR.

A decision to move toward a new bilateral exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union will encounter some opposition as well as considerable support domestically. We will want to make the point to our public and the Congress that a new agreement enforcing reciprocity is to our great advantage (there is a strong constituency on the Hill for the exchanges.) In general, we believe that our Allies will welcome such a decision as further evidence of our willingness to deal seriously with the Soviet leadership. We

will, of course, want to consult with the Allies before announcing any decision, to ensure that they fully understand our reasons and that they understand it is not a move to initiate a rapprochement with the USSR.

If you agree with our view of the importance of building a new framework for conducting exchanges and enforcing reciprocity, USIA will develop, in cooperation with the Department of State and other interested agencies, a draft agreement and negotiating strategy. When that process is completed, we would then propose to you appropriate timing for an approach to the Soviets on opening negotiations.

*Recommendation:*

That you authorize us to develop a draft exchanges agreement and negotiating strategy.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/04/83). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by B.B. Morton on March 4 and cleared by Simons and Palmer according to a March 10 covering memorandum. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive March 1-15 1983)

<sup>2</sup> Not attached.

<sup>3</sup> The President did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

## 19. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 16, 1983

### SUBJECT

Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

In accordance with your instructions,<sup>2</sup> here is how I propose to proceed in our bilateral relations with the Soviets in the coming months. I will continue to report to you and seek your further guidance at each stage of the process.<sup>3</sup>

*Human Rights:* We will continue to keep this issue at the top of our agenda with the Soviets, focusing on:

— *The Pentecostals:* I will meet with Dobrynin this week to begin implementing the approach you have approved.<sup>4</sup> Emphasizing that the recent Soviet response does not go far enough, I will press Dobrynin to permit the immediate emigration of the one member of the family (Lydia) who was evacuated from the Embassy in connection with her hunger strike last year. I will also give him our understanding of the Soviet statement concerning the Pentecostals still in the Embassy, i.e. that they will be given permission to emigrate if they return to their home and submit applications.<sup>5</sup> At this initial meeting, I will inform Dobrynin that I have discussed areas for possible progress in our bilateral relations with you, but will reserve further discussion of these for a later meeting.

—*Shcharanskiy*: I will continue in subsequent meetings to reiterate our strong interest in an early release of Shcharanskiy and indicate that we remain interested in the possibility of an exchange for him (as you know, there has recently been some movement on this score).

—*Madrid*: Underscoring our interest in a balanced outcome at Madrid, I will continue to reinforce Max Kampelman's suggestion that Soviet release of a number of prisoners of conscience would remove a major obstacle to a successful conclusion of the conference.<sup>6</sup>

*Arms Control*: In my meetings with Dobrynin and in our other diplomatic contacts, we will stress our intention to continue serious negotiations at Geneva. Our arms control approach will continue to be based on the criteria you have established—real reductions, equality, verifiability, and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance.

*Regional Issues*: In accordance with our overall policy of probing Andropov for new flexibility on regional issues, we will continue to raise these issues with the Soviets. Because we do not wish to fall into the old pattern of conducting most of our exchanges through Dobrynin, our principal interlocutor with the Soviets on these issues will continue to be Art Hartman. I believe that in coming months Art should test the Soviets on the following regional issues:

—*Middle East*: Art should meet with senior MFA Officials for a discussion of the Middle East, as he has done on two recent occasions. These exchanges represent a low-cost means of keeping the Soviets at bay on this issue and, of course, would not touch upon more sensitive aspects of our diplomacy. They

also give us a means of reiterating our concerns about unhelpful Soviet behavior, such as the export of SA-5s to Syria.

—*Afghanistan*: Art should also be instructed to keep the pressure on Moscow by reiterating our basic position on Afghanistan—something we have not done in detail since Andropov became General Secretary. Following the visit of UN SYG Perez de Cuellar to Moscow this month and the next round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva next month, we will again assess whether there is more we can do, together with the Pakistanis and Chinese, to press Moscow on Afghanistan.

—*Southern Africa*: We are carefully considering whether further US-Soviet dialogue would advance our Namibia/Angola initiative and our broader objectives in the region. If this review suggests that more exchanges would be in our interest, I would anticipate that Art would be our principal channel of communication on this issue as well.

*Bilateral Relations*: In this area, we will move deliberately and cautiously, looking at each step in terms of our interests and the requirements of our overall policy approach. In accordance with your guidance, I will in subsequent meetings with Dobrynin indicate our willingness to take two steps that are in our interest:

—Negotiation of a new cultural agreement to enforce reciprocity and enhance U.S. ideological penetration of the Soviet Union itself;

—Opening of a U.S. consulate in Kiev to establish a new U.S. presence in the Ukraine.

As for the existing bilateral agreements which come up for review/renewal over the next year, we will examine carefully each agreement on its merits to ensure that any action we take is clearly in the U.S. interest. The first of these is the Fisheries Agreement where we are already under pressure from Congress and U.S. fishing interests to negotiate a new agreement with expanded joint venture fishing activities—steps which would rescind elements of our Afghanistan and Poland sanctions regime. I will be sending you a recommendation on this issue shortly.

As I suggested in our recent discussions, the long-term grains agreement is a special case requiring careful handling. I will shortly be sending you a recommendation on this matter.

*High-level Dialogue:* As noted above, I will be implementing your instructions in meetings with Dobrynin, focusing first on the Pentecostals, and then addressing other issues in subsequent meetings. I will instruct Art Hartman to pursue his contacts with the Soviet MFA on regional issues. If these discussions indicate that a meeting before the next UNGA between Gromyko and me would be in our interest, I will have further recommendations on timing and venue.

*Public Handling:* As we proceed, it will be essential that our public statements on US-Soviet relations continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet behavior—their military buildup, geopolitical expansionism, and human rights violations. Against this background of Soviet behavior, we must continue to stress the necessity for a renewal of American economic and military strength. It must be equally clear that we have no intention of returning to “business-as-usual” in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union—there must be significant concrete changes in Soviet behavior.



Our public statements should also emphasize that we intend to continue the dialogue with the Soviet Union which we began at the outset of this Administration on the full agenda we have established. We should continue to emphasize our intention to negotiate in good faith in the START and INF talks. But we should also underscore that we have engaged the Soviet Union in discussion of human rights, regional issues, and our bilateral relations. While continuing to stress the continuity of our policy of realism, strength, and dialogue, we can proceed with confidence to take limited steps in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union where it is in our interest to do so.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union March. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 14 memorandum to Shultz, forwarded through Eagleburger, Burt summarized the purpose of sending this memorandum forward to Reagan. Eagleburger wrote in the margin: "G.S.: This is a *good* memo. LSE." (Ibid.) Lenczowski forwarded the memorandum to Reagan on March 25 (see [Document 25](#)).

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 17](#).

<sup>3</sup> In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "On March 16, I sent the president an important memorandum entitled 'Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations.' I outlined my proposed program and our four-part agenda. Instead of asking for the president's formal approval—and thereby allowing my memo to be funneled through the NSC staffing process—I gave the president my reading of our own private discussions, and I said, 'Here is how I propose to proceed in our bilateral relations with the Soviets in the coming months. I will continue to report to you and seek your further guidance at each stage of the process.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 269)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to Shultz's meeting with Dobrynin that evening. See [Document 20](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 12](#).

<sup>6</sup> Kampelman headed the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE Second Review Conference being held in Madrid.

## 20. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 16, 1983, 5 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

Secretary of State Shultz  
Mark Palmer, EUR

#### *USSR*

Ambassador Dobrynin  
Minister-Counselor Sokolov

The Secretary opened by stating that he had discussed with the President the matters which are on our agenda. The President found his meeting with Dobrynin useful.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary expected shortly to be able to review with Dobrynin a number of issues. But he had insufficient time to do so properly now. The effort we are making is on track.

The Secretary then said that he did not want to let more time go by on the Pentecostalists. The President was pleased with the promptness of the Soviet response. We would like to move ahead to resolve this problem. We interpret the Soviet response to mean that if the Pentecostalists leave the Embassy, go home and apply for visas, their requests will be acted upon favorably. If we are not correct—and we are not asking for the Soviet Union to rewrite its communication—the Secretary said he would like to know about it.

The Secretary continued that we believe persuading the Pentecostalists will not be easy. One of them has left the Embassy—Lidia Vashchenko. If her papers are processed and she is allowed to leave the Soviet Union, we could inform the Pentecostalists still in the Embassy, and this

would be definitive, and persuasive evidence. We request the Soviet Union to act on this key element so that we can make this effort come about.

Dobrynin responded that he could not say more than is in their communication.<sup>3</sup> Careful examination of it should be done. He was not in a position to give additional assurances. There were matters of principle, legality and extra-territoriality. The Soviet authorities would take into consideration all the circumstances, including the President's appeal. But he could not give any guarantee and doubted that Moscow could.

Dobrynin argued that they could not have a situation in which the Pentecostalists go to OVIR (Soviet passport office) and say that they have assurances from the U.S. Ambassador and the Secretary of State. We should be eloquent and persuade the Pentecostalists to proceed.

The Secretary then stressed that we need more than eloquence. We face a practical problem and are trying to resolve it. We made our points carefully. The Secretary then reiterated them again, stressing that we were not asking for additional assurances but that if our understanding was off base, we should be told. He also emphasized again that allowing Lidia to emigrate would constitute a convincing argument.

Dobrynin then stated that he would pass our message to Moscow. He went on to ask where we stood on other matters.

The Secretary stated that he would be in touch promptly to continue our effort and to become more specific. He had been busy with other matters.

Dobrynin said he would like to raise one question. There are still major issues at the Geneva talks. The Secretary had stated before this round in Geneva that he would look through these issues. This round is almost over. Maybe higher levels than the delegations should address these matters. He was speaking from experience. What did the Secretary think? Would it be worthwhile?

The Secretary stated that when he got back to Dobrynin he would have some comments to make on arms control. But we also wanted to discuss regional issues and we had a number of bilateral matters to address. We wanted to see what we could do, for example on what we have called "Madrid" issues. We accept approaching these matters in that spirit.

The Secretary reiterated that arms control is certainly one of the most important issues, but there are other issues too. The menu is important. His discussions with Dobrynin would continue. Art Hartman's discussions in Moscow also can make contributions. The Secretary does not have any doubt that as we proceed we should try to arrange a meeting with Gromyko. At the next meeting with Dobrynin he would have one or two concrete things. The Secretary concluded by noting that everybody has a different approach to exercise. Some like to walk. Dobrynin seemed like he wanted to run. But the Secretary is a jogger.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer on March 18; cleared by Seitz and McManaway. Palmer initialed for both clearing officials. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. A typed notation indicates that McManaway "cleared cable

with ident. text." The text of the memorandum of conversation was sent to Moscow in telegram 80054, March 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 10](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 12](#).



## **21. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 21, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

Increasing the Pressure on Moscow

This memorandum discusses a number of things we will or could be doing to step up pressure on the Soviets in the critical period ahead.

### *The Setting*

US objectives over the period between now and 1984 are described in the memorandum which you recently sent to the President.<sup>2</sup> We see building pressure on the Soviets within that context—providing additional pressures/incentives for moderation and serious negotiations.

We will be pursuing a new and sounder basis for US-Soviet relations through domestic and international economic recovery, through rearmament, through sustaining and strengthening of our alliances and international friendships, and through direct diplomacy—recognizing that success in direct diplomatic dealings depends in large part on success in these first three fields (economic, rearmament, Allies and friends). In terms of timing, however, the next year or so breaks down prospectively into two phases.

Until late summer and early fall, we and the Soviets will be engaged in the battle over INF deployments in Western Europe. The shape of the second phase depends on who wins or loses that battle. If we have demonstrated that we cannot be isolated, if INF moves forward in the framework of the NATO dual decision, and if economic recovery and rearmament are proceeding apace, the Soviets can be expected to take rearguard actions to mask and compensate for their defeat. Indeed, the harder line they have adopted following the West German elections and toward Nakasone may be groundwork, intended to prepare for work on a losing wicket. Some of these Soviet actions may be quite nasty.

In addition, we should be aware that inadvertence, neglect, the dynamic of events—or all three together—could produce a further deterioration of relations which neither country desires as a matter of policy. Simple continuity in the Soviet approach to El Salvador, for instance, could have this result under certain circumstances. The Bulgarian connection to the Papal assassination attempt is another potential source of new strain in our relations with Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

Prospects, nevertheless, are not necessarily discouraging. At present, the Soviets have an interest in avoiding a major political crisis in Europe or the Third World which could distract European publics from the INF issue, or even make deployments easier by casting Moscow in the role of “aggressor.” New Soviet diplomatic activism in Asia—with Sino-Soviet “normalization” as its centerpiece—serves the same end. Any risk of confrontation with the U.S. would have to be commensurate in importance with the INF issue. There are only a few issues—Poland, the Middle East, and possibly Iran—on which Moscow would envisage such a tradeoff in 1983. Even in these areas, moreover, Moscow

will have an important incentive for restraint—at least until the fate of INF is clear.

And if we are successful as this year proceeds, there will be a growing prospect of the Soviets dealing with this Administration on the basis of the comprehensive agenda we have established these last two years. We could face a situation which potentially parallels the 1953-1956 transition period. During that “thaw,” there were significant changes in both domestic and international Soviet conduct.

—On the one hand, the parallel is sobering: the USSR made important moves on human rights and in Eastern Europe, Austria and Korea, but it continued its military buildup, eventually cracked down again in Eastern Europe and renewed its expansionism elsewhere.

—On the other hand, the parallel is encouraging: internally, millions of prisoners left the camps never to return, and the terror regime has never been the same; Eastern Europe has never reverted to the pure colonial status of the pre-1953 period; and the Korean armistice and the Austrian State Treaty were substantial accomplishments.

Our task, then, is to maintain our overall framework of realism, strength and negotiations for dealing with the Soviets whatever they do. We should test the Soviets, along the lines you have recommended to the President; we should step up the pressure, as I recommend below; and we must insist on deeds rather than merely words. In the period immediately ahead we should be alert to the possibility of genuine openings, but we should above all be firm in our direct dealings with the Soviets and imaginative

in our approach to our Allies and friends. That is the context for the program of pressures described below.

### *A U.S. Pressures Program*

You are aware of efforts underway to put our political action programs into high gear, and the Counterintelligence SIG is actively considering more stringent controls on Soviet diplomats in the U.S. This memorandum does not address these issues or our START/INF positions, though they will be critical to our success in dealings with the Soviets. Rather, I begin with two ideas for further thought in the military programs area.

1. *Defense.* These ideas are put forward as possibilities only, and will require further elaboration.

—Rapid agreement with Congress on the MX study recommendations (put the MX into Minuteman silos and develop a small, genuine mobile) would give us additional leverage with Moscow. Announcing soon that we are moving ahead to put the MX into Minuteman silos quickly (possibly in 1985) would have the distinct advantage of confronting the Soviets in the near term with a deployed system they would have to reckon with in both arms control and defense planning. Announcing the small mobile would demonstrate that we have a longer-term challenge as well.

—We could submit a major security assistance supplemental if the Soviets themselves undertake a new, dramatic aggressive act. This would give us more practical leverage in key countries and areas across the spectrum than practically any other other step we could take.

## *2. High-Level Diplomatic Activity*

We can offset Andropov's own greater activism (meetings with foreign leaders, etc.), and put pressure on the Soviets, by effective use of visible U.S. high-level activity. In particular we want President Reagan himself to outshine and outrun Andropov. We should task a thorough review for 1983-1984 to ensure that we are making the best use of this tool. The President should be identified with some drama and movement in foreign affairs to continue the momentum created by the Middle East initiative and his letter to the peoples of Europe.<sup>4</sup> The Vice President and you can also play important roles—as demonstrated by your recent trips. In this connection, we suggest that you publicly announce a meeting with Gromyko following this round of INF and START talks if he has agreed.

Another idea which interweaves political action and Presidential drama would be a private and then public invitation to Andropov to appear on American television in return for a Presidential appearance on Soviet television. If the proposal were rejected (or simply not answered, as when the President made the offer to Brezhnev in his London speech last year),<sup>5</sup> Andropov's "sophisticated," "liberal" image would suffer. If it were accepted, we would be the net winner, since Andropov is unlikely to overwhelm the American public, while the President's appearance on Soviet TV would be a major event in the USSR.

*3. Diplomatic Action.* We suggest a program to increase pressures (or at least maintain our present positions) in two areas directly adjacent to the USSR—the Far East and Eastern Europe.

—In the *Far East*, and throughout Asia, we should demonstrate our continuing involvement and relevance to

area problems. Specifically:

(a) With *China*, we should follow up on your trip with continuing efforts to maintain and advance our relationship, recognizing the limits to what we can accomplish in the short term and the need to sustain the realistic tone you have set. To this end, we could move forward with a summit later this year and concentrate on being responsive to some of China's needs in the technology area, as well as meeting our commitments under the August 17 communique.<sup>6</sup>

(b) We could seek to build up incrementally toward *trilateral US-PRC-Japan talks*. We could suggest to a private American institute (e.g. CSIS, AEI) that it approach a Japanese counterpart to take the lead in organizing "private" trilateral exchanges with PRC counterparts, who could include some officials. In a parallel effort, we could also move in the official track. We have responded to Chinese interest in bilateral talks on Soviet issues by inviting a small delegation of their Soviet experts to Washington this spring for consultations with our Soviet experts, along lines similar to those we use with the Japanese. We are also suggesting that we add a stop in Beijing to the itinerary of the experts going to Tokyo for talks later this year. The Chinese have responded informally but positively, and we are firming this up. Once these steps have been taken, and if the result warrants it, we could consider how to build up or enhance such consultations further.

(c) EUR and EA have been considering yet another run at trying to establish a diplomatic presence in Mongolia. Both Art Hartman and Art Hummel favor an approach. But neither we nor EA think the time is



ripe as there is a “Mongolian element” in the second round of Sino-Soviet normalization talks now underway in Moscow—it could appear that we are rather fecklessly trying to interfere. Once this round is over, however, we will want to take another look at the pros and cons of what would in any case be a small step, and will be sending you a paper on the topic.

(d) We should sustain our support for ASEAN’s approach to *Kampuchea* and take further steps, like your meeting with Sihanouk in Beijing, to strengthen the anti-Vietnamese coalition.

(e) Further west, we should supplement Pakistani efforts to use the UN process to keep diplomatic pressure on the Soviets over *Afghanistan* with pressure of our own in bilateral and other channels. We will be instructing Art Hartman to meet with Soviet MFA officials to reiterate our basic position on Afghanistan before UNSYG Perez de Cuellar visits Moscow March 27–28. Following the next round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva in April, we will reassess whether there is more we can do, together with the Chinese and the Pakistanis, to keep diplomatic pressure on the Soviets.

—In *Eastern Europe*, greater U.S. activism would serve to counteract Soviet attempts to enforce greater unity and discipline, and to supplement the dwindling economic resources we can commit to East-West competition in the area. We want to heighten Andropov’s uncertainty about his own backyard, and undercut the widespread impression that we have written off Eastern Europe from Yalta onwards. Specifically:

(a) In *Poland*, this strategy argues for our going ahead with the Allies to develop a package indicating Western willingness to reciprocate concrete human rights progress. Specifically, we should make our willingness to consider rescheduling of Polish debt dependent on release of political prisoners and cessation of regime harassment of prisoners already released. We could make our approach to the Poles themselves in the wake of the Pope's visit in June—assuming it goes well.

(b) In *Hungary*, we should place a high priority on ensuring that the Vice President visits Budapest this year, and indicate the possibility of seeking Congressional approval for multi-year MFN for Hungary at an appropriate time. We should also move forward with the visit by their Foreign Minister this fall.

(c) In *Czechoslovakia*, we should consider expanding our ideological penetration and presence by negotiating an exchanges agreement—this would parallel the same step we will be taking with the Soviets.

(d) In *Romania*, while lifting MFN, we should manage our post-MFN relationship to encourage continued Romanian independence from Moscow.

(e) In *Yugoslavia*, we should keep moving on economic support and with the Vice President's visit.<sup>7</sup> There could be no better signal of our vitality and relevance to the area than major movement toward sale of the F20 to Yugoslavia—and it may justify use of countertrade financing.

(f) In *Albania*, we should encourage the Italians, Greeks, West Germans and French to respond to Hoxha's opening to the West with modest reciprocal gestures and discreet appeals to Hoxha to get off his anti-Yugoslav campaign.<sup>8</sup> The only bilateral step we might consider would involve a settlement of Albania's pending gold claims against the U.S. This careful building of a Western connection would take account of both Yugoslav sensitivities and Andropov's recent signals to the Albanians, and would be designed to keep the Soviets from moving into a vacuum either now or post-Hoxha.

(g) With *selected Soviet allies*, we should make occasional bilateral demarches explaining our current START and INF positions and criticizing those of the Soviets, and making clear our concern about their programs in areas of tension in the Third World. This would match what the Soviets do with our Allies and make the point that we consider these countries to be potentially autonomous in foreign policy.

#### 4. *Covert Action*

A separate memo has been sent to you on this subject. It should be read in tandem with this memorandum.<sup>9</sup>

Under prudent management, steps in these four categories—plus movement to put our political action and counter-intelligence/reciprocity programs in place—would enhance the effectiveness of the diplomatic testing I have recommended, and serve to keep our overall framework of realism and strength in place as the Soviets test us. Together, this combined program of direct tests and indirect pressures would also lay the groundwork for more

productive direct dealings if and as the Soviets realize that their current diplomatic offensive has failed.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and Napper on March 8; cleared by Palmer. Napper initialed for Simons. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on March 21.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 19](#).

<sup>3</sup> Documentation on Bulgarian involvement in the 1981 Papal assassination attempt is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. X, Eastern Europe](#).

<sup>4</sup> In a letter read by Bush in West Berlin on January 31, Reagan offered to meet with Andropov to sign an agreement to ban intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, p.155.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Reagan's speech to Parliament at Westminster, June 8, 1982. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 742-748. See also [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 177](#) and [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 104](#).

<sup>6</sup> Documentation on the Taiwan communiqué on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XXVIII, China, 1981-1983](#).

<sup>7</sup> Vice President and Mrs. Bush visited Yugoslavia from September 16 to 18. In telegram 7776 from Belgrade, September 21, the Embassy reported: "The Vice President was, I believe, fully satisfied and indeed impressed by his talks with the Yugoslav leadership. He held over seven hours of substantive talks with the top-most officials." The Embassy continued that the Yugoslavs "expressed their

sincere appreciation for the Vice President's warmth, directness and measured approach to internal and bilateral affairs. They especially value his comments on continued U.S. support for Yugoslav independence and for its non-aligned position." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830546-0875)

<sup>8</sup> The Embassy reported in telegram 449 from Belgrade, January 19: "Albanian foreign policy has undergone a major and dangerous change over the last several months. Albania no longer sees its security linked with that of Yugoslavia; indeed Tirana now appears to be seeking to destabilize Yugoslavia. Although for the moment, the main thrust of Albania's foreign policy seems to be [to] expand carefully relations with selected Western European states, the Yugoslav officials did not rule out an Albanian turn back to the east." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830033-0073)

<sup>9</sup> A tandem memorandum on covert action was not found.



## 22. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 23, 1983, 4:30 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

The Secretary  
Amb. Eagleburger  
Mr. Mark Palmer

#### *USSR*

Amb. Dobrynin

The Secretary opened the meeting by noting that Dobrynin had indicated he had something to raise.

Dobrynin stated that Andropov had instructed him to convey an oral message in reply to our oral message on MBFR.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary read the reply and described it as forthcoming. He said we would send the message to Ambassador Abramowitz. He stressed that the key to MBFR is verification. The so-called data issue is really a verification issue. If we can find methods which are mutually satisfactory on verification, we can move ahead. It is not the starting numbers but the ending numbers which matter.

Dobrynin noted that the Soviets had made their suggestions several weeks ago and they are awaiting our substantive move.

The Secretary then stated he wanted to note that our Embassy in Moscow had reported that Lidia (the Pentecostalist outside the Embassy) had telephoned to our



Embassy. In her hometown, she has been called in and told to submit forms for departure. She intended to do so tomorrow. We were very pleased to learn of this movement. We give the Soviets the credit. The family members had called London and it would get into the press. Our Embassy will confirm this.

Dobrynin recommended that there be no special statement. The less talk, the better. There would be a chain reaction of why, where, etc.

The Secretary stated that he agreed we should keep a lower profile, but noted that a refusal to say anything at all would simply make matters worse. The Secretary then asked whether Dobrynin had anything more to say on this subject.

Dobrynin said that he had nothing more. He recommended that we wait until it is final.

The Secretary agreed that we would wait until Lidia had left the country and then go to work to approach the other family members.

The Secretary then said he wished to give the Soviet Union an advance copy of the President's speech to be delivered that night. He noted that the defense position of the speech is couched basically in descriptive language. What he wanted to call Dobrynin's particular attention to was the section entitled "Call for a Bold Defense". This section puts forward the notion that given the sophistication of technology, it may in the future be possible to provide defense against ballistic missiles.<sup>3</sup>

The Secretary continued that the President is saying here that the U.S. is pursuing an R&D effort. This is consistent

with the ABM Treaty, and we presume that the Soviet Union also has a similar effort underway.

This effort is being undertaken in the context of our seeking methods for further stabilization, the Secretary said. It is therefore not intended to destabilize the situation.

The President points out in his speech that we are pursuing arms control. The Secretary said the President will have something further to say on arms control in a speech he will be giving a week from tomorrow (Thursday, March 31).<sup>4</sup> The Secretary noted that we would be in touch with the Soviets before that speech at the negotiating table, and that he would see Dobrynin here in Washington beforehand too.

Dobrynin responded that he was disturbed to see the U.S. pursuing a new area in the arms race. This Administration seems to be piling one area on top of another, and there is nothing moving in the negotiations. If the U.S. produces something, the Soviets will do so as well.

The Secretary responded that this is not a new area, and that what is involved is only a research effort consistent with the ABM Treaty.

The Secretary then noted that he also has in mind the other things (on our agenda). He pointed out that Dobrynin's meeting with the President had been kept quiet except for a mention in "Time" magazine. We have prepared low-key press guidance in case it does get more attention. The Secretary concluded by noting that he has mentioned the progress on Lidia to the President, and the President is appreciative of the effort under way.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, March 16-23 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer; cleared by Eagleburger, Seitz, and Hill. Eagleburger initialed for Seitz and Palmer initialed for Hill. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet oral message is not attached to this document. A copy was found in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.4, President/Andropov Correspondence.

<sup>3</sup> Shultz provided Dobrynin with an advance copy of the President's speech on "Defense and National Security," given on March 23 at 8 p.m. in the Oval Office. Reagan's speech is in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 145\*](#).

<sup>4</sup> On March 30, Reagan gave brief remarks announcing a "Proposed Interim Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Agreement." For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 473-474. On March 31, he also gave a speech in Los Angeles at the World Affairs Council luncheon, in which he discussed INF reductions and other U.S.-Soviet issues. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 479-486. See also [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 146\*](#).

## 23. Editorial Note

At 8 p.m. on March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan delivered a televised address to the nation on defense and national security. During the speech, Reagan called for research on a new initiative designed to protect the United States from incoming nuclear ballistic missiles. This program eventually became known as the Strategic Defense Initiative or, colloquially, by reporters and detractors of the program, as “Star Wars.” The origins and development of the Strategic Defense Initiative will be documented in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981-1984\*](#).<sup>7</sup>

During a campaign trip to NORAD in 1979, Reagan learned that the United States had no defense against an incoming nuclear missile attack. Since that visit, the idea of developing some kind of defense against nuclear missiles resonated with Reagan. In his memoir, he wrote: “I came into office with a decided prejudice against our tacit agreement with the Soviet Union regarding nuclear missiles. I’m talking about the MAD policy—‘mutual assured destruction’—the idea of deterrence providing safety so long as each of us had the power to destroy the other with nuclear missiles if one of us launched a first strike. Somehow this didn’t seem to me to be something that would send you to bed feeling safe. It was like having two westerners standing in a saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head—permanently. There had to be a better way.

“Early in my first term, I called a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—our military leaders—and said to them: Every offensive weapon ever invented by man has resulted in the creation of a defense against it; isn’t it possible in

this age of technology that we could invent a defensive weapon that could intercept nuclear weapons and destroy them as they emerged from their silos?

“They looked at each other, then asked if they could huddle for a few moments. Very shortly, they came out of their huddle and said, ‘Yes, it’s an idea worth exploring.’ My answer was, ‘Let’s do it.’” (Reagan, *An American Life*, page 547)

In his February 11, 1983, diary entry, Reagan wrote: “An almost 2 hr. lunch with Joint Chiefs of staff. Most of time spent on MX & the commission etc. Out of it came a super idea. So far the only policy worldwide on nuclear weapons is to have a deterrent. What if we tell the world we want to protect our people not avenge them; that we [a]re going to embark on a program of research to come up with a defensive weapon that could make nuclear weapons obsolete? I would call upon the scientific community to volunteer in bringing such a thing about.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 196)

According to Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, Reagan asked him to begin working on a special insert for the upcoming defense and national security speech, which would propose research and development for SDI. Reagan told McFarlane: “‘I want you to keep this tightly under wraps.’ and ‘Do the work in your own staff and write the speech and let’s get ready to give it.’” (McFarlane, *Special Trust*, pages 229–231) McFarlane, with assistance from National Security Council Staff members Raymond Pollock, Richard Boverie, and John Poindexter began work on the insert, while the White House speechwriters worked on the main parts of the speech.

By March 21, word of the speech reached the Department of State. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "On Monday morning, March 21, Larry Eagleburger reported to me on a conversation he had just had with Bud McFarlane. 'The president will give a speech on Wednesday, March 23,' he told me. The Joint Chiefs had convinced the president, he said, that the MX would remain vulnerable but that there was an alternative. 'The alternative is a high-tech strategic defense system that can protect us against ballistic missiles and thereby protect our offensive capabilities. The president is intrigued and wants to make strategic defense the subject of his speech.'

"'The chiefs,' I countered, 'are not equipped to make this kind of proposal. They are not scientists.'

"Eagleburger went on to say that the president had nevertheless decided that 'by the close of the century we should turn to a strategic defense and by then banish all nuclear weapons.' Bud McFarlane wanted to get up a message to our allies, said Eagleburger.

"'We don't have the technology to say this,' I interjected.

"'The White House has a whole public campaign planned,' Eagleburger responded. It sounded to me like Fortress America. 'This changes the whole strategic view and doctrine of the United States,' I said.

"Rick Burt came into the meeting. When Eagleburger described to him the president's idea, Burt was flabbergasted. 'Not only is a nuclear-free world a pipe dream, but a speech like this by the president will unilaterally destroy the foundation of the Western alliance,' he said.



“After this meeting, I confided to my executive assistant, Ray Seitz, that I had heard of the strategic defense idea before: first at my dinner with the president and subsequently when I had argued with Bill Clark about the strategic defense question the previous Friday. ‘There is an interplay between policy and technology,’ I said. ‘Technology can make policy obsolete. The president is saying that defensive measures have a lot of promise, and he’s right. But they should redraft the speech to recognize the evolving technology without changing our strategic doctrine.’

“About eleven o’clock that morning, Bill Clark called on the secure line about the new defensive concept that was to be part of the president’s speech on the defense budget.

“‘This is so sweeping,’ I told him, ‘that it must be carefully considered. It could hit the allies right between the eyes. This is the year when we especially need a cohesive alliance in our negotiations with the Soviets. Why place so much confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff? They are in no position to make what amounts to a scientific judgment.’

“Later in the afternoon I went to the White House for a meeting with the president. I found great resistance to any change in the words for the speech. ‘This paragraph is a revolution in our strategic doctrine,’ I told President Reagan. He had Keyworth [Science Adviser to President Reagan] called in. I asked him, ‘Can you be sure of an impenetrable shield? And what about cruise missiles? What about stealth bombers? Your language is sweeping. I’m not objecting to R and D, but this is a bombshell. What about the ABM Treaty? What about our allies and the strategic doctrine on which we and they depend? You don’t say anything about those questions.’ His answers were not at

all satisfactory to me.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 249–250)

Reagan wrote in his diary on March 21: “Geo. Shultz came by concerned about an insert intended for inclusion in Wednesday T.V. speech on defense. He had a point but I think the writing of the insert is at fault. I find it hard to understand myself.—I think I’ll have to try rewriting it.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 208)

On March 22, Shultz expressed concerns in a meeting with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs William Clark and McFarlane. Although no formal record of this meeting has been found, Shultz briefed Charles Hill, who prepared the following handwritten notes:

“*Speech on defensive weapons.*—S [Secretary] has pissed in the punch bowl. Not happy w him at WH.

“—Clark and McF have [committed?] P [President] to it w/o thinking it through & now embarrassed to go & back him off. McF to blame.

“—Cap won’t accept it.

“—Will send our draft to P. They have not agreed that they must pull P back. But know that S opposed & won’t support it. Gaping holes in the concept (stop all of nucl-attack ag U.S.) [illegible] says that we *can* stop Sov stealth bomber while asking Cong to spend for our stealth. How do we know we cld stop it.

“—S has carried big load & been hurt by it. He has had to say WH *wrong*. But did right thing, has cost him with P

“—idea came fr *PFIAB*. And JCS strong supporters. (until later said they only meant ballistic missile)

This does not amt to full defense of nucl attack

*“And wld have us violate the ABM treaty.*

1. The JCS, *PFIAB* predicted what can’t be known

2. but was there a philosophical basis behind it—fortress America

“—philosophical [unilateralism?] The circle where left & rt meet in the circle. Isolationism meets America out & Yankee go home

“F’stein meets the Wolfman.” (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 22, 1983)

Shultz raised his concerns with Reagan in a telephone call that evening, March 22. As he recounted in his memoir: “At 6:30 in the evening, the president called me. ‘I think the wording of the speech is better in this current draft, and some of the Qs and As are helpful,’ I told him, ‘but I still have great reservations, not about the R and D effort, but about advancing this as something of such tremendous importance and scope. It implies we are changing our strategic doctrine. There are a host of unanswered technical questions. There is tremendous strength in both offensive and defensive measures, but the former historically has the upper hand. I can’t see being certain of one system defending against cruise missiles on submarines and stealth bombers, let alone ballistic missiles. I can see the moral ground you want to stake out, but I don’t want to see you put something forward so powerfully, only to find technical flaws or major doctrinal weaknesses.’ I went on, ‘I have been sitting here trying to

think it through. It raises questions about the B-1 bomber and stealth and INF deployments. I have to say honestly that I am deeply troubled. Of course, I will support you. I'm sure you know that.'

"President Reagan responded, stressing the overwhelming attractions to him of a defensive system.

"'I agree that if we get there, we'll be in the catbird seat,' I said. 'So we must push our R and D if for no other reason than because the Soviets are. But it can be destabilizing as to what the Soviets do and how they respond. They will assume that we have a major scientific breakthrough. I don't know the implications of that.'

"The president interrupted to say that this was the part that would make a news item and attract the networks.

"'It's more than a news item. It's a sweeping proposal,' I said.

"I looked over the draft text again and said, 'A lot of weight is put on Keyworth. It suggests that we really have the technology. I don't have the information. Is stealth irrelevant? Perhaps I could redraft a few alternative paragraphs that support R and D, state that the research is consistent with the ABM Treaty and that we continue to rely on our strategic doctrine of deterrence. We don't want to make the prospect sound as if this is an overall and imminent solution to our problems. Should I give it a whirl?'

"The president told me to go ahead.

"Half apologetically I said, 'I feel I would be derelict if I didn't tell you what I think.' That was the end of the conversation.

"I was impressed with the president's call. Again, I could see the depth of his feelings about this issue, his abhorrence of reliance on the ability to 'wipe each other out' as the means of deterring war, and, of course, I could agree that if we could learn how to defend ourselves, that would be wonderful." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 253)

Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: "On my desk was a draft of the speech on defense to be delivered tomorrow night on T.V. This was one hassled over by N.S.C., State & Defense. Finally I have a crack at it. I did a lot of re-writing. Much of it was to change bureaucratic into people talk." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 208)

Throughout the day on March 23, the struggle over the contents of the speech continued between the NSC and State Department. As Charles Hill wrote in his notes for the day: "*—More on P speech on defensive issues blood level high.*

"—Clark distancing himself from it now he sees it as big mistake. S fears that McF will take the rap & not survive. (Clark will go to the press about it & blame someone so as to avoid trouble himself)

"—still unclear what is to be said, but we toning it down, less dramatic. Not as hair raising as headed for yesterday. S was the only one athwart it.

"—(a total collapse of the whole NSC decision making procedure)

"—NSC sold P a bill of goods. Preempt freeze mvt, etc." (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 23, 1983)

On March 23, Reagan wrote in his diary: "The big thing today was the 8 P.M. T.V. speech on all networks about the Nat. Security. We've been working on the speech for about 72 hrs. & right down to deadline." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 209)

In his televised address that evening, the President stated: "One of the most important contributions we can make is, of course, to lower the level of all arms, and particularly nuclear arms. We're engaged right now in several negotiations with the Soviet Union to bring about a mutual reduction of weapons. I will report to you a week from tomorrow my thoughts on that score. But let me just say, I'm totally committed to this course.

"If the Soviet Union will join with us in our effort to achieve major arms reduction, we will have succeeded in stabilizing the nuclear balance. Nevertheless, it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat. And that's a sad commentary on the human condition. Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability? I think we are. Indeed, we must.

"After careful consultation with my advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I believe there is a way. Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today.



“What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

“I know this is a formidable, technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. Yet, current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it’s reasonable for us to begin this effort. It will take years, probably decades of effort on many fronts. There will be failures and setbacks, just as there will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response. But isn’t it worth every investment necessary to free the world from the threat of nuclear war? We know it is.

“In the meantime, we will continue to pursue real reductions in nuclear arms, negotiating from a position of strength that can be ensured only by modernizing our strategic forces. At the same time, we must take steps to reduce the risk of a conventional military conflict escalating to nuclear war by improving our non-nuclear capabilities.

“America does possess—now—the technologies to attain very significant improvements in the effectiveness of our conventional, non-nuclear forces. Proceeding boldly with these new technologies, we can significantly reduce any incentive that the Soviet Union may have to threaten attack against the United States or its allies.

“As we pursue our goal of defensive technologies, we recognize that our allies rely upon our strategic offensive power to deter attacks against them. Their vital interests

and ours are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. And no change in technology can or will alter that reality. We must and shall continue to honor our commitments.

“I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. But with these considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.

“Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and recognizing the need for closer consultation with our allies, I’m taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose—one all people share—is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

“My fellow Americans, tonight we’re launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it. As we cross this threshold, I ask for your prayers and your support.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pages 442–443)

Reagan also wrote in his diary that a special group was invited to the White House for the speech, including

“several former Secs. of State, Nat. Security Advisors, distinguished Nuclear scientists, the Chiefs of Staff, etc. I did the speech from the Oval office at 8 & then joined the party for coffee. I guess it was O.K. they all praised it to the sky & seemed to think it would be a source of debate for some time to come. I did the bulk of the speech on why our arms build up was necessary & then finished with a call to the Science community to join me in research starting now to develop a defensive weapon that would render nuclear missiles obsolete. I made no optimistic forecasts—said it might take 20 yrs. or more but we had to do it. I felt good.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 209)

**24. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with the President on US-Soviet Relations, March 25

I recommend that you use your meeting tomorrow with the President to reconfirm his approval for the strategy you have proposed for US-Soviet high-level dialogue over the coming months. This should include both the series of meetings you are having with Dobrynin and our plans to have Art Hartman renew his dialogue with Gromyko and Korniyenko. I have prepared a speaking paper based on your most recent memorandum to the President which you may wish to use in your discussion with him.

The President will also be interested in your assessment of a number of events in US-Soviet relations which either have taken place in the last few days or which are pending. I have prepared talking points for your use on the following topics:

—Your exchange with Dobrynin on the Pentecostals;<sup>2</sup>

—Andropov's reply to the President's message on MBFR;<sup>3</sup>

—Gromyko's appointment as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers;

—Developments in the arms control area (i.e. Your plans to convey our new INF position to Dobrynin on Saturday, and the general points you will be making to Dobrynin on arms control next week).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 August 10, Secretary's Meetings with the President. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Although the memorandum is undated, Hill initialed it on March 25. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 20](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 22](#).

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 31](#). The memorandum lists three tabs. Tab 1 is printed as [Document 19](#). Tabs 2 and 3, talking points summarizing Shultz's memorandum on "Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations" and talking points on "recent and pending developments in US-Soviet relations" are attached but not printed. See [Document 26](#).

## **25. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

The attached memorandum (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> outlines Secretary Shultz's proposals for relations with the Soviets according to his understanding of your guidance at last week's meeting.<sup>3</sup> His basic thrust is that both he and Ambassador Hartman should continue talks with the Soviets to press them on issues of special concern to us including human rights issues, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations.

This memo represents a continuation of State's insistence on intensified U.S.-Soviet dialogue. However it appears to recognize a bit more explicitly than previous communications on this subject the dangers of being perceived as returning to "business as usual" with the Soviets. State thus reassures you that our public statements should continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet misbehavior.

With a couple of exceptions, State's proposals, if carried out discreetly and judiciously, may serve our interests in small but concrete ways. They may yield some very limited positive results. But we must be under no illusions: the Soviets will neither change their communist system to please us nor pull out of places like Afghanistan until they are forced to by exceedingly high costs. They may let the



Pentecostalists or Shcharansky go, but their only real motivation for doing so would be to encourage the illusion in Western minds that bigger and better things can be accomplished (when the fact is that the kinds of things we really want cannot be accomplished without major political change in the Soviet system). Thus, certain concessions they might make to us are part of the general Soviet strategy of deception.

It is for this reason that the way we go about a dialogue with the Soviets, the way we handle it publicly, is the most critical question here. It is a very delicate balancing act. On the one hand, we want to appear reasonable, peaceful, and ready to deal with the Soviets in ways that minimize the possibility of war. On the other hand, this entails the enormous risk of raising false public expectations—i.e., deceiving our own people about the possibility of achieving a true accommodation with communism.

Since the number one theme of Soviet disinformation strategy is to make the West believe that true peace is possible with the USSR, we must be extremely wary about serving as accomplices to this Soviet deception. That is why it is encouraging to see State's acknowledgement that our public statements will continue to be tough. Nevertheless, I have my reservations about how State will handle all this. Its heart is in dialogue and detente and not in the kinds of public statements that are necessary to sustain public vigilance and support for our defense buildup. Unfortunately, whenever you tell the blunt truth about the nature of communism, too many people at State cringe in embarrassment. The issue here is that the truth is the only real weapon we have in our political competition with the Soviets, whose principal weapons are falsehood and deception.

The other great danger in the way we handle any limited dialogue is the kind of signal we may be sending to the Soviets. If we appear too eager to make concessions, or to pursue a greatly expanded agenda for talks, they will get the immediate impression that their manipulation of Western public opinion forced us into talks with them, and that we are weakening and they are getting stronger. *We* may not see things this way. But this is the way the *Soviets* look at it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they believed that their greater political and military strength had actually forced us into talks and negotiations with them. It was on the basis of these kinds of perceptions of U.S. weakness that they made many of their calculations to advance geopolitically worldwide.

I have strong reservations about State's two proposals for bilateral relations.<sup>4</sup> The first, a new cultural agreement, seems innocuous enough. But the issue is part of a whole complex of questions that relate to reciprocity and controlling the KGB presence in our country, I will be sending you a more detailed explanation on this. But for now, we should not yet authorize any negotiations until the issue has been thoroughly aired at an NSC meeting. The second proposal is equally problematical: opening a U.S. consulate in Kiev and a Soviet consulate in New York. This also needs much further study.

Otherwise, so long as State's proposed talks are held very discreetly, with no public fanfare, no bragging about great accomplishments, I believe we can achieve the two political results we want: projecting our peaceful intentions and maintaining realism and vigilance with regard to the Soviet threat.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum is unsigned. Prepared by Lenczowski. Clark wrote in a covering memorandum: "Mr. President: Preparatory to your 2:30 meeting with George Shultz, it might be well you review the attached two papers. Bill." A stamped notation indicates the President saw both memoranda.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 19](#).

<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to the March 10 meeting on U.S.-Soviet relations. See [Document 17](#).

<sup>4</sup> See the "Bilateral Relations" section of Shultz's March 16 memorandum, [Document 19](#).

## 26. Editorial Note

Secretary of State George Shultz and President Ronald Reagan met privately at the White House on the afternoon of March 25, 1983, to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his diary entry for the day, Reagan wrote: "An hour meeting with Geo. S. just the 2 of us to talk about our quiet diplomacy efforts with Dobrynin. We may get those Pentacostalists out of the embassy in Moscow yet." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 210)

In his memoir, Shultz explained the origin of this private meeting in relation to the March 10 meeting (see [Document 17](#)) and his March 16 memorandum to Reagan (see [Document 19](#)). As Shultz recounted: "On Thursday, March 24, Bill Clark called. He told me he had arranged a meeting the next afternoon with the president to discuss relations with the Soviets. It would be a small meeting. 'You should be there,' I said. Clark said he would try to arrange to have that sort of meeting a couple of times a week. He told me he had a heart-to-heart talk with the president, urging him to spend more time talking about foreign policy issues. According to Clark, the president had told Deaver to put this on the schedule. He also passed on an invitation to come to the White House in the morning to listen to a report by Dick Wirthlin on opinion poll findings about foreign policy. I was also invited to have lunch with the president, along with Arthur Sulzberger. When I hung up the phone, I laughed—apparently my office was bugged by the NSC.

"In my private meeting with President Reagan on the afternoon of March 25, a Friday, I recalled to him our earlier conversation on the snowy evening in February

when we had dinner together in the White House. [See [Document 9](#).] 'If Andropov is willing to do business, so am I,' he had told me then. He was ready to work with the Soviets. But one camp of his staff did not want him to try. The president told me he was 'open to a summit meeting,' but only if there was some substantive movement. I reminded him of my initial meetings with Dobrynin and the Soviets' prompt response on the Pentecostals. 'We have to take that as a direct signal,' I said. 'If we are going to pursue this, we have to outline a series of steps that build on each other.' We needed to 'create the right background music on human rights and bilateral issues as precursors to the agendas on arms control and regional issues,' I said." The discussion moved to the long-term grain agreement, with Shultz suggesting that negotiations begin in April. "On INF and arms control issues," the Secretary added, "the president told me to make sure Dobrynin realized that we were serious, and he agreed that I should talk to Dobrynin about arms control between the sessions of our negotiations in Geneva." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 269-270)

Shultz continued to struggle against Clark and other members of the NSC Staff to move forward in negotiations with the Soviets. He wrote: "I had no illusions—Clark was *not* on board with the president's and my Soviet agenda—but I seized on this to say to President Reagan that we had to have a fast-track way to get decisions. 'The Soviets will outmaneuver us at every turn if we have to refight the fundamental direction of policy with each and every action memorandum.' We also needed, I said, a way to slip the existence of our dialogue with the Soviets into the public domain rather than have it emerge as a sudden and sensational discovery. My testimony on U.S.-Soviet relations before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then scheduled for mid-April, would be the way. The president

said he agreed. 'Let's proceed.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 270)

In a handwritten note to Reagan, dated March 26, Clark wrote: "Mr. President: Following your meeting with George Shultz, he dropped by my office to leave the attached notes used during your meeting. His opening comment to me was 'I don't know what kind of game is being played over here in your not attending my meeting with the President.' Mr. President, if our plans for Soviet (or any other issue in my area of responsibility) are not coordinated with Cap and Bill and Jeane, we will fail. —Bill." Reagan initialed Shultz's handwritten notes on the meeting, indicating that he saw them. (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (4))



**27. Note of a Meeting Between President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

P [President]—Doby [Dobrynin] mtg [meeting] is origin of all this East-West Rels [Relations]

S [Secretary]—P Friday Readout

What S said: If Sov [Soviets] by what it did showed it ready for constr [constructive] rel [relations], P was willing. (Basic dec [decision] that we wld [would] try for more const rel) —He wld welc [welcome] mtg w Andrp [Andropov] but only if sure to produce subs [substantive] advances. In P-Doby mtg he had talked of Pentac [Pentecostals] as first of symbolic steps. Doby sent it in & Sov had responded & then we did. Today another resp [response] in what Lidia got—approval. (a direct signal). Then we wld try to outline steps that interruptible, but cld [could] become larger. Bgnd [Background] music of human rts [rights]. They must play it and many bilat [bilateral] steps that they like & we can take. But large agenda is arms control & reg [regional] issues.

I disc [discuss] w [with] Doby here & Hartman there.

Then: S-Gromyko in Moscow (so he sees Andrp) When Gromy [Gromyko] at UN, he wld see P

All to move twd [toward] P- Andrp late '83 summit conf [conference] '84

—Talked Pentac: P suppose they out, but in Bonn? No problem Clark says.

MBFR. We shld [should] go into verif [verification] & not stress data. See where we end up & then see if we can verify. Howe doing paper. P agreed. P thinks it easier for Sov to move troops back than for us.

Bilats I described cult [cultural] agreement & consular opening Kiev. On LTA I said its coming. He agreed. So do what we can before being forced to by Cong [Congress]. Maybe April. I promised something on LTA. Clark says get it to P w/o [without] domestic wing seeing it or we will lose control.<sup>2</sup> On INF I shld talk to Doby. Say it serious effort. We wld put fwd [forward] that at Geneva & work on it betw [between] rounds. We shld have Nitze say we will table it. And advance next round. (LSE: I will have 2 drafts tomorrow, one no, one w/o). Rick says Ruth says not now, give later number. He opposed by most who favor a concrete proposal. If not a # now, there will be one.<sup>3</sup>

I sd [said] betwe [between] rounds Doby shld come to me to talk about START and then INF [unclear].<sup>4</sup> P said ok. I sd we'd get Gromyko mtg w [with] agenda.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 25, 1983. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the text from an entry in Hill's handwritten notebooks. An image of the note is Appendix B. After his meeting with Reagan on March 25, Shultz returned to the Department and briefed Hill.

<sup>2</sup> Hill wrote in the left margin: "EUR *Palmer* hand carry to Clark."

<sup>3</sup> Hill wrote in the left margin: "check on Doby Mon."

<sup>4</sup> Hill wrote in the margin: "(tp [talking points] for S-Doby Mon Dobbins)." He originally wrote "Howe" but crossed this out.

<sup>5</sup> Hill wrote in the margin: "(EUR, S/P, Howe EUR)"

**28. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet SALT Compliance and U.S.-Soviet Relations

*The Immediate Issue*

The immediate issue is how to handle the latest apparent Soviet arms control violation: the testing of the PL-5. The intelligence community unanimously believes that this test has raised enough questions about Soviet compliance that a major diplomatic demarche is necessary. The problem here is that this issue cannot be treated in isolation without causing severe problems for the President and his overall foreign policy.<sup>2</sup>

*The Surrounding Immediate Issues*

Coming up very soon are several critical issues, all related: the Adelman vote, the MX votes, the nuclear freeze votes, the defense budget vote, and a decision on how to proceed at the INF negotiations—whether to present a new fall back proposal or not. Each one of these issues hinges on the answer to one question: how will the President conduct U.S.-Soviet relations? Each one of these issues represents a challenge to the President's views and policies. What the President must decide is whether or not he will try to win each battle by presenting the strongest case he can make

or whether he is willing to risk losing these battles by compromising his views and thus making a weaker case in order to accommodate his critics.<sup>3</sup>

### *The Real Issue*

To view these various issues and upcoming battles in Congress in the context of the compliance issue presents a situation that cuts to the core of how we conduct our policy toward the USSR. This situation compels us to address several key questions:<sup>4</sup>

- Who is responsible for U.S.-Soviet tensions?
- Who is responsible for progress or lack of progress in arms control negotiations?
- Is it possible to trust the Soviets?
- Is it unreasonable, provocative or belligerent to conduct a policy based on a suspicion about true Soviet motivations and behavior, especially in the field of arms control?
- Is true peace and accommodation possible between the U.S. and the USSR, between democracy and communism?

Each of these questions depends upon a certain theory about the nature of the Soviet system and communism. Thus, the compliance issue in combination with its surrounding issues, at bottom, addresses the whole question of whose assessment of the USSR is correct—that of the President and those who are realistic about the Soviets, or that of his critics—the proponents of detente and those who are inclined toward wishful thinking and a

mirror-image perception of the USSR. Put yet another way, the real question here is: are the Soviets actually communists or not, and if they are, will we conduct our foreign policy on the basis of this fact?

### *The Position of the President's Critics*

The President's critics answer every one of the above questions on the basis of a wishful-thinking, mirror-image view of the USSR.

—They believe that the Administration is just as responsible as, if not more responsible than, the USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions, the arms race and lack of progress in arms control. This is evident in their pressures on the President to back off his zero-zero proposal in order to “get the negotiations moving again.” Apparently, the fact that they are not criticizing and pressuring the Soviets to do something means that in their view, the Soviet position is reasonable and the President's is unreasonable. Somehow it is the Soviets and not the President who deserve the benefit of the doubt. Implicit in this view is the mirror-image perception that the Soviets must feel threatened by the prospective U.S. INF deployments and defense buildup and that their fears are legitimate ones.

—They either trust the Soviets (on account of the fact that they never raise questions about Soviet treaty compliance) or they argue that we need not trust them: instead we can rely on the fallacious, mirror-image assumption that the Soviets have just as much incentive to control arms as we do (e.g., the problems of their domestic economy). Their trust of the Soviets



manifests itself in another, even more important way: they refuse to believe that the Soviets are using arms control negotiations as an integral part of their ideological struggle against democracy and that such negotiations are the key to the Soviet strategy of deception.

—They believe that the President (and Adelman as well) is not truly committed to arms control, and that as a result, the Administration position is not only unreasonable but even provocative toward the Soviets. Not one of the Senators opposing Adelman acknowledged that there is any legitimacy to the President's (and Adelman's) hesitation about rushing Cranston-style into new agreements with the Soviets—a hesitation based exclusively on a realistic suspicion about Soviet motivations and behavior.

—They believe that some kind of real peace and accommodation can be reached with Soviets if only we try harder and give the Soviets the right incentives to cooperate with us to realize our alleged "mutual interests." Arms control negotiations are thus seen as the key to this process. Originally, it was detente that made arms control both possible and desirable. But, since the policy of detente was called into question by Soviet misbehavior, the only thing left to keep detente alive was arms control—the only arena where there appeared to be a mutuality of interest, an interest in avoiding war. Thus the President's critics see arms control as a cooperative enterprise in confidence building and reduction of tension, a process of mutual concessions, mutual interests and mutual advantages. This is in direct contrast to the Soviet, ideological approach to diplomacy which considers negotiations as an arena

of class struggle, a zero-sum game where one side must win and the other must lose.

The common denominator of each of these positions held by the President's critics is that the Soviets are not really communists and therefore do not pursue the unlimited international objectives of a revolutionary communist power, using any means necessary to achieve these goals. Instead they feel that the Soviets are just like any other normal great power, possessing limited international objectives, and desiring their fair share of the spoils. The assumption here is that once the Soviets get their fair share, which may include a "legitimate" security buffer, then they will behave like a good citizen in the existing international order and find an ever greater mutuality of interest with us in controlling arms and maintaining a peaceful international status quo.

If this view of the Soviets is correct,<sup>5</sup> then the policy of detente with its elements of appeasement and accommodation would be a legitimate foreign policy path to explore. If it is incorrect, then all elements of the policy of detente, including arms control, are put into question and we have to face up to the possibility that we are facing not just a "potential adversary" but a real, live, communist enemy, for whom the mere existence of a democratic United States is an ideological and therefore internal security threat.

As part of their wishful thinking, the President's critics refuse to listen to any portrayal of the East-West conflict that is couched in moral terms. They refuse to acknowledge that military forces are a *reflection* of political, ideological and moral differences and not the cause of them. To repeat, they refuse to believe that the Soviets are really communists.

The President's critics are so unwilling to face this possibility (just as Chamberlain and Co. were unwilling to take Naziism's unlimited revolutionary objectives seriously), that they remain committed to doing everything they can to try to teach the Soviets to be something they cannot be.

To find an arms control violation thus represents not only a failure of these efforts and a failure of the policy of detente, but it represents a repudiation of their wishful-thinking, mirror-image view of the USSR, a view which is the only thing that seems to sustain their hope that peace on earth is possible. Thus, any violations of agreements must be made to go away: either they did not occur, they were passing aberrations, or they have no significant military or political consequences.

It is for this reason that the Carter Administration defined a SALT violation *not* as an act contrary to the terms of the agreement, but as a deliberate act, contrary to the precise terms of SALT, *which results in a significant increase in Soviet strategic power*.

### *The Soviet Role*

The Soviets have one overall objective in this context: to change the correlation of forces (both political and military) in their favor. Their immediate objective is to stop our INF deployments and force us to reduce our defense budget and our strategic programs. Their principal means for achieving these goals are the use of deception and intimidation.

*Deception:* Their primary deception—their number one disinformation theme—is to convince the West that they are really not communists and that therefore a true

accommodation is possible between us and them. They try to cultivate the notion that they do not really believe in their ideology any more, that they have lost their revolutionary elan, and that there is a new non-orthodox “pragmatic” group in power. The more they can promote this fallacious mirror-image perception in the minds of Western leaders, the more those leaders can be convinced that the Soviets are as interested in arms control as they are.

A related disinformation theme is the idea that the Soviets have as much to fear from Western military forces as we do from theirs. This theme promotes the idea that the U.S. is as responsible as, if not more responsible than the USSR for the arms race and lack of progress in arms control.

If the Soviets can compel Western publics to accept these premises and assumptions, then they can much more easily force us to play the peace game on their terms rather than ours. Thus, they can come to the arms control table and make countless false statements, engage in all sorts of circumventions and violations, and still compel us to sit at the table with them. In spite of a decade’s worth of unilateral U.S. restraint, in spite of all our peaceful international intentions and behavior, much of the West accepts these false notions to be true.<sup>6</sup>

*Intimidation:* As part of their effort in psychological conditioning, the Soviets have used various forms of intimidation to compel Western publics and leaders to accept their terms of the “peace” game. Principal among these is to encourage us that there will be dire consequences if the arms control process does not continue. Other forms of intimidation include the recent threats that INF deployments would compel the Soviets to target European cities and station similar weapons close to

American borders, and the threat of nuclear attack against the Japanese.

### *The Soviet Assessment of Western Behavior*

The one factor that rarely is considered in situations like this is the true Soviet view. Almost always, the fallacious, mirror-image perception of the Soviet view is the basis upon which Western decisions are made. This mirror-image perception invariably explains that the Soviets will see how their own alleged interests in reducing their own military expenditures and reducing tensions with the West are advanced by the arms control process. This mirror-image perception also explains that the Soviets regard all U.S. negotiating proposals as signs of U.S. strength and self-confidence: after all, isn't the reverse true?—didn't we tell ourselves that the Soviets would never negotiate until they felt strong enough to bargain from a position of relative parity and therefore strength?

The facts are the complete opposite. The Soviets view the very fact that we are sitting at the table with them as something they forced us to do.<sup>7</sup> Every time we impatiently come up with another negotiating proposal (usually a fall-back position), they regard it the same way. Most significant of all is their perception of our utter lack of response in the face of their continuing circumventions and violations of existing agreements. They can only see this as proof that the correlation of forces has shifted so much in their favor that Western leaders have no choice but to accommodate themselves to the Soviet position that no violations have occurred.<sup>8</sup>

### *What Is To Be Done*



As things currently stand, we are in the intolerable position of being forced by our allies to reject the zero-zero proposal as if we were the ones responsible for no progress in the INF talks, as if we have been negotiating in bad faith.<sup>9</sup> In other words, we are being forced to act as if we are the principal cause of East-West tensions and the arms race. Since this is unequivocally not so, the Soviets can only view their disinformation efforts as successful and remain convinced that even under Ronald Reagan, the U.S. is too weak to compete politically with them.

If the President loses the nuclear freeze vote (a Soviet proposal, after all), the defense budget vote, the Adelman vote, the MX vote, the Soviets will be even further convinced of the Administration's and America's political weakness. And they will make further plans for more geopolitical offensives around the world based on this view.

The only recourse available to us to reverse this situation is to expose Soviet bad faith in arms control. No explanations of arcane weapons comparisons or military force balances (which can be easily manipulated by sophisters) will either be as convincing or comprehensible to Western publics as a clearcut accusation that the Soviets have been cheating.

If, however, the President accuses them of a violation only on the PL-5 issue, and only on the grounds of impermissible changes in the RV to throw-weight ratio (which would be utterly incomprehensible to the public), then he will be put in a very politically precarious position. His critics will easily be able to portray him as having gotten overly exercised about a miniscule violation that is strategically insignificant. They will try to make the President look petty and foolish.



What he must do, therefore, is to explain to the public that this is the last straw—the straw that broke the camel’s back. He would then explain what all the others straws are.

*Presenting the Catalog of Soviet Deceptions, Circumventions and Violations*

The President can then point out that:

—The Soviets have consistently violated the 1972 Agreement on the Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S. and the USSR.<sup>10</sup> Since the SALT II Treaty states in its preamble that it “proceeds” from the Basic Principles Agreement, the only foundation of SALT II is being violated.

—The Soviets have violated the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements of 1962 on the placement of offensive weapons in Cuba. (The President and three top national security officials are already on record with this charge.) Specific violations include the TU-95 Bear, the nuclear capable MIG 23/27’s and others.

—The Soviets have committed more than 30 violations of both SALT I and II and other arms control agreements.

*Explaining Why Soviet Deceptions, Circumventions and Violations are an Intrinsic Element of Soviet-Communist Strategy*

The most convincing way the President can present the catalog of Soviet violations is by putting them in the context of communist (particularly Leninist) strategy. For the first time in decades, the President can explain the real

basis of the East-West conflict and thus why both sides have the kinds of arsenals they do.

What this really means is that he must show the American people that the Soviets really are communists. He must explain that whether they believe in the ideology or not, the system requires that they must behave as if they believe in it entirely. He must show how the Soviet Party leaders use their ideology as the standard against which deviationism is measured—and how this is the way they identify threats to their rule and thus stay in power.

From this analysis necessarily follows a foreign policy which cannot accept a “social status quo” and thus which considers negotiations as part of the class war.

### *What Then?*

If the President comes forward with these charges and explanations, many will instantly conclude that arms control is dead and that he is leading us to war. To curtail the effect and spread of such accusations, he can immediately declare that the U.S. will continue to negotiate with the Soviets and do everything possible to reach a verifiable agreement—only now it will be on our terms and no longer on Soviet terms.

### *A Challenge Brewing in the Senate*

If the President fails to raise the entire compliance issue he will face a major challenge from conservative Senators. As far as I can tell two measures are being prepared: a SALT II withdrawal resolution and an amendment prohibiting U.S. unilateral compliance with SALT II (on Constitutional grounds).

—If the resolution or amendment wins, SALT II is dead.

—If either fails, it will be followed by passage of a Senate advice and consent resolution on SALT II ratification.

—If this wins, the conservatives will have at least prompted U.S. compliance with SALT II to be in accordance with their Constitutional powers on treaty making.

—If consent for SALT II ratification is given then the President will be in a very difficult spot. He will have to ratify a treaty which he declared to be “fatally flawed” and he will have to do so in the context of the recent evidence of Soviet violations, and face charges of appeasement and cover-up.

—If the President refuses to ratify SALT II after Senate consent, he may face a major conflict with the Senate that may have Constitutional implications.

If the President fails to charge Soviet violations in his March 31 speech, it is very likely that he will be faced with this predicament.

### *Conclusion*

If the President follows the recommendations in this memo:

—He will not only avoid the potential challenge in the Senate;

—He will seize the moral high ground;

—He will take the steam out of the freeze movement;

—He will demonstrate to the Soviets his and America's political strength, thus strengthening our military deterrent in a non-military way;

—He will re-enter the peace game on American terms while rejecting Soviet terms;

—He will gain as good a chance as any of winning the votes on Adelman, the MX, the freeze, and the defense budget;

—He will have told the unadulterated truth, thus confounding the Soviets' number one foreign policy priority—namely to silence Ronald Reagan, and aborting the efforts of their principal disinformation campaign—to convince the West that they are not really communists and that a true accommodation, especially in the form of a good faith arms accord can be reached with them.

—He will have made the strongest case he could possibly make in each of the upcoming political battles he faces.

—He will have avoided appealing to the weakness of the American people—their naive good will and willingness to give others (including the Soviets) the benefit of the doubt; but rather,

—He will have appealed to the strengths of the American people—their pride and greatness, their commonsense view of right and wrong, their devotion to truth, justice and fair play.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (4). Secret. Sent for information. A notation in an unknown hand at the end of the memorandum reads: "Sven Kraemer and Ken DeGraffenreid concur."

<sup>2</sup> Reagan wrote the number one in the margin of this paragraph. In addition to his marginalia, Reagan also responded in an attached handwritten note, with points relating to these issues. Concerning "The Immediate Issue," he wrote: "1. I think we should seriously discuss with Sec. Shultz a strong demarche—re the test of the P.L.5."

<sup>3</sup> Reagan wrote the number two in the margin of this paragraph. Concerning "The Surrounding Immediate Issues," Reagan wrote: "2. Of course we make a strong fight on these issues before long. Decision has been reached on I.N.F."

<sup>4</sup> Reagan wrote the number three in the margin of this paragraph. Concerning "The Real Issue," Reagan wrote: "3. We know the answers to these questions re—the Soviets and détente as done or attempted was not the answer. There is some truth however that the Soviets are mistrusting of us because they are Russians. They've had a sensitive inferiority complex for centuries. We can be realistic about them & still try for peace. Not to do so is unthinkable."

<sup>5</sup> Reagan underlined this phrase and wrote in the margin: "This is not correct."

<sup>6</sup> Reagan underlined this phrase and wrote in the margin: "We must do better than we have in refuting this."

<sup>7</sup> Reagan underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin: "I can't agree to this. History shows they have always resisted coming to the table."

<sup>8</sup> Reagan wrote in the margin here: "I agree we must insist on enforcing *to the letter* every agreement we have."

<sup>9</sup> Reagan underlined this sentence and wrote in the margin: "I don't believe this is accurate. We knew from the 1st we might have to settle for less but whatever gains we made might make it easier to ultimately get zero-zero."

<sup>10</sup> The Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations was issued on May 29, 1972, during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. For the text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633-635. See also [Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 233](#)<sup>9</sup>.



## **29. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, March 25, 1983, 1527Z

3597. USSTART/USINF/USSCC. Subject: Soviet Reaction to President's Speech.

1. (C) Summary: After initially charging that U.S. deployments of anti-missile systems would violate the ABM treaty, TASS backed off later in the day yesterday with a more detailed reaction to the President's speech which did not repeat this charge.<sup>2</sup> In a private conversation, an MFA official with apparent advance warning of the speech commented: "Americans have such confidence in their technology," but "we will do what we need to." We can expect a more authoritative and detailed Soviet public reaction in the next few days. End summary.

### *TASS Comments*

2. (U) The first Soviet reaction to the President's speech was a short TASS dispatch March 24 which asserted flatly that deployment of "systems of anti-missile defense" would violate the ABM treaty and protocol. The item was carried on the Russian language wire, but not on the English language wire meant for foreign audiences or in the March 25 central Soviet press.

3. (U) Later in the day March 24 TASS English carried a longer Washington dispatch asserting that the President's speech was meant to facilitate passage of his "mammoth" arms programs. TASS noted that "observers" had focused on the President's remarks concerning U.S. development of

new anti-missile systems, but made no mention whatever of the ABM treaty. *Pravda* March 25 carried a short excerpt of this TASS item, but without mentioning the strategic defense aspects of the President's speech. (*Izvestiya* March 24 comments reported in septel.) Foreign Ministry Official 4. (C) In a March 23 conversation with French EmbOffs, MFA USA Department Deputy Director Tarasenko dwelled on the theme that "Americans have such confidence in their technology." (French EmbOffs inferred subsequently that Tarasenko had advance knowledge of the President's speech.)<sup>3</sup> The Soviet diplomat cautioned, however, that "we'll do what we need, at whatever price, so this military competition makes no sense." Tarasenko added that the U.S. approach in START also would force the Soviet Union to compete technologically. "The U.S. tells us 'you are at a dead end, we'll make your systems obsolete, so destroy them and follow us in the development of new systems.'" Tarasenko drew an analogy between what the U.S. and what the USSR had to do to restructure their strategic forces under U.S. START proposals: "The U.S. wants to negotiate on how to decorate its attic, but wants us to move the foundations of our house."

### *Embassy Comment*

5. (C) We can expect a more authoritative and detailed Soviet public reaction in the next few days. The Soviet media's ambiguous treatment of the question of whether U.S. development of a modern strategic defense would violate the ABM treaty implies that the Soviets have yet to develop a definitive line on this point. Nevertheless, Soviet spokesmen are certain to attack the President's strategic defense plan, emphasizing that it is a new effort to achieve strategic superiority. Soviet military leaders have appeared to be deeply concerned about U.S. programs to modernize

strategic offensive forces. The reawakening of American interest in strategic defenses will compound this concern.

**Hartman**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830166-0101. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Secretary of Defense, USNATO, and the Mission in Geneva; sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague, Tokyo, US MBFR Delegation Vienna, USNMR SHAPE Belgium, CINCSAC Offutt AFB in Nebraska, USCINCEUR Germany, and the Consulate in Leningrad.

<sup>2</sup> For Reagan's March 23 speech on "Defense and National Security," see [Document 23](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 22](#).

### **30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, March 28, 1983, 1528Z

3657. Geneva for USINF, USSTART. Subject: Andropov on President's Defense Speech.

1. (U) Andropov's *Pravda* March 27 interview,<sup>2</sup> on TASS March 26 (presumably available in Washington) disputed the President's March 23 description of the U.S.-Soviet military equation.<sup>3</sup> Andropov claimed the President told a "deliberate untruth" in saying the USSR had not observed its unilateral moratorium on deployment of medium-range missiles. He charged that the U.S. intention to acquire ballistic missile defense (BMD) reflects U.S. desire to gain a first strike capability against Soviet strategic forces, which would be deprived of the capability of executing a second strike. Andropov asserted when the USSR and the U.S. negotiated the ABM Treaty, they established an inseparable link between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Along standard lines Andropov warned that the USSR will not allow the U.S. to gain military superiority, and that the U.S. is threatening the whole world.

2. (C) Comment: The tone of Andropov's remarks was the sharpest we have seen from the top Soviet leader for some time. It probably reflects continuing Soviet irritation with the Orlando speech,<sup>4</sup> as well as concern about the challenges inherent in the President's defense policy speech. The tone, and specifically the statement that the President lied, also may reflect growing Soviet defensiveness about Western charges that SS-20 deployments in the European USSR have continued since

Brezhnev announced the moratorium a year ago March.<sup>5</sup> Andropov did not attempt to claim that the President's proposed BMD program would violate the ABM treaty, as TASS had charged in the initial Soviet reaction to the President's speech.

**Hartman**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830170-1044. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, USUN, USNATO, London, Paris, Bonn, the Mission in Geneva, Secretary of Defense, USNMR SHAPE Belgium, USCINCEUR Germany, US Delegation MBFR Vienna, and Mission in Geneva for the INF and START delegations.

<sup>2</sup> For the full text of Andropov's interview, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXV, No. 13 (April 27, 1983), pp. 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 23](#).

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 15](#).

<sup>5</sup> In a speech on March 16, 1982, Brezhnev proposed a moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe. For an extract of his speech, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 118-121.



### **31. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 28, 1983

SUBJECT  
Meeting with Dobrynin

My meeting with Dobrynin today covered four subjects: Andropov's statements about your speech, our new INF proposal, the dialogue on the overall US-Soviet relationship, and the Soviet response to our proposal on the Threshold Test Ban.

I began by pointing out that your speech last week was not polemical but descriptive<sup>2</sup>—setting forth the facts as we see them. The evidence that deployment of the SS-20s was not frozen is overwhelming. I said that Andropov's claiming you had lied was troublesome and unnecessary, particularly when you had stayed away from invective.<sup>3</sup> I reiterated that your statements on ballistic missile defense were consistent with the ABM Treaty and designed to enhance stability. I noted that the Soviet Union was doing work in this field and alone has a deployed ABM system.

Dobrynin responded that the Soviets believe the facts you set forth were not correct, that they should know better whether or not they are adding SS-20s, and that based on the language of the interview Dobrynin believed Andropov was "angry." Dobrynin stressed that the word Andropov used was "untruth" not "lie," and that there is a difference in Russian. He said your speech contradicts the spirit if not the letter of the ABM Treaty.



After once more reiterating the stabilizing objective of your remarks on ballistic missile defense, I turned to INF. I informed Dobrynin that today Paul Nitze had given Kvitsinskiy the approach you had authorized him to make, and I gave Dobrynin the essence of the approach. I stressed that this is consistent with the principles you set forth in the American Legion speech. I noted that we deliberately had not set it in highly explicit form with specific numbers as we regarded this as a matter of negotiation, wanted to invite a Soviet response, but will be ready to put in numbers when the time comes. I underlined that we continue to believe that zero-zero is the best outcome. However, we are not making agreement in principle to zero-zero a condition for agreement on our interim approach. I noted you would be mentioning your proposal in a speech later this week. And I suggested that it be useful for Dobrynin to get together with me and Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny to discuss INF and START respectively between rounds. I urged the Soviets to study our proposals carefully as they are made in the utmost seriousness.

Dobrynin responded in a “preliminary” and uninstructed way by stating that there is a difference in philosophy—the Soviet Union wants reductions, but the United States wants to increase for itself, while asking the Soviet Union to go down. The Soviet Union insists on “equal security” and that French and British systems must be counted. And in perhaps his most important point, Dobrynin said: “It is difficult to see that we will sign an agreement introducing American nuclear missiles into Europe.”

I reiterated the seriousness of our approach and said that it should be viewed in the context of our discussions on bilateral relations. I informed Dobrynin that I would be prepared later this week to resume our discussions on the

broad agenda:<sup>4</sup> arms control, including the Andropov message on MBFR; the Pentecostalists, Shcharanskiy and other such cases; regional issues; and bilateral issues.

Dobrynin then delivered an oral statement in response to our proposal for improvements in the verification provisions of the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties. We are sending you the full text separately.<sup>5</sup> The Soviets reject our proposals, claiming that the treaties as written have adequate verification provisions. They urge us to go ahead with ratification of the treaties.<sup>6</sup> They also urge that we resume negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) in April or May, 1983. This is obviously a propaganda ploy, as they know we will not renew the CTB talks at this point. We will have further analysis and suggestions for you on this issue.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (03/24/83-03/25/83). Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Palmer and cleared by Blackwill. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D 188, Sec/Dobrynin 2/15/83) Clark forwarded the memorandum and summarized its main points in an undated memorandum to the President. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts (3/5)) Reagan initialed the memorandum from Shultz, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 23](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 30](#).

<sup>4</sup> In his personal notes of a White House meeting the following day on March 29, Dam reiterated Shultz's points on engagement: "The principal meeting of the day occurred in the Situation Room and later in Judge Clark's office. The Secretary, Allen Wallis and I met with Judge Clark and Bud McFarlane, as well as two junior staffers, to discuss the East-West studies. We also talked about how they fit into the discussion of East-West matters at the Williamsburg Summit."

Dam continued: "We then turned to a discussion of relations with the Soviets. The President has agreed in principle to putting in place a process which little by little will lead toward a much broader relationship with the Soviet Union and eventually to a well-prepared summit at which progress could be recorded, if not indeed made. However, it is clear to me that the NSC staff is none too happy about this game plan and tends to resist at each step of the way. How this will work itself out remains to be seen, but it is rather clear that the resolution will be extremely important, not only to U.S.-Soviet relations but also to the posture of the President going into the 1984 elections." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

<sup>5</sup> The oral statement was not found.

<sup>6</sup> The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974. The Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions was signed in Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976. In a message to the Senate in 1976, President Ford stated: "The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty are closely interrelated and complement one another. The TTB Treaty places a limitation of 150 kilotons on all underground nuclear weapons tests carried out by the Parties. The PNE

Treaty similarly provides for a limitation of 150 kilotons on all individual underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 23, 1976, p. 269)

<sup>7</sup> Reagan highlighted the last five sentences in the margin.

## **32. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 1, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

New Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the USSR

The present one-year extension of the Long-Term Grain Agreement with the USSR expires September 30, 1983. As you know, I believe negotiating a new LTA has become a political necessity from many points of view. By moving now, you can take the initiative; receive credit with Congress and the American people; and make sure by our handling of the issue that our Allies and the Soviets understand how the move fits in our overall Soviet policy.

The Administration faces increasing pressures for an LTA from the farm community, the grain trade, and the Congress. All of these sectors view an LTA as an important test of USG support for agriculture trade and the logical culmination of your agricultural export policy. Soviet reluctance to enter our markets, despite your statements on agricultural export policy, has only reinforced the belief that an LTA is essential in reestablishing the US as a reliable supplier. Senators Percy and Dole are now pushing a sense of the Senate Resolution, which calls on you to negotiate a new LTA. It is now scheduled to come to a vote on April 13-14.

I believe that we should move forward quickly on this issue. I recommend that you announce a decision on April 12th—thus moving before the Senate vote. In doing so, however, we must take care to manage a number of political problems that are sure to arise.



The Allies need to understand that this step fits into our approach to the current studies on east-west trade and our discussions with the EC on agricultural exports. I think this problem can be managed by informing them on April 11th that our grain sales will be on commercial terms and will not be subsidized, that the LTA will structure our grain trade to avoid export dependence on the Soviet market, and by reminding them that they are pursuing normal grain sales to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets will need to understand that we are taking this step as part of our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership's intentions on a step-by-step basis. If you agree, I would inform Ambassador Dobrynin in the context of our dialogue that this decision is a manifestation of your desire to work towards improved relations, provided the Soviets are willing to engage in give-and-take and to take similar positive steps. In recent bilateral grain consultations in Moscow, the Soviets affirmed their interest in a new LTA and suggested it could lead to increased purchases.<sup>2</sup> Of course our negotiating leverage with the Soviets will be limited by the grain market glut, the Durenberger Amendment delivery assurance and the USSR's LTA's with Canada and Argentina; the PIK Program, however, works in our favor.

Our public needs to understand that we are not stepping back from our firm approach to Soviet misbehavior and our Afghanistan/Poland sanctions regime. We would point out to domestic and foreign audiences that our concerns about the USSR's behavior—including its military buildup, its geopolitical expansionism and its record of human rights violations—remain unchanged. However, the Poland sanction postponing LTA negotiations has already made our political point, and at considerable cost to the American



farmer. It is unfair to make him continue to pay this price alone.

I recommend you authorize me to inform our Allies on April 11 that we are now willing to negotiate a new LTA. Bill Clark and I would inform Don Regan, Jack Block, Mac Baldrige, Cap Weinberger and Bill Brock the same day that you had decided to go ahead. I would inform Ambassador Dobrynin the next day. We also would inform key Senators and Congressmen that same day as well as issue a public statement. It is important that we keep this decision to the fewest possible people until April 11th or we will have additional problems with the Allies and lose your impact on the Congress, the public and the Soviets.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83). Secret; Sensitive. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt forwarded a draft to Shultz on March 31. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, March 17-31) Clark forwarded the memorandum to the President on April 5. See [Document 35](#) and [footnote 5](#) thereto.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3691 from Moscow, March 29, the Embassy provided a full report of these meetings: "The US-USSR semi-annual grain consultations were held in Moscow March 24-25. The sessions were cordial throughout, and the atmosphere was improved over previous consultations. The Soviets were unusually forthcoming with import data. The delegations reviewed the current world grain market and the new PIK program. The Soviet side hinted that financial conditions in 1982 had caused some drawing down of grain reserves in lieu of purchases, but did not

provide any 1982 harvest figures. After voicing usual criticisms of U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union, the Soviets said they were interested in a long-term grain agreement, and implied they would buy more from the U.S. if a new LTA were negotiated. They did not rule out further purchases from the U.S. this year." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830173-0091)

<sup>3</sup> Reagan did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but see [Document 47](#).

### 33. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 2, 1983

#### SUBJECT

Gromyko's Press Conference

As expected, the focus of Gromyko's press conference—both his one-hour, essentially ad-libbed opening statement and the follow-up questions and answers—was the INF negotiations.<sup>2</sup> He said explicitly that our interim proposal was “unacceptable,” characterizing it as a step backward in the negotiations and inconsistent with the principles of “equality and equal security.” However, in his tone Gromyko was restrained by Soviet standards, according to Embassy Moscow; while lamenting that the U.S. does not want improved US-Soviet relations, he was careful to avoid *ad hominem* attacks on you or other U.S. officials.<sup>3</sup>

Gromyko cited three reasons why agreement on the basis of our proposal was impossible:

- Our refusal to limit U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe and on aircraft carriers;
- Our refusal to take British and French nuclear forces into account in calculating the level of INF on the U.S. side; and
- Our insistence on limiting SS-20s in the Asian part of the USSR.

At the same time, he did not exclude the possibility of continued Soviet participation in the INF negotiations after

U.S. deployments were initiated.

Judging by Gromyko's approach, it is evident Moscow is still determined to hinder our INF deployments and undermine our negotiating position by political means. By throwing cold water on the new U.S. proposal and by seeking to occupy the high ground in the ongoing war of words between Washington and Moscow, the Soviets calculate that the renewed West European support for our position will quickly dissipate—leading to pressures on us even before the next round to make more substantial concessions.

### *Highlights of the Press Conference*

The conference lasted about two hours, the first half of which was taken up by Gromyko's opening statement. In those remarks, Gromyko said that the U.S. was "erroneously" asserting that serious negotiations were taking place in Geneva, and declared that your new INF proposal was "not a road to peace." He called "absurd" the U.S. position on exclusion of nuclear-capable aircraft from the negotiations, and went on at length on the need to take British and French forces into account. Citing data showing that NATO's advantage in intermediate-range warheads would increase from 50% to 250% under the U.S. proposal, Gromyko suggested that the U.S. designed the proposal so as to ensure Soviet rejection, since our sole aim was to deploy new U.S. missiles.

In the follow-up questions, Gromyko stated explicitly that the Soviet Union would not dismantle SS-20s reduced in the European USSR, but insisted on the right to transfer the missiles to Asia to offset U.S. nuclear capabilities in the Far East, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. (Given the

growing Japanese and Chinese concerns, it is surprising Gromyko was so explicit on this point.) He also insisted that the USSR was keeping its word on its moratorium on European SS-20 deployments.

Gromyko was evasive in response to questions about Soviet policy in the event U.S. deployments actually went forward. He refused to state that the Soviets would suspend negotiations, or that they would not accept an agreement under which some U.S. deployments were permitted. He side-stepped a question on counterdeployments in Cuba, stressing only that the USSR would not accept a position of "inequality."

Gromyko gave a lengthy and obviously well-prepared response to several questions on US-Soviet relations. With reference to your Orlando speech, Gromyko said that insults against the USSR were "unbecoming" to the U.S., and that the Soviets do not seek to impose their ideology on anyone. He asked rhetorically whether a country proposing the renunciation of nuclear first-use and the elimination of all nuclear weapons could be described as the "focus of evil." To a follow-up question, he declared that the Soviet Union seeks better relations with the U.S., that such relations would be in both sides' interests, but that the U.S. was insisting on fundamental concessions detrimental to legitimate Soviet interests. He called on the U.S. to be more "objective." (Gromyko avoided any comment on your speech proposing accelerated ballistic missile defense research.)

We will be releasing a statement shortly that refutes Gromyko's main points, and sustains the momentum of your new initiative.<sup>4</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83-04/15/83); NLR-748-24-10-2-8. Secret. Reagan initialed the attached FBIS press report, which summarized U.K. Foreign Minister Pym's rebuttal to Gromyko's press conference. (FBIS 58, April 2, 1983; "Pym Attacks Gromyko's Rejection of Reagan's Proposals")

<sup>2</sup> Gromyko held a press conference in Moscow on April 2. His remarks were largely responding to Reagan's March 30 remarks proposing an interim agreement on INF forces. See [footnote 4, Document 22](#).

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3952 from Moscow, April 2, the Embassy reported: "During a two hour April 2 press conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko conveyed an image of firm restraint in responding to U.S. proposals for an interim INF agreement and commenting on a range of international issues. Gromyko's tone seemed deliberately calculated to prevent further escalation in U.S.-Soviet rhetoric, and as to avoid frightening European and U.S. public opinion." The Embassy continued: "Gromyko was equally cautious in response to questions on U.S.-Soviet relations and international issues. Asked to comment on the President's characterization of the USSR as the 'focus of evil,' Gromyko praised Moscow's international role rather than attacking the U.S." and "reasserted Soviet interest in improved relations with the United States. In short, we read Gromyko's performance as an effort to impress the U.S. and other audiences with Soviet seriousness and responsibility as it moves into the next, crucial stage of the year of the missiles." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830183-0773) For extracts of Gromyko's statement before a question-and-answer session, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 253-261.



<sup>4</sup> The Department's statement was transmitted in telegram 90889 to all NATO capitals, Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo, April 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830183-0840)

### 34. Editorial Note

By early April 1983, the situation with the Russian Pentecostals who had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow since June 1978 began to take a turn. Since their meeting with President Ronald Reagan on February 15 (see [Document 10](#)), Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and Secretary of State George Shultz had continued the discussions about the Pentecostal situation. On February 28, Soviet Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov delivered a message to Shultz (see [Document 12](#)), which Shultz deemed a “significant overture” in his memoir. (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 168) Due to an illness, one member of the Pentecostals, Lidia Vashchenko, had been allowed to leave the Embassy to be admitted to the hospital. She then returned to her home town in Siberia in January 1983. On April 2, Shultz sent a memorandum to Reagan informing him that “Soviet authorities have requested Lidia Vashchenko to apply formally for exit permission and on March 30 she did so. She is now in her hometown, Chernogorsk, awaiting a decision on her application. If it is approved, she will receive an Israeli visa (her nominal destination) in Moscow and exit via Vienna.”

Shultz went on to comment that the United States might have difficulties convincing the other six Pentecostals to leave the Embassy and apply for exit permission. “Even a dramatic development such as Lidia’s departure may not make this easy, since the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families remain deeply afraid of what may happen to them.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/02/83))

Shultz planned to send Dr. Olin Robison to Moscow to visit the Pentecostals in the Embassy. He wrote in his memoir:

“Robison, president of Middlebury College and a lay Baptist minister, had spent time in the embassy during the Carter administration and knew the Pentecostals well. He was the right person, we felt, to explain to the Pentecostals what had happened and to express our view that if they left the U.S. embassy, the Soviets would likely grant them permission to leave the Soviet Union.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 170)

Robison came to Washington and met with Shultz on April 5. Robison also met with Sokolov, whom he had known for many years. In an April 5 memorandum to Shultz, Richard Burt reported: “Robison made clear at the outset that he was seeking neither assurances nor responses from Sokolov. He wanted Sokolov to be fully aware of what he was doing. Robison told Sokolov he was going to Moscow because he is convinced after seeing both the Secretary and the President that the time is propitious for the Pentecostals to leave the Embassy, and because of his concern for them as individuals.” Robison stressed that the “Soviets surely know how important it is to ranking members of the U.S. Government that this matter come out right.” He continued that “this is an exceptional opportunity for something constructive to transpire, and Lidia’s current travel has led him and others to be optimistic.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive File, April 1–8 1983)

In the meantime, Lidia Vashchenko was given an exit visa to leave the Soviet Union. In his diary entry on April 6, Reagan wrote: “They have let Lydia—the young hunger striker member of the family that’s been living in the embassy basement in Moscow for 4 yrs. go. She is in Vienna as of today.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 212) Lidia

being allowed to leave the Soviet Union helped compel the departure of the remaining Pentecostals. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "Dr. Robison and others in our embassy had a strong set of arguments to work with and Lidia's departure was the clincher. On April 12, the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families left the U.S. embassy, took flights to their village in Siberia, and applied for permission to leave. Lidia's invitation to her family to join her in Israel fulfilled the final condition imposed on the Vashchenkos for their departure from our embassy." Shultz "assured President Reagan that we would monitor the developments in Siberia as closely as possible, but, of course, we had no American personnel there. We now had taken the fate of these human beings into our hands. And by this time we were dependent on the reliability of the inferences the Soviets had encouraged us to make from their statements." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 170-171) On April 12, Reagan wrote in his diary: "*Today the Pentacostals left the Am. Embassy basement in Moscow where they've lived in the basement for 4 yrs.* They left at our request. We think—well more than that we're sure we have a deal that they will be allowed to emigrate." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 215)

**35. Memorandum From Norman Bailey, John Lenczowski, and Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 4, 1983

**SUBJECT**

Shultz Memo to the President on a New Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA)  
with the USSR

Secretary Shultz has written to the President (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> recommending that he be authorized to announce to our Allies on April 11 and to Ambassador Dobrynin on April 12 our decision to negotiate a new long-term grain agreement (LTA) with the Soviets. The reasons given for wanting to do this are:

- It is a political necessity.
- To preempt the Percy/Dole Senate resolution calling on the President to negotiate a new LTA (scheduled for vote April 13 or 14).
- We would gain credit with Congress and the public.

The memo sets forth a series of steps to deal with Allied and public criticism and proposes that Regan, Block, Baldrige, Weinberger and Brock be notified of the President's decision the same day (April 11) we notify the Allies.

We believe this to be part of the State Department's attempt to implement on a piecemeal basis Secretary Shultz's strategy memos on U.S.-Soviet relations of January

and March.<sup>3</sup> The memo further states: “The Soviets will need to understand that we are taking this step as part of our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership’s intentions on a step-by-step basis.” This is indeed the intent of the strategy suggested by the earlier Shultz memos. But, whatever the merits of a new LTA, we do not see how it can be construed as a means of “testing” Andropov’s intentions.

Our principal reservation with the Secretary’s proposal is that launching negotiations for an LTA at this particular moment does not seem to be in complete consonance with what we understand is the President’s overall approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. It is our impression that the President wants an incremental process:<sup>4</sup> some concrete progress on some of the smaller issues such as the Pentecostals; and if the Soviets are willing to concede something on such issues first, then we would return a Soviet favor by negotiating certain agreements with them. Then, having established a pattern of negotiating behavior which impresses the Soviets with our strength and ability to enforce reciprocity, we could approach them on larger issues like an LTA without suffering the consequences of negotiating like a supplicant from a position of weakness.

Additionally, the timing Shultz’s proposal suggested is bad for the following reasons:

- The President may announce soon Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.
- The East-West economic relations studies are in a delicate stage and grain sales are a red flag before the European bull.
- Such an announcement is likely to impinge unfavorably on an harmonious economic Summit.



The most persuasive arguments for an LTA are domestic political and economic ones. So, if a decision is reached to proceed with this, it would be in spite of a variety of compelling foreign policy considerations.

Finally, at Bill Brock's urging, you have requested that the LTA issue be put on the SIG-IEP agenda, and it is scheduled for April 14. Of course, it can be taken off, but what explanation do we make to Brock? Indeed, what explanation do we give to *all* the Cabinet officials listed above when they are told on April 11 of a decision in the formulation of which they not only had no role but were not even given a chance to have a role?

If Shultz's proposal is approved, it would cause an uproar from other Cabinet members who have an abiding interest in this issue. This, in conjunction with the other foreign policy problems, could be damaging not only to the President, but to Secretary Shultz.

#### *RECOMMENDATIONS:*

That you sign the attached memo to the President (Tab A).<sup>5</sup>

That you raise orally with the President the potential problems this proposal creates within the Cabinet and for the Administration as a whole.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/01/83) (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for Urgent Action. In a cover note to Poindexter, McFarlane wrote: "The attached memo, which Shultz sent over by courier, is being staffed (close-hold) by Norman Bailey in coordination with John

Lenczowski, Doug McMinn and Don Fortier. The Secretary's proposal that no one else be involved until the day of the announcement (Brock, Block, Regan etc) won't work. Still we can find a way to do it discreetly."

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 32](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Documents 1](#), [13](#), and [19](#).

<sup>4</sup> "Incremental process" is underlined, likely by Clark.

<sup>5</sup> Clark indicated neither his approval nor disapproval of the recommendation; however, the memorandum from Clark to Reagan, with Shultz's April 1 memorandum attached, was sent on April 5 (see [Document 32](#)).

<sup>6</sup> Clark indicated neither his approval nor disapproval of the recommendation.

### **36. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1983

#### **SUBJECT**

The Menu of Current Issues in East-West Relations

We currently have before us several State Department proposals on East-West relations requiring decisions. Although you have received individual memoranda on each of these, we believe it would be useful for you to consider each in the broader context. The specific proposals are:

- To negotiate a new cultural exchange agreement with the Soviets (Tab 1);<sup>2</sup>
- To negotiate a new Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the Soviets (Tab 2);<sup>3</sup>
- To set up new consulates in New York and Kiev (a proposal contained in Tab 3);<sup>4</sup>
- To adopt a new strategy for Poland, including: a linkage between debt rescheduling and a lifting of repression, an offer to the Polish regime to renew LOT (Polish airlines) charter flights, and an effort to seek Soviet acquiescence on a national reconciliation in Poland (Tab 4).<sup>5</sup>

While these proposals have merit, taken together they may give the appearance of expanding ties and increasing cooperation, allowing the contention that we are tilting toward detente.

Each proposal forms a part of a broader set of issues. The cultural exchange question might be handled in tandem with the problem of enforcing reciprocity and controlling the hostile intelligence presence. The SIG-Intelligence is developing a broader set of options on part of this issue that will need high-level discussion. This is an issue on which our Allies are working seriously. Seven of our Allies have expelled Soviet agents this year alone.

The proposal for new consulates has been presented with virtually no pros and cons and we might discuss those today with George. Of all the proposals, this one gives the greatest appearance of expanded diplomatic ties and cooperation. Whether or not you proceed with it might depend on a careful balancing of the intelligence benefits versus the various disadvantages. The LTA proposal has not been handled through the interagency process, and currently presents potential problems for us with our Allies. Finally, of the various proposals for Poland, any request for the Soviets' assistance must be placed in the context of the extreme unlikelihood that they would actually help us to bring about reforms in Poland; and the proposed renewal of LOT flights must be analyzed in terms of how the Soviets would perceive such a move: as yet another "first step" or olive branch extended by the US as if we were responsible for the tensions in US-Polish relations—as if our sanctions were somehow mistaken and deserved to be retracted.

All of these proposals, of course, appear in an even more complex context. Other issues bearing on them are also coming up soon:

- The whole problem of Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. The NSC staff is working on an options paper that will raise serious questions about how we are to deal with the Soviets in light of ever-

increasing evidence that they have not been playing fairly. If indeed we raise the compliance issue, as I believe we inevitably must (given the mounting evidence), the prospect of conducting a whole new set of negotiations, expanded ties and cooperation may appear to be totally illogical and short-sighted. It gives the impression to the Soviets, our Allies and the American people that Administration is neither serious about treaty compliance nor capable of coordinating both right and left hands at the same time.

—The wholesale Soviet rejection of your latest INF proposal.<sup>6</sup> Apparently the Soviets must still believe that the correlation of forces is tilting so much in their favor that they can risk rejecting a proposal that at least today has won the support of our European allied governments. The only conceivable reason for this summary rejection is that they must feel that their disinformation, propaganda, and manipulation of Western public opinion has been so successful that they believe that they can stoke up enough public opposition to your proposal in the next few months to pressure Allied governments once again to call for a new, more satisfactory US INF proposal. The Soviets feel that they succeeded in doing this to your zero option and that they can do the same again.

—Andropov has personally accused you of lying.<sup>7</sup> This raises to new levels the temerity with which the Kremlin feels it can deal with the West. Although the Soviet propaganda machine regularly makes such accusations, the last time in anyone's memory that such an accusation was made by the Party boss was when the Soviets were in a position of relative weakness—a position that was definitely perceived as

such by the Kremlin itself. The difference today is that the Soviets perceive that the correlation of forces is tilted in favor of socialism worldwide—especially in the most critical element in their view—the political-ideological measurement. How you might handle this new Andropov accusation is at issue.

—Georgi Arbatov, the well-known Soviet scholar-disinformation agent, has applied for a visa to come to the US for several weeks to attend conferences and utilize the US media for Soviet purposes. State recommended<sup>8</sup> granting him a visa despite the fact that the technical-legal circumstances of his visa application permit us to deny him one. His planned activities here are symbolic of the utter lack of reciprocity in these matters—especially access to the mass media. This issue gives special impetus to deal with the legal mechanisms at our disposal to enforce real reciprocity.

—Our effort to persuade the Pentacostalists to leave our Embassy.<sup>9</sup> If the Soviets actually permit them to emigrate, it will be a victory for quiet diplomacy and the humanitarian cause of these beleaguered people. However, there are two dangers involved here: First is the possibility that the Soviet will not follow through. If this is the case, we must be prepared to inflict a sanction that must do justice to the pain that these poor people may have to suffer. Secondly, there is the danger that the Soviets may attempt to show the world what great liberals and humanitarians they are. This is standard practice most every time a communist regime lets somebody out of the gulag or permits someone to emigrate. This is a normal element of their strategy to deceive the West about their real intentions.



—Finally, we have the defense budget, the MX, the nuclear freeze and Adelman votes coming up in Congress. How we conduct the overall US-Soviet relationship, including our assessment of how much a political as well as military threat the Soviets present, will have enormous bearing on each of these issues.

All this is not to say that State's proposals should be rejected. For example, there *is* merit in a new exchange agreement *so long as* we utilize existing legal mechanisms first to enforce reciprocity and to gain negotiating leverage. There is merit to an LTA—but for domestic, political and economic reasons. The question of new consulates may have some merits—but pros and cons have yet to be aired.

In conclusion, NSC staff feels that all these issues must be discussed as part of the broader context. They also feel that things are moving much too fast and deserve more caution and coherent planning. Each issue has enormous public diplomacy implications which have not been adequately raised as yet. Since these public questions, both domestic and foreign, affect such things as the defense budget and our intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, I feel that Defense, CIA and other relevant parties should be permitted some input into these decisions. Too much is at stake here to permit their absence.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Lenczowski. A note in an unknown hand at the top of the page reads: "For discussion with Geo. Shultz at 4 pm."

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 18](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 32](#).

<sup>4</sup> A memorandum from Shultz dated March 16 is listed but not attached.

<sup>5</sup> A memorandum from Shultz dated March 28 is listed but not attached.

<sup>6</sup> On March 30, Reagan proposed an “Interim Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Reduction Agreement,” in remarks at the White House. “To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, provided the Soviet Union reduce the number of its warheads on longer range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, p. 474)

<sup>7</sup> For Andropov’s reaction to Reagan’s March 23 speech proposing a new U.S. missile defense program (see [Document 23](#)), see [Document 30](#).

<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand revised this to read “may recommend.”

<sup>9</sup> See [Document 34](#).

# **April 1983-August 1983 Preparing the Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations: Human Rights and Arms Control**

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## **37. Memorandum of a Meeting**

Washington, April 6, 1983, 4 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Not for the System. Shultz initialed the memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that the original was carried to the White House by the Secretary on April 7. In an April 7 covering memorandum to Shultz, McManaway noted that the memorandum had been dictated by Dam and explained: "As you know at your breakfast meeting this morning Judge Clark asked for a memorandum that would codify the decisions made with the President yesterday on the subjects you would discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin; and that such a memo be provided to him for review prior to your meeting with Dobrynin. "Ken Dam has dictated the attached memorandum in response to Judge Clark's request. Charlie and I would like to suggest that there is some risk in actually providing the paper which could find its way down

to the NSC staff and invite reopening of decisions made. We also question the establishment of such a precedent. If you agree with these concerns you might want to use the attached paper for a phone call to the Judge in lieu of sending him a memorandum." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1-17)

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### **38. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, April 7, 1983, 2 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Eagleburger, McManaway, and Farrell. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

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### **39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, April 7, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/05/83-04/07/83). Secret; Sensitive. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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### **40. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's**

### **Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, April 7, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1-17, Confidential. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "I understand that at the NSPG Friday [April 8] you may want to raise these issues. At Tab 1 are talking points. At Tab 2 are options papers we sent to the NSC." The NSPG meeting on April 8 did not address the exchanges and consulate issues; instead, it dealt entirely with Poland. Information on this NSPG meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. IX, Poland, 1982-1988.

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### **41. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the Ambassador to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick), and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, April 14, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983. Secret.

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### **42. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, April 14, 1983



Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Shultz/Dobrynin plus Shultz or Dam/Dobrynin in Washington, D.C. February-1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt.

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### **43. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, April 18, 1983, 5:45 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Dam and Hill. An unknown hand initialed for Dam and Hill. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary's office. Dam was acting for Shultz, who was in Mexico City to attend the meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission. On April 18, Dam sent the President a memorandum summarizing the meeting with Dobrynin. He noted that the State Department would "initiate the appropriate inter-agency action to follow up on the Soviet response." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983) Telegram 106831/Tosec 30036, to Secretary Shultz in Mexico City and for information to Moscow, April 19, contained a summary of the meeting and the text of the Soviet oral statement. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983)

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**44. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, April 20, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Minton; cleared by Hall, Combs, Palmer, Dean, and Labowitz. Forwarded through Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

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**45. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, April 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/21/83). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a forwarding memorandum to Shultz, Palmer noted: "I have prepared the attached memorandum to the President reporting on your meeting this afternoon with Dobrynin. Given the fact that Dobrynin did not yet have any definite answer on the LTA and the continuing sensitivity of this issue, I have not included any reference to that matter in this memo." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, April 18-30)

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**46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, April 22, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83-04/15/83). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Dobriansky, who forwarded a draft to Clark on April 20. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**47. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)**

Washington, April 22, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on April 22.

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**48. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, May 5, 1983, 11:15 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, May 1-15. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer. Cleared by Eagleburger, Dam, and McManaway. The meeting took place in the Acting Secretary's office.

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**49. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Dam) to President Reagan**

Washington, May 5, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/02/83-05/06/83). Secret; Sensitive. In a May 5 action memorandum to Dam, Burt wrote: "In accordance with usual practice, we have prepared appropriate reports on today's meeting with Dobrynin for your approval." Attached to Burt's memorandum were: "1) a memorandum to the President on today's meeting with Dobrynin; 2) a cable to the Secretary and Ambassador Hartman on the INF discussion; and 3) a separate cable to the Secretary and interested posts on the Middle East discussion."

(Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Shultz/Dobrynin plus Shultz or Dam/Dobrynin in Washington, D.C. February-May 1983) In a May 10 memorandum to Clark, Lenczowski wrote: "Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam has sent the President a memcon of his meeting with Dobrynin. (Tab A) Your cover memorandum to the President (Tab I) briefly summarizes Dam's memo but adds no further comment. The only comment the memo might deserve is that it demonstrates yet again how fruitless most of our dialogue with the Soviets really is. This is not to say that the dialogue is politically worthless to the United States: the mere fact that we can say we are talking to the Soviets is beneficial. But it is to say that the President's policy of general caution in dealing with the Soviets and avoiding putting too large an investment in this dialogue in hopes of achieving a true peace with the Soviets is a wise and far-sighted policy." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File,

Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/02/83-05/06/83)) Clark wrote "I agree," and he initialed his approval that the memorandum be forwarded to the President. Reagan initialed Clark's May 16 covering memorandum, which forwarded Dam's May 5 memorandum.

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**50. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, May 11, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memos To/From S, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reading "GPS" and Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating they saw it. Shultz was in the Middle East to negotiate a troop withdrawal from Lebanon from April 25 to May 8, then traveled to Paris from May 8 to May 11 for the OECD meeting.

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**51. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)**

Washington, May 17, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 17.

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**52. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, May 18, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/84-06/27/84); NLR-748-25A-5-7-7. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Lenczowski. Poindexter wrote in the top margin: "President has seen. JP."

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**53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, May 20, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**54. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, May 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In forwarding a draft to Shultz on May 17, Burt wrote: "Per your instructions this afternoon, we have prepared the attached memorandum to the President."



You may find the last paragraph too strongly worded for your tastes. If so, you could decide to delete all but the first sentence." No changes were made in the paragraph. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, May 16-23 1983) On an NSC routing slip attached to Shultz's memorandum, Poindexter wrote: "Judge, I have tasked the staff to prepare a cover memo for this to go to President on Sunday [May 22]. George just will not follow the interagency process. After my conversation with you yesterday, I told State 10 June NSC meeting on U.S.-Soviet Relations was still scheduled and we still needed an interagency paper on consulates and cultural agreement. My tasking memo is attached. I had passed verbal instructions to them earlier. I'm sure George will want to talk about this at 0945 on Monday. JP." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6))

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**55. Note From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, May 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6).  
Secret; Sensitive.

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**56. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)**



Washington, May 23, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 23.

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**57. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, May 26, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, May 1983. Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for the System.

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**58. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, May 27, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (7). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

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**59. Memorandum From Douglas McMinn of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, June 9, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/09/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Bailey. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**60. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, June 14, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Forwarded through Eagleburger.

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**61. Editorial Note**

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**62. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, June 15, 1983, 4:50-5:50 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (14). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the

memorandum. The meeting took place in the Treaty Room in the Residence of the White House.

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**63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, June 16, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/14/83) (1). Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock.

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**64. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, June 18, 1983, 9:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 May-June, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. The memorandum of conversation was approved by the Secretary in telegram Secto 7003 from the Secretary's aircraft, June 23. The text printed here incorporates the changes approved in the telegram. Brackets are in the original. On June 20, Shultz sent the President a memorandum summarizing his conversation with Dobrynin. At the end of the memorandum, Shultz noted: "As I see it, by your decision we have now taken the initiative to move our dialogue forward on the basis of our agenda, and the ball is truly in the Soviet court. We cannot at this point predict how they will respond, but we are at least in a position to say we have undertaken a major effort." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and

Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83-06/24/83)) Reagan initialed Shultz's June 20 memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**65. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, June 22, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83-06/24/83). Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum is based on another, undated, from Burt through Eagleburger to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 9-16 1983)

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**66. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, undated

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 6/16-30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Hill initialed for Shultz. On June 23, Bosworth sent Hill a draft of the memorandum and attached paper, which Hill forwarded to Clark. Hill commented in a covering note to Clark "Attached is the Secretary of State's reply to the President's memorandum of June 7 on our foreign policy goals and priorities over the next 18 months. We have treated this reply as particularly sensitive and have not distributed it in the Department of

State. It includes, at the end, an annex on Presidential travel which refers to some sensitive matters discussed between the President and the Secretary. If this paper is given a wider circulation (which we do not recommend), you have the option of detaching the last section." (Ibid). On June 13, in a memorandum to Bosworth, Shultz wrote: "I look to you to organize a discussion of this important subject sometime within the next 10 days. It seems to me that all the members of your council should be included. We might consider, also, some people outside of the Department, in Government or out. I am not suggesting a gigantic meeting but some way of organizing discussions promptly and aggressively." (Ibid.)

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#### **67. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83-06/28/83). Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamp on the memorandum reads: "Received 83 Jun 25." On June 16 in a note to Matlock, McFarlane wrote: "For many reasons—some good and some not so good—we owe the President a thoughtful treatment of whether, and if so, why and how a Summit meeting should be held. We have already given him two solid papers which treat the historical record, and emphasizing the damage which can be done to our long term interests by creating a false euphoria in the minds of Americans which makes it difficult to contend with the continued misbehavior by the Soviets in the wake of a summit. In short, we have stressed that for a summit to be worthwhile, it must involve the resolution of



problems, not atmospherics.” McFarlane requested a paper from Matlock addressing a possible agenda and topics for discussion. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File—Summitry—USSR (2/2)) While no drafting information was found on Clark’s memorandum, it seems likely it originated with McFarlane’s request to Matlock.

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**68. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, June 27, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83–06/28/83); NLR-748-24-27-4-8. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note reads: “PDB—0930.”

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**69. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, July 7, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Summitry—USSR (2/2). Secret. Sent for information.

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**70. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Andropov**

Washington, July 11, 1983



Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Andropov (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). No classification marking. The editor transcribed the letter from Reagan's handwritten original. An image of the handwritten letter is Appendix C. In his memoir, Shultz noted: "I later discovered that the president had shown his first draft to Bill Clark and, on the advice of Clark, he had taken out the sentences 'If we can agree on mutual, verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons we both hold, could this not be a first step toward elimination of all such weapons? What a blessing this would be for the people we both represent.' President Reagan was consistently committed to his personal vision of a world without nuclear weapons; his advisers were determined to turn him away from that course." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 360)

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**71. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, July 13, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/1-15/83. Secret; Nodis. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill's initials are stamped on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**72. Memorandum From the Chief of the International Activities Division, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Casey**

Washington, July 14, 1983

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 85M00363R: Box 13, Folder: DCI Meetings with Secretary of State (Shultz), 7/15/1983. Secret; Sensitive. [text not declassified]. Forwarded through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations.

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### **73. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, July 15, 1983, 8-9 a.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Seitz. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Shultz summarized the meeting in a memorandum to the President on July 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/08/83-07/19/83)) On July 22 in a covering memorandum to Seitz requesting approval of this memorandum of conversation, McKinley wrote: "The second question is tricky. Rick Burt wants to send to the members of the START IG the pertinent extract of the Dobrynin conversation, as well as the START portion of the 'oral statement.' The START IG will appreciate this gesture. It could head off disputes and disagreements. It also makes Burt look good. On balance, however, I would recommend against letting the memo go. Despite the fact that Rowny has the START related portion of the conversation already by cable, we have in the past gotten away with not circulating Dobrynin memcons in Washington. This partial break with that precedent could whet the appetites of other agencies for full disclosure or lead to charges that we were

manipulating information. Please give me your guidance.”  
(Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special  
Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262,  
Super Sensitive, July 1983)

**74. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the  
National Security Council Staff to the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, July 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC  
Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/20/83).  
Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Matlock, and Sims  
initialed their concurrence.

**75. Information Memorandum From the Assistant  
Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to  
Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, August 3, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S,  
Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot  
96D262, ES Sensitive August 1-15 1983. Secret; Sensitive.  
Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill's  
handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating  
he saw it on August 3.

**76. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of  
the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary  
of State Shultz**

Washington, August 4, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/1-15/83. Confidential. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Boeker. An unknown hand initialed for Sestanovich, Azrael, and Boeker.

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**77. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, August 4, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Presidential Briefing [1983-1984]. Secret. Prepared by Dobriansky. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. Reagan initialed at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**78. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, August 10, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83-08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for action. Fortier, Kraemer, Raymond, Sims, and Sommer concurred with this memorandum. Lenczowski initialed for Fortier, Kraemer, and Sims.

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**79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, August 18, 1983, 2058Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830007-0378. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. A notation in the telegram indicates that “#” indicates an omission in the original.

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**80. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, August 23, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83-08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Lenczowski.

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**81. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to President Reagan**

Washington, August 27, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985-1986, E.4 President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret. A typed notation on the letter reads: “Translation from the Russian.” The letter was forwarded to the President with an attached covering memorandum from Shultz on August 29 (see Document 82).

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**82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, August 29, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Brezhnev (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the routing slip for Shultz's memorandum reads: "Sep 02 83 Pres Noted."

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**83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, August 30, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/16-31/83. Secret. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt and Azrael forwarded the memorandum to Shultz through Eagleburger under cover of an action memorandum on August 30. Simons drafted the August 30 action memorandum on August 26, which was cleared by Palmer, Kelly, and Sestanovich.



## 37. Memorandum of a Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 6, 1983, 4 p.m.

### MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

#### PARTICIPANTS

Shultz  
Clark  
Baker  
Meese  
Dam

The meeting dealt with both long-term and immediate short term relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> The President confirmed that he is prepared for a step-by-step effort toward a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union if those steps are substantive and that the present game plan was to proceed in a manner consistent with a summit in early 1984, if circumstances warrant and substantive and significant results could be confidently expected. Working back from that date, it would be necessary to have a number of matters well in train in 1983, so that the summit could have some substance. The President agreed that one should be in a position so that if conditions warranted it, Secretary Shultz would be able to go to Moscow in mid-summer to meet with Gromyko and possibly Andropov. A Gromyko meeting with the President could then be held at the time of the U.N. General Assembly meeting in late September.

It was therefore agreed that Secretary Shultz should call in Dobrynin this week to express our satisfaction with the Pentecostalist events and to lay on the table four proposed courses of action:

1. Negotiation of a long-term grain agreement.
2. Conversations on arms control between Shultz and Dobrynin with Rowny present for START talks, Nitze for INF talks, and Abramowitz for MBFR talks. These would be probing discussions to see if any progress can be made at respective negotiation tables.
3. Probing discussions on regional issues (Afghanistan, Poland, Kampuchea, etc.) by Ambassador Hartman in Moscow.
4. Progress on our human rights agenda, particularly emigration of the remainder of the embassy Pentecostals, Soviet Jewry emigration and Poland.

It was agreed that options papers would be prepared for the President on two other possible Dobrynin agenda items:

- (1) A cultural agreement in order to control Soviet access to U.S. audiences and to permit penetration of the closed Soviet society; and
- (2) Opening of consulates in Kiev and in New York.

In addition, it was agreed that State should immediately propose an options paper on current issues in Poland.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (5). Secret. Not for the System. Shultz initialed the memorandum. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that the original was carried to the White House by the Secretary on April 7. In an April 7 covering memorandum to Shultz, McManaway noted that the memorandum had

been dictated by Dam and explained: "As you know at your breakfast meeting this morning Judge Clark asked for a memorandum that would codify the decisions made with the President yesterday on the subjects you would discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin; and that such a memo be provided to him for review prior to your meeting with Dobrynin.

"Ken Dam has dictated the attached memorandum in response to Judge Clark's request. Charlie and I would like to suggest that there is some risk in actually providing the paper which could find its way down to the NSC staff and invite reopening of decisions made. We also question the establishment of such a precedent. If you agree with these concerns you might want to use the attached paper for a phone call to the Judge in lieu of sending him a memorandum." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1-17)

<sup>2</sup> In his diary entry for April 6, Reagan wrote: "Learned in office George S. is upset—thinks NSC is undercutting him on plans he & I discussed for 'quiet diplomacy' approach to the Soviets. They have let Lydia—the young hunger striker member of the family that's been living in the embassy basement in Moscow for 4 yrs. go. She is in Vienna as of today. [See [Document 34](#).] We had a meeting later in the day with George & cleared things up I think. Some of the N.S.C. staff are too hard line & dont think any approach should be made to the Soviets. I think I'm hard line & will never appease but I do want to try & let them see there is a better world if they'll show *by deed* they want to get along with the free world." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 212)

## 38. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 7, 1983, 2 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

The Secretary  
SecDef Weinberger  
Deputy Secretary Dam  
Under Secretary Eagleburger  
Assistant Secretary Burt

#### *U.S.S.R.*

Ambassador Dobrynin  
Minister-Counselor Sokolov

The Secretary began by noting that he and Dobrynin had discussed a variety of things in their meetings, and he would have more to say about these matters today and in later meetings. He had asked Secretary of Defense Weinberger to join them today because the President had decided to propose a new set of confidence-building measures. Secretary Weinberger would present the outlines of these proposals to Dobrynin, and we would have more to say about them in other channels later.

Secretary Weinberger said that we had developed these proposals in order to clear up ambiguities and prevent misunderstandings, particularly in a period of crisis. There were new technologies, such as high-speed data transmission and facsimile transmission, which we should make use of to upgrade the capabilities of the existing U.S.-Soviet hotline. We would also be proposing the establishment of a new military-to-military communications link.

Dobrynin asked how such a military-to-military link would be helpful. Secretary Weinberger replied that we could use it to provide notifications about military maneuvers, missile test launches, and military movements which might cause misunderstandings. Dobrynin asked who would be in charge of such a link on the U.S. side, the Chiefs of Staff? Weinberger replied that the Secretary of Defense would exercise control on the U.S. side, since we have a history of civilian control of the military.

Weinberger said that we would also be proposing an upgrade in the quality of communications between the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet Foreign Ministry and its Embassy in Washington. Finally, we would be proposing that the U.S. and the Soviet Union hold discussions on the handling of nuclear events involving terrorism. Dobrynin asked whether such consultations should take place when such an event happens or beforehand. Weinberger replied that we see such discussions as most useful beforehand—as contingency planning for response to such a crisis.

In summing up the new CBM's proposals, Weinberger noted that we see them as a means of clarifying intentions on each side, eliminating accidents and misunderstandings, and improving communication in a crisis. We are particularly interested in building greater redundancy into the existing hotline. Dobrynin asked whether our proposals involved only technical improvements. Should U.S. and Soviet delegations meet to work these out? Weinberger responded affirmatively, and Secretary Shultz told Dobrynin that we would provide the Soviet Embassy with more information in writing about our CBM's proposals as soon as possible.



Dobrynin said that the idea of a military to military link is new. He personally would favor it, but we must recognize that it is a new departure. Weinberger said that there are two questions involved in such a link. First, there is the question of new technologies which are available, and then there is the question of how they should be used. Dobrynin said that we would need to do some preliminary thinking about these questions, possibly even develop a charter for the use of such a channel. Weinberger stressed that we see it as a potentially convenient and useful means for exchanging information in a fastbreaking situation.

Dobrynin asked what was meant by our proposal to upgrade communications between our respective foreign ministries and embassies. He recalled that a special telephone link had been established between his Embassy and Moscow in 1974 at the time of Brezhnev's visit to the U.S.<sup>2</sup> This link had proven so troublesome because of the time difference between Moscow and Washington that he had had it removed as soon as the Brezhnev visit was completed. Weinberger recalled that, when he had been Secretary of HEW in the 1970's,<sup>3</sup> a direct Telex link with Moscow had proven useful in conveying urgent information under U.S.-Soviet cooperative agreements on medical research.

Returning to the suggestion of U.S.-Soviet exchanges on events involving nuclear terrorism, Weinberger noted that U.S.-Soviet discussions could ultimately be expanded to involve many nations. Secretary Shultz added that such discussions could build nicely upon U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks on non-proliferation which are already taking place.

Secretary Shultz noted that the Administration is scheduled to send a report on our new CBM's proposals to Congress on April 11. Indeed these proposals were, in part, a



response to Congressional interest in the idea of confidence-building measures. Dobrynin said it would be better to have Soviet agreement before the proposals were sent to Congress; otherwise it would look as if we were more interested in the public impact of the proposals than in reaching an agreement on them with the Soviet Union. Dobrynin thought he could obtain at least a preliminary response from Moscow by Monday or Tuesday.<sup>4</sup> Weinberger asked whether Dobrynin had in mind a joint announcement. Dobrynin replied that this was not needed, but that it would be useful to have a general Soviet response before we made our proposals public.

Without making any commitment, Weinberger offered to see what could be done about delaying the report to Congress for a short period. Secretary Shultz emphasized that the report could not be held up for long and urged that Dobrynin obtain the earliest possible response from his government. Dobrynin asked when he would receive the written material on the U.S. proposals, and Weinberger replied that we would transmit it to the Soviet Embassy on Friday April 8.

Turning to the START and INF negotiations, Secretary Shultz said that we continue to look for areas where progress might be made. In this connection, he thought it might be useful if he and Dobrynin met with Nitze and Rowny, and possibly MBFR negotiator Abramowitz, during the current recess between rounds of the respective negotiations. These meetings would not be for the purpose of negotiation, but would seek to elaborate upon and facilitate greater understanding of our respective positions on an informal basis. Dobrynin asked what would be the real nature of such meetings. They would only be useful if they did not become simply a sterile defense of existing positions. If they were to be useful such meetings should

focus on one or two points and see whether progress might be made. Secretary Shultz agreed.

With regard to START, Dobrynin asserted that all the Soviet side had heard in the last round was Rowny repeating the same unacceptable statements that he had made in previous rounds. Secretary Shultz replied that, in our view, there had been a retrogression in the Soviet position in the last round of START. At this point, Dobrynin agreed to the Secretary's suggestion of further meetings on arms control to which the U.S. negotiators would be invited.

Turning to TTBT, the Secretary reminded Dobrynin that we had made a positive suggestion for improving the verification provisions of the treaty, but the Soviets had responded negatively. Dobrynin said that the Soviet response had made three points: (1) that we should first ratify the TTBT and PNET and then decide whether additional verification measures might be needed;<sup>5</sup> (2) that the U.S. should agree to resume tri-lateral negotiations on a CTB; (3) did the U.S. intend to restrict its tests to the 150 ktn threshold provided for in the TTBT.

Secretary Shultz noted that the TTBT, as currently drafted, does provide for additional verification measures. However, in our view, even these measures would not be sufficient to provide adequate verification of compliance with the treaty provisions. It is clear that verification is a critical consideration, since both sides have raised questions about the yield of a number of tests. With regard to a CTB, Secretary Shultz said that the Soviet position seemed to indicate a desire to run before we had learned to walk in the area of nuclear testing limitations. Dobrynin asked whether it would not be possible to pursue discussions on a CTB in tandem with discussions about improving the verification provisions of the TTBT. Secretary Shultz replied

that we saw no utility in pursuing CTB talks at this time. He and Secretary Weinberger told Dobrynin that we had no present plans to test above the 150 kt. threshold of the TTBT.

Dobrynin said that our position on the TTBT was another example of a growing U.S. habit of not following through with treaties which it had signed. Secretary Shultz replied that we had no intention of ratifying a treaty if we could not verify compliance with its provisions. Dobrynin replied that the treaties as drafted contained a mechanism for verification. Secretary Weinberger replied that, in our view, this mechanism is not adequate. Secretary Shultz said that he would ask Assistant Secretary Burt to call in the Soviet Embassy for further discussion of our TTBT proposal and urged that the Soviet side take another look at it. Dobrynin said that the Soviet side would, of course, consider whatever material Burt might provide about our proposal.

On bilateral relations, Secretary Shultz told Dobrynin that the President had decided on a one-year extension of the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Fisheries Agreement.<sup>6</sup> Secretary Shultz said that he also had some new information for Dobrynin about the U.S.-Soviet Long-term Grains Agreement. The President had decided in principle that it was time to begin negotiations for a new agreement. As Dobrynin knew, this was a matter of considerable political sensitivity in the U.S., and the decision had not been an easy one for the President. We would begin the process of internal preparation for the negotiations, and we hoped for an early Soviet response to our proposal. The Secretary recalled that Dobrynin had, in previous meetings, indicated that the Soviet response to such a decision on our part would be positive. Dobrynin replied that we would have to see.

The Secretary said that we were considering an announcement of our decision to negotiate a new LTA on Saturday.<sup>7</sup> Would it be possible to have a Soviet response by that time? Dobrynin said that he doubted it but that he would try to obtain an answer from Moscow as quickly as possible.

Turning to human rights, Secretary Shultz noted that Lidia Vashchenko had left the Soviet Union and that we viewed this as a positive development. He wanted to inform Dobrynin of the President's personal appreciation for this positive Soviet action. As Dobrynin knew, human rights issues, such as the Pentecostalist situation and the level of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, are very important to us. In the Pentecostalist case, as in other such matters, we have focused on results, not on making a public noise. The President has written a letter to the Pentecostalists in the Embassy and Dr. Olin Robison will be meeting with them in an effort to sustain momentum toward a solution of this problem.<sup>8</sup>

With regard to regional issues, Secretary Shultz noted that these problems have proven very difficult for us. Much of the tension in U.S.-Soviet relations at present is due to Soviet conduct on these issues. We would like to see progress toward a negotiated solution in Afghanistan. In this connection, we have little information about Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's visit to Moscow,<sup>9</sup> but we have instructed Ambassador Hartman to see Gromyko or Korniyenko on Afghanistan and on the Middle East. We may also have more to say later on southern Africa. The Secretary said that he hoped that Ambassador Hartman would have access in Moscow comparable to that enjoyed by Ambassador Dobrynin here. Dobrynin replied that, when Hartman has something to say or specific proposals to make, he is afforded access to the Soviet leadership.



In conclusion, the Secretary noted that he and Dobrynin had established an agenda on which progress might be made. However, unless the Soviet side took concrete steps to address our concerns on regional issues, it would be very difficult to bring about an overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Dobrynin suggested that he and the Secretary identify three or four regional issues for discussion; then questions of time and venue could be worked out. Secretary Shultz noted that we had tried to establish such a dialogue on regional issues but, in our view, these discussions had been more academic than operational. Dobrynin replied that it is nonetheless useful for us to discuss these issues as a means of clarifying our respective positions.

Before concluding the meeting, the Secretary and Dobrynin agreed to meet the next week on arms control, with the subject matter of the meeting to be established.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Eagleburger, McManaway, and Farrell. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

<sup>2</sup> Brezhnev came to the United States in June 1973, not 1974, for the Washington Summit. For documents on this summit, see [\*Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972-August 1974, Documents 119-133\*](#).

<sup>3</sup> Weinberger was Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from February 1973 to August 1975.

<sup>4</sup> April 11 or 12.

<sup>5</sup> See [footnote 6, Document 31](#).

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 97341 to Moscow, April 9, the Department reported: "On April 8, Sov Deputy Director Yalowitz handed note to Soviet Embassy Economic Counselor Shershnev proposing extension of the Governing International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA) for one year. We planned following the same procedure as last year, that is to effect the extension through the exchange of diplomatic notes." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830197-0906)

<sup>7</sup> April 9. See [Documents 32](#) and [35](#). The announcement was made on April 22. See [Document 47](#).

<sup>8</sup> See [Document 34](#).

<sup>9</sup> United Nations Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar visited Moscow in March 1983. Before taking the post of Secretary General, Pérez de Cuéllar served as UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Situation in Afghanistan.



### 39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 7, 1983

#### SUBJECT

Meeting with Dobrynin—April 7, 1983<sup>2</sup>

Pursuant to our discussion of yesterday,<sup>3</sup> Cap Weinberger and I met today with Dobrynin for approximately 70 minutes.<sup>4</sup> We covered the full range of our established agenda for US-Soviet relations—arms control, regional issues, human rights, and bilateral relations. The tone of the meeting was businesslike and generally constructive, and there will be a number of follow-up actions to be undertaken in coming days.

#### I. *Arms Control:*

*Confidence-Building Measures:* Cap began by outlining the new proposals for confidence-building measures you have recently approved, emphasizing that our purpose is to reduce the risk of a misunderstanding or accident that could lead to the inadvertent outbreak of war. Dobrynin expressed interest in our proposals and asked a number of substantive questions. Cap and I agreed to provide him more details in writing tomorrow and asked that he seek an early response from his government. Dobrynin suggested that our public announcement of the proposals—now scheduled to go to Congress April 11—be delayed until Moscow has had an opportunity to respond privately. Cap and I noted that our proposals are, in part, a response to Congressional interest and that their transmission to the Hill could not be held up for long. Nevertheless, we agreed

to see whether a short delay is possible and again urged Dobrynin to seek a quick response from his government.

*START and INF:* I noted that we continue to look for ways to make progress and suggested that Dobrynin and I meet separately with Paul Nitze and Ed Rowny during the current break between rounds. In offering these meetings, I emphasized that their purpose would not be negotiation but clarification and informal discussion of our respective positions. After noting that he hoped these discussions would not be simply a sterile rehash of our respective positions in Geneva, Dobrynin agreed to go ahead with these meetings.

*TTBT and PNET:* I reminded Dobrynin that we had made a serious proposal to negotiate stronger verification provisions for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), and that we had been disappointed by the negative Soviet response. Dobrynin responded with the usual Soviet line that we should first ratify the treaties as they are and then consider whether additional verification measures might be needed. He also asked whether we intended to continue observing the 150 kiloton limit on underground nuclear tests provided for by the unratified TTBT. Finally, he reiterated the suggestion that we resume trilateral negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban.

In response, I noted that we have no plans, at present, for underground tests above the 150 kt. level, but that serious concerns about verification precluded our ratification of the TTBT until these concerns were addressed. I added that the Soviet emphasis on a CTB seemed to reflect a desire to run before walking in the field of nuclear testing limitations. Finally, I stated that Assistant Secretary Rick Burt would be calling in one of Dobrynin's deputies soon on our TTBT

proposal. I urged that the Soviet side reconsider our proposal. Dobrynin offered to consider whatever information we provided on our proposal.

## *II. Human Rights*

After underscoring again the importance we attach to these issues, I told Dobrynin of your personal appreciation for the positive Soviet actions in the Pentecostalist case.<sup>5</sup>

Emphasizing the need to keep up the momentum toward final resolution of this problem, I told Dobrynin of your letter to the Pentecostalists in the Embassy and Olin Robison's visit to Moscow. I noted that we had proceeded quietly in this case, as is our general intention in handling human rights issues, and pressed Dobrynin for Soviet action on other "Madrid" issues, such as the level of Jewish emigration.

## *III. Regional Issues*

Noting that Soviet misconduct in regional conflicts had been a major source of tension in our relationship, I pressed Dobrynin for concrete Soviet actions on Afghanistan, in southern Africa, and other regional trouble spots. I reiterated our readiness to play a positive role and told him that Art Hartman has instructions to see Gromyko on Afghanistan and the Middle East. Dobrynin suggested that we identify three or four priority areas for discussion on regional issues and develop specific proposals for solutions. I responded that we had tried to establish such a dialogue, but that the talks had seemed to us more academic than operational. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to move far in improving our relations unless there

was concrete evidence of Soviet action to meet our concerns on these regional issues.

#### *IV. Bilateral Issues*

Having placed discussion of our bilateral relations in this overall context, I informed Dobrynin of your decisions to extend the fisheries agreement for one year<sup>6</sup> and to propose negotiations for a new grains LTA.<sup>7</sup> Noting that the decision on a grains LTA had been a particularly difficult one for us, I told Dobrynin that we intended to make an announcement on Saturday. Dobrynin was noncommittal on a new LTA and again noted that we were planning a public announcement before the Soviets could reply to our proposal. I replied that it would be extremely difficult to maintain the confidentiality of this decision while waiting for a Soviet reply. Dobrynin did not say when we might expect a reply, but later told Rick Burt that our proposal might have to be put on the weekly Politburo agenda—thus delaying a Soviet reply until at least the end of next week. While making no commitments about the timing of our announcement, I pressed Dobrynin to seek an early reply from Moscow.

#### *Next Steps:*

I will be taking the following actions to follow-up on today's meeting:

1. Rick Burt and Richard Perle will call in an appropriate official from the Soviet Embassy tomorrow to convey more information in writing on our CBMs proposals and to press for an early Soviet response. Cap and I will confer on whether to delay transmission of the proposals to Congress for a few days in order to give the Soviets an opportunity to

reply. Rick will also convey to the Soviet Embassy further information on our TTBT proposal as soon as possible.

2. I will schedule a meeting with Dobrynin next week to discuss either START or INF with Nitze or Rowny.

3. We will take another look at possibilities for dialogue on regional issues in light of Dobrynin's suggestion that we identify three or four issues for priority work.

4. On the grains LTA, I believe we should try to give the Soviets a reasonable opportunity to respond before we make a public announcement, despite the difficulties this will cause us. Senators Dole and Percy have agreed to hold off on their legislation. I have already informed Jack Block of your decision and asked that it remain confidential for at least a few days. We have therefore told the Soviets that we intend to postpone an announcement for a few days.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/05/83-04/07/83). Secret; Sensitive. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> The Subject line incorrectly dated the meeting as April 7, 1982.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 37](#).

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 38](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 34](#).

<sup>6</sup> See [footnote 6](#), [Document 38](#).

<sup>7</sup> See [Documents 32](#) and [35](#).

**40. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary  
of the Department of State (Hill) to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1983

**SUBJECT**

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Kiev/New York Consulates and Cultural Agreement

We have been looking into the pros and cons of taking action in two areas of our relationship with the Soviets:

- (1) Consulates General in Kiev and New York City;
- (2) Cultural Exchange Agreement.

We believe there are some clear benefits to be gained by U.S. initiatives in these areas, but each also has some public relations or foreign policy drawbacks. Attached are our analyses of the options available to us on these issues and the pros and cons of each.

Regarding cultural exchanges, you will recall that NSDD 75 states, inter alia, that the exchanges framework should not be further dismantled; and that those exchanges that promote positive evolutionary change within the USSR should be expanded at the same time that the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity.

**Charles Hill<sup>2</sup>**

**Attachment 1**

**Options Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>3</sup>**



Washington, undated

ISSUE: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City:  
Options

Option 1. Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to establish Consulates General in Kiev and New York City and propose a public announcement and the resumption of technical discussions toward this end.

*Pros and Cons*

In terms of assets, we would gain substantially from the opening of a Consulate in Kiev; by comparison, the Soviet presence in New York City would increase only marginally. As matters stand, because of the UN presence, the Soviets have free run of New York and we have nothing comparable in the USSR. A [*less than 1 line not declassified*] presence in the heart of the Ukraine, expanded contacts with important minority nationality and religious groups, and consular access for our citizens would prove most advantageous to the U.S. Government. It would also respond to the wishes of the U.S. Ukrainian community and many in the U.S. Jewish community who have long stressed the need for a consulate in the area.

On the down side, the lifting of an Afghan sanction will evoke some criticism. While this move may effectively show the American public, the Allies and the Soviets that confrontation is not the only arrow in our quiver, it may at the same time raise unrealistic expectations both here and abroad about overall improvements in our relations.

*Practical Steps*

Even if we were to agree in principle to open Consulates General, the timing and cost of our actions would be determined by decisions on several subsidiary issues. The first decision involves the type of establishment we wish to open in Kiev. We have the choice of a simple, unclassified operation which would constitute an American presence and give some consular protection to American visitors, or a full-scale post, with *[less than 1 line not declassified]* advantages in a key non-Russian area. Devolving from this decision will be the question of timing. An unclassified establishment in Kiev could be organized fairly easily and quickly in terms of personnel and money, whereas full-scale establishment would take years.

Establishing a full-scale post would entail a great deal of effort to secure the necessary personnel and funding, and to resolve numerous technical and logistical difficulties. However, depending upon how rapidly we would wish to implement this, several approaches are available. If quick results are crucial, we could immediately start the process of securing preliminary funding, TDY personnel for an advance team, and logistical support in order to have the consulates operational (though with a skeleton staff) within approximately a year. At the other end of the spectrum, we could do a limited amount of initial planning until Congressional support was assured and all funding requirements approved. A third approach would involve sending a temporary advance team as soon as possible and then developing an overall strategy for the selection of long-term personnel, the briefing of Congressional committees, the acquisition of funding, and the fulfillment of all the technical requirements of the facility. The implementation of this strategy would follow as soon afterwards as considered desirable or feasible.

Option 2: Propose to the Soviets that we resume *discussions* on the possibility of establishing Consulates in Kiev and New York, but not move quickly actually to open the Consulates and make no announcement at this time.

*Pros and Cons*

This approach would enable us to do the preliminary work both with the Soviets and within the U.S. Government necessary for the opening of the Consulates General at some future date. At the same time, it does not obligate us to take the more visible steps of actually putting an Advance Team in place now or allowing the Soviets to resume construction work on the building that will eventually house our Consulate General. The decision on whether or when to undertake these steps could depend on progress in the technical discussions and the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the discussions would be technical, no formal announcement would be required at this time. Similarly, no final decision would have to be made regarding the lifting of an Afghanistan sanction. On the other hand, the Soviets would regard this as a positive decision and it would allow us to begin allocating personnel and resources and setting up a logistical support system.

However, if Congress or the public becomes aware that we are identifying positions and earmarking funds for Kiev, we would probably be asked what this meant for our sanctions policy. Other disadvantages of this option are limited.

Option 3. Tell the Soviets that we are actively considering the resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates General.

*Pros and Cons*

The main advantage of this option is that it simply allows us to await a more favorable moment. It also enables us to avoid any criticism, except from the Ukrainian-American community which is pushing us to open in Kiev. Its primary drawback is that it accomplishes little. In terms of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is devoid of benefits, since the Soviets would see it as a do-nothing statement. After the suspension of our agreement to establish these Consulates General in 1980,<sup>4</sup> a weak consensus emerged on the policy level that on balance the suspension was an ill-advised move.

Option 4. Say nothing to the Soviets and adhere to the status quo.

### *Pros and Cons*

The one advantage inherent in this position is that we are spared from justifying the lifting of an Afghan sanction. The costs of our current practices are high. Financially, we bear the burden of three apartments in Kiev for which we pay rent but have no use. (We have kept the apartments because we previously spent substantial money on reconfiguring them for U.S. use, and because if we gave them up, we would have a lot of trouble obtaining other adequate apartments later.) We also risk the loss of the office building which the Soviets have, to date, kept open for us. The cost of reconstructing an alternate building will be considerably higher in the future. Finally, we face criticism from U.S. visitors to Kiev, especially Jewish groups, whom we are unable to assist.

## **Attachment 2**

**Options Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>5</sup>**

Washington, undated

*Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options*

As matters now stand, the Soviets have almost unlimited access to American media and other forums. And we have only limited means to penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology. Our open society and the legal restraints on our ability to refuse visas to Soviet citizens except on national security grounds make this possible. We are fortunate that the Soviets since 1979 have chosen not to send performing artists here; otherwise, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moscow Circus and similar major groups could be touring the US annually without any reciprocity for American groups in the USSR. There are indications that the Soviets are rethinking this policy, and may start sending performers again. We currently have no means of ensuring reciprocity in this area, nor do we have leverage to gain Soviet agreement for us to conduct thematic exhibits in the USSR. Such exhibits, with American guides speaking Russian or other local language, have proven to be one of the most effective means of reaching thousands of Soviet citizens with the American message. For example, Vladimir Bukovsky has stated that he became a dissident when he visited the US Exposition in Moscow in 1959.

To increase our penetration of Soviet society through cultural exchanges, we need to consider the most effective means. We see three basic options:

1. Negotiate a new exchanges agreement, replacing the one that expired in 1979, that ensures reciprocity.

*PROS:* The exact form of an agreement would have to be worked out in interagency discussions to ensure

that all USG interests would be considered. At a minimum, it would define the areas in which reciprocity must be provided, including the performing arts. We should be able to improve our access to influential Soviet circles by putting continued access to US audiences on a reciprocal basis. Exhibits would be an important part of an agreement, as would all other legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society. We would also require access to Soviet television.

*CONS:* This would involve negotiating a highly visible agreement and raise questions about how it conforms to our sanctions policy. It would cause speculation whether we are returning to a policy of detente.

2. Combine negotiation of an exchanges agreement with a stricter visa regime, through legislation restoring our ability to refuse visas for foreign policy reasons or by invoking the "Baker Amendment." Such draft legislation is now at OMB for review and decision. The Baker Amendment involves an official determination, which can be made by the Secretary of State, that the USSR is not in substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

*PROS:* This would permit us to generate greater leverage to get the kind of truly reciprocal exchanges agreement we want. It has the additional virtue of allowing us to refuse visas for policy reasons and not have to justify refusals on national security grounds. We could choose which Soviets we would admit or exclude.

*CONS:* This has the same problems as Option 1, somewhat mitigated by combining it with instituting



tougher visa controls. In addition, visa refusals are a crude tool, subject to easy retaliation not necessarily confined to the visa field. American sponsors of Soviet visits would criticize arbitrary refusals, and those who invested money in long-term planning to bring Soviet performers here might have a legal claim. Invoking the Baker Amendment raises issues of foreign policy and long-term US-USSR relations that require careful study.

### 3. Continue current practice.

*PROS:* This involves no change and is easy to administer, with few decisions having to be referred to senior levels for political decision.

*CONS:* This does nothing to ensure reciprocity and leaves the Soviets with easy access to US society.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1-17, Confidential. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "I understand that at the NSPG Friday [April 8] you may want to raise these issues. At Tab 1 are talking points. At Tab 2 are options papers we sent to the NSC." The NSPG meeting on April 8 did not address the exchanges and consulate issues; instead, it dealt entirely with Poland. Information on this NSPG meeting is scheduled for publication in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. IX, Poland, 1982-1988\*](#).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> McManaway signed for Hill above Hill's typed signature.

<sup>3</sup> Confidential.

<sup>4</sup> Preparations for establishment of the consulates were suspended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

5 Confidential.

**41. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the Ambassador to the United Nations (Kirkpatrick), and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 14, 1983

The attached memorandum, "Meeting the Soviet Challenge in the Third World" is required reading. While we spend hundreds of billions to counter Soviet missiles and armies threatening the United States and Europe, the Soviets have succeeded with a cost-effective strategy of creeping expansionism, positioned Soviet power on China's southern flank, in South Yemen and Afghanistan where they threaten the oil resources of the Middle East, close to the choke points in the world's sea lanes and on our very doorstep in the Caribbean and Central America. The current furor in the media and Congress emphasizes that our strategy for dealing with this Soviet strategy is inadequate. The attached memorandum lays out the Soviet strategy in the Third World and how it has succeeded and U.S. counter-strategy which, in my view, is urgently needed if we are to protect our future.

**William J. Casey<sup>2</sup>**

**Attachment**

**Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, April 8, 1983

## SUBJECT

Meeting The Soviet Challenge in the Third World

### I. *A Little History*

Somehow Americans thought their first loss of a major foreign war—Vietnam—would have no important consequences, especially inasmuch as it was accompanied by detente with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet it was in fact a major watershed in post World War II history, especially as it coincided with other historic developments:

—The collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa; the last such in the Third World.

—A return to the international stage of Cuba's Castro in 1975, willing, for internal reasons, to send Cuban soldiers abroad in large numbers to defend revolutionary regimes and radicals determined to consolidate their power.

—Immediately after the US expulsion from Saigon, the US Senate confirming for all the world America's withdrawal from the Third World by its defeat of a pittance of aid for Western supported forces in Angola, and the accompanying Clark Amendment.

—Soviet determination, initially at Castro's prodding, to seize the opportunity presented by the US defeat in Asia and resulting American abhorrence of involvement in the Third World.

—A revolution in Ethiopia, bringing to power the radical Mengistu.

—And, a wavering and misguided policy by the Carter Administration on human rights, and key allies that played a major role in revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua.

The effects of American defeats in Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua—and the coming to power of bitterly antagonistic and aggressive, destabilizing governments in all three countries—undermined the confidence of US friends and allies in the Third World (and Europe and Japan) and ensured that an opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the Third World its principal foreign policy opportunities for years to come. A Soviet strategy evolved in the mid-1970s that built on historic events and opportunities and combined them into an approach to the Third World that, even should the US decide to compete, would help frustrate an effective US response.

## II. *The Soviet Strategy*

The Soviets themselves suffered setbacks in the 1960s and early 70s in the Third World. They suffered one setback after another in Africa. They saw their hopes in South America dashed by the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile and were humiliatingly expelled from Egypt in 1972. When they turned again to the Third World in 1975, it was with a strategy designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of those setbacks. The strategy, enriched and strengthened over several years, is realistic and calculated to exploit effectively both events and opportunities.

—First, shown the way by Castro in Angola, they helped him consolidate the radical power of the MPLA there, creating a government dependent on Soviet and Cuban support for survival. This was

followed by the dispatch of thousands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia, where in his turn Mengistu became dependent on their support. Unlike Sadat, neither the MPLA nor Mengistu could afford to order the Cubans and Soviets out. The cornerstone of the new Soviet approach then was the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the power of “revolutionary governments.” The tactic of using Third World radical states as “surrogates” in the Third World would subsequently involve assisting Vietnam’s conquest of the remainder of Indochina, Libya’s designs in Chad and plotting against Sudan, the PDRY’s aggression against Oman and the YAR, Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front, Cuba’s nurturing of revolutionary or radical regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname, and its support of the insurgency in El Salvador. All had one feature in common—the principal, obvious role in Third World countries was played by another Third World state; no superpower was seen to be guiding or arming or directing the radical forces at work; no numbers of white faces interfered in the internal affairs of Asian, African, or Latin countries; and wherever possible the host government was maintained by foreign advisors and troops who could not be expelled. It was a strategy that made (and makes) any direct response appear neo-imperialistic, and a change of heart by the host government difficult if not impossible.

—Second, when radical governments came to power without the aid of foreign troops, as in Nicaragua or Suriname, the Soviets directly or through their surrogates helped in the establishment of an internal security structure to ensure that any possible challenge from within would be stamped out. There



would be no more Allendes. Sometimes it worked—as in Ethiopia, and sometimes there was not enough time—as in Jamaica.

—Third, the Soviets continued to supplement these tactics with its more traditional offerings, such as technical (and political) training in the USSR; the rapid supply of weapons to regimes which either felt threatened or wished to use them for aggression; and, of course, the use of a wide range of active measures (covert action) to support friends or help destabilize unfriendly governments.

—Fourth, consistent with Russian expansionist policy of a thousand years, where a vacuum existed or the costs and risks were low, the USSR proved still willing to launch its own forces at targets on its periphery—Afghanistan, and perhaps elsewhere when and if circumstances seemed right.

—Fifth, the Soviets advised new radical regimes to mute their revolutionary rhetoric and to try to keep their links to Western commercial resources, foreign assistance, and international financial institutions. Moscow's ambitions did not cloud recognition that it could not afford more economic dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.

This strategy was intended to achieve three principal Soviet objectives in the Third World:

—The further spread of Communism in countries on the path of Soviet-style Socialism. However much Western commentators may assert the death of ideology among Soviet leaders, there is a genuine ideological conviction that this is an historical

imperative and that the future of Communism and its eventual victory depends on success in the Third World, a thesis put forward by Lenin himself.

—To achieve great power ambitions, including access to port facilities, airfields, and intelligence and reconnaissance installations; to obtain allies and friends whose support in international politics is assured; gain access to raw materials and markets and obtain hard currency customers for Soviet goods and weapons; and to acquire influence and power over dependent states.

—Finally, to divert and distract the United States through many simultaneous challenges—some pinpricks, some major; to exploit lingering repugnance in the US to Third World engagements and to build on resulting controversy to complicate other foreign policy and national security initiatives, including defense programs; and to deny the US access to facilities abroad such as the USSR itself seeks.

The centrality of the Third World in Soviet foreign policy is suggested by the fact that Moscow has chosen to allow its relationship with three successive US Administrations to deteriorate in substantial measure because of its refusal to moderate its aggressive pursuit of Third World opportunities, principally in Angola (Ford); Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Afghanistan (Carter); and Central America (Reagan).

### *III. The Soviet Balance Sheet*

A Soviet Union that had found itself in 1972 without major successes and with many failures in the Third World after

two decades of effort could count the following achievements by the end of 1982, ten years later:

- Victory in Vietnam and Hanoi's consolidation of power in all of Indochina.
- New radical regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua.
- Possession of Afghanistan, a Russian goal for over a century.
- Cuban control of Grenada (and new military facilities there for support of further subversion).
- An active insurgency in El Salvador where US assistance had rekindled all the old Vietnam memories at home.
- US expulsion from Iran, which, though not through any Soviet action, represented a major strategic gain for the USSR.
- Rapid progress toward Cuban control of Suriname, the first breakthrough on the South American continent.
- Pro-Western regimes under siege in Chad and the Sudan.

Beyond these successes, the Soviets could see opportunities, actual or potential, to achieve its objectives in many other places:

- Success in El Salvador would likely bring gains in Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Honduras, perhaps then

opening the way to creating problems for the US in Panama and even Mexico.

—Habre in Chad and Nimieri in Sudan both are vulnerable and the fall of both, but especially Nimieri, seems only a matter of time.

—Mozambique on the verge of requesting Cuban forces to fight the South African sponsored insurgency.

—Zimbabwe on the brink again of civil war, perhaps offering an opportunity to make gains lost by Mugabe's victory.

—A big prize, Zaire, continues to tantalize, the Soviets aware that Mobutu cannot last indefinitely and that a struggle will follow his departure.

—Long-time Soviet support for SWAPO, promising opportunity in Namibia either by its inclusion in a government or by civil war.

—Insecure regimes in both the Seychelles and Mauritius interested in expanding contacts with the Soviet Union.

—Zia's regime in Pakistan growing weary of the burdens of supporting the Afghan insurgency and confronted with mounting internal problems.

—In Asia, prospects less bright but the insurgency in the Philippines worth watching and potentially a major breakthrough in the region.

Against these successes and opportunities, the Soviets had to count:

- A still weak position in the Middle East.
- Failure to make any headway with the Iranian regime.
- US aid to the Salvadoran regime, Habre, and Nimieri.
- The regional strength of ASEAN and general internal stability of its members.
- Vietnamese inability to crush the Kampuchean resistance totally, and
- Soviet inability to crush the Afghan resistance.

All in all, the balance sheet is strongly favorable and encouraging to the Soviets. The opportunities for and ease of destabilizing regimes and exploiting economic and social problems promise continued high priority of the Third World and intense Soviet involvement and success in the Third World in the last decade and a half of the century.

#### *IV. A US Counterstrategy: The Realities*

Three successive Presidents have tried to grapple with the Soviet offensive in the Third World. While their actions have at times increased the costs to the Soviets and their surrogates, in only one instance—Chad—have they succeeded fully in blocking externally supported destabilization. Moreover, in virtually every instance, the US reaction has been principally through covert action—out of fear (or realism) that overt US involvement was not sustainable politically at home.

A US counterstrategy in the Third World needs to be based on domestic and foreign realities:

—The Vietnam Syndrome is a reality; the Congress will not support or allow the use of US combat forces in the Third World. As El Salvador has shown, even a training role is suspect.

—Nearly every Third World government, friend or foe, is authoritarian and can fairly be accused of repression, corruption, and failure to observe democratic procedures and basic human rights. Thus, few if any countries we seek or need to help will meet the standards of behavior set by many in Congress and the media.

—The US cannot provide sufficient economic assistance to every friendly government which faces destabilizing economic problems susceptible to foreign exploitation.

—Covert action is becoming increasingly suspect in Congress as a means of helping some Third World governments or hindering others. The cost also is growing.

—It will be difficult to develop political support in the US to help most Third World countries threatened with destabilization or insurgencies. The Soviet hand will be ambiguous at best and the benefit to the US of maintaining or restoring a friendly government will often be difficult to demonstrate concretely. This will be especially true of small countries like Suriname, Grenada, or Mauritius; of some large ones like the Philippines where insurgencies will be regarded in the US with some accuracy as the consequence of



repression and corruption (a view that will be fostered by emigre activities); and of many countries remote to Americans like Chad, Zaire, Mozambique, and Namibia.

—Overt US intervention—political, military, or economic—will be castigated abroad as neo-imperialism, as motivated by US economic interests and the like. It will appear to be both bullying and racist.

#### *V. A US Counterstrategy: What is to be Done?*

Soviet ambition in the Third World is not exactly a new problem, even though the tactics are in some respects. Thus, while the US is in need of a new strategy, many components of that strategy also are familiar, though they must be approached and linked in new ways. What follows is a number of steps to address the Soviet challenge in the Third World. They have the additional appeal that they represent also a sensible American approach to the Third World whether or not the USSR is involved.

1. As stated above, the Third World has (and has had for years) a central priority place in Soviet foreign policy. If for no other reason than this, the US must begin to take the Third World and its problems seriously. We have too often neglected our friends and neutrals in Africa, Latin America, and Asia until they become a problem or are threatened by developments we consider hostile to our interests. The Third World now buys 40 percent of our exports; that alone is reason enough to pay greater attention to the problems of the LDCs before we confront coups, insurgencies, or instability that affect us adversely. Except when we confront a situation we consider dangerous to ourselves,

the Third World has been a very low priority. This has resulted in a case by case, fragmented response to Soviet and Cuban actions. The priority of the Third World in our overall foreign policy must be raised and sustained.

2. The Executive Branch must do more to educate the public, the Congress, and Third World governments about Soviet strategy in the LDCs generally. This requires low-key, factual briefings and meetings on a sustained basis—keeping people up to date on developments and sharing as much of our intelligence as we safely can. One or two media campaigns or Presidential speeches are not the answer. A continuing information program designed to inform and tie together developments in areas widely distant is needed and must be pursued intelligently over a long term.

3. The US Intelligence Community, and especially CIA, must continue to give priority to learning more about developments in the Third World and creating analytical methods to provide early warning of economic, social, and political problems that foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation by the USSR or its allies. Policy agencies should then use this information in developing approaches to LDC governments that are aimed at dealing with these problems promptly (though the solutions may take years) when the cost often will be modest. We should serve as a clearing house of information useful to threatened countries, for example, seeing to it that lessons learned in successful anti-insurgent campaigns in Malaysia and Thailand are brought to the attention of the El Salvador and Philippine Governments.

4. The US can provide some help to many countries (and does) but must establish for itself priorities in terms of major commitments. President Nixon wanted to rely on key

regional states as bulwarks for stability and keeping the peace. There are some dangers in this approach (Iran was to be the key state in the Persian Gulf), but it is generally a sensible strategy. If our early help fails to prevent serious trouble, for which countries are we prepared to put our chips on the table? We should address this ahead of time so that we do not expend political and other assets on places of marginal importance because we must decide such matters in haste and lacking perspective. Also, we should choose in consultation with key members or committees of Congress so that their support at crucial moments is more likely. Great losing battles for FMS, economic assistance, and the like—as for Angola and El Salvador—played out on the world stage and at critical times represent devastating setbacks for the US with ramifications going far beyond the affected country. Even politically bloody success—e.g. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan—can result in the costs outweighing or offsetting the gains.

5. We must be more demanding *in private* of those who seek our help. Public criticism of sovereign governments may be spiritually satisfying but it is the surest way to policy failure. The human rights campaign in the first two years of the Carter Administration is a case in point. By the same token, the very great numbers of Jews permitted to emigrate from the USSR between 1971-1976 as a result of private pressure from the US demonstrates that we can affect the behavior of even our adversaries. We must be prepared to demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights. It is required by our own principles and essential to political support in the US. Moreover, we have to be willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they must address to block foreign exploitation of their problems—issues such as land reform, corruption, and the like. We need to show how the Soviets

have exploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to good effect to make clear we are not preaching out of cultural arrogance but are making recommendations based on experience elsewhere. We should also point out how policies in other areas, such as nuclear proliferation, undermine Congressional support. In sum, we have a right and a responsibility to condition our support—but must do so in ways that make it possible politically for the recipient to comply.

6. We must press for changes in our foreign military sales laws to permit the US to provide arms more quickly to friends in need and to do so without hanging out all their dirty linen for the world to see. It does not serve any rational purpose to humiliate those whom we would help. We also need to change our military procurement policies so as to have stocks of certain basic kinds of weapons more readily available. Telling a requestor we can get him a weapons system in several months or even two or three years from now is not satisfactory when he wonders whether he will be in power in six weeks. Nor is it satisfactory to be forced to take weapons out of the inventories of our own forces. Finally, we need to be tougher with requestors when they seek weapons—such as F-16s—for prestige but their military needs and economic well-being would be better served by less sophisticated, less expensive weapons.

7. As we rely more on overt means to meet the Soviet challenge in the Third World, covert action can be used, as in the past, to create problems for hostile governments, to provide discreet help to friendly organizations and governments, but especially to expose and discredit Soviet and surrogate actions in the Third World. With few exceptions, covert action is most effective when its purpose

is limited and specific. It is a complement to our overt help; it cannot be a substitute.

8. We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest asset in the Third World—private business. Few in the Third World wish to adopt the Soviet economic system. Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-scale economic assistance to the LDCs. Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote investment in the Third World. The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries. The US needs to explore incentives to encourage the private sector to play a greater role in the LDCs, especially in countries of key importance.

9. At times, our friends in the Third World are going to need armed assistance. In view of the political difficulties involved in the US undertaking such help, we need to take a leaf from the Soviet book and explore the possibility of our Third World friends taking on this responsibility. There are some examples already—Morocco in Zaire in 1978; Pakistan in Saudi Arabia; and Egypt in the Sudan and Chad. Others may be willing. We should not shrink from encouraging such involvement when it can help a friendly government (and our own interests). Friends such as Korea also could serve as a source of weapons when we cannot help.

10. Finally, the Executive Branch must collaborate more closely in the setting of strategy with key members and committees of Congress. Too often opportunities to counter the Soviets have been lost by clashes between the two Branches, often by last minute, poorly thought out or poorly explained initiatives from the Executive. The independent stand of Congress is a fact of life, and any

effort to counter the Soviets in the Third World will fail unless the Congress is made a party to the Executive's thinking and planning—all along the way. This is anathema to Constitutional purists in the Executive who see foreign policy as the necessary preserve of the Executive (and I am one of those), but it is reality and if we do not accommodate to it we will have no success against the Soviets in the Third World. In the same vein, support for a Third World policy must be bipartisan and stable. The flip-flops and zig-zags of the past eight years have led to confusion and uncertainty among our friends and neutrals who doubt our constancy and our reliability. It may be naive to call for this at this point in our history, but without a sustained, constant policy applied over a number of years, we cannot counter the relentless pressure of the USSR in the Third World.

As I warned, none of these measures are new. What would be new is linking them in a well-thought out strategy applied with consistency and keeping in mind that they are all related and must be applied as a package. Above all, it is past time for the American Government—Executive and Congress—to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it. It will be the principal US-Soviet battleground for many years to come.

**Robert M. Gates Deputy Director for Intelligence**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Casey signed "WJ Casey" above his typed signature.

<sup>3</sup> Secret. Prepared by Gates.



## 42. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 14, 1983

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam  
START Negotiator Ambassador Edward Rowny  
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt  
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy  
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy

The Secretary noted that Secretary of Defense Weinberger's Report to the Congress on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) had been held up for a few days, but had been finally released since the Soviet Embassy had not gotten back with a reply from Moscow.<sup>2</sup>

Ambassador Dobrynin stated he had waited too, but had received no instructions in time.

The Secretary made reference to the just-released TASS article on the CBMs proposal and expressed the hope this did not constitute the formal and final Soviet response.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he hoped so as well. He did not know the background of the article in TASS, which generally reflects prevailing opinion. But, he cautioned, we should wait to see what develops.

The Secretary noted Rick Burt would be calling in Sokolov soon to discuss Threshold Test Ban Treaty verification improvements.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated that was fine.

The Secretary noted that by some miracle, the decision on the Long-Term Agreement (LTA) had not yet leaked.

Ambassador Dobrynin interjected that Agriculture Secretary Block was aware.

The Secretary noted he had informed Secretaries Block and Regan personally. Nevertheless, when would the Soviet government reply on this question?

Ambassador Dobrynin stated he would get in touch as soon as he received word from Moscow.

The Secretary noted that in his absence, the Ambassador should get in touch with Ken Dam or Rick Burt directly.

The Secretary went on to observe that he had read the report of Ambassador Hartman's most recent conversation with Korniyenko.<sup>3</sup> Not much had been accomplished, he noted, save that we were at least meeting for such discussions. He emphasized that somehow we must make progress on these regional issues.

The Secretary then noted the unfolding case of the Pentecostals.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated the Pentecostals were all back home now and expressed the hope the next steps would work out.

The Secretary stated that we had kept this low-key as the Soviets asked.

Ambassador Dobrynin acknowledged this fact.

The Secretary then stated the main topic he wished to discuss this day was START.

Ambassador Dobrynin interjected when would we finish?

The Secretary noted that to reach any eventual agreement, our present START dialogue would have to be opened up. The Ambassador had earlier suggested the utility of informal exchanges on this issue. The Secretary was now taking him up on this to demonstrate the seriousness of the Administration in seeking progress towards a mutually-acceptable START agreement. Such meetings should not replace the Geneva talks, but rather explore possible directions to be pursued by the negotiators.

The Secretary observed that there had been a disappointing lack of results in the last round of START negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. had taken several important steps, such as proposing limitations on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). For their part, the Soviets had tabled a draft treaty but had continued to leave key elements of their proposal blank.

Ambassador Dobrynin interjected this showed how flexible the Soviet proposal was.

The Secretary stated that nonetheless, the Geneva talks currently lacked a sense of direction which these informal and exploratory conversations might help to determine. In that regard, he had some questions for Dobrynin on three areas in which flexibility would be necessary.

The Secretary noted that in Geneva, the U.S. Delegation had proposed a ceiling of 850 deployed ballistic missiles and 400 heavy bombers. These figures, of course, could not be simply added together because of the significant differences between the weapons systems. The Soviets had proposed reductions to total of 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The gap between the U.S. and Soviet

numbers was major, but they were not that widely apart. The Secretary stated he did not wish to negotiate these figures here, but posed the general question to the Ambassador whether the Soviet figures could come down if the U.S. numbers went up?

Ambassador Dobrynin stated he would get back to Moscow with the Secretary's interesting proposal. He noted that the current Soviet proposal in Geneva dealt with weapons across the board whereas the U.S. proposal differentiated between missiles and bombers. Perhaps even more important than numbers in regards these reductions proposals was their structure. The U.S. proposal, with its undue emphasis on ICBMs and its philosophy—as publicly expressed by Ambassador Rowny—of making the Soviet Union “buy now and pay later,” was unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary suggested that, on the basis of the Ambassador's remarks, there were three components to the Soviet Union's problems with the U.S. proposal—the timing of reductions, the ratio of missiles versus bombers, and the ICBM sub-limits within the ballistic missile category.

Ambassador Dobrynin agreed and then inquired whether the structure of the U.S. proposal in this regard was fixed.

Ambassador Rowny noted that the 850 limit on deployed ballistic missiles in the U.S. proposal included not just ICBMs but SLBMs as well. His “buy now, pay later” remark, he explained, had been meant to reflect his belief that proposed reductions would be in the ultimate interest of the Soviet Union.

The Secretary noted that both the structure of reductions and the composition of remaining forces were legitimate subjects for negotiation.

Ambassador Rowny offered his personal view that ICBM sub-limits might be easier to deal with in this regard than the issue of launcher limits in separate categories.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated that the Soviet Union continued to think SALT II had been sound in dealing with weapons across the board. The Soviets did not accept the U.S. theory of differing destabilizing effects of various weapons systems. Rather, the U.S. proposal focused on those weapons which were the backbone of Soviet strategic forces, some 70 percent. There was a need for greater balance in the U.S. proposal.

The Ambassador went on to note the U.S. proposal offered a equal ceiling of 400 heavy bombers at a time when the Soviet Union had only some 150. The U.S., of course, even included Backfire in this category. The Ambassador related an anecdote from SALT II in which Soviet Marshal Ogarkov reportedly offered a inter-continental ride in a Backfire to General Rowny to prove the plane would run out of fuel well before reaching land.

Ambassador Rowny interjected that he had not turned down that invitation.

The Secretary stated that we would consider this question of structure.

The Secretary then raised the question of ALCMs. He noted that in Geneva Ambassador Rowny had made quite clear the U.S. position that the Soviet call for a complete ban on all long-range cruise missiles was unacceptable. The U.S. considered ALCMs a reality and a necessary element in our

modernized deterrent forces in the case of increasing Soviet air defenses. The U.S. was, however, ready to discuss a system of realistic limitations on ALCMs. Was the Soviet Union, he asked, now ready to negotiate with us seriously on this question?

Ambassador Dobrynin said he had no flexibility at this time on this. The Soviet Union still sought a complete ban. Did the Secretary have any more on this?

Ambassador Rowny noted that in START the U.S. had proposed ALCM limitations analogous to SALT II.

The Secretary moved on to his third question in regards to the effect of any agreement on the large numbers of Soviet heavy and medium missiles. He stressed that the U.S. perceived the MIRVed Soviet heavy SS-18's and medium SS-17's and SS-19's as a very real threat to our deterrent forces. This was not, he stated, a contrived or peripheral issue for the U.S. In Geneva, the U.S. delegation had proposed various direct and indirect constraints on these missiles which the Soviet Delegation had rejected without offering any alternative of meeting these basic U.S. concerns. At times, he went on, the Soviet Delegation had alluded to possible reductions of heavy missiles in connection with its own reductions proposal but had essentially avoided direct discussion of this issue.

The Secretary concluded by noting that the Ambassador had asked whether the U.S. numbers in its proposal were frozen. The answer was no, but that the U.S. was still in dark as to the Soviet proposal and particularly its effects on this heavy/medium missile problem.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated that the Soviets were quite familiar with the arguments advanced by Ambassador



Rowny in Geneva on this, but were nonetheless prepared to look at this further.

The Secretary noted that, in general, the U.S. was looking for a readiness on the part of the Soviet Union to work together on the successful resolution of these problems. The general purpose of U.S. efforts was to facilitate progress. He noted that despite the importance of the INF, MBFR and other negotiations, START was truly the most serious and far-reaching in its implications.

The Secretary emphasized his seriousness and that of the President in achieving a mutually-acceptable agreement. He noted the President's careful interest in this question and stated that if the President were able to get satisfactory START agreement, he would be able to get it ratified. The Secretary noted that he had spent the previous weekend with the President at Camp David where, during the course of long discussions, the President had expressed his desire to see something accomplished in START.<sup>4</sup>

Ambassador Dobrynin noted in response that the Soviet Union was prepared to make arms reductions. Both countries, he went on, desired reductions. The key fact, however, was that all systems should be dealt with on an equal basis. The U.S., he remarked, was inviting the Soviet Union to restructure its forces along U.S. lines; while the Soviet Union could make similar proposals, it would not do so because the U.S. would reject such a proposition. A reductions agreement must have equal application, he stated, but the U.S. was seeking more in this regard from the Soviet Union than it was itself prepared to do. The present U.S. proposal would, he concluded, leave the U.S. with more missiles and warheads.

The Secretary asked just what effect the Soviet proposal would have on throw-weight numbers.

Ambassador Dobrynin stated he could find out, but cautioned realism in regards this issue of throw-weight. Even Henry Kissinger, he remarked, had agreed that throw-weight was not that important in connection with the U.S. decision in previous years not to build heavier missiles.

The Secretary noted that even Henry Kissinger had not always been right.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. was not seeking an agreement which would be to the obvious disadvantage of one party. Rather, he explained, he was seeking to determine through his talks with the Ambassador a way to find a mutually advantageous agreement. He agreed that both countries wanted to reduce their forces, but their differing force structures clearly complicated that effort. Perhaps less important than the numbers reduced, he commented, would be where the two sides ended up.

Ambassador Dobrynin suggested this would not necessarily be so if the end result reflected an unwarranted focus on ICBMs.

The Secretary noted that he hoped to meet again with the Ambassador before too long on INF and MBFR matters. In his absence, however, Ken Dam might meet with the Ambassador.

Ambassador Dobrynin promised to let the Secretary know of Moscow's response to his questions and comments on START.

On this note, the meeting ended.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Shultz/Dobrynin plus Shultz or Dam/Dobrynin in Washington, D.C. February-1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt.

<sup>2</sup> Shultz, Weinberger, and Dobrynin discussed CBMs during their April 7 meeting (see [Document 38](#)). On April 12, Reagan made a brief statement: "I am pleased to note the completion of the report of the Secretary of Defense on Direct Communications Links and Other Measures to Enhance Stability. I believe that the proposals in this report, which was prepared in accordance with Public Law 97-252, are fully consistent with our goal of reducing the risk of nuclear war." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, p. 525) The report is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 309-324. See also [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 159, footnote 8](#).

<sup>3</sup> Hartman and Korniyenko met in Moscow on April 9 to discuss the situations in Afghanistan and the Middle East. (Telegram 4311 from Moscow, April 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830003-0219)

<sup>4</sup> Reagan wrote in his diary for April 8-10: "Then off to Camp David. We had the Shultz's with us as guests." He continued: "They are nice to be with. George & I had hours of discussion of all our international problems." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 214)

## 43. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 18, 1983, 5:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: CBM's and Pending Bilateral Issues

### PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary  
Assistant Secretary Burt  
Ambassador Dobrynin  
Minister-Counselor Sokolov

Ambassador Dobrynin asked to see Acting Secretary Dam in order to deliver Moscow's reply to the President's CBM proposals, put forward by Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger on April 7, 1983.<sup>2</sup> The meeting lasted about 15 minutes.

Dobrynin handed the Acting Secretary the attached text (in English) of his instructed demarche. Dobrynin said that the Soviet side found certain measures regarding communications worthwhile. The Direct Communications link (Hotline) was an example, and Moscow therefore had no objection to upgrading the Hotline. This could be done through discussions at the technical level, with the time and place to be determined through diplomatic channels.

Since the Soviet side felt that existing channels were adequate, it did not consider establishment of new, military-to-military channels as "expedient." The Soviet attitude was the same regarding the U.S. proposal to upgrade communications between our two capitals and respective embassies. Any new communications channels could be incorporated into the Hotline.

The Soviet side was prepared to listen to further U.S. ideas regarding its proposal to undertake multilateral consultations on nuclear terrorism. Dobrynin wondered if the U.S. had approached anyone else on this matter; Burt responded that we had not.

The Acting Secretary welcomed the Soviet response on the Hotline and nuclear terrorism, but regretted the negative Soviet attitude on the other two proposals. Dobrynin said that if the U.S. had further information on these two proposals, the Soviet side would listen. The Acting Secretary took due note of that, pointing out that we felt the military-to-military link was particularly desirable.<sup>3</sup>

The Acting Secretary asked if Dobrynin had any word on other pending issues. We could understand that the START issues were complex, and that Moscow might not have prepared responses to the Secretary's questions. We were concerned over the lack of a Soviet response on the LTA issue, which, as Secretary Shultz had indicated, could become public knowledge at any moment. Dobrynin said he would get back to the Department on the LTA question as soon as he heard from Moscow, adding that the issue "was not as simple as it looked."

## **Attachment**

### **Soviet Oral Statement<sup>4</sup>**

Moscow, undated

The U.S. Government, of course, is fully aware of the consistent position of the USSR favoring the adoption of effective measures aimed at enhancing stability and preventing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war. In the present circumstances this would be best of all facilitated

by reaching at the current Soviet-American negotiations mutually acceptable agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms. In the context of such agreements an important place could be assigned also to confidence building measures in order to prevent the emergence of crisis situations, including the ones arising from all kind of accidents or miscalculations. Of course, such measures must be substantive, and they should really restrict certain types of military activities of the sides and not just be confined to a mere recording of facts.

We also believe that certain specific measures which were agreed and adopted by our countries in the past are worthwhile and serve a useful purpose. This applies, in particular, to the Direct Communication Link between Moscow and Washington. As is known, the existing bilateral agreements in force on this matter provide for the possibility of making arrangements for upgrading and improving the quality of the Direct Communication Link. We have no objections to having a discussion on this subject. This could be done, as was the case in the past, at the level of technical experts with the venue and time of such consultations to be agreed through diplomatic channels. We also understand that the U.S. side intends to present additional clarification on this question.

Since the Direct Communication Link meets the existing requirements, has demonstrated that it is secure and efficient, the setting up of some other parallel channels, for instance, between defense ministries, would not be expedient. It is our view too, that our embassies, considering the functions assigned to them, have sufficient capabilities to maintain efficient communications with their respective capitals.



We would be prepared to listen to additional considerations that the U.S. side said it would present with regard to multilateral consultations on crises resulting from the seizure of nuclear weapons or nuclear materials. It would also be useful to know if the U.S. side has approached anybody else on this matter or whether it intends to do so.

Generally speaking, we would like to emphasize again that, on our part, we maintain a fully serious attitude to the elaboration and implementation of measures designed to strengthen confidence and to prevent the danger of a nuclear confrontation. But we are, of course, against having the question of confidence building measures used primarily for propaganda purposes and as a substitute for real steps in curtailing the arms race and in lowering the military levels of the opposing sides, first of all nuclear levels. The specific initiatives in this area advanced in the statements of the Soviet leaders, including their recent statements, as well as our detailed proposals made at the negotiations in Geneva, Vienna and Madrid open up a realistic prospect for reaching agreements on these pressing issues. Regretfully, we have to note that so far the U.S. has been avoiding their businesslike consideration.

If the U.S. side is genuinely seeking to restore confidence and to uphold it, to clear the atmosphere of mutual suspicions, it is necessary to abandon the preaching of animosity and hatred, the propaganda of nuclear war and the attempts to break the existing military balance to its own advantage. It is necessary to start to exert resolute efforts toward curbing the arms race, and not increasing it, toward restoring the normal and correct relations between our countries. And, of course, the real nature of the approach of the U.S. to confidence building measures may be determined by whether the U.S. side will be willing to reconsider its unobjective and lop-sided stand at the

negotiations on the limitation and reduction of weapons, above all, nuclear weapons.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Dam and Hill. An unknown hand initialed for Dam and Hill. The meeting took place in the Deputy Secretary's office. Dam was acting for Shultz, who was in Mexico City to attend the meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission. On April 18, Dam sent the President a memorandum summarizing the meeting with Dobrynin. He noted that the State Department would "initiate the appropriate inter-agency action to follow up on the Soviet response." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9-20 1983) Telegram 106831/Tosec 30036, to Secretary Shultz in Mexico City and for information to Moscow, April 19, contained a summary of the meeting and the text of the Soviet oral statement. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memoranda of Conversation 1983)

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 38](#).

<sup>3</sup> Dam wrote in his personal notes, April 18, that the Soviets "have been unwilling to agree to several other CBMs, including the joint military-to-military link. I am sure that this will upset Cap Weinberger, who had been very strongly advocating such a link. People in the State Department have been concerned about it because of the possibility of losing control in a crisis. On the other hand, there are technical reasons for thinking that in a time of near war, such communication might be useful. But there is a strong fear that it will be abused, and moreover, there are

great dangers of too many channels of communication at a time of a crisis. Different messages, including conflicting messages, can be sent on different channels, and such a proliferation of message channels could actually deepen the crisis.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983)

<sup>4</sup> No classification marking.

**44. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Howe) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 20, 1983

SUBJECT

Follow-Up to Soviet Response on CBMs

*Issue For Decision*

As you are aware, Dobrynin called on Ken Dam April 18 with a formal Soviet response to our proposals for additional confidence-building measures (CBMs).<sup>2</sup> We need your agreement to our general approach on the next steps in our follow-up to this Soviet message.

*The Soviet Response*

The tone of the Soviet reply—in the form of an “oral statement”—was one of cautious interest in some, but not all of our proposed CBMs. While reiterating at some length their position that CBMs cannot be allowed to divert public attention from the central issues of arms reductions, the Soviets did state a willingness to discuss both upgrading the Hotline and our proposed multilateral convention on procedures for handling crises involving nuclear weapons and terrorism. They rejected, however, the suggestions to establish a Joint Military Communications Link and high-data rate links between our respective foreign ministries and embassies.

In sum, the Soviets are prepared to talk with us about two of the proposed CBMs. We should bear in mind, however, that they may well stall or back away entirely from such discussions should it appear to them the U.S. is reaping significant public relations benefits from this as a demonstration of progress in Soviet-American arms control. Thus in our follow-up, we will need to be especially careful in balancing our public diplomacy needs with the requirements for a quiet, businesslike approach to substantive negotiations.

### *Next Steps*

*Your Meeting With Dobrynin:* In your arms control meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow, it will be important for you to give a personal reply to the Ambassador's demarche. We will be providing you with talking points promising that we will approach the Soviets shortly with more specific ideas on the two proposals they have agreed to discuss, and urging their renewed consideration of the other two.

*Next Interagency Steps:* Thus far, these measures still have the public status of DOD recommendations only. It is expected that sometime within the next week or so, the President will announce his official approval of them. Secretary Weinberger will be eager to move quickly to interagency agreement on negotiating modalities for the Hotline upgrade and the convention on nuclear terrorism as well as on concrete U.S. recommendations for presentation to the Soviets and our allies, so that the President can include these specific decisions in his public statement. Additionally, OSD is certain to press for the President to renew publicly the call for establishment of a Joint Military Communications Link, their favorite measure but one which Moscow has already rejected.

These matters will be considered by the START interagency group, probably later this week or early next week. If you agree, we propose to take the following general approaches:

1. *Multilateral Convention on Nuclear Terrorism*: Because this issue is closely related to nuclear non-proliferation and the key parties are the same, we believe Dick Kennedy should handle the diplomatic approaches on this. He is scheduled to travel to Moscow this June for our non-proliferation bilaterals with Soviet counterparts; this would appear to be the most appropriate time and venue for presenting greater detail on this proposal with the Soviets. He could brief the relevant Allied Ambassadors in the Department sometime before then. OSD, however, may seek to shorten this time frame drastically by having the President speak to negotiating considerations in his public statement. Since the effectiveness of such bilaterals rests in part in their low-key nature, we believe too much public detail at this stage would be a mistake.

*Recommendation*: That Dick Kennedy be selected to take the lead in discussions of this proposal with the Soviets and Allies during the course of his already-scheduled bilaterals.<sup>3</sup>

2. *Hotline Upgrade*: The Soviet "oral message" refers to past precedent in expressing a willingness to hold discussions on this subject "at the level of technical experts." At this stage, we believe that the most productive approach might be to dispatch a technical team to Moscow for negotiations to be headed up by Ambassador Hartman on our side (Conversely, a Soviet team could come to Washington). Given the present Soviet tactic of stonewalling on all areas of potential agreement within the START talks, we think it would be a mistake to attempt to



insert this proposed measure into those negotiations—thus making Hotline upgrade hostage to larger Soviet START concerns and confounding our desire for tangible progress in this area.

*Recommendation:* That we seek to negotiate the Hotline upgrade through Ambassador Hartman, backed up by an appropriate team of technical experts to be sent out to Moscow.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, April 9–20 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Minton; cleared by Hall, Combs, Palmer, Dean, and Labowitz. Forwarded through Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 43](#).

<sup>3</sup> Shultz initialed his approval of this recommendation.

<sup>4</sup> Shultz initialed his approval of this recommendation.

## **45. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 21, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

My April 21 Meeting With Dobrynin

In accordance with our earlier discussions, I met with Dobrynin today to talk about the INF negotiations. Paul Nitze, Ken Adelman, Ken Dam, and Mark Palmer joined me. The meeting also touched briefly on the Pentecostalists, Shcharanskiy, your new confidence-building measures proposals, and our bilateral fisheries agreement.

On INF, I underscored for Dobrynin that the zero option remained on the table, but that we had presented an alternative, interim proposal in order to emphasize our flexibility and our willingness to discuss any reasonable approach based on equality. I then posed a series of four questions for Moscow to ponder, in order to determine whether there is any give in the Soviet position:

First, was there any finite, equal level of U.S. and Soviet INF warheads-on-missiles that the Soviet Union was prepared to accept?

Second, did the USSR insist that an INF agreement must totally exclude Soviet systems located in the Eastern part of the Soviet Union? (I cited the mobility and transportability of the SS-20 as arguments against a Europe-only approach.)

Third, is it the Soviet view that even an interim INF agreement must include aircraft as well as longer-

range INF missiles? (I noted that the U.S. was prepared to consider aircraft in the context of a two-phased approach.)

Fourth, is it conceivable that we can design an INF agreement between the U.S. and USSR based on parity and equality (i.e. without accounting for British and French forces)?

On each of these questions, Dobrynin interjected with comments indicating no change in the Soviet positions as had been set forth earlier either in Geneva or at Gromyko's recent press conference.<sup>2</sup> I took issue with Dobrynin's consistent "No's," noting that this suggested no progress at all was possible in INF. In light of his earlier comments to me that Soviet negotiators never act without instructions, I expressed some puzzlement how he could square this with Paul Nitze's exploratory conversations with his Soviet counterpart last year ("The Walk in the Woods"), during which there had been some deviation from these Soviet positions.

In response, Dobrynin tacitly admitted it had been the Soviet side which broke off those discussions on the grounds they were apprehensive they "were negotiating with an individual and not with a government." I stressed to him that we were seeking precisely that sort of informal, exploratory discussion to find a mutually-agreeable INF solution.

After reiterating various familiar Soviet arguments (the "strategic" threat posed by the Pershing II, the need to be compensated for UK and French systems, and a refusal to negotiate on systems beyond Europe), Dobrynin attempted to put the onus on the U.S. for coming up with new ideas to solve the current stalemate. I reminded him that no such

ideas would be possible if the Soviets continued in their inflexibly negative responses to questions expressing our basic concerns. Dobrynin promised to pass on our questions to Moscow, but was not particularly sanguine about the likely replies.

### *Other issues*

On the Pentecostalists, I noted that the two families were now back home in Siberia waiting for their visas. I expressed the hope that Moscow would proceed in a reasonable fashion to grant them permission to leave. I also reminded Dobrynin that we want the Soviets to release Anatoliy Shcharanskiy soon. He did not respond on either of these subjects.

With respect to your new confidence-building measures proposals, I told Dobrynin that we would be approaching them soon with ideas on how to begin discussions on the two which Moscow had accepted (upgrading the Hotline, and developing a multilateral convention for consultations in the event of the use or acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists). I also urged the Soviets to reconsider their position on the two proposals they did not accept, including the proposed Joint Military Communication Link.

On economic matters, Dobrynin confirmed that the Soviets today had conveyed their acceptance of our proposal for a one-year extension of the bilateral fisheries agreement.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/21/83). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In a forwarding memorandum to

Shultz, Palmer noted: "I have prepared the attached memorandum to the President reporting on your meeting this afternoon with Dobrynin. Given the fact that Dobrynin did not yet have any definite answer on the LTA and the continuing sensitivity of this issue, I have not included any reference to that matter in this memo." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, April 18-30)

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 33](#).

**46. Memorandum From the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)  
to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1983

SUBJECT

Prospects for the Embassy Pentecostals

Kenneth Dam forwarded you a memorandum (Tab A) which provides an update on the Pentecostals.<sup>2</sup> Briefly, our Embassy in Moscow has been in touch with the two families, the Chmykhalovs and the Vaschenkos, by telephone and expects both to apply for exit permission sometime next week. Simultaneously, our Embassy in Tel Aviv is assisting Lidia Vaschenko submit formal invitations to her family through the appropriate Israeli officials.

In continuing to maintain a low-key approach on this issue, State intends to pursue the following steps: give the Soviets a list of the family members seeking to emigrate, establish regular telephone contact with the families in Chernogorsk, work with the Israelis to get all their visa authorizations and maintain continuous contact with various Pentecostal support groups in the U.S. Already, George Shultz has raised the subject with Dobrynin.<sup>3</sup>

State's memorandum alerts you to several obstacles that may arise in the upcoming weeks. These include: delays in the application processing, potential hostile scrutiny by various Pentecostal support groups, release of several family members at a time, and the families' destinations. State will keep you abreast of developments and will



provide you with recommendations for necessary action if such problems arise.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83-04/15/83). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Dobriansky, who forwarded a draft to Clark on April 20. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Dated April 15; attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 42](#).

## **47. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Today was the day that we decided to go public with our offer to the Soviet Union to negotiate a new long-term grain agreement.<sup>2</sup> On April 7 Shultz had proposed to Dobrynin a negotiation of such a long-term agreement,<sup>3</sup> but when we did not hear from the Soviets as to their willingness, the decision was to go public. The decision was taken for two reasons. First, the Hill and particularly the Democrats on the Hill were gaining the initiative in beating up on the Administration on the ground that we were not interested in a long-term grain agreement, an obviously high-powered issue in the farm states.<sup>4</sup> Secondly, the danger of a leak grew as time passed, as more and more people came to know of the offer. There was, of course, reluctance within the Administration to take this step, because the ending of the five-year grain agreement had been one of the Polish sanctions. Of course, the sanction had been imposed by the Carter Administration, which had actually imposed an embargo, but nevertheless, the decision to negotiate a new agreement was a hard step to take. It was essentially thrust upon us by the politics of the situation, recognizing that the embargo and the cancellation of the agreement had not had any significant effect upon Soviet willingness to be moderate on Polish matters. On the other hand, it is not so clear that it has hurt the United States all that much, because the Soviets, in shifting to purchases from other wheat exporters, were at the same time creating new markets for U.S. exporters.

That is to say, there is a single international wheat market. But in a period of over-supply and surpluses, it was difficult for the farm community to see the issue that way.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on April 22.

<sup>2</sup> In a statement released on April 22, the President announced: "we have proposed to the Soviet Union the negotiation of a new long-term grain agreement (LTA). We are taking this step to reaffirm our reliability as a supplier of grain. The present U.S.-Soviet long-term agreement, which originally covered the 1976–1981 period, was extended last September for a single year, through September 30, 1983. Negotiation of a new long-term agreement is consistent with United States agricultural export policy and reflects our commitment to reestablish the U.S. as a reliable supplier. Assuming the Soviets accept this proposal, these negotiations will be conducted by the U.S. Trade Representative in close coordination with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of State." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 575–576) See also [\*Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 147, footnote 3\*](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 38](#). In an April 15 memorandum, Burt provided Dam with a full report on LTA actions and outstanding decisions. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive April 1–17)

<sup>4</sup> See [Documents 32](#) and [35](#).

## 48. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 5, 1983, 11:15 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

The Acting Secretary  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger  
ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman  
INF Negotiator Paul Nitze  
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt  
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Embassy  
Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy

Ambassador Dobrynin noted he had received a reply to the Secretary's earlier questions on INF.<sup>2</sup> It was, however, now the Soviet Union's turn to ask questions.

The Ambassador then read from a non-paper, translating into English from the original Russian:

"During our conversation of April 21 the Secretary of State touched upon the key elements of the problem under discussion; the sides' position on precisely these key elements will determine whether there is progress at the negotiations.

However, the very nature of the questions he raised in this connection by no means demonstrates a desire on the part of the U.S. side to reach a mutually acceptable outcome and to break the deadlock which still exists at the negotiations as a result of the unconstructive U.S. position.

1. Let us begin with the question of whether the U.S.S.R. would agree to the deployment of 'some specific number' of new U.S. missiles in Europe.

This way of putting the question is in itself incompatible with the objective of the current negotiations, which is to achieve maximum reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, to the extent of completely ridding the continent of both medium-range and tactical arms, and which is certainly not to agree on a buildup of such arms.

But since the Secretary of State did nonetheless raise this question, in order to clarify his train of thought we, in turn, would like to ask the following: how would the U.S. react to the appearance of a certain number of Soviet medium-range nuclear systems in areas from which they could reach U.S. territory?

Incidentally, this would be fully consistent with the principle of 'equal rights and limits' with respect to medium-range arms, regardless of their location, which has recently been proclaimed by the U.S. side.

2. Let us take the other U.S. question: will the U.S.S.R. agree not to take into account the nuclear systems of England and France in the agreement?

We have already provided repeated and detailed explanations as to why the Soviet Union cannot consent to an agreement on limiting nuclear arms in Europe without taking into account the English and French systems.

If the Secretary is still somehow unclear on this point, then one would think the following question might help to clear things up: if some Soviet Warsaw Pact allies had at their disposal medium-range nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, would the U.S. agree not to take them into account in the agreement?

3. Turning to our medium-range missiles in the eastern parts of the U.S.S.R., we will state plainly that questions

whose point it is to somehow justify reductions of our arms in the eastern part of our country cannot be regarded as pursuing a constructive goal or even as serious questions at all. These arms are totally unrelated to the subject of the negotiations in Geneva.

Or should we take the Secretary's statements to mean that the U.S. agrees to consider the question of all the relevant nuclear systems in Asia which are countered by our arms?

4. As for nuclear weapon delivery aircraft, we believe it is necessary and essential that they be included in the agreement. After all, no matter which delivery vehicles—whether missiles or aircraft,—deliver the nuclear warheads the consequences of their use remain the same. The reductions must cover all medium-range systems in Europe—aircraft as well as missiles. Otherwise, a nuclear arms limitation agreement would be inequitable for the Soviet Union.

In this context we would like to ask the following question: what numerical parameters for possible reductions and limitations on aircraft would be acceptable to the U.S. side?

5. We would like particularly to emphasize that the best option for solving the question of limiting and reducing nuclear arms in Europe would, of course, be to rid Europe completely of nuclear arms—both medium-range and tactical—as proposed by the Soviet Union. With such a radical solution many problems currently creating difficulties at the negotiations would disappear by themselves.

The Soviet Union is prepared to do everything in its power to carry out precisely such a far-reaching solution.



Does the U.S., for its part, agree to act in a similar fashion, with a view toward completely ridding Western Europe of nuclear arms?" (This ended the non-paper).

Ambassador Nitze asked whether this Soviet proposal covered all nuclear weapons, including Soviet strategic weaponry.

Ambassador Dobrynin responded in negative, stating it covered only those weapons under discussion in INF.

The Acting Secretary stated we would look at these Soviet responses, but he was not terribly encouraged by them. In regard to the Ambassador's first question, he asked for clarification of the phrasing—Would in fact the Soviet Union accept any U.S. deployments?

The Ambassador repeated the response—to what extent the U.S. would accept any comparable Soviet deployments.

The Acting Secretary stated he was not sure the Soviet ideas had brought the two sides very far in narrowing various differences.

The Ambassador noted the Soviet side had not been particularly encouraged either. In their earlier meeting the Secretary had only asked questions and had not introduced any new elements.

The Acting Secretary replied that the purpose of this particular channel was not to negotiate, but rather to explore possible new avenues.

The Ambassador noted that this applied to both sides. We should explore, but not simply pose questions. He had been involved in such efforts for many years, and stressed that

they do not get anywhere without the introduction of new ideas.

The Acting Secretary then changed the subject to the Middle East (Ambassador Nitze and ACDA Director Adelman left the room at this point).

The Acting Secretary noted that the Secretary was currently in the Middle East, engaged in difficult and personally dangerous negotiations to achieve a settlement in Lebanon, including the withdrawal of all foreign forces.<sup>3</sup> We believe, however, we have the possibility of achieving an agreement. We trust that despite the many differences between the U.S. and Soviet Union on issues in the region, the Soviet Union does not want to stimulate conflict in the area. In that regard, we are worried that many recent Soviet statements and media reports may have the effect of increasing the possibility of conflict.

The Acting Secretary stated he was particularly concerned about Soviet statements regarding Israeli intentions to attack Syria as in the Soviet statement of March 30. We have noted these alarmist and emotional reports have been picked up by the Syrian press and seem to reinforce Syrian intransigency. At a time when diplomatic efforts hold real promise for peace in Lebanon, these statements are unhelpful. In that regard, we hope you will hold down the rhetoric and attempt to temper, not excite, tensions in the region.

The Acting Secretary went on to note that if we are able to achieve an early agreement, we expect Syria also to keep its commitments to withdraw its forces as well. We ask you to use your influence to that end.

Ambassador Dobrynin then asked what commitments the Syrians had made in regards withdrawal.

The Acting Secretary noted the Syrians had made such commitments in the Fez Communiqué, the Non-Aligned Declaration and in a variety of public and private statements since.

The Ambassador stated that to his knowledge, there had been no Arab decision to remove Syria's peace-keeping mandate in this regard.

The Acting Secretary noted that this was primarily a matter for the sovereign government of Lebanon to decide. While we would of course speak to the Syrians about this, this was not a matter for negotiation.

The Ambassador noted that this was an Arab matter, but that he was nevertheless unaware of these Syrian commitments.

The Acting Secretary stated we would bring these to his attention with a paper. He again cited the Fez Communiqué.

The Ambassador persisted in asking just what obligations of the Syrian government was the Acting Secretary referring to. If these were in fact clear, then why was the Secretary going to Damascus? He added this was not his business, but he needed to clarify this for his government.

The Acting Secretary stated that in any event, our two nations had a common interest to facilitate peace in the area. There was a need for both calm and restraint.

The Ambassador noted that press comments were a problem in both countries, but that as for official

statements—no Soviet official had attacked the U.S. As for Lebanon, he went on, an arrangement which would partition Lebanon, which would give the Israelis a right to intervene—where is Lebanese sovereignty in that? This is what we mention in our statements and press commentary. The Soviet Union is not involved in this; the Syrians have ideas of their own. They are worried about an Israeli attack on which they have some information—as do the Soviets. U.S. leniency with Begin allows him to do anything he wants.

The Acting Secretary replied that the Ambassador's description of the emerging agreement was incorrect and that when it became public, he would see where he had been wrong. The U.S. objective is a fully sovereign Lebanon, including its borders.

The Ambassador interjected that if that were the case, the Soviet Union would welcome it.

The Under Secretary noted that when the Soviet press, whether inspired or unintentionally, charges that Israel is about to attack, these reports are picked up by the Syrians, which is very dangerous situation. It is not our impression the Israelis are going to attack Syria. Soviet reporting is creating a difficult atmosphere.

The Ambassador responded that it was a Soviet right to be concerned that Israel could do this—a sincere concern given recent history. Could the U.S. guarantee that Israel will not do this? If so, then the situation would be clear.

The Acting Secretary replied that the U.S. was not asking the Soviet Union for guarantees but rather to exercise helpful influence.

The Ambassador stated there were no grounds to question the sincerity of Soviet concerns. He expressed the hope that the U.S. really knew the intentions of the Israelis, as he recalled several previous senior U.S. officials had spoken to him one way and the situation had turned out otherwise in the past.

The Acting Secretary stated the U.S. had no information on an Israeli attack. If the Soviet Union had such information, we would like to see it.

The Ambassador noted that if the Israelis in fact left Lebanon, then the situation would be improved.

On that note, the meeting ended.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, May 1-15. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer. Cleared by Eagleburger, Dam, and McManaway. The meeting took place in the Acting Secretary's office.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 45](#).

<sup>3</sup> Shultz traveled to various capitals in the Middle East from April 25 to May 8.

## 49. Memorandum From the Acting Secretary of State (Dam) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 5, 1983

### SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin—May 5, 1983

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin came in on May 5 to deliver the response from Moscow to the various INF-related questions the Secretary had posed in their April 21 meeting.<sup>2</sup> Paul Nitze was present. I also used this meeting to convey to Dobrynin our serious concerns about rising Israeli/Syrian tensions and the unhelpful Soviet role in stimulating them. In this connection, I reminded Dobrynin of our own commitment to help bring about withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and of our hope and expectation that all parties will act with restraint during this critical period.

*INF:* The general tenor of his presentation was tough and rhetorical, offering nothing in the way of substance that might be construed as movement in the Soviet position. Dobrynin began his presentation by noting that the very phrasing of the Secretary's questions had indicated an "unconstructive" U.S. attitude and continued unwillingness to make progress in INF. Essentially turning aside our April 21 queries, he posed counter-questions of his own.

In response to the Secretary's question whether there was any finite number of deployed U.S. LRINF missiles acceptable to the Soviet Union, Dobrynin asked what number of comparable Soviet missiles able to reach the U.S. would we find acceptable. In regard to British and French systems, he questioned how the U.S. would propose



to count similar missiles if they were at the disposal of other Warsaw Pact nations. As for the Asian theater, which he asserted had nothing to do with the current negotiations, he raised the issue of nuclear weapons systems other than the Soviet SS-20's in that region. Stating the inclusion of aircraft was "indispensable" in any INF agreement, he asked what new military parameters for the possible reduction and limitations of aircraft would be acceptable to us.

Concluding with a claim of Soviet interest in a "radical solution" to the problem, he urged U.S. consideration of the Soviet proposal to remove all nuclear weapons from Europe (though his subsequent comment made clear that as before, this offer would not affect Soviet strategic weapons within the U.S.S.R.).

In sum, Dobrynin broke no new ground, essentially reiterating Soviet assertions we have already heard at length in Geneva. His rhetorical question to us about numbers of Soviet LRINF missiles able to reach the U.S. was an explicit repetition of the Soviet threat to put the U.S. in an "analogous position." It is interesting to note, however, that although Andropov's latest negotiating offer to accept equality in warheads with the British and French is barely three days old,<sup>3</sup> Dobrynin's message from Moscow and his personal comments made no mention of this at all. This absence suggests that the Soviets themselves see Andropov's proposal as primarily a public diplomacy ploy rather than a serious negotiating position.

*Israeli/Syrian Tensions:* On the Middle East, I reminded Dobrynin that the Secretary is currently engaged in difficult and personally hazardous negotiations which could lead to real progress toward peace in the region. At the same time, Soviet statements had not been helpful and had

indeed contributed to rising Israeli/Syrian tensions. I told Dobrynin that this is a particularly sensitive period in which all parties should exercise restraint in the interest of peace. Finally, I expressed the hope that, if we were able to obtain Israeli and Syrian agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, the Syrians would keep their own commitments to withdraw.

In the ensuing discussion, Dobrynin asserted that Syrian forces are in Lebanon under Arab League mandate and questioned whether the Government of Syria had undertaken any commitment to withdraw them. I reminded Dobrynin that we considered the Lebanese Government sovereign in this matter. Shifting his ground, Dobrynin said that Israel might attack Syria and asked whether we could give any guarantee concerning Israeli behavior. I replied that guarantees were not the issue; we would continue to work for peace and were urging the Soviets to exercise their influence in a constructive manner. Finally, I told Dobrynin that we had no evidence of Israeli preparations for an attack on Syria and asked if the Soviets had any such evidence. Dobrynin did not reply directly, but said that, if the U.S. could achieve an agreement for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, this would improve the situation.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/02/83-05/06/83). Secret; Sensitive. In a May 5 action memorandum to Dam, Burt wrote: "In accordance with usual practice, we have prepared appropriate reports on today's meeting with Dobrynin for your approval." Attached to Burt's memorandum were: "1) a memorandum to the President on today's meeting with Dobrynin; 2) a cable to

the Secretary and Ambassador Hartman on the INF discussion; and 3) a separate cable to the Secretary and interested posts on the Middle East discussion.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Shultz/Dobrynin plus Shultz or Dam/Dobrynin in Washington, D.C. February–May 1983) In a May 10 memorandum to Clark, Lenczowski wrote: “Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam has sent the President a memcon of his meeting with Dobrynin. (Tab A) Your cover memorandum to the President (Tab I) briefly summarizes Dam’s memo but adds no further comment. The only comment the memo might deserve is that it demonstrates yet again how fruitless most of our dialogue with the Soviets really is. This is not to say that the dialogue is politically worthless to the United States: the mere fact that we can say we are talking to the Soviets is beneficial. But it is to say that the President’s policy of general caution in dealing with the Soviets and avoiding putting too large an investment in this dialogue in hopes of achieving a true peace with the Soviets is a wise and far-sighted policy.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (05/02/83–05/06/83)) Clark wrote “I agree,” and he initialed his approval that the memorandum be forwarded to the President. Reagan initialed Clark’s May 16 covering memorandum, which forwarded Dam’s May 5 memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 48](#). For the Secretary’s questions, see [Document 45](#).

<sup>3</sup> Andropov made this proposal in a May 3 speech in Moscow. For extracts of his speech, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 389–391.

## 50. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 11, 1983

### SUBJECT

Welcome Home Report

The following is a status report on the issues you asked me to track prior to your departure, as well as a few that have arisen in the interim.

### I. *U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS*

- *The Dobrynin Channel.* We have kept the Dobrynin channel active during your absence. In the course of five meetings with Dobrynin, we have received answers on START, our PL-5 and Syrian demarches, and some of the answers on INF. There has been very little movement in the Soviet positions on these issues. Most troublesome was the Soviet counter-demarche on the Middle East, the bottom line of which was that we cannot resolve Lebanon's problems without Soviet involvement. Still pending are the Soviets' answers on the LTA. For our part, we owe the Soviets responses to Andropov's proposal for a meeting of scientists to discuss ballistic missile defense and to Dobrynin's START presentation,<sup>2</sup> as well as further details on our CBM proposals. Also, we have not responded to Dobrynin's latest demarches on the Neutral and Non-Aligned draft concluding document for the Madrid CSCE review.<sup>3</sup> We must determine a position as soon as possible since Max leaves for Madrid this week. As you know, the Soviets have offered a package on performance. Max thinks



we can improve on it if the President is willing to see Andropov in the context of the UNGA.

I have asked Larry and Rick Burt to chart a strategy for the entire Dobrynin channel process, to include topics and timing over the next several months.

You should know that Rowny has suggested that we disband the Dobrynin channel on START and turn it over to him when he is at Geneva. This concept has absolutely no support in this building.

- *START*. We have had several discussions of START in my arms control group. I also attended an NSC meeting on Wednesday, May 10 to discuss our position on START.<sup>4</sup> The upshot will be a Presidential letter to Congress expressing the Administration's willingness to conduct a thorough review of our START proposal in light of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations.<sup>5</sup> The letter will also express an interest in and willingness to give serious thought to the so-called "build-down" proposal and to the proposal to establish a bipartisan arms control commission.

- *MBFR*. The issue paper for an NSC meeting on MBFR has been forwarded to the NSC staff.<sup>6</sup> OSD was not altogether pleased with the options and talked about submitting its own, separate paper. To date, OSD has not produced. An NSC meeting is now tentatively scheduled for May 17.

- *Kiev/New York Consulates and Cultural Agreement*. After discussions with Bill Clark, he has agreed (after some reluctance) to move these subjects to the NSPG after developing a more rigorous options paper for the President. I think we are going to continue to face resistance on both these issues.

- *Technology Transfer*. The CIA briefing on Soviet acquisition of western technology raises a number of serious problems which you will be better able to gauge once you have had this briefing.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Memos To/From S, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reading "GPS" and Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating they saw it. Shultz was in the Middle East to negotiate a troop withdrawal from Lebanon from April 25 to May 8, then traveled to Paris from May 8 to May 11 for the OECD meeting.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 42](#).

<sup>3</sup> Documentation on the Madrid CSCE Review Conference is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983](#).

<sup>4</sup> Documentation on this NSC meeting is in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 66](#).

<sup>5</sup> On January 3, 1983, the White House released a statement announcing the establishment and membership of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. The Commission consisted of Chairman Brent Scowcroft, Vice Chairman Thomas Reed, and members Nicholas Brady, Harold Brown, William Clements, John Deutch, Alexander Haig, Richard Helms, John Lyons, Levering Smith, and James Woolsey. Marvin Atkins of the Office of the Secretary of Defense served as Executive Secretary of the commission. (*Public Papers; Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 4-5)

<sup>6</sup> The NSC meeting on MBFR took place on May 18, 1983. Documentation is scheduled for publication in [Foreign](#)



*Relations, 1981-1988, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983* .

## **51. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 17, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

A good deal of time was spent this afternoon with Secretary Shultz in an internal meeting with Eagleburger, Seitz, and Hill (as well as Burt and Palmer for part of the meeting), discussing how we can work out a better working arrangement with the NSC. One aspect of the problem has to do with the Soviet Union, where there is a Presidential decision to probe the Soviet Union across a number of fronts to see whether there is any prospect of making progress with them, particularly the kind of progress that might permit a well-prepared summit. However, in practice, because of the reluctance of the NSC staff and the opposition of Cap Weinberger, it is almost impossible to get decisions to move forward on individual items. What we need to do is to work out some sort of a system where each item does not have to be fully staffed by the entire bureaucracy. Particularly because of the way Defense proceeds, by essentially taking a position and then sticking to it with no compromise, it is extremely difficult to move forward. I personally fear that the President will be under enormous pressure for a summit meeting, particularly with the election coming up, and it will be one in which we will not be prepared and expectations will be dashed because nothing can be agreed upon at the summit. I also fear that pressure for an arms control agreement before the election will become very great, and again we will not be prepared to move forward because we cannot make decisions within the executive branch.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 17.

**52. Memorandum From William Stearman of  
the National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 18, 1983

SUBJECT  
U.S.-Soviet Summitry

We can expect continuing pressure for a Reagan-Andropov Summit from State, our allies and others. So far, the President has wisely resisted a summit until the Soviets demonstrate better intentions through concrete, positive actions. He should continue to hold the line for reasons explained below.

The President is, in a way, emulating Eisenhower's wise example. After Stalin's death in 1953, Eisenhower stated he would go to a summit if the Soviets agreed to: A German Peace Treaty, an Austrian State Treaty or significant arms control measures. The Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty in 1955 and a summit took place in Geneva a few months later. The resulting "Spirit of Geneva" reinforced a Soviet detente campaign which was beginning to weaken NATO until detente ended with the Hungarian Revolution. At least Eisenhower made the Soviets pay a price for the summit.

The record of U.S.-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. With one exception, Camp David in 1959, these summits have ranged from being merely unnecessary to being nearly disastrous. For example, I have long believed that the 1961 Vienna summit (in which I was involved) convinced Khrushchev that

Kennedy could be pushed around, and the result was the Berlin Wall and later the Cuban missile crisis. Camp David, on the other hand, bought us valuable time needed to toughen our position on Berlin.

The 1961 Vienna summit illustrates a principal danger in summitry. There is bound to be an unbridgeable gulf between the mind-set of a Soviet leader and that of any American President. This compounds the danger of misunderstandings and miscalculations. This danger is further compounded by the fact that summits are perforce short and rendered even shorter by the necessity of translation; therefore, the serious and complex subjects, which are usually on the agenda, can be only superficially discussed.

The Soviets presently feign disinterest in a summit; however, they would probably leap at one were it offered. Summits help them promote detente and "peace" campaigns, provide a convenient propaganda platform, and are regarded by the Soviets as necessary reaffirmations of their co-equal status as a "super power." U.S. participation in a summit may temporarily buy the Administration some domestic and foreign political advantages, but can also backfire when unrealistic expectations are dashed by the usual absence of concrete results—for which the U.S. may be blamed as much as the Soviets (or even more). Of course, this would not be the case if a summit only ratified agreements already concluded—which is the only circumstance under which I feel a summit is warranted at all.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/84-06/27/84); NLR-748-25A-5-7-7. Confidential. Sent for

information. A copy was sent to Lenczowski. Poindexter wrote in the top margin: "President has seen. JP."



## **53. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 20, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

My Meeting with Dobrynin—May 19, 1983

I wanted to give you a more complete account than was possible last night of my first meeting with Dobrynin since my return from the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> The meeting lasted about eighty minutes. During the first part of it we were joined by our senior staffs for a discussion of a wide range of issues—the Sakharov case, the grains LTA, the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, the MBFR negotiations, and a number of pending bilateral problems. We also met alone for a discussion focusing on the Soviet-Syrian relationship, the dangers of the current situation in Lebanon, and the overall substance and tenor of our bilateral relations.

I led off with our serious concern over the health of Andrey Sakharov and his wife Yelena Bonner and urged that the Soviets permit them to return to Moscow for medical treatment. I referred to Congressional interest and your Sakharov Day proclamation, and noted to Dobrynin that we had treated this matter with considerable discretion.<sup>3</sup>

On MBFR, I told Dobrynin that we would be back to him soon with some ideas for introducing new momentum into the negotiations. On the grains LTA, I told Dobrynin that although I was not yet in a position to give him an official response, his suggestion that the grains consultations previously scheduled for June 1–2 be devoted to preparations for the negotiations seemed a generally good

idea, and I saw no reason why we should not treat the parameters of a new agreement at the meeting.

Turning to the Middle East, I gave Dobrynin a fairly full briefing on the negotiations leading to the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. I recalled that all parties to the negotiations had bargained hard and in good faith. For the Lebanese, the bottom line had been to retain the exclusive right to guarantee the security of their borders, and we were satisfied that this had been achieved. I concluded that Lebanon now deserves a chance to address its internal problems, and can do this best if all foreign forces would withdraw. Israel had now committed itself to withdraw, and it was up to others to follow suit.

At this point, I invited Dobrynin to take the floor, and he began with the familiar line that the Sakharov case was an internal Soviet matter. To my comments about the LTA, Dobrynin responded positively, and assured me we could work with the Soviet in charge of the June 1-2 talks, but added that a new agreement should contain assurances against future embargoes. Responding to my comment on MBFR, Dobrynin said that he would wait to see what we had to say. He noted that the Soviets were themselves waiting for our response to their proposal for confidential consultations between U.S. and Soviet scientists on the implications of your ballistic missile defense initiative.

Turning to bilateral relations, Dobrynin noted that in our meetings earlier this year, we had reviewed a number of issues which were of particular concern to the Soviet side. Among these he listed the bilateral agreements on cooperation in Transportation and Atomic Energy up for renewal this year, the Soviet proposal for more activity under other bilateral agreements still in force, and the Soviet request that we take another look at seven bilateral

arms control negotiations which are now suspended. He also noted that, at one point, I had mentioned the possibility of taking another look at negotiations for a new cultural agreement and consulates in Kiev and New York, but had had nothing more to say to him on these issues, so that he wondered what we propose to do. Finally, he said that the Soviet side looked forward to my meeting with Gromyko at the UNGA this fall and hoped that other meetings preliminary to it would take place.

At this point, Dobrynin and I adjourned for a private meeting. I told him of our concern that the tensions in Lebanon were becoming more dangerous. There are Soviets in the Bekaa, I noted, and the Soviets are associated with the Syrians in Lebanon, with the PLO, with other groups. Who controls such groups is an open question; one had bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, and we had one report that there was Soviet involvement in this. I had told the official who said it that we had no evidence of that. But the fact is that the Soviets are involved with various irresponsible groups in Lebanon, I said, and that they are playing with fire. And their increased military deployments in Syria meant that they would inevitably be involved in any new war from the outset. The situation is extremely dangerous.

Dobrynin replied that he had understood my message and did not think the Syrians were seeking a conflict nor doing anything to bring one about. In this connection, he said the Soviets had counselled Damascus to be careful. (I said we had done the same with the Israelis.) On the question of the broader Middle East peace process, Dobrynin said it was not up to the U.S. to determine whether the Soviets have a role. He asserted that the Soviet Union needed no U.S. "ticket" to play in the Middle East game, perhaps signalling

Soviet sensitivity over their current position on the diplomatic sidelines.

Dobrynin and I then privately reviewed our personal dialogue over the past few months, agreeing that it would rate a grade of C-plus at best. Noting the possibility of a trip by me to Moscow this summer for meetings with the Soviet leadership, I told Dobrynin frankly that not enough progress had been made to justify the trip at this point.

Dobrynin replied that, from Moscow's perspective, the results of our dialogue had not been impressive. The only real accomplishment had been our LTA offer, and this had been accompanied by our statements that this step had no broader political significance. Dobrynin continued that, when asked by Moscow for a list of steps the U.S. had taken in the interest of improved relations, he had little or nothing to report. In these circumstances, Moscow is of the opinion that the U.S. Administration has a hostile attitude toward the USSR.

The meeting concluded on this note. Dobrynin and I agreed, however, that it is important for us to stay in touch, and that we should meet after the Williamsburg Summit and before the NATO Ministerial, in the first week of June.<sup>4</sup> While there was a certain amount of characteristic posturing in Dobrynin's remarks, his attitude was businesslike, and I believe the overall thrust of his presentation should be taken seriously. I look forward to our discussion together with Bill Clark Monday morning on next steps in our relations with the Soviets.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6).

Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Shultz returned from the Middle East and Paris on May 11.

<sup>3</sup> On May 18, Reagan signed Proclamation 5063, declaring May 21, 1983, to be National Andrei Sakharov Day.

Sakharov, a noted Russian physicist, human rights activist, and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, was exiled to the city of Gorky in the Soviet Union. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book I, pp. 731-732.

<sup>4</sup> The G-7 Economic Summit took place in Williamsburg, Virginia, May 28-30. The NATO Ministerial meeting took place in Paris June 9-10.

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 56](#).

## 54. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 21, 1983

### SUBJECT

Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

At your direction, I have embarked on a process of intensive dialogue with Dobrynin on the full range of US-Soviet issues;<sup>2</sup> Max Kampelman has been engaged on sensitive Madrid issues; and Art Hartman has also had a role in Moscow. We have identified four necessary topic areas for discussion:

A. *Human Rights*: In this area there has been some movement. It began with your initiative to break the impasse in the Pentecostalist case, but in recent weeks the Soviets, in the context of reaching a CSCE agreement in Madrid, appear to have been moving toward us on other human rights issues of special concern.

B. *Bilateral Relations*: Dobrynin and I have reviewed outstanding issues in our bilateral relations to see where we might move to mutual advantage. In this area, our principal move was your proposal to begin negotiations for a new Long Term Agreement on grains. They knew we wanted an agreement, and they have now accepted the proposal.<sup>3</sup>

C. *Arms Control*: Here the results of our discussions have been mixed. We have covered virtually every topic in your arms control negotiating program, and the Soviet responses have ranged from some modest movement on START, MBFR, and your recent CBMs proposals; through a



serious but still unsatisfactory reply to our démarches on their tests of the PL-5 ICBM; to a blank wall on INF. At the same time, there is some momentum in our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on nuclear non-proliferation (Ambassador Richard Kennedy will hold a second round of these consultations in Moscow in mid-June). As you know we are now reviewing our positions on some of the central arms control issues and, depending on what we decide, we may have more to say to the Soviets on these subjects.

*D. Regional Issues:* We have had a fair amount of dialogue with the Soviets on issues such as Afghanistan, but positive results have been meager. Our task remains to drive home to the Soviets the importance of progress on these issues if there is to be a meaningful and lasting improvement in our relations.

Against this background, we are now in a position where we need to take further steps if we want to see whether a visit this summer to Moscow for meetings with Andropov and Gromyko, an invitation to Gromyko to Washington for a meeting with you at the time of the UNGA this fall, and ultimately a meeting between you and Andropov would be in our interest. I believe the next step on our part should be to propose the negotiation of a new US-Soviet cultural agreement and the opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York, as I suggested some months ago. Both of these proposals will sound good to the Soviets, but are unambiguously in our interest when examined from a hardheaded American viewpoint. I am enclosing copies of the options papers on these issues the Department earlier sent to Bill Clark.<sup>4</sup>

In NSDD 75 on US-Soviet relations, you endorsed the idea that getting an adequate formal framework for exchanges is the only way to ensure reciprocity in cultural, academic

and media contacts with the Soviets, and to penetrate the Soviet Union with our own ideology. To get it we need to negotiate a new US-Soviet cultural agreement with the Soviets, and that is what Charlie Wick and I have proposed for your decision.<sup>5</sup>

The opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York would have the advantage of getting us onto new Soviet terrain while increasing the Soviet presence here only marginally. The Soviets already have a big UN Mission in New York, while our consulate in Kiev would be the first Western mission in the capital of the Ukraine. There is growing interest in a Kiev consulate in Congress and among American Jewish and Ukrainian groups. A U.S. presence in Kiev would also help us broaden our access to and ideological penetration of Soviet society.

In order to continue the dialogue process you have authorized me to pursue, I would like to propose to Dobrynin next week that we move forward with the cultural agreement and the consulates. So far it is the Soviets who have made most of the moves in the process, particularly on the LTA and human rights.<sup>6</sup> It is now time for us to take some modest steps of our own. These steps are necessary (but obviously far from sufficient) ingredients to development of the possibility of a substantive meeting with real results between you and Andropov during your first term.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In forwarding a draft to Shultz on May 17, Burt wrote: "Per your instructions this afternoon, we

have prepared the attached memorandum to the President. You may find the last paragraph too strongly worded for your tastes. If so, you could decide to delete all but the first sentence." No changes were made in the paragraph.

(Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, May 16-23 1983) On an NSC routing slip attached to Shultz's memorandum, Poindexter wrote: "Judge, I have tasked the staff to prepare a cover memo for this to go to President on Sunday [May 22]. George just will not follow the interagency process. After my conversation with you yesterday, I told State 10 June NSC meeting on U.S.-Soviet Relations was still scheduled and we still needed an interagency paper on consulates and cultural agreement. My tasking memo is attached. I had passed verbal instructions to them earlier. I'm sure George will want to talk about this at 0945 on Monday. JP." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6))

<sup>2</sup> On May 21, Dobriansky sent a memorandum to Clark that addressed her issues with Shultz's memorandum. She recommended against Shultz meeting with Dobrynin "for the following reasons:

"—The current international environment (Soviet obstinacy in Geneva, sabotage of US peace efforts in the Middle East, new round of pressures on Polish regime to intensify repression of workers, etc.) makes the raising of these symbolic issues untimely.

"—Second, the impending June 10 Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party might change or clarify the Soviet internal power balance, thus enabling us to judge Soviet moves better.

“—Third, before these issues can be addressed, there is a need to develop and overall operational strategy as to how to implement the goals set forth in NSDD-75 (US Policy Toward the Soviet Union).

“—Fourth, a June 10 NSC meeting is scheduled already to discuss the pros and cons of a cultural agreement and new consulates.” (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6))

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 59](#).

<sup>4</sup> The options papers are attached; printed as attachments to [Document 40](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 18](#).

<sup>6</sup> Reagan drew two parallel vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote a question mark.

**55. Note From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1983

Judge Clark

SUBJECT

Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

I have not sent this paper to Cap or Bill for reasons of security and negotiating strategy.<sup>2</sup>

What do I mean? As you know, I have a fundamental problem with the way we are conducting our dialogue with the Russians. These deal with both style and substance. Here are the parameters as I see them:

—We are now strong enough and have enough leverage to get real concessions from the Russians—in short we are bargaining from strength.

—We must not fritter that leverage by making public what it is (consulates etc) because if it leaks, we are steamrollered into making some deal to suit the special interest group involved in the congress or the country at large. We must play our cards close to the vest.<sup>3</sup>

—In playing our cards, however, we must know what we want to achieve. Surely some of our leverage is more valuable than others. We should use it wisely and get substantial quids for it. This means we must



have priorities. What do we want to get for consulates, for a cultural agreement, for the grain deal etc. Surely these agreements must not be signed for nothing more than “improved dialogue.” In short, what are our priorities?<sup>4</sup>

—Once we have our priorities set, we must have a negotiating strategy which tells us which cards we play first, second, etc; what our fallbacks are; when we stonewall etc.

Assuming we can put this together—and let me stress I do not believe it can be done within the European Bureau and perhaps not even within the Department at all—it must be handled very discreetly. Otherwise it will leak and we will come under enormous pressure to forfeit our advantages for the sake of agreement. This means we cannot staff US-Soviet Relations through the bureaucracy.

How should we proceed? I think the only way to deal with this issue is to handle it from the White House. The options are that you deal with it personally; that I handle it privately with Dobrynin; or that the Vice President handle it. There are advantages to each of these. I guess I come down on the Vice President option for reasons of low visibility.

But we cannot go on as we are with State continuing to fritter away leverage, not being taken seriously by the Soviets and, at the end of the day, ending up with no strategic gain to show for our several incremental concessions.

Could we discuss this?

**Bud<sup>5</sup>**



<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (6). Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 54](#).

<sup>3</sup> Clark bracketed this point and wrote “style” in the margin.

<sup>4</sup> Clark wrote “strategy” in the margin next to this point.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy with this typed signature. At the bottom of the page, Poindexter wrote: “Judge, I agree with this. As long as we have a strategy that the President agrees with the various aspects of such issues as consulates and exchange agreements can be analyzed outside the interagency process. John.”

## **56. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 23, 1983

I attended a dinner this evening at the White House for Members of the House of Representatives. The purpose was to lobby for the approval of the MX. The evening ended when Tom Foley, the House Democratic Whip, announced that he was going to support the approval of the MX. This suggests that the vote should be rather strongly for the MX. If this is true, this culminates a period of aggressive Presidential activity on behalf of this ICBM system. The strongest arguments have been the arms control arguments, namely, that the determination of the Congress to support the MX will induce the Soviets to come to the table to negotiate seriously in the START talks and that we cannot expect our NATO allies to agree to the deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM missiles unless we are willing to deploy the MX.

I attended a meeting with Secretary Shultz and the President this morning in the Oval Office.<sup>2</sup> Shultz's purpose was to convince the President that he should go ahead with his plan of engaging the Soviets on a broad range of discussions.<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the Secretary sought approval by the President of the Kiev-New York consulates and the cultural agreement. It was an awkward situation, because a number of people were there who had nothing to do with foreign policy (specifically, Ed Meese and Jim Baker). Among the foreign policy group there was, of course, Bill Clark and Bud McFarlane, as well as the Vice President. This was in effect a continuation of the normal 9:30 meeting on national security matters. The President said

that he was willing to go forward with the consulates but that he was troubled about the cultural agreement. Although he realized that the cultural agreement would be in the national interest, because at present the Soviet Union was able to bargain and pick and choose among private sponsors of Soviet cultural events in the United States and the cultural agreement would give us some control of that process and some equal bargaining power, he felt, nevertheless, that voters would not understand the applause for the Bolshoi Ballet and laughter concerning Soviet circuses at the same time that Soviets were gassing Afghan rebels in Afghanistan. The Secretary did the best he could with the situation and tried a number of tacks in discussions with the President, but the President clearly was unable to focus on the broader subject of relations with the Soviet Union. Bill Clark had already frightened him to death with our intelligence reports on the number of Soviet ships visiting Nicaragua, something that was brought home to me when he raised it again this evening at the dinner with the House Members on the MX. It was not a hopeful harbinger of the future. Indeed, even worse news arose later in the day when I realized that Bill Clark had appointed Ron Lehman, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, as his principal arms control staff man on the NSC staff. Although Lehman is an honorable man and certainly one who understands the technical aspects of arms control, he has thus far been aligned with those who tend to view any arms control agreement as a threat to national security. How he will turn out remains to be seen, but the initial reaction at the State Department is to view this as a very ominous development.

My arms control discussion group met this morning to discuss the next eighteen months of arms control negotiations. Because I was meeting with the Secretary and the President, I arrived after the discussions had

started. I arrived to find that Richard Perle and Richard Burt were scoring points off each other and generally raising each other's temperature. I have sought to make these arms control discussions a calm and reasoned place in which issues can be discussed, but I find that that consensus about purposes of the discussions is beginning to dissipate. On the one hand, the change of temper must be because the question of arms control is becoming a major national issue. On the other hand, Richard Burt, who is clearly one of the brightest and most dedicated analysts of arms control matters, is also a person who doesn't know how to use his ammunition carefully in an interagency debate. Since he joined the group, I find it difficult to maintain the atmosphere of civility with our Defense Department colleagues. Until he was confirmed, I did not include him in the discussions, because I felt that it was not in his self-interest to be so deeply involved in arms control matters, and especially in view of the strong opposition among the high conservative members of the Senate. Obviously he belongs in the discussions, but it shows how deeply held the views are and how emotional some of them are when he enters into these discussions with his opposite numbers in the Defense Department.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 23.

<sup>2</sup> Shultz and Dam met alone with Reagan from 9:43 to 10:23 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his May 23 diary entry, Reagan wrote: "Met with Shultz re our moves with the Soviets. I thought we've come to a point where we should include Bill Casey & Cap W. in some of

our decisions.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 229)

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 54](#).

## **57. Letter From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Dear George:

Washington, May 26, 1983

I am very conscious of frustration over the US-Soviet dialogue—indeed, I share it. It is because I—and I know, the President—share your interest in getting results that I have wanted to assure that we—and I include all those with a legitimate interest—are all supporting you based upon a clear understanding of strategy and tactics. We hope through this letter to utilize an expeditious and existing process through which we can create this solid base of support so that you can proceed on an overall plan that holds promise of success.

Let me be more specific. It seems to us that the policy enunciated by the President in NSDD 75 is clear. Based upon its objectives, it seems worthwhile for us to translate it into specific priorities—what we are trying to achieve in their rank order—and then to forge a negotiating strategy which is based upon the judicious use of our several elements of leverage so that at the end of the day a year from now we will have achieved one or two extremely important goals en route to our objectives.

Regarding your negotiating strategy, there are no prejudgments against concluding these kinds of agreements, e.g., cultural or consulates; we only ask whether, as a matter of strategy, these ought not be put together with a comprehensive list of others which are



bargained for with an overall sense of priorities so that they take on a strategic, and not merely a tactical and perhaps illusory quality.

As a separate but related matter, it is clear that some of the areas you will wish to negotiate involve by necessity the interests of other agencies. [2 lines not declassified] We know you are conscious of this, but believe it is useful for you to have discussed the important considerations [2 lines not declassified]. There are other examples but the point is clear. Other advisors to the President in the national security area need to understand our strategy.

In order to put us in a position for you to be able to step off with the full support of all (and as a corollary, not to have to worry about having your agreements undermined later by disaffected bureaucrats), we believe it would be worthwhile for you, me, Bill and Cap to get away (from phones) together for a period so that you could lay out your proposal on how we should proceed. Your presentation could include: what should we try to achieve in the way of solving problems in the next year and in what order (START, human rights, cultural, MBFR, regional security, etc.); what is our leverage, again in descending order of value; what are we willing to give up in exchange for our high-value goals and increased security.

I believe we could emerge from such a meeting with a consensus. Given the President's endorsement, you could move out with great latitude in implementation. It seems worth a try to me. Indeed, I find it difficult to imagine another way. What do you think?

Sincerely,

**William P. Clark<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, May 1983. Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for the System.

<sup>2</sup> Clark signed "Bill" above his typed signature.

**58. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Dear Bill:

Washington, May 27, 1983

Attached are some comments with respect to the State Department memo proposing several new openings to the Soviets, which you and I have discussed.<sup>2</sup>

Please let me know if you want anything more.

**Cap**

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, May 25, 1983

*Comments on State's Memo on US-Soviet Relations: Next Steps*

1. The specific proposals of this memo come down to the following initiatives:

—a SecState visit to Moscow to be followed by an invitation for Gromyko to visit Washington; — negotiations on a new Cultural Agreement; and — opening of consulates in Kiev and New York.

2. Regarding the *visit of SecState to Moscow*, one should consider that SecState visited there at the occasion of Brezhnev's funeral. A better first step might be a Gromyko visit to Washington early in September. This makes the United States appear less as the petitioner. A SecState visit to Moscow as early as this summer could put pressure on the US—far more than on the Soviets—to produce results. It would be our Secretary who would be seen as having to come back with results if he goes all the way to Moscow *at the President's initiative*.

3. The *Cultural Exchange Agreement* was permitted to expire in 1979 as part of the Carter Administration's response to Afghanistan. Resuming negotiations toward such an Agreement could be misconstrued as our having forgotten and forgiven the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The memo points out that the asymmetry in the visits between the US and the Soviet Union is troublesome, but this point ought to be broadened. There is a disturbing lack of reciprocity favoring the Soviet Union in a wide variety of US-Soviet relationships. The Soviets have a larger Embassy staff and trade missions; their visitors generally have more access to the American people and the media; and their trade relationships with us (as George Schulz has pointed out in another context) is one-sided because they are a single government monopoly with a great deal of information about the US economy and US firms, while we have private firms competing with each other to do business with the Soviet Union.

Thus, the problem that a new Cultural Exchange Agreement is supposed to fix is much broader than cultural affairs. And even in the realm of cultural affairs, it cannot be fixed by such an agreement. What we need is more effective implementation of the tools we now have to enforce reciprocity, plus perhaps some legislative changes.

We should therefore develop a framework for US-Soviet reciprocity in diplomatic, business, cultural, scientific, and other such relations, and proposals on how to enforce it. Once we have such a framework in place, a new Cultural Exchange Agreement might well fit into it and accomplish its desired purposes.

4. A critical question on all these initiatives is *timing*. If there is a possibility of a summit next year or later this year, the agreement on the consulates and the signing of the Cultural Agreement (based on rigorous reciprocity) may be precisely the kind of limited substantive outcome that we need to hold in reserve, so as to keep open for the President the option of a summit. We should not get into a situation where a summit may be desirable for a variety of reasons, but achievable with a substantive outcome only by massive last-minute US concessions on arms control negotiations or other difficult issues. If a Cultural Agreement and consulates are the things the Soviets are perhaps more eager to get than we, these items could give us the leverage to avoid one-sided pressures on the President in conjunction with a summit.

5. The State memo omits the flat Soviet rejection of our proposal to negotiate verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. We must not accept that turndown and go on to other business more convenient for the Soviets, such as cultural affairs and consulates. We should not be left dangling with an unverifiable treaty that we comply with; this would establish a bad precedent for other arms control. Hence, the verification negotiations on TTB ought to be part of any package of new initiatives.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers Working File: Contains Originals (7).

Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 54](#).

<sup>3</sup> Secret; Sensitive.



**59. Memorandum From Douglas McMinn of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 9, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Negotiations on a New Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA)

The initial round of negotiations for a new LTA (June 2, in London) was constructive and non-polemical. While major differences remain on several issues, the Soviets made clear their readiness and desire to conclude a new LTA soon. There was joint agreement to use the existing LTA framework as the basis for negotiations.

With regard to the next round of negotiations, to be held in Moscow June 20-21, the Soviets hinted they would like this to be a major negotiation session with the signing of an agreement some time shortly thereafter. It is open to question whether such an optimistic timetable is possible. The Soviets also made known their desire that a Cabinet-level official sign the agreement and they would like the signing ceremony in Moscow. Our negotiators told the Soviets that no decision had been made on who might sign for the U.S. and where.

Based on the June 2 discussions, the major substantive differences between the Soviets and ourselves are as follows:

*Minimum Purchase Levels*

Whereas the present agreement has a range of 6-8 million tons for the minimum and maximum purchase levels, the Soviets suggested a range of 6-12 million tons with delivery assurances not only on those amounts, but also on additional amounts offered during regular bilateral consultations (in effect on all Soviet purchases of U.S. grain). The Soviets also want separate USG assurances to intervene in case of longshoremen boycotts, strikes, etc. The U.S. side countered with a minimum purchase range of 16-19 million tons, which the Soviets rejected; the U.S. indicated we were willing to consider a lower number. *The U.S. side "hung tough" on the supply assurances issue and offered no more than current Article 2 delivery assurances.*

### *Short Supply*

The Soviets reacted negatively to the U.S. proposal that the short supply trigger (permitting the U.S. to reduce deliveries if our crop situation dictated) be raised from 225 million tons to 280. The Soviets want to delete this provision altogether, arguing it makes the LTA imbalanced because it gives the U.S. an "out" whereas the Soviets do not have one.

### *Quality*

The Soviets argued for inclusion of a provision that the USG would guarantee quality levels set in contracts and that the Soviets would be relieved of their purchase obligations if grain were not up to particular quality standards. The U.S. side suggested it would explore a "good offices provision" by the USG, but strongly rejected the notion of a Soviet escape clause from its minimum purchase obligations.

## *Maritime Agreement*

The Soviets argued for negotiation of a new maritime agreement, even though acknowledging that shipments were proceeding smoothly now in the absence of a maritime agreement. They indicated that at a minimum, retention of Article 7 of the present agreement was essential. (We have no problem with retaining Article 7, which merely stipulates that grain shipments be conducted in accord with the maritime agreement in effect at the time, but the U.S. delegation simply noted we were not authorized to negotiate a new maritime agreement).

\*\* In private discussions with our chief negotiators this week, I reaffirmed the President's position that he favors mutually beneficial trade with the Soviets, on the basis of regular commercial considerations, i.e., no "special deals." I emphasized that major additional guarantees to the Soviets on supply assurance (over and above those in the existing agreement) would run counter to the President's position.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/09/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Bailey. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

**60. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 14, 1983

**SUBJECT**

The Political Context of US-Soviet Dialogue Over the Next 18 months

From the beginning of the Administration, and particularly during your recent series of meetings with Dobrynin, we have been able to conduct an intensive and comprehensive dialogue with the Soviet Union despite increasing tensions in East-West relations. While concrete results have not been impressive, we have demonstrated to Moscow the durability of our basic approach (e.g. realism, strength, and negotiation). Additionally, the process of dialogue has been to some extent insulated from the impact of political events beyond the parameters of the US-Soviet bilateral relationship.

However, this period is rapidly coming to an end. Our dialogue with the Soviets will be profoundly affected by a number of events over the next 18 months—most importantly our INF deployments and the Soviet reaction to them;<sup>2</sup> the handling of the summit prospect by both sides; and the onset of the Presidential political season in the U.S. We foresee the following pattern: a period of opportunity from now until mid-fall; a period of relatively high tension and low prospects for new movement in US-Soviet relations as INF deployments begin; a second possible interval of opportunity in the spring of 1984; and decreased chances for progress as the U.S. Presidential campaign goes into high gear next summer.

If we are to exploit the creative possibilities inherent in the dialogue we have worked to establish, we must recognize how the emerging political context will establish the limits of possible progress in the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. But we must also move now to put ourselves in a position to take advantage of whatever possibilities may emerge by creating incentives for the Soviets to behave with restraint and engage us in the give-and-take of real negotiations on the agenda we have established.

### *The Emerging Political Context of US-Soviet Relations*

#### *1. The INF Factor*

We have long recognized that, from the Soviet perspective, our INF deployments later this year are and will remain the preeminent issue of East-West relations. In the period remaining before deployments begin, the Soviets will pull out all the stops in a last-ditch effort to derail the NATO decision and prevent the political and military recoupling of the U.S. and Western Europe. At the same time, the Soviets have no doubt absorbed the full implications of the displays of Alliance unity on INF at Williamsburg and Paris and may well have concluded that deployments will actually begin later this year.

Should deployments go forward, Moscow will have no choice but to make good on its repeated promises to respond, although the Soviet leadership probably has not yet made a final determination of the extent and shape of its response. Thus, during the final quarter of this year and the first quarter of 1983, movement in the overall US-Soviet relationship will become increasingly difficult as our deployments begin and the Soviet response takes shape.

This suggests that we may have only a period of few months in which to test seriously Soviet willingness to address our concerns before an inevitable period of increased tension begins. If we are able to use this “window” to establish a credible posture of readiness to explore possibilities for progress in other key areas of the relationship, such as START, the Soviets *may* have some incentive to attenuate their response to INF deployments. Indeed, this may be the only hope of heading off a severe Soviet rejoinder that would, in turn, force us to respond—an action-reaction sequence which would all but eliminate the chances of accomplishing any constructive results in our dialogue with the Soviets during this Presidential term.

If this analysis is on the mark, a possible trip by you to the Soviet Union in July or August takes on importance beyond that normally attached to a meeting between you and Gromyko.<sup>3</sup> At a minimum it would be a useful U.S. analogue to the Kohl visit, thus reducing the impression (and reality) of West German isolation in high-level dialogue with Moscow this summer.<sup>4</sup> Beyond this, a visit would provide the opportunity for you to deliver a dual message—that INF deployments will go forward, but that we remain ready to explore the possibility of a more constructive relationship, including arms control, in the post-deployment period. Of course, if such a message is to carry any weight with a Soviet leadership already preoccupied with INF, it will have to be accompanied by concrete evidence of our readiness to address Soviet concerns on key issues, such as START. It will also require that you be in a position to speak authoritatively on another topic of potential interest to the Soviet leadership—a possible US-Soviet summit.

## *2. The Summit Factor*



As we head into the homestretch of the "year of the missile," pressures will inevitably grow for a US-Soviet summit. From the Soviet perspective, a summit before INF deployments begin could be attractive as a means of building European pressures on us for further concessions in the negotiations or possibly even for a delay in the deployment schedule. It is also conceivable that Andropov might be attracted to a summit as a means of consolidating his position within the Soviet leadership. Moreover, the upcoming UNGA session and Prime Minister Gandhi's call for Heads of State to meet in New York gives Andropov a ready-made opportunity to create the prospect of a meeting with the President without having to become the demandeur.

In my view, a summit before INF deployments begin would be highly undesirable. Beyond giving the Soviets a golden opportunity to pressure us on the INF issue, a premature summit would forfeit the opportunity for the President to meet his Soviet counterpart in a much stronger position once deployments have actually taken place. Thus, from the perspective of U.S. interests, a much more advantageous period for a summit would be the spring of 1984 when INF deployments will have commenced, our own economic recovery will be more advanced, and we will have had more time to solidify the emerging domestic consensus on strategic forces modernization and arms control.

Of course, we cannot control the Soviet decision about Andropov's possible trip to the UNGA. If such a visit does materialize, we will have to assess the situation at the time and determine a course of action that will minimize the possible adverse consequences for INF deployments. If it does become necessary for the President to meet with Andropov under such circumstances, I believe strongly that we should move quickly to keep expectations here and in

Europe in check by keeping the meeting as short and as non-substantive as possible.

In these uncertain circumstances, a trip by you to Moscow this summer could help us manage the summit prospect. If you were able to present Andropov and Gromyko with a realistic scenario for a substantive summit in 1984, the Soviet incentive to exploit the UNGA opportunity for a premature and essentially meaningless Reagan-Andropov meeting might be substantially reduced. Such a presentation might include the prospect of an invitation to Gromyko to meet with the President during the UNGA if such a meeting appeared justified in light of events at the time.

A serious effort to encourage a responsible Soviet approach to the summit issue would require that your substantive presentations during a July visit convey a credible prospect of U.S. readiness to engage in a real give-and-take on issues of critical importance to Moscow. If you could accomplish this, there is at least a reasonable chance that the Soviets would prefer a well-prepared summit with real prospects for concrete accomplishments in the spring of 1984 to a hastily organized and inevitably disappointing meeting in New York this fall.

### *3. The Presidential Political Factor*

One more limiting factor on prospects for US-Soviet dialogue over the coming 18 months should be mentioned—the onset of the 1984 Presidential campaign season in the U.S. If by the beginning of summer next year we have not registered some concrete achievements in our dialogue with the Soviet Union, the incentive for the Soviets to hunker down and wait out the results of the November balloting will be overwhelming. This would be particularly

true if the Soviets conclude that the election will be close and that, by denying the Administration any success in US-Soviet relations, they could damage the President's prospects for reelection.

Even if Moscow were convinced that the President would be reelected, we would find it difficult, if not impossible, to respond to any Soviet interest in forward movement in the midst of the Presidential campaign. Thus, unless we are in a position to have registered some important concrete accomplishments in US-Soviet relations by the spring of 1984, we will probably not again be in a position to do so until January 1985.

### *Conclusion:*

If the above analysis is correct, the remaining 18 months of the President's first term break down into two periods of possible movement and two periods of likely stasis in US-Soviet relations. From now until the middle of the fall, we have an opportunity to engage in a serious dialogue with the Soviets before INF deployments begin. While INF deployments and the Soviet response will put prospects for progress on hold for a period of several months, it is possible that seeds planted in the coming three or four months could survive this "winter of discontent" and emerge as the substance of a substantive summit in the spring of 1984. A trip by you to Moscow this summer could be a crucial factor in using this likely cyclical pattern of US-Soviet relations to best advance U.S. interests.

We have no illusions that this process will be easy. It could be derailed at any point—by Soviet intransigence, an unrestrained Soviet reaction to INF deployments, or both. But it could also be stillborn if we are not able to introduce

enough new substance into our dialogue to give the Soviet Union some incentive for restraint in its behavior and flexibility in its negotiating positions. In short, if we are going genuinely to test Soviet willingness to work with us, and lay the groundwork for a substantive summit, we must begin to do so soon.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Forwarded through Eagleburger.

<sup>2</sup> The United States was scheduled to begin the deployment of INF missiles to Western Europe in November.

<sup>3</sup> Shultz did not travel to the Soviet Union during the summer of 1983.

<sup>4</sup> West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl went to Moscow for discussions with his Soviet counterpart in July.

## 61. Editorial Note

On June 15, 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz testified publicly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on U.S.-Soviet relations. In his opening statement, Shultz said: "The management of our relations with the Soviet Union is of the utmost importance. That relationship touches virtually every aspect of our international concerns and objectives—political, economic, military—and every part of the world. We must defend our interests and values against a powerful adversary that threatens both. And we must do so in a nuclear age, in which a global war would even more thoroughly threaten those interests and values. As President Reagan pointed out on March 31: 'We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust.' It is, as he said, 'one of the most complex moral challenges ever faced by any generation.'" (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1983, page 65)

In his memoir, Shultz explained the thrust of his testimony was "captured in my statement: 'Strength and realism can deter war, but only direct dialogue and negotiation can open the path toward lasting peace.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 277) Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff, later wrote in his book that this testimony was "the most comprehensive and forward-looking explanation of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union since Reagan had taken office." He concurred that Shultz's sentence quoted above became the "basic thrust" of the administration's approach to relations with the Soviet Union. (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 61) The full

text of Shultz's testimony is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1983, pages 65–72.

Much attention was given to drafting Shultz's testimony. Originally written in the Department of State, the testimony was then coordinated with Matlock. On April 21, Charles Hill, Executive Secretary of the Department of State, forwarded an early draft to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark. As Shultz wrote in his memoir: "I had worked on this testimony with great care. Jack Matlock had taken an important part in the effort." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 276) Matlock had joined the NSC Staff in early June and later commented in his book that his "first major task was to work with Richard Burt, my counterpart in the State Department, and his deputy for Eastern Europe, R. Mark Palmer, on a statement to be delivered by Secretary Shultz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I found the State Department draft consistent with my own views, made a few minor suggestions, and recommended that the president approve it." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 61)

On June 8, Clark forwarded Reagan the most recent State Department draft of the Secretary's testimony with notes, edits, suggested changes, and a page of typed footnotes by National Security Council Staff member John Lenczowski. Lenczowski had numbered sections in the draft and typed out 11 corresponding footnotes, suggesting changes to the testimony and providing analysis. For example, on page 3 of the draft testimony, Lenczowski crossed out the following lines: "We believe our people cannot—and need not—accept as inevitable the prospect of endless, dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union. For if we do, then many of the great goals that the United States pursues in world affairs—peace, human rights, economic progress, national independence—will also be out of reach.



We can—and must—do better.” In his corresponding footnote 1, analyzing this section, he wrote: “It is unrealistic and misleading to hold forth the hope that the essential political-moral conflict with the USSR will end within the foreseeable future. It is even more misleading to hint that we can mitigate this basic conflict through ‘dialogue.’ That is not to say that dialogue is not in the national interest—but it is to say that if we are to speak publicly about the prospect of ending the conflict, it should be in the context of our confidence that democracy will ultimately triumph and not that true compromise can be reached between irreconcilable forces.” (Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File June 1983)

In another example, Lenczowski crossed out the text: “respect legitimate Soviet security interests,” and wrote in footnote 5: “We must never acknowledge that an illegitimate regime has legitimate security interests.” And in the following section of the testimony he took issue with the statement that “the Soviet Union is and will remain a global superpower,” countering in footnote 6: “The idea that the USSR ‘will remain a superpower’ is standard Soviet propaganda that we should not repeat.” (Ibid.)

After reviewing the draft testimony and Lenczowski’s comments and suggestions, Reagan wrote on the June 8 memorandum from Clark: “I have crossed out most of the numbers in the margins to indicate I don’t think the footnotes they indicate apply & thus the crossed out lines should be restored. As to insert on P.20A I would only offer that to Sec. Shultz as a suggestion and leave it to him to accept or reject.” Lenczowski had added a typed insert on page 20A entitled: “Rebuilding America’s Moral, Spiritual and Political Strength.” The first few lines read: “Finally there is the question of America’s moral-political-spiritual strength. This is the factor of our own national power that

the Soviets scrutinize most closely. It is on the basis of their assessment of the levels of this strength that the Soviets make most of their strategic decisions." (Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (13)) None of this suggested section was added to Shultz's final testimony.

In his note to Clark, Reagan commented: "I read the footnotes loud & clear but believe they fail to recognize some of the problems we are trying to resolve with Congress. At the same time some of them suggest or could be taken as indicating that war is inevitable. I can't accept that." (Ibid.) In accordance with Reagan's note, very few of Lenczowski's additions and changes were incorporated into the final version of the testimony. In each of the examples above, the testimony remained as it was originally written in the draft.

In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "Several days before testifying, I took a copy over to the White House, gave it to the president, and went over it with him line by line." Shultz continued: "I got the committee's attention by telling them of President Reagan's personal involvement. 'The President has taken the time not only to talk with me about this, but he has read through this testimony and made a few suggestions,' I said, adding with a smile, 'which I found it possible to accept.' Everyone laughed. I continued, he 'has signed off on the testimony, so I feel very confident in saying that I am speaking not only for myself but for the President in this statement.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 276)

During his testimony, the Secretary addressed the primary factors contributing to tensions between the United States and Soviet Union: "A peaceful world order does not require that we and the Soviet Union agree on all the fundamentals

of morals or politics. It does require, however, that Moscow's behavior be subject to the restraint appropriate to living together on this planet in the nuclear age. Not all the many external and internal factors affecting Soviet behavior can be influenced by us. But we take it as part of our obligation to peace to encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system toward a more pluralistic political and economic system and, above all, to counter Soviet expansionism through sustained and effective political, economic, and military competition. In the past decade, regrettably, the changes in Soviet behavior have been for the worse. Soviet actions have come into conflict with many of our objectives. They have made the task of managing the Soviet-American relationship considerably harder and have needlessly drawn more and more international problems into the East-West rivalry. To be specific, it is the following developments which have caused us the most concern." Shultz listed four developments: first, "the continuing Soviet quest for military superiority even in the face of mounting domestic economic difficulties;" second, "the unconstructive Soviet involvement, direct and indirect, in unstable areas of the Third World;" third, "the unrelenting effort to impose an alien Soviet 'model' on nominally independent Soviet clients and allies;" and fourth, "Moscow's continuing practice of stretching a series of treaties and agreements to the brink of violation and beyond." (Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1983, pages 66-67)

Shultz explained several ways the United States worked to increase its strength in the face of Soviet challenges: "In a rapidly evolving international environment, there are many fundamental ways the democratic nations can, and must, advance their own goals in the face of the problem posed by the Soviet Union. We must build a durable political consensus at home and within the Atlantic alliance on the

nature of the Soviet challenge. We must strengthen our defenses and those of our allies. We must build a common approach within the alliance on the strategic implications of East-West economic relations. And we must compete peacefully and even more effectively with the U.S.S.R. for the political sympathies of the global electorate, especially through the promotion of economic dynamism and democracy throughout the world. Finally, we must continue rebuilding America's moral-spiritual strength. If sustained over time, these policies can foster a progressively more productive dialogue with the Soviet Union itself." (Ibid., page 67)

Shultz also listed four items on the U.S. agenda in dealing with the Soviet Union: "To seek improvement in Soviet performance on human rights, which you emphasized, Mr. Chairman [Senator Charles H. Percy], in your opening statement; To reduce the risk of war, reduce armaments through sound agreements, and ultimately ease the burdens of military spending; To manage and resolve regional conflicts; and To improve bilateral relations on the basis of reciprocity and mutual interest. This is a rigorous and comprehensive agenda, and our approach to it is principled, practical, and patient. We have pressed each issue in a variety of forums, bilateral and multilateral. We have made clear that the concerns we raise are not ours alone, but are shared by our allies and friends in every region of the globe. We have made clear that each of our concerns is serious, and the Soviets know that we do not intend to abandon any of them merely because agreement cannot be reached quickly or because agreement has been reached on others." (Ibid., page 69; brackets are in the original)

Shultz concluded his testimony by examining prospects for improvement in Soviet-American relations: "We have

spelled out our requirements—and our hope—for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. The direction in which that relationship evolves will ultimately be determined by the decisions of the Soviet leadership. President Brezhnev's successors will have to weigh the increased costs and risks of relentless competition against the benefits of a less tense international environment in which they could more adequately address the rising expectations of their own citizens. While we can define their alternatives, we cannot decipher their intentions. To a degree unequaled anywhere else, Russia in this respect remains a secret. Its history, of which this secrecy is such an integral part, provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And yet it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our part, we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S. strategy, resting on a broad consensus, that we can sustain over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or not. If the democracies can meet this challenge, they can achieve the goals of which President Reagan spoke at Los Angeles: both defend freedom and preserve the peace." (Ibid., page 72)

On June 27, the Embassy in Moscow reported on Soviet reactions to the Secretary's testimony: a "June 24 article by *Izvestiya* political observer S. Kondrashov sharply criticizes the Secretary's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15 as sounding conciliatory, but, in fact, presenting no new U.S. approach toward the Soviet Union. Kondrashov notes that the Secretary's speech had been called the 'most detailed, comprehensive description to date' of the Reagan administration's approach to U.S.-Soviet relations and that the President 'looked over' the speech himself, 'corrected' it and 'gave it his blessing'. Kondrashov accuses Shultz of supporting President Reagan's 'crusade' against the Soviet Union, claiming that while Shultz's approach is 'more measured',

his desire to 'encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system' is just a sweeter way of pushing for 'interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs.'" The Embassy commented: "Kondrashov's rejection of the sincerity of the U.S.'s 'flexible' and 'conciliatory' approach to arms control talks follows the standard Soviet line. His vehement opposition to the Secretary's remarks on bilateral relations, and to what he views as unwarranted attempts to interfere in Soviet internal affairs, shows Moscow's continued sensitivity to the U.S. ideological offensive." (Telegram 8095 from Moscow, June 27; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830364-0999)



## **62. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 15, 1983, 4:50-5:50 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

US-Soviet Relations

### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President, Vice President Bush, Counselor Meese, Chief of Staff to the President Baker, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Clark, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Deputy Director of Intelligence McMahon, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McFarlane

**BACKGROUND:** The purpose of the meeting was for the attendees to receive a status report on the state of US-Soviet relations as expressed in the dialogue undertaken at the President's instruction by the Secretary of State in February 1983. There have been approximately ten meetings between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin which have been focussed upon four generic areas: Human Rights; Regional Issues; Arms Control; and Bilateral Issues.

The Secretary of State opened with a summation of the President's thinking for why the initiative had been authorized originally. He referred to the President's success in establishing a solid beginning toward the restoration of our military strength. More recently, Williamsburg had presented solid evidence of greatly improved allied cohesion which would contribute significantly to Soviet perceptions of Western strength in any negotiation we might undertake.

The Secretary stated that the President's instructions had been to explore Soviet responsiveness to our interests in each of the four general areas. These discussions were to take place at the Ambassadorial level and based upon the

results a decision could be taken as to whether or not the dialogue should be elevated to the Foreign Minister level with a view ultimately toward a meeting between the Heads of State.

STATUS REPORT: The Secretary of State then went into the results thus far achieved in each of the four generic areas.

*Human Rights.* There appears to be some promise of progress in the human rights area as exemplified by the release of Lydia Vaschenko. The other members of her family have applied for their visas. The other family (Chymkhalov) has experienced difficulty in making their application. In short, while the process seems to be in motion all except Lydia remain in the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary noted the possible promise of a channel established by Ambassador Kampelman with his KGB counterpart in the Soviet delegation at the CSCE-Madrid. While a solid agenda had been discussed no tangible results have thus far been achieved however. Time will tell.

*Regional Issues.* The Secretary of State said that with regard to discussions on Afghanistan, Poland and Central America, essentially nothing had been achieved. He noted that the Soviets had expressed an interest in discussing the Middle East. He had intentionally restricted references to the Middle East to only the most summary comments.

*Arms Control.* The Secretary noted that we have had mixed results in discussions on arms control. Today he had heard that the Soviets had made a somewhat encouraging statement in response to the President's recent START announcement. With regard to INF, we have thus far not been able to make progress. Concerning MBFR, we have

had an apparent “nibble.” Finally, concerning confidence building measures (CBMs) the Soviets appear to have some interest in two of the four proposals we had made.

*Bilateral Issues.* In this area the Secretary said the only initiative proposed by either side had been our offer for negotiation of a new long-term grain agreement (LTA).<sup>3</sup> He noted that the Soviets viewed this proposal as serving our interests and not theirs. As a consequence it had a rather ambiguous standing.

The Secretary then went on to describe the format for the sessions with Dobrynin. These normally included two phases: the first in which staff specialists contributed to particular issues on the agenda, (e.g., Ambassador Nitze on INF); followed by a private one-on-one session between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin.

Before going on to propose an agenda for the forthcoming meeting on Saturday, June 18,<sup>4</sup> he asked if anyone had any comments.

*Deputy Director McMahon* noted that Chernenko’s speech at the CPSU Central Committee Meeting in support of Andropov was an indicator of the latter’s strength.<sup>5</sup>

*The next meeting.* The Secretary then proposed that the forthcoming meeting follow the same format as before with the agenda this time to include a discussion of our recent initiative at MBFR (Ambassador Abramowitz to attend) and the President’s recent proposal for START (Ambassador Rowny to attend for this item). The Secretary of State said he would also describe the Williamsburg Conference—the point to be made, that of Allied solidarity. In addition to these subjects, the Secretary proposed going once more into each of the four generic areas. With regard to bilateral

relations, the Secretary proposed that he be authorized to express US willingness to open talks toward the establishment of a Soviet Consulate in New York City and a US Consulate in Kiev.<sup>6</sup> In addition, he proposed that he be authorized to express our willingness to open talks devoted to the negotiation of a new cultural agreement. The Secretary went on to explain that the net benefit from any such agreements would accrue to the United States. Specifically, with respect to the proposed consulates the Secretary noted that the improved intelligence accruing to the Soviets from a New York City consulate would not add that much to the capability they already enjoy through the United Nations presence. On the other hand, a window for the United States in Kiev would provide us a substantial improvement in our collection capability.

With regard to the cultural agreement, the Secretary noted at the moment the Soviets were free to send as many cultural representatives to this country as they wished since these are arranged through private sources and the government now has no real control over them. He noted that a treaty would give us an instrument for seeking greater reciprocity in this area and would also legitimize a higher flow of cultural visits from West to East.

The Secretary then noted that with regard to regional issues the situation had worsened in *Central America* and that this might be an outgrowth of a flaw in the marker we had earlier laid down to the Russians. Specifically, our statement that we would find the introduction of high-performance aircraft or Cuban combat units “unacceptable” may have implied that all actions other than these would be tolerated. The Secretary stated that we should clarify this.

*Judge Clark* noted that in the early 70's when the Soviets commenced submarine operations out of Cienfuegos, Cuba, the Administration had characterized this as "an unfriendly act." Ultimately this had led to the termination of these operations. He recommended that the Secretary treat current Soviet activities in Central America in the same fashion—that is, that their activities which contribute to unrest generally (not just the introduction of modern weapons and combat units) will be unacceptable. The President approved this proposal.

The Secretary then raised the matter of how any mention of a summit ought to be treated. He reiterated existing Administration policy with regard to summits: that is, that we are not opposed in principle however they would need to be well prepared in advance and hold the promise of significant accomplishment.

*Secretary Weinberger* noted the inconsistency which would be represented by our conducting discussions of the possibility of a summit while the Soviets remained in Afghanistan, Poland and Central America.

This subject was not conclusively resolved.

At this point the meeting evolved into round-table remarks which were basically supportive of the Secretary proceeding according to the *format* he had proposed. *The Vice President* noted in particular the value of the private meeting after the larger set piece agenda had been disposed of. He believed that this private session held the most promise for getting results.

As the participants rose to leave, the Secretary of State asked whether he should bring Ambassador Rowny back to



participate in Saturday's meeting. *The President* agreed that he should.

The Secretary also asked, "what about the other items?" *The President* answered go ahead.

Conclusions: After the meeting it was confirmed that the President approved:

- The convening of a meeting by the Secretary of State with Ambassador Dobrynin on Saturday, June 18.
- That this meeting should be conducted according to the same format as meetings of the past.
- That the Secretary should summarize important issues and proposals put forth by our side since the last meeting (e.g., START proposal and the results of Williamsburg).
- He should discuss human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral issues.
- That in discussing the situation in Central America, the Secretary should protest the recent Soviet escalation of military deliveries to Nicaragua and state that we consider these actions and other Soviet measures of support to Nicaragua for the export of revolution to neighboring countries to be unfriendly actions which must cease.
- That Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Abramowitz should return to participate in the arms control portion.



- With regard to bilateral issues the Secretary was authorized to propose that the U.S. and the Soviet Union open talks devoted to the conclusion of agreements for the establishment of consulates in New York City and Kiev; and for the conduct of cultural exchanges between the two countries.

There were no conclusions reached with regard to:

- Any future possibilities of a summit meeting, or
- Travel by the Secretary of State to Moscow for meetings with Soviet officials.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, William Clark Files, US-Soviet Relations Papers, Working File: Contains Originals (14). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Treaty Room in the Residence of the White House.

<sup>2</sup> See [Documents 34](#) and [46](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Documents 32](#), [35](#), and [47](#).

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 64](#).

<sup>5</sup> Chernenko gave the keynote address at the June 14-15 session of the Central Committee Plenum. For the full text of his June 14 speech, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXV, No. 24 (July 13, 1983), pp. 1-10. On June 16, McMahon prepared a Memorandum for the Record and noted: "The next thing that surprised me was in regard to a discussion on Andropov. In response to a question from Ed Meese, I noted that Andropov seemed to be gaining in strength in light of Chernenko's speech at the Plenum which was very much in deference to Andropov. Clark dismissed this completely and said that it was only propaganda given out to the newspapers; that a struggle

was still continuing in the Soviet Union and further it really didn't matter because we were dealing with a system, not a person. I countered by noting that since Andropov has come to power evidence suggests that he is very much calling the tune and decisions that have been made in the Soviet Union were pro-Andropov decisions. I further noted the rise in priority of the agriculture and home economic issues—which are very much the priorities of Andropov. I commented how rolled steel and aluminum were diverted from the military to the agricultural sector. This was news to Shultz who was quite surprised by that.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 86M00885R: Subject Files, Box 6, Folder 94: 1983 DDCI Meetings with NSC/State/Defense)

<sup>6</sup> McMahon's Memorandum for the Record above also noted: “I was somewhat stunned by Clark's eagerness for the Kiev consulate until I learned later in the discussion that State was feeling a great deal of pressure from the Jewish community because of the number of Ukrainian Jews who center and focus around the Kiev area.” (Ibid.)

<sup>7</sup> In his personal notes, Dam wrote after this meeting: “The Secretary gave us a readout this afternoon of his meeting with the President earlier in the afternoon in which the President basically signed onto the Secretary's program on negotiations with the Soviet Union. The President agreed, in the presence of Weinberger and Clark, to allow us to negotiate on a cultural agreement (which will be placed in broader terms than pure culture to include industrial expositions and the like) as well as new consulates in New York and Kiev. The meeting with Dobrynin will be held on Saturday.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983)

# **63. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 16, 1983

## **SUBJECT**

Renewal of U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation

*Issue:* Should the 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation (which will expire automatically on June 19, 1983) be extended for a further six-month period? Should we propose to the Soviets now that a working-level meeting take place during the six-month period to consider a longer term amended agreement?

*Facts:* The 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation will expire on June 19, 1983. State forwarded a memorandum (Tab A) recommending that the agreement be extended for a further six-month period and that during this time a working-level meeting of both sides be convened to consider a longer term agreement.<sup>2</sup> State endorses renewal of the agreement as it is consistent with our policy enunciated in NSDD 75 (U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union)—not to dismantle further the framework of exchanges with the USSR. The Department of Transportation (Tab A-2) believes the agreement has resulted in tangible benefits to the U.S.<sup>3</sup>

*Discussion:* Six-month renewal of this agreement has been approved by the appropriate agencies. However, Commerce and DOD have expressed some concern about the risk of

technology transfers through certain activities conducted under the agreement.

As extension of the agreement upholds the guidelines set forth in NSDD 75, I concur with State's recommendation that it be extended. However, before a working level meeting is proposed to the Soviets, a thorough review of the agreement and the risks of technology transfers entailed should be made. The appropriate vehicle to undertake this review would be the NSC-chaired Polish-Soviet Sanctions Monitoring Group. Also, if a negotiating strategy is developed through the interagency process, it should be submitted to the Monitoring Group for consideration.

#### *RECOMMENDATION*

1. That the 1973 U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation be extended for a further six-month period.
2. That a working level meeting of both sides not be proposed to the Soviets now, but that the Polish-Soviet Sanctions Monitoring Group undertake a thorough review of the agreement.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/14/83) (1). Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock.

<sup>2</sup> Tab A, the memorandum dated June 14, is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Tab A-2 is attached but not printed

<sup>4</sup> Clark approved both recommendations. On June 17, Poindexter wrote under the recommendations: "President

briefed by Matlock and President approved both recommendations.”

## 64. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 18, 1983, 9:45 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

### SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State  
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political  
Affairs  
Edward Rowny, Ambassador, U.S. START Negotiator, Geneva  
Morton I. Abramowitz, Ambassador, U.S. MBFR Negotiator, Vienna  
Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director, EUR/SOV

#### *USSR*

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, Washington  
Oleg M. Sokolov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington  
Viktor F. Isakov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy, Washington

The meeting was divided into a private session [during which Burt separately raised four other topics with Sokolov and Isakov], a larger meeting, and a concluding private session.

In the *initial private session the Secretary* said he would be introducing a number of items previously discussed, but wished to make one main point: the President continues to be willing to engage the Soviets in serious dialogue aimed at solving problems. The Secretary would be making various proposals designed to determine whether the Soviets are also prepared for such dialogue, but he wanted Dobrynin to understand that from the point of view of U.S. policy the whole is larger than the sum of these parts.



The Secretary also raised *two regional issues* in that session:

—As the President had instructed him to do, he told Dobrynin that Soviet/Cuban activities in *Central America*—and in particular their support for Nicaragua and Nicaraguan activities and their arms shipments to the area—were in our view “unfriendly acts.” *Dobrynin* responded that Nicaragua is a small country that does not pose a threat to the U.S. *The Secretary* said in reply that he did not wish to argue the point, but that the Soviets should understand our view and take it into account.

—On *Lebanon*, the Secretary reiterated that we wish to see all foreign forces out of the country, and that the sooner they leave, the sooner our MNF forces could also leave. If the Soviets are concerned about MNF, they should know that we have no long-term plans for it, but there is a relationship between the role the MNF would have to play and the role of UNIFIL.

In the larger meeting, Deputy Secretary Dam, Under Secretary Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary Burt joined the Secretary, and Minister-Counselors Sokolov and Isakov joined Dobrynin. Five specific subject areas were discussed.

*Human Rights.* The Secretary raised three issues:

—On the Pentecostals, the Secretary said we are following the families’ progress with their emigration applications very closely, but it is slow; he asked if Dobrynin had any information. *Dobrynin* said he had no specific information to provide officially, but he “had heard” that the families do not seem anxious to leave now that the Embassy has provided them with money. *The Secretary*

said he understood one family is awaiting approval, and the other forms to apply.

—On CSCE, the Secretary said the Madrid process is at a critical point, and we want a satisfactory conclusion. We had thought there was some promise in Max Kampelman's earlier discussions with the Soviets, but more recently the Soviets had become intransigent on the language of the NNA draft document. The Spanish had now made an initiative, and this might provide a way to break the deadlock. *Dobrynin* replied that we have put in two years of time and work in Madrid, and argued that the NNA document is not Soviet. *The Secretary* rejoined that it is still not good enough. *Dobrynin* urged that we "finish this nonsense." *The Secretary* stressed that our proposals are on the table, and that improvements on human rights in the draft concluding document are needed. *Dobrynin* said he had not seen the Spanish initiative, but it was perhaps OK.

—*The Secretary* raised the issues of Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and Jewish emigration, noting he had seen a number of American Jewish leaders in the previous week. *Dobrynin* responded merely that these were "internal matters."

*The Secretary* then went over the *series of meetings the Western Allies had just completed*—the OECD Ministerial, the Williamsburg Summit and the NATO Meetings of Defense and Foreign Ministers.<sup>2</sup> He stressed that these meetings demonstrated Western economic recovery and renewed growth, and that this will help not only Western economies but other economies too. On the security side and on East-West economic relations, he said, the meetings demonstrated the genuine view of the Western powers that they must maintain their cohesion and unity, and, specifically on INF, they demonstrated that behind their

resolve to deploy lay a genuine desire to negotiate. On East-West economic relations, the focus was on controlling trade of direct military application; nobody wants economic warfare. The main point, the Secretary concluded, is that the West is strong and cohesive, on the one hand, and ready to negotiate, on the other.

*Dobrynin* said the Soviets had followed these meetings and read the Secretary's SFRC testimony that week,<sup>3</sup> and we should know the situation looks different to them. In the economic field, it seems to them that we are doing all we can to cut off East-West trade. *The Secretary* interjected that our objective relates to the security aspects of trade and in no sense implies a trade war with the Soviets.

*Dobrynin* went on that the Secretary's testimony seemed to imply a view that economic pressure would stop Soviet behavior the U.S. does not like. On the security side, the U.S. seemed to want military power not for defense but for foreign policy purposes, to use strength to impose its views on others.

*The Secretary* objected that our purpose is not to impose our views; conversely, the Soviets had made countries like Japan feel threatened with their SS-20 deployments.

*Dobrynin* said the Soviets are willing to leave Japan in peace, but the U.S. seeks to militarize the Soviet Union's eastern border area, and make it like NATO. This may be wrong; but the Williamsburg declaration, signed by a non-NATO power, does not make pretty reading. *The Secretary* reiterated that this does not result from a push by the U.S.; rather, the Japanese are worried by the SS-20's. *Dobrynin* replied that if there were no U.S. forces in Asia, there would be no SS-20's there. *The Secretary* reminded him that our military deployments are purely defensive.

*Dobrynin* responded that one tragedy of history is that both sides believe this about their deployments. If we would take

up the Soviet "proposal" to discuss arms control in Asia, they were prepared to talk about the issue.

*The Secretary* said the main point is that the West is determined to maintain its defenses, but also to lessen tensions and reduce armaments. *Dobrynin* asked what actions expressed this. *The Secretary* replied that he would be suggesting some at this meeting.

*MBFR.* After Ambassador Abramowitz joined the group, *the Secretary* began by noting that MBFR talks had lasted ten years. The President and Andropov had exchanged messages earlier in the year, and we are now prepared to respond. The two sides agree that we should seek reductions through a process leading to parity as the ultimate outcome. This will mean asymmetrical reductions. We think the principal task is verifying reductions to equal levels, putting in place a verification system that will result in the capacity to ensure correct data. In other words, the Secretary said, we are prepared to defer the problem of prior agreement on data if we can agree on adequate verification procedures. He suggested that we authorize our Vienna negotiators to explore this privately.

*Dobrynin* said he would report back, but had one point to make: we should begin with something practical, the small symbolic step of reducing 13,000 U.S. and 20,000 Soviet troops. He was not saying the Secretary's idea was a bad one, but a small step like that would also help elsewhere in arms control negotiations. *The Secretary* replied that we should shift gears to verification, and in that context the idea of a small initial step was not significant although, in the context of a broader understanding, it could be the way to start the withdrawal process. Ambassador *Abramowitz* added that we are seeking not minor reductions, but a way to break the deadlock toward significant compromise.

*Dobrynin* concluded that his points had been meant to be constructive.

*START*. After Ambassador Rowny replaced Ambassador Abramowitz in the group, *the Secretary* said we have made some new decisions and would be putting our proposal on the table in Geneva, but the basic point is the President's desire for real give-and-take in Geneva. Our decisions bear on four topics:

—We give highest priority to reductions in warheads.

—There must be reductions in destructive potential, and there are various ways to go about this.

—Concerning limitations on deployed missiles, we are ready to envisage higher levels than in our previous proposal.

—We are prepared to envisage equal limits on bombers and air-launched cruise missiles.

We now need a sharper focus and a more dynamic process, and we would like the Soviets to be more explicit and precise than they have been.

On confidence-building measures, the Secretary said we have put forward some proposals in *START*, and the Soviets have too. We should establish a working group in *START* that could consider the ideas of both sides.

*Dobrynin* said he did not have detailed instructions, but could make several general points. If the U.S. approach continued to single out Soviet land-based missiles, or sought direct throw-weight limits or highly restrictive sublimits like the 110 ceiling on heavy missiles, there would not be much progress. The Soviets are prepared to

look at warhead limitations, but not to make substantial cuts in the major leg of their strategic forces. *The Secretary* replied that if the talks are to get anywhere there must be cuts in heavy missiles. The largest cuts would come through warhead limitations, but the Soviets had to understand that reductions in destructive potential, where there is a huge disparity in their favor, are important.

*Bilateral Issues.* The Secretary informed Dobrynin that the President is prepared to renew discussions leading toward openings of consulates in New York and Kiev, and to negotiate a new cultural agreement. If the Soviets respond positively, we could work out the modalities for discussion. *Dobrynin* said he would report this back to Moscow.

In the *concluding private meeting*, the *Secretary* reiterated that while each individual issue has its own importance, we have a broad agenda, and the overall signal we wish to make is that we are prepared to discuss that whole agenda seriously. *Dobrynin* finished with three broad points:

—Gromyko's speech at the Supreme Soviet June 16 dealt with U.S.-Soviet relations to an "unprecedented" extent.<sup>4</sup>

—Chernenko's speech at the Central Committee Plenum June 14 laid heavy emphasis on the need to combat the President's democracy initiative, as well as our statements about yellow rain and other objectionable Soviet activities: the Soviets view all this as an attempt to discredit the USSR.

—Dobrynin dwelt at great length on the Soviet perspective on INF, and especially on the Pershing II "threat." He made it sound as if this is the almost overwhelming Soviet preoccupation of the moment, and almost pleaded for us to put ourselves in their shoes, and see the situation as they



see it. He concluded by suggesting that we need a kind of philosophical discussion on how the world looks to the two sides.

*The Secretary* concluded that he would be back in the U.S. and available for discussions and for Soviet responses to our proposals in early July.<sup>5</sup>

While the concluding private session was going on, *Isakov* asked Burt separately to confirm that when we said discussions on consulates, we had in mind Kiev and New York.<sup>6</sup> *Burt* replied that the 1974 agreement specifies "two or three" cities for new consulates, but we wish to discuss Kiev and New York. *Isakov* informed the U.S. side that the office building prepared for our use in Kiev is in use by the municipal authorities. They had pressed the U.S. on this issue last year, and received no definite answer. *Simons* recalled that last spring we had asked the Soviets to hold the building for our use, and were proceeding on the assumption that this had been done. *Simons* asked *Isakov* to ascertain whether, if our discussions were successful, that building would be made available to the U.S. *Isakov* said that in reporting the U.S. proposal he would say that the U.S. side remains interested in using that building.

For the Record: During the discussion on MBFR and START, the Secretary gave Dobrynin an inter-agency agreed "non-paper" on each subject. Copies of these "non-papers" are attached.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 May-June, Mtgs. w/A. Dobrynin. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. The memorandum of conversation was approved by the Secretary in telegram Secto 7003 from the Secretary's

aircraft, June 23. The text printed here incorporates the changes approved in the telegram. Brackets are in the original. On June 20, Shultz sent the President a memorandum summarizing his conversation with Dobrynin. At the end of the memorandum, Shultz noted: "As I see it, by your decision we have now taken the initiative to move our dialogue forward on the basis of our agenda, and the ball is truly in the Soviet court. We cannot at this point predict how they will respond, but we are at least in a position to say we have undertaken a major effort." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83-06/24/83)) Reagan initialed Shultz's June 20 memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> The OECD Ministerial meeting took place in Paris from May 8 to 11. The G-7 Williamsburg Summit took place from May 28 to 30. The meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers was held in Paris from June 9 to 10. The NATO Defense Ministers met in Lisbon in late March.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 61](#).

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 65](#).

<sup>5</sup> Shultz was on official travel in Asia and the Middle East, returning to Washington on July 9. In his personal notes for June 18, Dam wrote: "Dobrynin took all of this on board without too many comments and said that he would report to his government, with the assumption that he will be back to us after the Secretary returns from Southeast Asia. He did complain about our failure to understand how the Soviets look at the world and the fact that we insist on discrediting them in connection with such things as yellow rain." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982-Sept. 1983)

<sup>6</sup> Shultz's June 20 memorandum to Reagan provided additional details of Burt's discussion: "Burt took up the following issues with Embassy Minister-Counselors Sokolov and Isakov:

"—He gave them a short statement that the first launch of the Peacekeeper, a new type of 'light' intercontinental ballistic missile (under SALT II criteria) took place June 17, and pointed out that this notification parallels their notification of a new-type test last October.

"—He urged the Soviets to take another look at Cap Weinberger's communications confidence-building measures [see [Document 38](#)]; proposed that State and Defense experts join Art Hartman in Moscow for further discussions of these measures plus the idea of a multilateral convention against nuclear terrorism; and said we would be getting back soon with a proposal on timing.

"—In responding to the Soviet proposal for meetings of scientists on ballistic missile defense, Burt said we believe such discussion must be on a government-to-government basis, given its policy and strategy implications, and proposed that it take place between official representatives in the established fora of START and SCC, augmented by experts as necessary.

"—Burt informed the Soviets that the U.S. has approved extension of the Transportation Agreement for a six-month period, and would be proposing an exchange of notes that would register extension before the expiration date next week [see [Document 63](#)]." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83-06/24/83))

<sup>7</sup> MBFR Talking Points and a paper on START are attached but not printed.

**65. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary  
of the Department of State (Hill) to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 22, 1983

SUBJECT

Gromyko's and Chernenko's Recent Speeches

Dobrynin told the Secretary on Saturday that Gromyko's June 16 speech to the Supreme Soviet dealt with US-Soviet relations to an "unprecedented" degree, and that Chernenko's June 14 plenum speech on ideology should be taken as an important indicator of Soviet leadership attitudes toward the United States.<sup>2</sup> The two speeches do, in fact, convey the impression of a Soviet regime that sees itself the target of a concerted U.S. campaign to weaken the USSR militarily and discredit it politically. This can be seen as the context for Dobrynin's plea that we try to put ourselves in their shoes and see the situation as it looks from Moscow.

*Gromyko's Supreme Soviet Speech*

While by no means unprecedented, the largest portion of Gromyko's speech was, indeed, a comprehensive and polemical critique of U.S. policy toward the USSR, with particular emphasis on the security and arms control aspects. Gromyko reaffirmed Moscow's desire for "smoother" relations with Washington; but he was typically pessimistic about the prospects for US-Soviet relations, implying that confrontational U.S. policies have been the norm since World War II, with détente an aberration.



Gromyko's speech struck us as defensive in tone. He conveyed the impression that the Soviets see themselves as under assault by the United States on several fronts:

- rearmament in pursuit of military superiority;
- efforts to wage economic warfare against the USSR and its allies;
- destabilization of Eastern Europe and an ideological crusade aimed at the rollback of socialism; and
- an aggressive public-relations campaign designed to put the onus on Moscow for lack of progress on arms control.

Gromyko came out swinging on all counts. He assured his Soviet audience that the Soviet leadership will take all necessary steps to defend the USSR and its "socialist gains" at home and in Eastern Europe. He rebutted U.S. allegations about the Soviet Union's arms control positions, and sought to discredit U.S. proposals as unbalanced and unserious. Most striking were his denunciations of U.S. nuclear doctrines that are allegedly based on the "admissability of nuclear war."

On specific substantive questions Gromyko broke little new ground. The most noteworthy aspect was his adoption of the harshly critical Soviet press line on the President's new START proposals—he described them as the "facelifted U.S. position" that was "fully tailored to suit the current further expansion" of U.S. programs. He endorsed the concept of a nuclear freeze, but did not specifically foreshadow the Supreme Soviet's subsequent call for a multilateral freeze among the USSR, US, UK, France, and China.<sup>3</sup> He also



called for resumption of the CTB trilaterals and ratification of the TTBT and PNET.

Gromyko was especially disparaging of our CBMs proposals, alleging that we seek nothing more than information exchange, whereas the USSR supposedly favors real limits on military activity designed to preclude the development of crises. Gromyko also insisted, defensively, that the USSR is for "universal and complete" verification of arms agreements.

Gromyko treated the FRG quite gently (no threats of the dire consequences that will attend INF deployments), perhaps in deference to Kohl's forthcoming visit. He directed harsh language against the Japanese, however, for their having joined in the U.S. "strategy of confrontation." There was also familiar fare about U.S. efforts to force agreements on the Lebanese "at gunpoint" and to pressure the Syrians, as well as denunciation of our "aggression" in Nicaragua.

Despite his bleak assessment of the US-Soviet relationship, Gromyko concluded on a confident note. He asserted that the USSR's international position remains solid, that the tide of history is rolling in socialism's favor, and that it is a well recognized fact that "not a single serious question of world politics can be solved, and in practice is not solved," without the USSR's participation. "That is how it should be," Gromyko boasted, implying that US-Soviet relations can improve only if the U.S. accepts the USSR as an equal superpower.

### *Chernenko's Plenum Speech*

The main event of last week was, of course, the Central Committee Plenum. The focus of published leadership

speeches (Chernenko and Andropov) was on internal rather than foreign problems.<sup>4</sup> Chernenko did touch on US-Soviet relations, however, in calling for efforts to counter the U.S. ideological offensive. His remarks were harshly critical of Administration policies and he seemed to be adopting the same defensive tone as Gromyko in explaining Soviet policies.

Chernenko stated that the United States and its NATO allies are following an extremely dangerous course (a possible reference to INF deployment) and that the President has announced a new crusade against Communism. In calling for a new propaganda counteroffensive against the West, Chernenko seemed to convey the sense of the Soviet Union at disadvantage.

Chernenko's June 14 delivery of the main plenum speech is of interest in Soviet domestic political terms. That Chernenko gave the speech indicates that the Politburo and Secretariat member is holding his own in the leadership—at least for now. He retains at least some of the ideological portfolio formerly held by Suslov.

From our perspective, however, the more interesting statements on internal matters last week were made by Andropov in his concluding speech. Andropov referred on several occasions in his speech to a new Party Program—suggesting that this might be his vehicle to set a new policy direction, not yet proclaimed. On economic topics, nonetheless, Chernenko was of interest precisely because he echoed themes previously sounded by Andropov: frank, if vague, admission of past shortcomings, together with an emphasis on the need for discipline and order. He also downplayed incentives to spur productivity.

Chernenko did keep the door open for some kind of economic reform by urging more fresh thinking from Soviet academics and think tanks. Andropov is believed to be interested in economic reform, and Chernenko's remarks could signal a developing leadership consensus to move ahead. There is no evidence, however, that the leadership has agreed on the scope and timing of economic change.

Chernenko's speech had a strong orthodox cast that moves him closer to Andropov on ideological issues as well. He called on various Soviet ideological organizations to be more aggressive and repeated the standard call for a vigorous struggle against such chronic problems as drunkenness, theft and bribe-taking. Chernenko called for better attention to Soviet public and social concerns—a theme that has gained currency among the leadership since the 1980 disruptions in Poland, and one on which he has spoken out in the past.

**Charles Hill<sup>5</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/19/83–06/24/83). Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum is based on another, undated, from Burt through Eagleburger to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive June 9–16 1983)

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 64](#). Excerpts of Gromyko's speech were printed in the *New York Times*, June 17, 1983, p. A8. Regarding Chernenko's speech, see [footnote 5](#), [Document 62](#).

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the June 16 Supreme Soviet resolution containing a proposal for a freeze on nuclear weapons, see

*Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 499–501.

<sup>4</sup> The Central Committee Plenum took place June 14–15. Andropov's speech focused on economic matters. (Dusko Doder, "Andropov Makes Decisive Break With Past Policies," *New York Times*, June 19, 1983, p. A11)

<sup>5</sup> McManaway signed for Hill above Hill's typed signature.

## **66. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT  
Goals and Priorities

Attached is my reply to your memorandum of June 7, in which you asked me to identify our goals and priorities in foreign policy over the next 18 months.<sup>2</sup>

### **Attachment**

**Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, undated

### *GOALS AND PRIORITIES*

In your memorandum to Cap and me on June 7, you asked us to identify the priority objectives in foreign policy on which we should concentrate our energies over the next 18 months, with special emphasis on your activity and involvement. This paper lists these priorities and lays out our strategy for pursuing them.

As your memorandum said, we have achieved a great deal in the first half of this Presidential term. In the second half of the term, however, we will need to start drawing dividends from our efforts. The restoration of our military strength, our firmness with the Soviets, the greater unity of the allies, and the promising initiatives we have launched in many areas are a solid foundation from which we can

now move forward. The next six months—before the full Presidential campaign begins—are particularly important.

### *EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

Our foreign policy priorities through the remainder of this term, it seems to me, are the following:

—We must maintain allied cohesion through the difficult period of INF deployment. This will require intensive Presidential contacts with key allied leaders (including Japan); public diplomacy to neutralize the expected sharp Soviet reaction to our deployment; and efforts to ensure that the Soviets, and not we, are blamed if negotiations fail.

—We should use our new leverage with the Soviets to explore the possibilities of constructive dialogue aiming at visible progress on our own agenda, including arms control. The question of a summit should be considered in terms of whether it is a way to make the Soviets face up to the long-term direction of our relationship and whether it is an effective way to demonstrate to our public and our allies that we are not to blame for any tensions.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

### *ANALYSIS*

Success or failure in any one of these areas will affect our success or failure in the others. Our success in holding the democracies together obviously will affect our negotiations with the Soviets, and vice versa. Success in the Middle East would affect our Alliance relationships; a setback in Central America would weaken us in all areas. Bearing in mind



these interrelationships, let me discuss each of the priority areas in turn.

### *The Democracies and INF*

The electoral victories of Thatcher, Kohl, and Nakasone are reflections of a strengthened resolve among our democratic allies, and the Williamsburg Summit showed an impressive unity among free world nations. Nevertheless, we are still basically dealing with an uncertain and dispirited Europe, as reflected in the deep polarization in some societies (particularly West Germany). Therefore, it will be no easy task to help these leaders manage through this critical year. Plans have been announced for very large and possibly violent "peace" demonstrations this fall. This will put unprecedented strain on allied solidarity and on West Germany's political cohesion. The Soviets will try to lure wavering allies into seeking a "delay" of INF deployments while negotiations continue, threatening new missile deployments and an increase in tensions if NATO deployments go forward.

Our strategy for maintaining allied unity in support of deployment will require, first of all, continual consultation at the highest level, drawing heavily on your close personal relationship with the key leaders. Bilateral and perhaps multilateral meetings with key leaders may well be essential as the December date of deployment approaches (particularly with the heads of government of the three initial basing countries: FRG, UK, and Italy). You will need to stay in constant touch with all of them. Next year's UK-hosted Economic Summit will undoubtedly be an important occasion for reaffirming allied cohesion and our willingness to negotiate with the Soviets on INF.

The second key component of our strategy will be public diplomacy. A bellicose posture is risky for the Soviets, since it could forfeit much of what they have gained through detente in Europe; we should be prepared to exploit it. As the Soviets prepare to stir up tensions to intimidate the allies, our job is to prepare the allies psychologically so they are not shaken by these pressures, and to ensure that European publics place the blame squarely on the Soviets for whatever tensions arise.

Related to this is the third component: our negotiating strategy toward the Soviets on INF. The allies will want reassurance that we have negotiated in good faith and that the blame for failure rests on the Soviets. This may require, down the road, some agile maneuvering and tactical flexibility, at least in presentation. Whether or not we make any further adjustments in our negotiating position, a major Presidential speech on arms control may be helpful at the appropriate moment.

A possible US-Soviet summit could come after the Soviets have given up hope of delaying the start of INF deployments. That timing would put you in the best position to move the dialogue to your agenda. Any such summit, in any case, should probably also be preceded by your meeting with at least Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterrand, and the Italians in Europe.

### *A Dialogue with the Soviets*

Over the next 18 months, we are sure to come under increasing pressure at home and abroad to do more to improve Soviet-American relations and in particular to hold a summit meeting between you and Andropov.

At a minimum a summit could help demonstrate to our public and our allies that we are pursuing every avenue of possible progress, and that if no progress results, the Soviets are to blame. However, while the shaping of public attitudes is important, our real starting point in assessing a possible summit should be whether it contributes to attaining our policy goals.

Looking to the next year and a half we can distinguish between our minimum objectives in US-Soviet relations and a series of more ambitious but still reasonable goals:

- Regional conflicts: at a minimum, our aim is no new Soviet gain or critical US setback owing to Soviet sponsorship; if possible, a Soviet retreat from a major geopolitical position (e.g., Angola, Nicaragua).

- Arms talks: at a minimum, no uncompensated sacrifice of key Western weapon systems; if possible, a breakthrough agreement on acceptable principles.

- Human rights: at a minimum, sustaining unified Western pressures for improved Soviet performance; if possible, a major dissident release or emigration increase.

Our record to date gives reason for confidence that all the minimum goals are attainable. By the standards of the 70's this will represent a real achievement. It will require vigilance and effort, especially to sustain public support at critical junctures.

What is less certain is whether meeting our minimum goals is sufficient for sustaining the tougher, more realistic policies this Administration has introduced. I believe that putting the superpower relationship on a more satisfactory footing for the long term may depend in part on whether

we can move *beyond* minimum goals in the short term. If not, our policies may be vulnerable to charges of a poor return on our investment (and allowed to unravel, as happened to even the Nixon-Ford policies under Carter). Particularly if the Soviets react to our INF deployments by increasing tensions, the payoff for our firm approach may be still further questioned.

Protecting our minimum goals over the rest of the decade may depend, in short, on making a serious effort to attain at least some of our more ambitious objectives. For this purpose, the leverage we have developed over the past two years—especially our military strength as leverage in the arms talks, and the public consensus that gives all our policies credibility—will be invaluable. However, it is likely that we will have to give increasing attention, as in any negotiation, to defining acceptable adjustments in the two sides' positions. And we will have to find ways of bringing these issues to a decision point for the Soviets.

My judgment is that a summit may prove a useful device for focusing Soviet attention on the longer-term direction of our relationship. While it cannot by itself substitute for leverage developed in other ways, it may help us to put this leverage to the test.

The prime worry in connection with a prospective summit is how to ensure public understanding of an event which might well produce only limited results or no results at all. I believe this problem will be manageable, especially as your political position continues to strengthen.

If the Soviets prove utterly inflexible and we end up having to tough out the next 18 months without any improvement in US-Soviet relations, we will not necessarily be any worse off whether or not a summit has taken place. In either case,

we will face the real job of showing that the Soviets are to blame. Avoiding a summit will not free us of this task.

The problem of public expectations applies not just to a summit that does not produce results but perhaps even more to one that does. You will have to make a major effort to control expectations generated by whatever agreements we are able to achieve. We will need to make clear—within the government, in public, and to the Soviets—that we are capable of sustaining a competitive posture even if the Soviets try to use agreement in one area as a kind of safety valve. To put Soviet-American relations on this secure footing for the long term may be as challenging as restoring our competitive posture in the first place.

On balance, I believe you would enter a summit in a relatively strong position. Precisely because you will not need the meeting to attain your minimum goals, you should be able to shift the negotiating burden to the Soviets. But even if a summit does not produce major progress, as is quite possible, it could have some tangible benefits. The preparations are likely to have a constraining effect on Soviet conduct, and the follow-up to a summit could be quite productive if it became clear to the Soviets that the fact of holding it had strengthened your hand.

Making a decision in principle, of course, would still leave many issues unresolved—timing, preparations, content, and (perhaps crucially) how to protect against the possibility of failure. My tentative view is that a meeting relatively early next year might be desirable, especially to help keep the INF confrontation within bounds. If Andropov comes to the UN General Assembly in the fall, we will face a different set of considerations, which must be carefully examined. These questions will require thorough consideration over the rest of this summer, so that we can have in place by the fall a

plan that can be well insulated against the coming Presidential campaign season. I will be sending you further analyses of these questions in the next several weeks.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 6/16-30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Hill initialed for Shultz. On June 23, Bosworth sent Hill a draft of the memorandum and attached paper, which Hill forwarded to Clark. Hill commented in a covering note to Clark "Attached is the Secretary of State's reply to the President's memorandum of June 7 on our foreign policy goals and priorities over the next 18 months. We have treated this reply as particularly sensitive and have not distributed it in the Department of State. It includes, at the end, an annex on Presidential travel which refers to some sensitive matters discussed between the President and the Secretary. If this paper is given a wider circulation (which we do not recommend), you have the option of detaching the last section." (Ibid). On June 13, in a memorandum to Bosworth, Shultz wrote: "I look to you to organize a discussion of this important subject sometime within the next 10 days. It seems to me that all the members of your council should be included. We might consider, also, some people outside of the Department, in Government or out. I am not suggesting a gigantic meeting but some way of organizing discussions promptly and aggressively." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> On June 7, the President sent Weinberger and Shultz a memorandum asking them "to reflect on the demands and opportunities in your respective areas and submit as detailed a forecast of your recommendations as possible.



By forecast, I intend your priority objectives together with your prescription of the actions/milestones along the way to meeting them.” The memorandum continued: “I ask that Bill Clark convene a meeting soon to review our thoughts and then to seek your help in integrating these individual efforts into an overall strategic agenda by the first of July.” (Ibid.) The memorandum is in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 155\*](#)<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Secret/Sensitive. An earlier version of the cover memorandum indicates the paper was drafted by Rodman. (Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 6/16-30/83)

**67. Memorandum From the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)  
to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT  
Summitry

I have submitted papers to you earlier pointing out the dangers of summitry in the absence of assurance that substantial progress can be made on issues of primary importance to us,<sup>2</sup> and believe that the considerations set forth in them remain valid. However, public and Congressional pressures are building for a summit meeting, and although the rationale is often fuzzy and the premises mistaken, this is a political fact of life with which we must deal.

At this point it is clear that we are well on track in rebuilding our defense strength and in rallying our Allies on the most critical issues. Our economy is showing increasing signs of long-term recovery, and your position of leadership is strong and assured. Andropov, in contrast, is faced with a myriad of problems far more fundamental and intractable than ours. The *basics*, therefore, are moving unmistakably in our direction and our negotiating strength is stronger than it has been for many years. Our task is to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a manner which will insure that these trends continue over the long term. In other words, we must insure the *sustainability* of our current policies.

This means, among other things, that we must deal with the summit issue in a manner so that pressures for a

summit do not erode our ability to maintain our defense programs or allied unity, particularly on the INF deployment issue. Our goal should be more ambitious than mere damage limitation, however. We should aim to use the summit issue in a manner which enhances our leverage rather than weakening it (which would be the case if we were forced by ill-founded public, Congressional or allied opinion to enter into an inadequately prepared meeting without clear objectives.) I believe that this can be done, provided that we are clear in our own minds about our objectives, avoid raising false public expectations, and pursue a purposeful, well-coordinated negotiating track over the coming months.

### *U.S. Objectives*

Our confrontation with the Soviet Union is and will continue to be a protracted one. Summitry, to the extent we choose to indulge in it, should be viewed as just one instrument in a long-term, sustained effort. Although it is possible that a major breakthrough can be achieved within a year in some area of primary interest to us, this is far from certain and, indeed, does not seem likely. There are two basic reasons for this: (1) Despite the favorable trends running in our direction, the Soviet leaders will continue to balk at offering proof that our policy of strength pays off, and are likely to continue for some time to try to undermine our strength and determination rather than making the hard choices required; and (2) Andropov, even with his accession to the titular chief of state role, has probably not consolidated his position to the degree that he can force painful decisions on powerful interest groups.

Therefore, if there is a summit within twelve months, our most important objective will be to impress upon Andropov

that our will and capacity to confront him successfully is firm and unalterable in the absence of a significant modification of Soviet behavior. This could prepare the ground for more significant Soviet concessions in 1985.

A second objective should be to obtain significant progress (though not necessarily formal agreements) in several of the areas of primary interest to us: human rights, Soviet restraint in third countries, arms reduction and confidence-building measures, and bilateral relations—particularly those aspects which strengthen our capacity to communicate with the Soviet public at large and thus to build pressure for a gradual “opening” of Soviet society.

A third objective should be to demonstrate—both to the more pragmatic elements of the Soviet leadership and to our own public—that we are in fact serious negotiating partners and that we are not making unreasonable demands in order to block settlement of disputes.

### *The Agenda*

The agenda for any summit will be effectively shaped by the content of negotiations prior to it. Our negotiations, therefore, should cover, persistently and systematically, those issues on our list, whether they seem amenable to progress or not. For it is important to keep hammering at the themes important to us, whether or not there is a Soviet response. Prospects in the various areas vary, of course, as do the appropriate channels we should use. The following examples are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

—*Human Rights*: Here the Soviets can make concessions regarding specific persons if they choose, but they are unlikely to make any in overall procedure. In my view, we

can aim realistically to obtain the emigration of the Pentecostalists, the release and emigration of Shcharansky, at least some improvement in Sakharov's position (e.g. medical treatment in Moscow), and increased Jewish emigration. We should continue to use the Kampelman channel for most of this, and are likely to get the most from quiet diplomacy, backed up by publicity generated by private organizations and—as appropriate—support from allied and other governments (e.g., the Stoessel mission).<sup>3</sup> We should offer nothing in return for these Soviet actions, other than an improved atmosphere.

—*Third Areas:* These promise to be among the most contentious and intractable issues we must manage. The Soviet aim will be to draw us into a form of geopolitical horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence. (For example, they promise to ease off arms supplies to Central America in return for a free hand in Poland.) We must, of course, totally reject going down this path, since it ultimately would undermine our alliances and weaken the moral basis for our policies. Our leverage on these issues varies with the local situation; it is most powerful when political conditions in the area and the military balance act as a barrier to Soviet penetration and weakest when one or both of these barriers is absent. But while our most effective counter to Soviet adventurism must be defeating it on the spot, we should make it clear that irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations. “Linkage” in this general sense is a political fact of life, and we must not let the Soviets forget it.

It is difficult to say at this juncture what we can expect in this area from a summit, but as a minimum I believe we should have credible assurance that there will be no further dramatic Soviet or surrogate military moves to tip

the balance in a regional situation. We should, of course, continue to probe Soviet intentions in each individual situation and be prepared to use the implicit leverage of an upcoming summit to push the Soviets toward a solution we favor.

—*Arms Reduction and CBM's*: We should be able to make progress on some of the confidence-building measures we have proposed, but a real breakthrough in any of the three major arms reduction talks seems highly problematic, although possible. If we are to move toward a summit, however, we should use that process to pressure the Soviets to get more forthcoming proposals on the table, and should hold off agreeing to a summit until our positions have narrowed on at least some of the key issues. Presumably both sides must be able to say after the meeting that some significant progress was achieved in this area.

—*Bilateral issues*: Here, we can reasonably expect some limited progress. If the Soviets agree to a cultural and information exchange agreement which enhances our access to the Soviet public it will be in our interest. Establishment of a consulate in Kiev would provide us with a window on the largest Soviet minority nationality and enhance our ability to exploit the potential nationalities problem. We may be able to achieve some greater access to the Soviet media, and possibly a cessation of jamming of VOA, as well as some minor improvements in the consular and travel areas. While none of these topics are likely to be suitable for extended discussion at a summit, the latter could provide some leverage for favorable results in negotiations preceding the meeting.

*Is this Enough?*



If the analysis above is accurate, it would seem that we can expect at this point only limited gains from a summit. So limited, in fact, that they might not justify the risk of public euphoria (some is inevitable, even if not encouraged) followed by a let-down and recriminations. For this reason, I believe we should continue to proceed cautiously and deliberately and avoid committing ourselves to a summit until our negotiations provide a clearer picture of how much give there is in Soviet positions.

There are other reasons for proceeding with caution. If the Pope's spectacular success in rallying the Polish people and humiliating Jaruzelski results in heavy-handed Soviet interference in Poland, it would, to put it mildly, make it difficult for you to meet Andropov. Also, we would want to be sure that the trial of the Pope's would-be assassin in Italy is unlikely to produce persuasive evidence of a "Bulgarian connection," since you will not want to sit down with a man whom the public believes—rightly or wrongly—to have taken out a contract on the Pope.<sup>4</sup>

I believe that the Soviets want a summit, since it enhances their stature—at home and in the rest of the world—to be seen dealing as equals with the President of the United States. It is also useful to Andropov personally in consolidating his power internally to be accepted by you as an equal partner. They will not abandon the store to us for the privilege of a meeting, but they will pay something (in human rights cases and in access to their population) if we negotiate these issues skillfully and avoid making them a public test of strength. But in order to squeeze the maximum out of them, we must position ourselves so that we will not be seen needing a summit more than they.

The Soviets clearly recognize the danger of appearing over eager, and I believe this was behind Gromyko's June 21

statement accusing us of having “no constructive goals” and implying that we must change *our* policies to make a summit possible.<sup>5</sup>

### *How to Proceed*

While we must be prepared to handle the matter in public with the same coolness Gromyko has shown, we should do what we can in diplomatic and private channels to probe Soviet flexibility. And if we can speed up this process without becoming the demandeur, we should do so.

I believe that Secretary Shultz’s testimony on the Hill last week and his recent approach to Dobrynin,<sup>6</sup> coupled with Kampelman’s conversations in Madrid and our proposals in the arms reduction talks in Geneva and Vienna provide an appropriate start to the process of setting an agenda for a possible summit. At this point, my judgment is that what we have put on the table is appropriate, but that we should go no further on any matter of substance until the Soviets respond with something of their own. We should press for significant progress in each of the areas we have outlined, utilizing both formal diplomatic channels, and—whenever appropriate and potentially useful—special channels such as that through Kampelman and his KGB interlocutor.

In fact, as we enter into a more intensive dialogue with the Soviets, we should give careful thought to establishing a private channel for frank discussion of sensitive issues of a broader nature than those handled by Kampelman. I believe that such a channel can be useful provided we manage it in a manner so that the heads of key agencies in our own government and our principal negotiators are aware of the messages passed, and that discussion is

shifted to formal channels before firm commitments are made.

In preparing for a possible summit, timing will be a factor almost as important as substance. On the one hand, we need to make clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to deal if they are and to give impetus to their sluggish policy making. On the other, it is important not to appear to be in a hurry lest our negotiating position be weakened.

If we do not take a step to force the pace of negotiations, the scenario would look something like the following:

A. Continue diplomatic exchanges (Shultz/Dobrynin, Hartman/Gromyko) until late September.

B. You and Shultz meet with Gromyko in late September, when he comes here for the UN session.

C. Assuming these exchanges produce some progress, plan a Shultz visit to Moscow in December. (I think it important that he not go in October or November so as not to provide an excuse in Europe to delay scheduled INF deployments.)

Although this scenario might provide enough evidence of the prospects for a summit to permit a go/no go decision by the end of the year (for a summit around March or April), it would do little to raise the visibility of our negotiations or to increase pressure on the Soviets for quick decisions. Also, a Shultz visit immediately following INF deployments might not be acceptable to the Soviets.

With these considerations in mind, Ambassador Hartman has recommended that Shultz propose a visit to Moscow in July or early August, provided he can be assured of a meeting with Andropov. Hartman argues that such a visit would exert pressure on the Soviets to respond promptly to

our latest proposals, give us the opportunity to explain the implications of our latest START proposals to Andropov directly (Hartman believes he has not really grasped their potential), and demonstrate to our public and the Allies that we are negotiating seriously.

These are powerful arguments in favor of an early Shultz visit to Moscow, but I am concerned over the impact of our taking the initiative in suggesting a visit before we have any forthcoming responses from the Soviets to our latest proposals. Obviously, we must make a decision on this very soon if the trip is to be possible at all, and over the next few days I shall be reviewing the pros and cons and exploring possible alternative ways to speed up the diplomatic process.

### *Public Handling*

Until we have decided whether to proceed to the summit and have nailed down the arrangements with the Soviets privately, we should hold strictly to our current position (that one could be useful in the future if properly prepared), and avoid speculation on whether and when one might be possible.

We should also consider approaching key Senators and Members of Congress privately to encourage them to avoid pressing publicly for a summit, which only erodes our negotiating position in arranging one. (Percy's comments during the Shultz hearing, for example, were distinctly unhelpful.)<sup>7</sup>

As we proceed with those negotiations you approve, it will be absolutely essential to avoid premature leaks. Therefore we will probably need to develop special "close hold"

procedures to avoid wide dissemination of our negotiating plans in the bureaucracy. I expect to have some specific suggestions for you shortly on this subject.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83-06/28/83). Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A stamp on the memorandum reads: "Received 83 Jun 25." On June 16 in a note to Matlock, McFarlane wrote: "For many reasons—some good and some not so good—we owe the President a thoughtful treatment of whether, and if so, why and how a Summit meeting should be held. We have already given him two solid papers which treat the historical record, and emphasizing the damage which can be done to our long term interests by creating a false euphoria in the minds of Americans which makes it difficult to contend with the continued misbehavior by the Soviets in the wake of a summit. In short, we have stressed that for a summit to be worthwhile, it must involve the resolution of problems, not atmospherics." McFarlane requested a paper from Matlock addressing a possible agenda and topics for discussion. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File—Summitry—USSR (2/2)) While no drafting information was found on Clark's memorandum, it seems likely it originated with McFarlane's request to Matlock.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 52](#).

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the Stoessel mission, see [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Documents 60-65](#).

<sup>4</sup> In his book, Matlock commented: "One cloud hung over thoughts of a Reagan-Andropov meeting. During the Italian investigation of possible accomplices in the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in May 1981, evidence had come to



light suggesting that Bulgarian intelligence—and, therefore, the KGB—might have been involved. What if it turned out the KGB had been behind the shooting? How could any American president meet with the former director of the KGB if that organization had tried to kill the pope?

“We asked the CIA to examine what was known and make a judgment. Forensic specialists went through the evidence meticulously and advised that it was not conclusive. Mehmet Ali Agça, the would-be assassin, had indeed testified early in the investigation that an officer of the Bulgarian security service had been involved, but he later changed his story, and many of his early allegations had proven false. The analysts concluded he was a pathological liar. However, none of this proved that the KGB had *not* been involved. Soviet officials were obviously upset when a Polish prelate was elected pope, and they feared his influence on the political situation in Poland. But this was not proof of their involvement in the shooting.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev* p. 66) Documentation on the Bulgarian connection to the Papal assassination attempt is scheduled for publication in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. X, Eastern Europe\*](#)<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Gromyko made the statement in an interview with TASS. (Dusko Doder, “U.S.-Soviet Summit Is Doubtful,” *Washington Post*, June 22, 1983, p. A17)

<sup>6</sup> Shultz testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15. See [Document 61](#). For his meeting with Dobrynin, see [Document 64](#).

<sup>7</sup> In his memoir, Shultz recounted Percy’s questions during his June 15 appearance before the SFRC: “Senator Percy led off the questioning by asking about the prospect of a



summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Andropov and urged that there be one:

“SENATOR PERCY: I would like to see us issue an invitation in the reasonable near future. . . . When can we look forward to a summit meeting with a properly prepared agenda but no high expectations and the world put on notice, that its purpose is just to gauge each other to be sure there is no miscalculation or misunderstanding, and to try to better understand each others policies

“SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President’s view is that a summit meeting could be a good thing. He is ready to have one if the meeting is well prepared and if there is a high probability of some significant outcome from it, so that it is substantive in nature. He fears that a meeting for the sake of a meeting would raise expectations very high, and if all that happened was that there was a meeting, it would do more harm than good.

“So there is in principle a readiness to have that meeting, but an operational requirement, that it have a substantive content that is prepared and on which we can move forward

“Negotiations were on everyone’s mind. ‘What is certain is that we will not find ourselves in the position in which we found ourselves in the aftermath of détente. We have not staked so much on the prospect of a successful negotiating outcome that we have neglected to secure ourselves against the possibility of failure,’ I said. ‘Our parallel pursuit of strength and negotiation prepares us both to resist continued Soviet aggrandizement and to recognize and respond to positive Soviet moves.’ I said further: ‘The direction in which that relationship evolves will ultimately be determined by the decisions of the Soviet leadership.

President Brezhnev's successors will have to weigh the increased costs and risks of relentless competition against the benefits of a less tense international environment in which they could more adequately address the rising expectations of their own citizens. While we can define their alternatives, we cannot decipher their intentions. To a degree unequaled anywhere else, [the Soviet Union] in this respect remains a secret.' I went on, 'Its history, of which this secrecy is such an integral part, provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And yet it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our part, we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S. strategy, resting on a broad consensus, that we can sustain over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or not.'"

(Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 278-279; brackets are in the original)

**68. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 27, 1983

SUBJECT  
Summitry

As I told you on Sunday,<sup>2</sup> after my quick reading, I like your memorandum on summitry.<sup>3</sup> Reading it carefully again, I have two reservations and one suggestion. The reservations are in the paragraph on the critical issue of Third Areas on page 3. They are these:

1. The Soviets have little or no interest in drawing us into a form of geopolitical "horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence." They have their spheres of influence nailed down, they are presently targetting and expanding in other areas which we have shown little capacity to defend. For example, why would they give up the prospect in Central America in return for a free hand in Poland, which to all intents and purposes they already have.

2. We hardly have to make it clear that "irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations." They have been told that by at least five Presidents and in each case they have demonstrated that they were not willing to give up their efforts to expand their influence in the Third World in return for improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

Now for my suggestion. I agree that we don't want a summit without adequate preparation. I further believe

that there is no way the Soviets would do a summit meeting in mid-1984 because they will do nothing to help President Reagan be reelected. But what they might find to be in their interest is a non-substantive meeting in New York at the UN. This would have to be informal with no White House hype to build up expectations, no intent to arrive at agreements, but merely an opportunity to get acquainted and talk about the agenda before the two countries. This would be sufficiently before the crunch period on deployment. It might serve Andropov's domestic purposes. The President would be showing flexibility and willingness to talk to the American public as well as the Europeans. If the Soviets were to decline the meeting that word would get out both at home and in Europe which would help the President. It could be an afternoon's talk followed by a small dinner or a small dinner followed by an evening's talk, perhaps with the Director General of the UN as host to minimize protocol problems.

**William J. Casey<sup>4</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83-06/28/83); NLR-748-24-27-4-8. Secret. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note reads: "PDB—0930."

<sup>2</sup> June 26.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 67](#).

<sup>4</sup> Casey signed "Bill" above his typed signature.

**69. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 7, 1983

SUBJECT

Summitry: Casey's Memo of June 27

My reaction to Bill Casey's thoughtful comments are as follows:<sup>2</sup>

(1) *Meeting on fringes of UN*: I think this has its dangers, but we must recognize that if Andropov decides to come to the UN, the President will have no alternative to meeting him. I doubt if Andropov would come without our encouragement, but if he should, we can minimize the negative fallout by making clear that (a) such a meeting is not a summit in the sense we have been using the term, but simply a courtesy due a major foreign chief of state coming to the U.S. on other business; and (b) such a meeting need not foreclose a proper, full-fledged summit if conditions make that desirable.

Whether we should encourage Andropov to come is a separate question, and at this point I would be inclined to advise against it since it would probably raise too many hopes and might well get in the way of INF deployments. However, we should keep the possibility of such a meeting in mind over coming weeks and say nothing publicly which would make it more difficult to manage it if future developments should increase the desirability. If at any point we decide for any reason that we *want* such a

meeting, we should try to arrange it privately before issuing a public invitation.

(2) *Soviet willingness to arrange Summit next year*: I do not agree with Casey that there is “no way” the Soviets will agree to a summit in mid-1984. They, in fact, may be eager for one if Andropov’s health holds. Their assessment of the likelihood of the President’s reelection will be important, of course. Almost as important will be their assessment of the possibility of concluding *any* deal with the Reagan Administration, and one task of our diplomacy (public and private) over the coming months will be to make clear that we are willing to conclude mutually advantageous agreements.

Aside from these considerations, however, there is a deeper reason for the Soviets not rejecting a summit next year, even if they feel that it contributes to the President’s reelection chances. This is that the Soviets prefer the known to the unknown and unpredictable; more importantly, they prefer an interlocutor who can deliver if a deal is struck to one who might be voted down by the U.S. Senate. Given their experience with Carter’s vacillations—which they found maddening—they may well actually prefer a strong U.S. President to an unpredictable one. And they appreciate the fact that a President with strong anti-Communist credentials offers more long-term reliability as an interlocutor than one who is weak at home. In sum, paradoxical as it may seem, they may favor the President’s re-election as the lesser of two “evils.”

(3) *Third Areas*: Though they will never say so directly, I feel strongly that the Soviets do have a strong urge to indulge in geo-political horse trading. This is implicit in almost every frank conversation with them I can recall when dealing with “third area” questions. The fact is that



they do *not* feel that they have “their” spheres of influence “nailed down.” They know they are not there legitimately, but only because they have been able to force themselves on these areas. Therefore, *legitimizing* their position is of great importance to them. Since theirs are not true alliances (as ours are) they stand only to gain from the appearance of legitimacy. Conversely, we stand only to lose. For this reason, it is a policy we should reject. Any analysis of what they theoretically might accept in such a “trade off” session is not only beside the point, but dangerous.

(4) *Linkage*: I am not sure the Soviets have really taken on board the implicit linkage of their overall behavior and our ability to conclude major agreements. It is true that every postwar U.S. President has made the right noises (at times) on this point, but few have *acted* as if it is important, and this is what counts. In fact, the Carter Administration consciously and explicitly de-linked SALT-II from any other factor. (We did not even warn the Soviets regarding Afghanistan during the period between the Taraki coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in December 1979, which caused some Soviet officials to complain after sanctions were applied, “How were we to know it made any difference to you?”) Therefore, I consider it important to continue to make the linkage point, since I am not confident that it is really understood.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Summitry—USSR (2/2). Secret. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 68](#).

## **70. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Andropov<sup>1</sup>**

Dear Gen. Secretary Andropov      Washington, July 11, 1983

I appreciate very much your letter pledging an, “unbending commitment of the Soviet leadership and the people of the Soviet Union to the course of peace, the elimination of the nuclear threat and the development of relations based on mutual benefit and equality with all nations.”

Let me assure you the government & the people of the United States are dedicated to, “the course of peace” and “the elimination of the nuclear threat.” It goes without saying that we also seek relations with all nations based on “mutual benefit and equality.” Our record since we were allied in W.W. II confirms that.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. General Secretary could we not begin to approach these goals in the meetings now going on in Geneva? You and I share an enormous responsibility for the preservation of stability in the world. I believe we can fulfill that mandate but to do so will require a more active level of exchange than we have heretofore been able to establish. We have much to talk about with regard to the situation in Eastern Europe, South Asia, and particularly this hemisphere as well as in such areas as arms control, trade between our two countries and other ways in which we can expand east-west contacts.

Historically our predecessors have made better progress when communicating has been private and candid. If you

wish to engage in such communication you will find me ready. I await your reply.

Sincerely,

**Ronald Reagan**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Andropov (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). No classification marking. The editor transcribed the letter from Reagan's handwritten original. An image of the handwritten letter is [Appendix C](#). In his memoir, Shultz noted: "I later discovered that the president had shown his first draft to Bill Clark and, on the advice of Clark, he had taken out the sentences 'If we can agree on mutual, verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons we both hold, could this not be a first step toward elimination of all such weapons? What a blessing this would be for the people we both represent.' President Reagan was consistently committed to his personal vision of a world without nuclear weapons; his advisers were determined to turn him away from that course." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 360)

<sup>2</sup> On June 17, Reagan sent Andropov a letter of congratulations upon his election as Chairman of the Presidium. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Andropov (4)) On June 22, Andropov sent a short reply including the lines Reagan quotes in his letter. (Ibid.) In a July 6 memorandum to the President, Clark wrote: "Andropov's reply (Tab A) to your congratulatory message avoids the code words known to be offensive to us (such as 'peaceful coexistence'). However, instead of speaking of working together, as you did in your message,

he implies in his last sentence that the burden of proof is on us to take 'practical steps.'

"This thrust is consistent with Gromyko's recent comments on the prospects for a summit, which also implied that a change in U.S. policy is necessary. I consider this an obvious but not surprising attempt to position the Soviets as the aggrieved party. The main implication for our own public statements is to continue the same cautious, non-committal line we have followed up to now in commenting on the prospects for a summit meeting." (Ibid.) Reagan initialed Clark's memorandum, indicating he saw it.

**71. Information Memorandum From the  
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council  
(Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 13, 1983

**SUBJECT**

View from Moscow—Red Team Redux

This memorandum updates the December 13 paper on the same subject.<sup>2</sup> It was drafted by the same “Red Team,” chaired by Jeremy Azrael and composed of specialists from S/P, P, EUR, and INR.

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared by the “Red Team” of the Department of State<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, July 13, 1983

*RED TEAM REDUX*

*The View from Moscow, Mid-1983*

*Introduction*

The eight months that have passed since Brezhnev’s death have confirmed our judgment that the first phase of the Soviet succession would be marked by policy continuity.<sup>4</sup> If anything, there has been even less tactical dynamism and innovation than we foresaw. The persistence of this pattern cannot, however, be taken for granted. The record of Soviet foreign policy during the past eight months, while containing a few pluses from Moscow’s perspective, has

been decidedly negative overall. The setbacks of this period—taken together with a changing Soviet perception of the Reagan Administration's staying power and willingness to do business with Moscow—have likely prompted the Soviet leadership to reassess its approach to a number of international issues, including the US-Soviet relationship itself.

In the view of some members of the "Red Team," moreover, there are signs that established Soviet policies and priorities are being subjected to unusually systematic scrutiny, most obviously in the realm of internal development but in foreign affairs as well. These analysts interpret a number of recent leadership statements as reflecting a wide-ranging reassessment of established Soviet tactics in East-West relations, Eastern Europe, and the Third World. If such a comprehensive review is, in fact, underway, it could suggest that we are entering a period of fluidity in Moscow's foreign policy, one in which US actions and the state of US-Soviet relations could play a greater role than in recent years in affecting Soviet policy choices.

Other "Red Team" members believe that any reevaluation of Soviet positions on international questions is likely to take place on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than in a comprehensive review. This appears to have been the general practice of the past two decades, and Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov, who have helped to frame Soviet policy throughout that period, may feel less inclined toward a wide-ranging review than would a team of newcomers. They probably do not regard recent negative trends as so adverse as to require a comprehensive reassessment of Soviet strategy. If so, changes in Soviet foreign policy are likely to be *ad hoc*, and US actions and the state of US-Soviet relations will affect Soviet behavior to a more limited extent.



In any event, policy reassessment—be it comprehensive or *ad hoc*—does not necessarily imply policy redirection. In fact, we do not expect Moscow to undertake any radical foreign policy departures over the next year and a half, even though significant shifts in several specific areas could well occur.

### *I. The Domestic Context*

Yuri Andropov stimulated high expectations on becoming General Secretary, for many different reasons including his personal style and Leonid Brezhnev's ossified rule. The picture of a dynamic and resourceful leader, which was so useful in the West, also had its impact at home. He was expected by many to begin an early assault on the more problematic elements of Brezhnev's legacy, especially the stalled economy.

In the event, as should have been expected, he was guided primarily by any new Soviet leader or leadership team's imperative—to consolidate power—and expectations of change have as a result been largely disappointed. To be sure, Andropov has strengthened his position, gaining increased public deference from his peers, and rounding out the full set of titles held by Brezhnev. But despite the lack of a major challenge to his position, it appears that the leadership turnover will be very gradual, with considerable jockeying and few policy departures. To date, Andropov does not appear to have gained control over local and regional party appointments. Lacking the ability to create an independent base of supporters, he will tend to remain in debt to—and in policy matters, constrained by—the senior colleagues whose backing gained him the top position in the first place. Gromyko and Ustinov are the most important of these; together with Andropov, their

dominance is marked by military promotions to the Central Committee, the key positions held by KGB officials, and Gromyko's acquisition of a First Deputy Premiership.

Whether or not because of limits on his power (as well as his uncertain health), Andropov has shown circumspection in approaching major policy questions. In particular, he appears to have no well-developed set of programs for dealing with the economy's ailments. To date, his most conspicuous break with the past has been a style of frank recognition of the magnitude and structural nature of the difficulties faced, and an implication that responses are being canvassed in every quarter. Few major policy initiatives have appeared. If anything, what the Soviet public has been told most clearly is that economic reforms are to be introduced slowly, only after a long review and search for solutions.

This combination of candor and delay was one of the most pronounced aspects of the recent Central Committee plenum;<sup>5</sup> particularly characteristic was Andropov's admission that the Soviet system is weakest at making use of new technology, the very factor on which modern economies depend for growth. On this evidence, few dramatic departures over the next two years should be expected, despite increasing public attention to (and the leadership's own insistence on) the need to do something. The leadership will probably make do for some time with what have until now been used as substitutes for reform—its campaign against corruption, and appeals for discipline and vigilance against foreign enemies and influence. In the latter, traditional Russian xenophobia has been given an overlay of ideological rhetoric to support stricter educational, intellectual and cultural policies. (Cultural exchanges with the West have been singled out for suspicion.) These policies may be the harbingers of more

sustained and systematic repression, something that the leadership may regard as the political and social requisite of economic reform.

Overall, unresolved policy and personnel issues have, since Brezhnev's passing, demanded a high priority for domestic concerns; they will continue to do so, although not to the exclusion of issues on the foreign policy agenda. Nor will they require retrenchment where the Soviet Union otherwise has the means to sustain its diplomacy.

## *II. Foreign Policy Balance Sheet Since November 1982*

The achievements of the Brezhnev era leave the Soviet Union with the military might of a superpower and a strong desire to compete with the United States on the basis of an asserted equality. The past eight months have seen small improvements in some areas, but on balance the record of Soviet foreign policy has left much to be desired. It has failed to capitalize on important opportunities, has witnessed better relations among adversaries who had appeared to be at odds with each other, and has been unable to resolve major outstanding problems. Although some of the Soviets' setbacks may well prove transitory, the Soviet leadership probably feels more on the defensive than immediately upon Andropov's accession.

*Assessment of the US.* Events since the end of last year have done nothing to alter fundamentally Moscow's view of the Reagan Administration, whose hostility to the Soviet Union and disposition to compete actively with it around the world are not doubted. Although domestic US and other constraints put certain limits on this competition, the Administration's commitment to compete has introduced added caution into Soviet decisionmaking.

Until this year, however, the Soviet leadership probably lacked a settled view of how long this stance might endure: whether the President had any interest in even limited accommodation with the Soviet Union, or (failing that) whether internal pressures might force him into it. Both points are somewhat clearer now. The President's political strength has plainly impressed Moscow: he is seen as highly likely to be re-elected, and still able to dominate domestic debate over military spending and arms control. He has salvaged weapons systems that last year seemed in jeopardy, and may even—thanks to the Scowcroft Commission—have established the basis of a broadening consensus about strategic issues.

At the same time, the Soviets have not missed the markedly greater Administration commitment to negotiation. Moscow surely suspects US statements of interest in “dialogue” as a necessary ploy to maintain domestic and allied support, and will remain suspicious. Some Soviet commentators have expressed the conviction, or hope, that the presidential campaign will further increase pressure on the President to conclude arms control agreements. Yet in combination with his stronger political position, the President's more open bargaining posture has made a Soviet strategy of waiting out Reaganism less tenable. In fact, it may have led the Soviet leadership to consider whether the coming year may not offer a better basis for bargaining with the US than a second Reagan Administration.

*Western Europe.* Last year Western Europe appeared to be the area where Soviet policy was making greatest headway, aided by nuclear issues, above all INF; alliance disagreement over East-West economic policy was a further Soviet plus. Since then, however, political trends have been almost uniformly adverse (above all, the setback of the

West German elections),<sup>6</sup> Soviet propaganda has been ineffectual and the peace movement markedly weakened; the result has been a revival of Alliance cohesion both on INF and on other issues. Moscow has had to take stock of successive shows of unity at Williamsburg, at Madrid, and at a series of ministerials. As a result, Soviet spokesmen increasingly speak of INF deployments as a *fait accompli*.

Despite this resignation, Soviet efforts to make use of the European peace movement and anti-nuclear sentiment will continue, and conceivably increase. The Soviets may still believe that an intensified peace campaign in the final run-up to INF deployments could be effective in straining Atlantic ties, even if blocking deployments no longer seems achievable. Moreover, Soviet policy of the past six months, in absorbing these setbacks in Europe, has already begun to display greater effort in exploiting West European interest in other East-West forums, including MBFR, CSCE, and in preparations for a CDE. The anticipated pay-off of such efforts, of course, is sharply less than the hoped-for Soviet returns from a full-blown INF crisis.

*Eastern Europe.* At Brezhnev's death, the Soviet leadership probably believed the worst was past in Poland. While still impressed by Jaruzelski's ability to prevent its recurrence, they have also been reminded that the internal security situation is still volatile and potentially dangerous. Above all, the Pope's visit was a dramatic demonstration that the Polish people remain alienated from the regime.<sup>7</sup> In this setting, Moscow is no doubt uneasy about Jaruzelski's plans to follow up the visit by developing his relation with the Church, ending martial law and freeing political prisoners.

Perhaps because of his experience as ambassador to Hungary and Party Secretary for bloc relations, Andropov's speeches have stressed themes of economic integration,



political coordination and ideological orthodoxy. He may have pressed the Hungarians to be firmer with dissidents and has proposed measures to improve Warsaw Pact and CEMA machinery. Clearly his efforts are meeting resistance. The East European summit did not issue as strong a statement on INF as Moscow wanted.<sup>8</sup> Divided over increasingly difficult economic problems, CEMA has repeatedly had to put off the economic summit. Meanwhile, the costs of maintaining this empire remain high, and the economic troubles of the region, together with East European reliance on Western trade and financing, are complicating Soviet influence.

*China and Japan.* Before Brezhnev's death, the Soviets had achieved an atmospheric breakthrough in relations with the PRC; some also saw his passing as a Soviet opportunity to review and improve ties with Japan. Since then, however, the Soviets have shown little inclination to take major steps toward better relations with either state.

With the Chinese, they have held another round of bilateral talks, have agreed to increase trade and have opened a remote border crossing point. Moscow has not, however, acted on the issues that China has asserted are central to a genuine improvement in relations: Kampuchea, Afghanistan, or—most importantly—Soviet troops in Mongolia and on their border. Despite the apparent opportunity afforded by the downturn in US-China relations last year, the Soviets made no concrete gestures; they did not draw down or draw back their forces. They have in fact continued to strengthen their force posture throughout the region; Soviet Far East INF deployments are an area of increasing friction in Sino-Soviet relations. For their part, the Chinese have continued to criticize Soviet “hegemonism,” while making small but significant moves to rebuild their damaged US connection.



Toward Japan, the Soviets have reacted with harsh criticism of Nakasone's bolder leadership style and his closer identification with the US on defense issues. Rather than trying to woo Nakasone or Japanese public opinion, the Soviets have sharpened their threats, raised historical antagonisms, and rejected any suggestion that the northern territories issue can even be discussed.

The past six months have shown Moscow that measurably improved relations with both China and Japan require a higher price than they might have envisioned, demanding concessions that they are unwilling to make. As a result, the Soviets regard East Asia as posing a series of problems rather than opportunities. They remain cautious and distrustful of their major Asian neighbors, and see their range of choices as very narrow.

*Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.* Since last year any Soviet hopes that Islamabad would readily acquiesce in a pro-Soviet settlement—or cut its aid to the rebels—have been largely disappointed. The UN-sponsored talks continue (and may eventually aid the Soviets in gaining *de facto* recognition of the DRA), but, on the core question, the Pakistanis show no signs of weakening, at least under present pressure, while the Mujahadeen more than hold their own. Even while experiencing intermittent defeats—as in the Panjshir Valley, for example—Soviet forces are in no danger of being driven out; they cannot, however, make significantly greater progress, at least for the foreseeable future, without incurring significantly greater costs.

While relations have been deteriorating for some time, Soviet-Iranian friction increased sharply this year, exemplified by Iran's effort to crush the Tudeh party outright, and by its militancy concerning Afghanistan. Earlier Soviet attempts to mediate an Iran-Iraq settlement

have come to nothing, reflecting in part the Soviets' sacrifice of a broker's role by resuming arms deliveries to Iraq. Moscow may be consoled that US relations with both parties also remain extremely poor, although the formation of the new Central Command may be seen as evidence that American ability to protect its interests in the region is slowly recovering from the fall of the Shah.

*Middle East.* Following the setback they suffered in Lebanon last year, the Soviets have made a determined effort to restore relations with their principal regional clients, to frustrate progress on US initiatives, and to achieve an enhanced role for themselves in any subsequent peace negotiations. Their minimum objective has been achieved: to consolidate their relationship with Syria through the SA-5 deployments and other arms supplies, to bolster Syrian intransigence in negotiations on Lebanon and thereby to block the Reagan initiative.

From the Soviet perspective, these developments at least partially recoup the ground lost last year—albeit by running a much greater risk of direct involvement in a future Israeli-Syrian conflict. With the current impasse in the US negotiating effort in Lebanon, as well as Jordanian unwillingness to enter the peace process, they likely believe that the gains have justified the risks taken, and that they are in a stronger position to frustrate US diplomatic efforts in which they are not involved. The Soviets also recognize, however, that they are not well positioned to take the diplomatic lead (which may account for Andropov's reluctance thus far to put on the record his own views regarding a Middle East settlement). With this in mind, they may also doubt the long-term congruence of their own and Syrian interests and fear that Damascus will eventually participate in US-sponsored diplomatic initiatives, thereby isolating them in the region.

*Central America.* Central America's instability may look like one of Moscow's most useful levers against the US. The affairs of the region obviously could compel increased US attention, probably at the price of involvements and commitments elsewhere, and—unlike many other areas—at little risk of producing a dangerous Soviet-American confrontation. Without exaggerating its own ability to affect, much less govern these events, Moscow has probably calculated that proxy escalation serves its interests. Yet while the Soviets may still hope that domestic opinion will constrain US policy, recent Administration statements and actions have likely made the Soviets more wary. Not only might increased Soviet involvement come at the expense of improved Soviet-US relations, but the prospect of an outright reverse—the downfall of the Sandinistas—has probably been taken seriously for the first time in Moscow; for this reason, and to counter US moves throughout the region, Cuba appears to be increasing its involvement in Nicaragua.

*Southern Africa.* The Soviet perspective on southern Africa has lost the strategic optimism and dynamism that was so pronounced in the late 1970s. Moscow now seems preoccupied with maintaining, and if possible consolidating, its large long-term stake in key southern African countries such as Angola and Mozambique. Yet both of these Soviet clients are threatened by increasingly effective insurgencies that enjoy the overwhelming regional military and economic backing of South Africa. The Soviets cannot be certain that the beleaguered Angolan and Mozambican leaderships will not seek relief from these pressures by cooperating with US diplomacy—thereby freezing Moscow out of the regional role it seeks, with no credit for contributing to the process. Recent developments have increased these worries, but the Soviets are probably still not convinced that the US can bring off a Namibia

settlement involving withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Moscow retains considerable leverage over the regimes in Luanda and Maputo, primarily by manipulating the flow of Soviet and Cuban security assistance on which these regimes depend.

### *III. Soviet Policy Decisions and Options*

The Soviet leadership's assessment of foreign policy trends since Brezhnev's death is, on balance, almost certainly negative. This will no more ensure a redirection of policy than declining growth rates ensure economic reform. Moreover, cyclical downturns will not be mistaken for secular trends, nor failures to advance for outright defeats.

Nonetheless, in the next 18 months, many particular issues will approach unavoidable decision points, at which existing policy lines will have to be either changed or reinforced. In responding to each of these, the leadership will face choices between becoming more cost-conscious and risk-averse on the one hand, and, on the other, accepting increased costs and risks, whether in exploiting new opportunities that appear or in making a concerted effort to resolve existing difficulties.

*Relations with the US.* The onset of the presidential election year forces the Soviets to decide how to respond to apparently increased US receptivity to bargaining. The meager content of discussions proposed thus far (consulates, etc.) may suggest to Moscow a US reluctance to address more important arms issues; the leadership may also be skeptical that the interval between the cooling-off after INF deployments and the heating-up of the electoral campaign will be long enough for serious bargaining.

Given this uncertainty about US purposes, and about what the calendar will allow, the Soviets will be cautious in probing for US flexibility. They are unlikely to invest more than token capital in their own initiatives, to avoid wasting unreciprocated concessions. The same wary hesitation will also limit Soviet responses to American probes. Small unilateral steps are likely, however, on the model of changes recently made in the Soviet START position. Under time pressure, and witnessing the progress of new US systems, the Soviets will also feel obliged to be responsive to US initiatives; an American summit offer, for example, is more likely than not to be accepted. Recalling the fragility of this entire process, they also may be more cautious about provoking the US on second-order issues.

In START, the Administration's success in winning support for new strategic systems will not by itself induce Soviet acceptance of our offers. The Soviets will not accept proposals that require early and costly restructuring of their forces so as to make them resemble those of the US. But if the period of adjustment is further stretched out, they may become more receptive. This is, moreover, one area where the political strength of the Soviet military is not necessarily an obstacle but perhaps an asset: the Soviet military have looked to arms control as a technological equalizer, and in addition to this incentive they now have a stronger budgetary motive as well.

*Western Europe.* The Soviets appear increasingly resigned to the failure of their efforts to halt deployment. They will understand that overreacting could be counterproductive, but this need not foreclose a tough response; for they will also want to make good on their threats and avoid defusing the issue by appearing to acquiesce in deployments. These considerations will argue for prompt military counterdeployments at a minimum, and could point to

political actions designed to heighten tensions. The options to be considered probably include a break-off of talks and, as Andropov implied to Kohl, an array of pressures directed at Germany. At the same time, despite the failure of their peace offensive to date, the Soviets will make further use of diplomatic initiatives aimed specifically at European opinion and at generating Allied pressure on Washington. In particular, greater Soviet activism in all arms forums that treat European issues should be expected.

After demonstratively reacting to US deployments, and insisting that deployments as such will not make them more flexible, the Soviets will nevertheless need to weigh the value of limiting these new systems short of the full 572. Accepting the "legitimacy" of these systems, almost unthinkable now, may prove significantly less sticky for the Soviets after the first tranche or two are already in place, particularly if a new negotiating framework serves as cover. Even in 1984, the value of a satisfactory INF agreement will probably be judged chiefly by how much it contributes to other Soviet interests, especially to an agreement in the more important START categories.

*Eastern Europe.* The Soviets have no expectation of an early alleviation of their problems in managing the East European bloc, but absent a major blow-up in Poland they probably have greater confidence that none of these difficulties will be an impediment to improved relations with the United States. They probably believe that the West is slowly climbing down from its program of pressures against Poland; this may offer some slight incentive to keep the situation there cool, perhaps even allowing Jaruzelski increased flexibility. But on balance the leadership probably expects Polish developments to have little importance one way or the other and this will limit the pressure they feel to allow significant liberalization.



*China and Japan.* The past six months suggest to the Soviets that outbidding the US for Chinese favor would be difficult; Sino-Soviet improvements could stimulate more intense courtship of Beijing by the US, and Moscow has no wish to be used as such a lever. For this and other reasons, the Soviet purpose toward China is more to stabilize than improve relations, while preserving what it can of last year's atmospheric gains. The conduct of this effort will not be greatly affected by Soviet policy toward the US. Unlike the US, the Soviets probably do not expect progress in relations with Washington to affect relations with China, for better or worse.

Japan is expected to be a growing threat to Soviet security interests, separately and in concert with the US. The Soviets have not yet decided the question of whether or how to adjust their security policy toward Japan in response; they may doubt that Japan can be wooed very far from the US, and appear to believe that inducements are not the best means for dealing with Japan in any event. They will continue to expand economic ties, while seeking to insulate these from their poor political/security relationship, and from the continuing policy of intimidation that accompanies it.

*Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf.* Like Poland, the *status quo* in Afghanistan is probably seen by the Soviets as a declining impediment to other East-West business. They do not (in contrast to policy toward Poland) expect Western and other pressures on their position in Afghanistan to ease up appreciably, even in the context of improved Soviet-American relations. Were such an improvement to materialize, however, Moscow's principal hope would be to play on Pakistani anxiety about a superpower deal. Keeping the UN negotiating process alive may be helpful, in the

long term, as an instrument for gaining Pakistani acquiescence in a pro-Soviet outcome in Afghanistan.

The current visit of the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister to Kabul could contribute to a limited increase in Soviet forces in Afghanistan or possibly to larger-scale escalation.<sup>9</sup> That the latter could set back East-West relations is well understood; this consideration might deter Moscow as long as the situation on the ground had not worsened; it would not by itself deter escalation if the military outlook began to deteriorate or if a military breakthrough seemed achievable.

Iran commands growing Soviet attention and even worry; while Moscow desires to position itself to exploit opportunities, it sees no openings at present.

*Middle East.* Soviet policy has played a larger role in damaging ongoing US diplomatic efforts in the Middle East than in any other region. In so doing, they have kept regional tensions high, even at the risk of direct confrontation with either the US or Israel. Despite this, Soviet-American rivalry in this region has not significantly complicated relations overall, and is probably not seen in Moscow as an obstacle to movement on arms control. Reassured by this separation between Middle East tension and the superpower relationship as a whole, the Soviets will not believe that improved relations with Washington will require more constructive policies in the region. They would, of course, make a stronger effort than in recent years to gain US support for a Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli negotiating process. Having abetted Syria's obstructionist policy, they may feel their claim to such a role is better than in some time. Their hope of involvement will, however, be complicated by the likely medium-term immobility of the Arab-Israeli processes (owing in part to

the state of the PLO, whose patron Moscow had hoped to appear). It will be further weakened by the very limited leverage that the Soviets can demonstrate in moving the parties toward constructive bargaining positions.

*Southern Africa.* As in the Middle East, the Soviets have no direct role in the principal diplomatic peacemaking process in southern Africa, despite regular exchanges of information on the process with the US, and retain enough leverage to pose a credible threat to Western peacemaking efforts. In the near term they probably doubt that they will face the choice of using or losing this leverage. If, however, the Namibia process comes to a head—and particularly if it appeared that Cuban troops were about to be ousted unceremoniously, with no credit to Moscow for having produced a good result—Soviet leverage could be used in a number of ways. At a minimum, it might help the Soviets to parlay their position into some formal role in the process. Even this, however, would seem a Soviet defeat, if it required the sacrifice of a military presence and geopolitical position from which to influence the unfolding Black African struggle against *apartheid*. Therefore, the Soviets are likely to increase where necessary their assistance to, and involvement in, Angola and Mozambique and to seek to demonstrate that South Africa and indirectly the US are responsible if the Namibia process breaks down. In view of their relatively low investment in the area, however, it is also possible that the Soviets would consider a less obstructive role if they conclude that this would put them in a more favorable position for dealing with the core issues of East-West relations.

*Central America.* Recent US policy toward Central America may have increased Soviet sensitivity to possible linkage between the events of the region and Soviet-American ties. For this reason, if a more active phase of superpower

negotiation opens, the Soviets will at a minimum endeavor to keep their Central American activities separate from it. They will dissociate themselves from regional flare-ups while the process is in train, and if favorable results are at hand in Washington, they may avoid contributing to escalation in the region. Although some reduction in arms supplies might be used as a signal, the Soviets prefer not to make such side-payments. The most difficult policy dilemma would arise for Moscow if, at the same time that arms agreements came within reach, pressure on the Nicaraguan regime threatened to topple the Sandinistas. Soviet assistance would of course be rendered through Cuba, but even this would certainly increase the danger of a confrontation with the US and—if Cuban involvement were provocative enough—might force the Soviets to consider how to protect their ally against direct US pressure.

#### *IV. Summary Judgment*

Soviet policy has been less activist than our projection of last year, and has not been notably successful, even in areas where new initiatives have been pursued. Whether or not as part of a comprehensive reassessment of its priorities, Moscow may undertake certain policy shifts in the next 18 months, particularly in its approach to the Reagan Administration.

In dealing with the US, the Soviet leadership is likely to conclude that their “wait-them-out” strategy is no longer adequate. Such an approach will appear both less effective and less attuned to emergent possibilities for doing business with the Reagan Administration. As a result, Moscow may be ready for small steps that probe US intentions, while moving slowly so as to avoid helping the

US to appear flexible or to confirm that the Administration's tough line has worked. Soviet diplomacy will aim, for the most part, to gain advantages by depicting US policy as *inflexible*.

The Soviets may also conclude that more confrontational or costly policies are needed in particular areas—to keep the INF controversy alive in Europe, to consolidate in Afghanistan, to exploit US vulnerability in Central America, and preserve a Soviet role in the Middle East. Certain of these decisions, and especially their timing, may be affected by whether the Soviets detect a short-term opportunity to make progress in Soviet-American relations. Even if this progress materializes, however, Soviet policy will not be diverted by it from the pursuit of long-term objectives. Instead, Moscow will in some instances see improved East-West relations as an opportunity to pursue a broadened policy role for itself and to gain Washington's cooperation, particularly in unstable regions where US policy has complicated Soviet efforts.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 7/1-15/83. Secret; Nodis. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill's initials are stamped on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the December 13, 1982, paper is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael, Baraz, Johnson, and Vershbow. Sestanovich initialed for the clearing officers.

<sup>4</sup> Brezhnev died on November 10, 1982.

<sup>5</sup> See [footnote 4, Document 65](#).

<sup>6</sup> On October 1, 1982, Helmut Schmidt's government in West Germany collapsed. Helmut Kohl, leader of the Christian Democratic Union, became the new Chancellor of West Germany. His party's coalition won a majority in the federal election on March 6, 1983.

<sup>7</sup> Pope John Paul II visited his native Poland in June 1983.

<sup>8</sup> The joint statement issued on June 28 after a meeting in Moscow of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 507-511.

<sup>9</sup> Soviet Deputy Defense Minister General Valentin Varennikov.



## **72. Memorandum From the Chief of the International Activities Division, Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Casey<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 14, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

Talking Points for Discussion with Secretary Shultz Re Expanded Soviet CA Program

1. *Action Requested:* We have been advised by Mr. Linton that the Secretary of State intends to raise the status of the expansion of the Soviet/East Europe Covert Action Program through a new Finding with you on 15 July. Attached are Talking Points for your use with the Secretary of State. (Attachment A).

2. *Background:* In April we forwarded a draft new Finding to expand the Soviet/East Europe CA Program (see Attachment B).<sup>2</sup> You have been holding action on this Finding. As you are aware, since last fall we have been holding periodic discussions with Mark Palmer (DAS for Soviet/East European Affairs at State), Dennis Kux (DAS for Intelligence Coordination at State), and Walt Raymond of the NSC on policy coordination relative to the expanded CA program. The last such discussion was held on 11 July.<sup>3</sup> State has consistently pressed us to get on with the expanded program on as large a scale and as soon as possible. Their view has been that this covert action pressure against the Soviets is a necessary ingredient to prod the Soviets to accept certain diplomatic initiatives.

3. We have commenced a number of new activities in the Soviet/East European target area under the authority of the

1978 Finding.<sup>4</sup> [*1 line not declassified*] we have reached the point now where additional funding is necessary [*less than 1 line not declassified*] if the momentum in this program is to be maintained. Some contemplated new operations have not yet been undertaken, since we would only be able to mount them with new authority sought in the new Finding. In the attached Talking Points, three possible courses of action are indicated:

—Proceed with the new Finding and a related Reserve Release;

—Go forward with a Memorandum of Notification reinterpreting the 1978 Finding to provide limited expanded authority and concurrently proceed with a Reserve Release;

—Do not seek new authority at this time, and proceed only with a Reserve Release under the 1978 Finding.

[*1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified*]

[*name not declassified*]<sup>5</sup>

## **Attachment A**

### **Talking Points<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### **SUBJECT**

Talking Points Re Expanded Soviet/EE CA Program

1. The Soviet/EE Covert Action Program as it existed at the beginning of FY-83 consisted of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] operational activities budgeted at 6.5 million dollars with an additional [*amount not declassified*]

allocated for developmental activities. [*number not declassified*] major new activities have been undertaken to date in FY-83, which have obligated the [*amount not declassified*] developmental funds. Advanced planning has gone forward for additional operations, for which specific funds have not yet been expended. [*1½ lines not declassified*] will be needed during the remainder of FY-83 to keep up the momentum in the expansion of the existing operations and the further development of those initiated during FY-83.

2. Assuming full-scale development of the expanded program under a new Finding (which would include clandestine radio and political action operations) [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is anticipated. If expansion of the program under the 1978 Finding *only* is approved, we will need a Reserve Release in FY-84 of [*amount not declassified*]. The major difference between these two programs involves the drop-out of clandestine radio broadcasting into the Soviet Union in the smaller program. A new initiative package involving the full expanded program has been included in the draft DDO FY-85 Budget in the amount of [*amount not declassified*] (see Attachment C).<sup>7</sup>

3. [*3 lines not declassified*]

4. New expanded operations already in process in FY-83:

- A new Ukrainian historical journal to appear early spring 1984;

- A subsidy to allow the continuation of the Russian edition [*less than 1 line not declassified*];

- A new Russian-language “newspaper” of moderate leftist viewpoint which will appear next summer;
- A Soviet Central Asian newsletter which should appear next year;
- A re-institution of support for a Hungarian newspaper and a few books;
- A new Czech-language “Readers Digest”-type publication;
- A new journal appealing to dissident West European communists;
- A new journal in the three Baltic languages to appear in fall 1983.

All of these operations have policy approval in the 1978 Finding.

5. A number of other planned publishing projects authorized under the 1978 Finding are contemplated for early FY-84 if sufficient funding is available. Two projects,

- Support from Western Europe of internal peace movement in the Soviet Union and East European countries
- Establishment in exile of the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and [*less than 1 line not declassified*] for support operations into the USSR

could most effectively be carried out under the new Finding but could be configured in a less effective form under the existing Finding if “publicity” was redefined to include “political action.”

6. If the new Finding includes clandestine radio broadcasting, we could commence operations on a limited scale six to eight months [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. At that time we probably could go on the air with programming in Uzbek. By the end of FY-84 we probably could also be broadcasting in the Russian language, the Baltic languages, and Ukrainian.

## **Attachment B**

**Memorandum From the Chief of the International Activities Division,  
Central Intelligence Agency, to Director of Central Intelligence Casey<sup>8</sup>**

Washington, April 20, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

Finding With Expanded Authority for Soviet/East Europe CA Program

1. ***ACTION REQUESTED:*** It is requested that you approve the attached draft Finding and Scope Paper proposing an expansion of the Agency's Soviet/East Europe covert action program for formal external coordination and subsequent consideration by the National Security Planning Group. This draft Finding and Scope Paper have received informal approval by the Department of State.

2. ***INITIATIVE:*** At the time [*less than 1 line not declassified*] at the NSPG last fall and approved by the President on 4 November 1982, a broader and more comprehensive Soviet/East European covert action program was discussed. It was decided to wait until the NSC completed action on NSDD-75 concerning overall policy toward the Soviet Union. NSDD-75 was signed by the President on 17 January 1983.<sup>9</sup> This proposed Finding specifies measures to be taken by CIA to support NSDD-75.



3. *POLICY*: Current U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union as set forth in NSDD-75 is to involve "external resistance to Soviet imperialism (and) internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism. . . . To promote . . . the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic policy and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced . . . . Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside world. . . . To loosen Moscow's hold on (Eastern Europe) while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries."

Current U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe is set forth in NSDD-54, dated 2 September 1982,<sup>10</sup> which states that "the primary long-term U.S. goal in Eastern Europe is to loosen the Soviet hold on the region and, thereby, facilitate its eventual integration into the European community of nations."

4. *ISSUE FOR DECISION*: The extent and characteristics of an expansion of CIA's covert action program toward the USSR and the Bloc.

5. *ACTION PROPOSAL*: The existing Soviet/EE CA programs are authorized in a series of Presidential Findings: the Soviet Union and Eastern European Section of the omnibus Finding of 7 June 1978, a separate Finding of 25 September 1980, an amplification of the 1978 Finding on 7 March 1979,<sup>11</sup> [*1½ lines not declassified*] these Findings limit Agency activities to the publication and distribution of literature and related publicity.

The new Finding will allow us to



—Initiate selected clandestine radio programming to the USSR and the Bloc, [*2½ lines not declassified*]

—Undertake a full range of propaganda and countermeasure operations against the Soviets at home and abroad [*1 line not declassified*]

—Initiate political action activities which will have impact in the USSR, [*1½ lines not declassified*]

We would continue and expand the existing program of literature production and distribution presently authorized to wider audiences in the USSR and the Bloc, [*2 lines not declassified*]. This program will be augmented under the new Finding.

6. *RISKS*: New operations undertaken in expansion of the existing program should not involve any particular increased risk to the U.S. Government or to the individuals concerned in the activities themselves. There has been a record of tolerance of this type of activity by allied governments in Europe, [*5½ lines not declassified*].

On the other hand, the Soviets will assume CIA or other Western intelligence services must be behind the initiation of clandestine radio broadcasting and any major hard-hitting program of propaganda and political action. The Soviets can be expected to take vigorous diplomatic action to influence foreign governments from whose territory clandestine broadcasts, for example, might be undertaken to close down such activity.

The Soviets may step up internal security measures and vigilance campaigns directed at new political action activities we may undertake. It is our understanding that the Department of State recognizes these risk factors, and wishes such activities undertaken, but with the

understanding that as specific problems in relations with the Soviet Union may be resolved, some of these activities might be suspended in the future. [5 lines not declassified]

7. *BACKGROUND:* For more than the past 25 years, the Agency has engaged in a covert action program against the Soviet Union and certain countries of Eastern Europe. The aim of this program since its inception has been to provide support and encouragement to reform-minded elements in those countries as a form of political pressure on the regime. This new Finding provides a response to current policy, which requests an expansion and broadening of our current efforts. Although we will proceed as rapidly as possible to implement the new Finding (as funds and additional staff personnel are made available), time will be needed to test and build up operational mechanisms and mount the new operations in a secure and professional manner. A few of the operations could be up to full strength action by early FY-84 if additional funding is made available promptly, while most of the program would not be up to full strength operation before the end of FY-84 or early in FY-85.

Discussions with the NSC Staff and the Department of State indicate that there should be two major aspects to our Soviet/East Europe covert action program: the carefully modulated soft-sell appeal for moderation of the Soviet system over the long haul aimed at the Russian and East European populations; and a harder hitting program aimed more at causing basic problems for the Soviet regime, although also having an impact on populations. We have advised State and the NSC that our covert action alone will not make significant impact on Soviet leaders if not accompanied by related overt policy and diplomatic actions. The present program of print media production and distribution along with the widening of this program to

additional national, ethnic, and special interest groups will accomplish State's first objective. The institution of operations involving clandestine radio broadcasting and the operation of political actions in the Soviet Union would contribute to State's second objective.

8. *COORDINATION*: The basic thrust of the Finding, the Scope Paper, and the general concept of the developmental operational program have been discussed with Mr. Walter Raymond of the NSC Staff and with Deputy Assistant Secretaries Palmer and Kux of the Department of State. Mr. Palmer has advised that the general aspects of the program have been discussed with Under Secretary Eagleburger and with the Secretary.

9. *FINDING*: The expanded program will require a Presidential Finding and report to the Congress pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. A draft Finding and Scope Paper are attached.<sup>12</sup>

10. *FUNDING*: The total estimated FY 1983 cost of the ongoing and proposed Soviet/East Europe covert action programs is \$10,557,000. [7 lines not declassified]

The total estimated FY-1984 cost of the ongoing and proposed Soviet/East Europe covert action programs is \$17,361,000, [4½ lines not declassified].

The total estimated FY-1985 cost of the ongoing and proposed Soviet/East Europe covert action programs is \$18,750,000, [5½ lines not declassified].

*OPERATIONAL FUNDING SUMMARY  
FOR TOTAL SOVIET/EE CA PROGRAM*

[4 rows and 4 columns of table not declassified]

TOTAL      10557K      17361K      18750K

11. [14 lines not declassified]

12. *STAFF POSITION*: This memorandum and the attached draft Finding and Scope Paper have been coordinated with the EXDIR, OGC, the Comptroller, and the DDI. Comments from D/SOVA AND D/EURA provided by the DDI are attached.<sup>13</sup>

**[name not declassified]**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 85M00363R: Box 13, Folder: DCI Meetings with Secretary of State (Shultz), 7/15/1983. Secret; Sensitive. [text not declassified]. Forwarded through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations.

<sup>2</sup> The April draft finding is attached but not printed. Also attached at Attachment B is a cover memorandum [text not declassified] to Casey explaining the need for expanding the covert action program, which is printed below. No final signed copy of the April finding has been found. [text not declassified] the Soviet/East Europe covert action program continued to operate under the 1978 finding (see [footnote 4](#), below).

<sup>3</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the June 7, 1978, omnibus Presidential finding, which is in the National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Presidential Findings/MONs. The "Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" section of the omnibus finding contains the following description: "Publish and infiltrate literature into the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries and generate publicity to support and

encourage the citizens of these countries who favor liberalization and the moderation of their countries' foreign and domestic policies." For documentation on earlier implementation of the Soviet and East European covert action program, see [\*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents\*](#) 162<sup>5</sup>, 273<sup>5</sup>, 280<sup>5</sup>, 284<sup>5</sup>, and 287<sup>5</sup>; and [\*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. XX, Eastern Europe, Documents\*](#) 2<sup>5</sup>, 3<sup>5</sup>, 20<sup>5</sup>, 28<sup>5</sup>, and 32<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears two typed signatures. [name not declassified] typed signature appears above the [name not declassified] typed signature.

<sup>6</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>7</sup> A budget chart is attached but not printed.

<sup>8</sup> Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on April 19. Forwarded through the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Operations.

<sup>9</sup> See [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document\*](#) 260<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>10</sup> Documentation on this NSDD is scheduled for publication in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. X, Eastern Europe\*](#)<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> On March 7, 1979, President Carter signed a finding to "amend" the worldwide section of the omnibus finding of June 7, 1978. In the worldwide section, "under the guidelines cleared with the Department of State," the President directed the CIA to "task or encourage the network of agents or other contacts in foreign countries to provide non-attributable propaganda, or related actions, not amounting however to separate major initiatives, in support of following U.S. foreign policy objectives." [text not declassified] (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Congressional Affairs, Job 81M01032R: Subject Committee Files (1943-1980), Box 9, Folder 25: Covert Action Pres Find World-Wide)

<sup>12</sup> Attached but not printed.

13 Attached but not printed.



## 73. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 15, 1983, 8-9 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Dobrynin, July 15

### PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

*USSR*

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador, Washington

The Secretary met for one hour with Ambassador Dobrynin on July 15 prior to the Ambassador's return to Moscow that day for summer leave. The session was businesslike throughout, focussing on the Madrid wrap-up and Shcharanskiy, but included discussion of U.S.-Soviet agenda across-the-board.

The Secretary led off the discussion by emphasizing the importance we attached to the Soviet commitments on human rights as part of the conclusion of the Madrid meeting. He particularly stressed the Shcharanskiy case, quoting the commitment the Soviets made to us (in Madrid) that he would be released from jail and allowed to leave the country shortly after January 1984. He also urged that they release Shcharanskiy on September 15 or earlier because of the latter's ill health. Having set the context, the Secretary informed him we intend to join the consensus at Madrid.

Dobrynin took these points without reacting and then gave the Secretary a long "oral statement" (translation attached). The statement predictably begins with arms

control and makes points supporting their freeze proposal, complaining about our negative reaction. Otherwise, it includes the following:

—On INF and START, the statement contains standard criticisms of our positions and calls on us to respond to their move to limit rather than ban ALCMs. But it also conveys their agreement to discuss our CBM ideas at Geneva in a special working group, an approach they had resisted until now.

—On MBFR, the Soviets agree to continue exploratory discussions with Ambassador Abramowitz in Vienna and state their willingness to consider further verification measures beyond what they have tabled. They are not, however, otherwise helpful on substance.

—On BMD, the statement turns aside our proposal to discuss ballistic missile defense on an official basis in START and the SCC, reaffirming the propagandistic Soviet proposal for open discussion among scientists.<sup>2</sup> At this point in the conversation, the Secretary told Dobrynin that he thought existing official channels were sufficient to discuss this issue. If necessary, of course, our delegations could be augmented by appropriate scientists, but a confidential official setting was necessary. The Secretary and Dobrynin concluded by urging each other to reconsider positions.

—On bilateral issues, Dobrynin stated Soviet agreement to hold negotiations in Washington on the opening of Consulates General in Kiev and New York and on a new cultural exchange agreement. He also gave consent to extension of the transportation and atomic energy agreements. The cultural agreement portion does, however, lay down a marker on the defection issue, and appears to

represent return to a position that we believed was becoming more flexible; however, the test will come in the negotiations. To Dobrynin's query as to whether we were thinking in terms of a more narrowly-defined cultural agreement, the Secretary responded that we are prepared to have a broader agreement similar to the last one.

There was some talk on how the talks on the two agreements would proceed. Dobrynin said he was instructed to conduct the discussions in Washington with participants coming from Moscow, but it was left to Burt and Sokolov to work this out.

Dobrynin also asked about the Secretary's plans at the UNGA this year. When the Secretary said he thought his participation would be much the same as last year, Dobrynin responded that Gromyko's plans would also be similar to the past. (We take this comment as indication that Andropov does not plan to come to the UNGA.)

The possibility of a Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Madrid was also discussed, but in non-committal terms. Dobrynin noted that Gromyko was planning to begin his vacation on July 25. The Secretary commented that we were not pushing for a Foreign Ministers' meeting to conclude Madrid, but that we would look at the issue as it arose.

Summit prospects were also discussed briefly. Both agreed that a summit is desirable in principle but that it should be well prepared and offer a good prospect of substantive results.

In conclusion, the Secretary emphasized once again that although arms control is important to us, as it is to the Soviets, Soviet conduct on regional issues has caused tremendous damage to the relationship in the past, and no

issue is more central than human rights. The Secretary noted that we welcome progress on the Pentecostals, but reiterated once again that progress is necessary on Shcharanskiy. In general, he stressed that we have to address the issues before us across-the-board if we wish to get anywhere. Dobrynin did not disagree.

## **Attachment**

### **Soviet Oral Statement<sup>3</sup>**

July 15, 1983

#### *Soviet Oral Statement of July 15, 1983*

Translated from the Russian

1. It has been noted in Moscow that the Secretary of State in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador spoke of the wish of the U.S. leadership to see Soviet-American relations somewhat more improved.

As is known, we, for our part, have already expressed the view as to the basis on which Soviet-American relations can and should be built, if one is guided by the goal of their improvement, which would undoubtedly be of great significance both in itself and from the standpoint of the positive impact it would have on the entire international situation.

Unfortunately, frankly speaking, we see no signs of readiness on the part of the U.S. to move jointly in this direction and to introduce substantive corrective changes into its policy with regard to the Soviet Union. In fact, the Secretary of State himself did not deny that we may have reasons to draw such a conclusion.

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that it would be possible realistically to count on the normalization of Soviet-American relations in the absence of a mutual desire to seek points of contiguity or to take into account one another's interests on the central issues determining the nature of those relations and, above all, on questions concerning the security interests of our two countries—in other words, questions of war and peace.

But it is precisely in searching for a common language on questions of safeguarding and consolidating peace and strengthening international security that lies the key both to the rectification of the abnormal situation that has developed in our relations and to the improvement of the general political atmosphere in the world.

In this connection we would like to draw attention, in particular, to the necessity in the present situation—as has been emphasized at the recent meeting in Moscow of the leaders of a number of Socialist countries<sup>4</sup> —of taking immediate steps capable of pushing back the danger of war and turning the course of world events in the direction of detente, toward healthier relations among states.

Guided by these objectives, the Soviet Union has put forward a program of far-reaching measures aimed at putting an end to the perilous development of events and ensuring a decisive turn for the better in the international situation. It would seem there is no need to enumerate all of those measures once again. They are well known. We would like only to recall our recent proposal that all the nuclear powers freeze their nuclear arsenals.

It is regrettable that the U.S. side hastened to express a negative reaction to this proposal. The arguments advanced in this regard can in no way be considered

convincing. Such a position can only reinforce the view that the U.S. is not interested in taking practical steps to curb the nuclear arms race.

We would like to hope that the American side will consider this question further. A positive answer to the nuclear arms freeze proposal would demonstrate U.S. readiness, together with the Soviet Union, to set a good example in the cause of peace.

2. Of great importance, without a doubt, are the negotiations now being conducted between our two countries on nuclear arms. The state of affairs taking shape at the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe is, to be frank, totally unsatisfactory.

If one asks the question what the reasons are, there can only be one and the same answer: the explanation lies in the absolutely unconstructive position of the American side, one that is, indeed, totally divorced from reality.

It is impossible, after all, seriously to count on reaching agreement when the objective of the negotiations is posed not as the reduction of European nuclear arms, but as the deployment in Europe of new American missiles, whose numbers we are called upon now to discuss. Such an approach can in no way be regarded as constructive.

We would also like to express the hope that the American leadership will once again weigh from all angles all the consequences of such a course.

3. What is also taking place in Geneva at the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms looks no better. Here too there is no evidence whatsoever of a desire on the part of the U.S. side to seek mutually acceptable solutions.



References to the fact that some flexibility has appeared in the U.S. position are not substantiated by reality. All this "flexibility" is designed to achieve the same purpose: to destroy the existing structure of the Soviet strategic forces while leaving the U.S. a free hand to build up its own nuclear arms.

Of course, we will not accept this, and no prospect of reaching agreement on the problem of strategic arms will emerge, until the U.S. approach to this problem is brought into line with the principle of equality and equal security.

For our part we have proposed solutions which do not prejudice anyone's security. Guided by a desire to seek mutually acceptable outcomes on specific issues, the Soviet side has taken a substantial step to meet the U.S. position: it expressed readiness to agree not to a total ban on air-launched cruise missiles but to their limitation to a specified level in the context of the resolution of other questions. So far, no adequate reciprocal step on the part of the American side has followed.

As to the confidence-building measures being discussed in Geneva, we remain convinced that such measures should be an integral part of the general agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. Proceeding on this basis and taking into account the expressed readiness of the U.S. side to consider not only its own confidence measures but also the ones proposed by the Soviet side, we do not object to continuing the discussion of such measures at the Geneva negotiations, including in a special working group.

Overall, we would like to hope that the U.S. government will weigh carefully the situation that now obtains, and that it will take steps which would open up the possibilities for

reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. It is our deep conviction that the U.S. should be interested in this no less than the Soviet Union.

4. We are bewildered by the reaction of the U.S. side to our proposal concerning a discussion of the consequences of the creation of a large-scale ABM system.

The U.S. idea of creating a comprehensive ABM system not only is in direct contradiction with the 1972 treaty of unlimited duration between the USSR and the U.S. on the renunciation of wide-area ABM systems, but also does not correspond to the aims of the current negotiations on strategic arms. The creation of such a system would, in effect, result in discarding the very principle on which negotiations on strategic arms—both offensive and defensive—have thus far been based.

The rationale for our proposal to convene a meeting of authoritative scientists of our two countries is to form a clearer perception of the nature and scale of the consequences for the entire strategic situation that could result from the development of a comprehensive ABM system. The American side alters the subject of the exchange of views that we are proposing: it, in essence, proposes to give the discussions such a form and content as if the advisability of developing comprehensive ABM systems were a given, and as if the only thing to do were to discuss practical questions connected with it.

We can in no way agree with such an approach. And we confirm our proposal that Soviet and American scientists meet and assess in an authoritative way a problem which, in the long run, could have very serious and dangerous consequences.

5. On the part of the American side there appears to be a readiness to make an effort to overcome the impasse at the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and to forego the fruitless data discussion. Such an intention would be welcome. However, an examination of those preconditions which are set forth and the way the verification issue is posed does not confirm such a conclusion. In this case, too, the negotiations would be deadlocked, albeit by a different method.

The socialist countries have recently put forward at the Vienna negotiations a draft agreement designed to bring those obviously protracted negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion. This draft also provides for verification measures corresponding to the task posed and adequate to the scale of the reductions. In this regard, we do not rule out the possibility of also considering certain additional measures, if the need arises for them in the process of practical reductions. What is necessary, however, is that the verification measures not be an end in themselves, inasmuch as the purpose of the negotiations is different.

If the American side is actually prepared to conduct constructive discussions, the head of the Soviet delegation in Vienna will be ready to listen to the considerations of the U.S. representative.

6. Concerning the Madrid meeting: We are working actively and constructively in favor of its successful conclusion. It is also from this perspective that we approach the well-known initiative of the government of Spain. The Soviet delegation in Madrid is maintaining appropriate contacts with the U.S. delegation. What is important is that no new and fresh obstacles be raised to a positive conclusion to this meeting.

7. On the set of questions on bilateral relations, our position was presented concretely and thoroughly in February to the Secretary of State.<sup>5</sup> At that time and subsequently, the U.S. side on more than one occasion confirmed that it owed us an answer. Since the June 18 conversation between the Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador touched upon only some of those questions, we proceed on the assumption that the American side is continuing to consider the views that we have expressed.

In regard to what was said by the Secretary of State in that conversation, we would like, first of all, to stress the need not to mix questions of mutual interest with questions concerning only one side—let alone those strictly in its own internal competence. It is simply not proper to raise such questions.

With respect to the few specific proposals made by the Secretary of State, we would like to say the following.

- a) We have no objections to the extension of the agreements on cooperation in the field of transportation as well as on peaceful applications of nuclear energy.
- b) Taking into account the readiness of the U.S. side to do so, we agree to hold negotiations on the opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.
- c) In principle, we have no objections to holding negotiations on the conclusion of a new agreement on exchanges in the field of culture. However, it is not clear what is meant here by the U.S. side, since the previously existing agreement dealt with contacts, exchanges and cooperation not only in the cultural area, but also in a number of other fields. In any case the conclusion of such an agreement—and it is important that the American side

know this beforehand—can be considered possible only given readiness on the part of the U.S. to provide official guarantees of security for Soviet participants in such exchanges.

*Second Soviet Oral Statement, July 15, 1983*

As to the practical discussion of the questions of Consulates General and a cultural exchanges agreement, the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been instructed to conduct such a discussion with the participation, as necessary, of appropriate representatives from Moscow.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt; cleared by Seitz. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office. Shultz summarized the meeting in a memorandum to the President on July 15. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/08/83–07/19/83)) On July 22 in a covering memorandum to Seitz requesting approval of this memorandum of conversation, McKinley wrote: "The second question is tricky. Rick Burt wants to send to the members of the START IG the pertinent extract of the Dobrynin conversation, as well as the START portion of the 'oral statement.' The START IG will appreciate this gesture. It could head off disputes and disagreements. It also makes Burt look good. On balance, however, I would recommend against letting the memo go. Despite the fact that Rowny has the START related portion of the conversation already by cable, we have in the past gotten away with not circulating Dobrynin memcons in Washington. This partial break with that precedent could whet the appetites of other agencies for full disclosure or lead to charges that we were

manipulating information. Please give me your guidance.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, July 1983)

<sup>2</sup> On April 27, telegram 5443 from Moscow April 27, reported: “The Soviet Academy of Sciences announced today the convening of a public meeting of scientists on May 17-19 to discuss nuclear weapons issues. The main purpose of this propaganda ploy appears to be to attack new U.S. strategic programs, particularly ballistic missile defense (BMD). In this connection, IMEMO’s Oleg Bykov tells us that Andropov’s proposal for U.S. and Soviet scientists to discuss BMD envisages participation by ‘official’ U.S. scientists; unofficial U.S. scientists, he said already agree that large-scale BMD is technologically infeasible.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830248-0954)

<sup>3</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>4</sup> See [footnote 8, Document 71](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 11](#).



**74. Memorandum From Paula Dobriansky of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 21, 1983

SUBJECT  
USG Posture on Pentecostals

On July 18, the second of the two Pentecostal families, the Chmykhalovs, arrived in Vienna. State has forwarded you a memorandum (Tab I)<sup>2</sup> pointing out that during the coming weeks we should expect heightened press interest in the role of the U.S. Government in the families' departure from the Soviet Union and recommending that the USG continue to maintain a low profile.

Our recent efforts on the Pentecostals behalf have been based on unpublicized diplomatic contacts.<sup>3</sup> We have indicated to the Soviets that we would not exploit the release of the Pentecostals for political purposes. Hence, any significant departure from this policy of downplaying the USG role would be viewed as a breach of our promise and could endanger our current efforts on behalf of Shcharansky and other prominent figures. It also would contradict the President's expressed desire to maintain a low profile on such human rights cases.

For these reasons, State believes (and I agree) that the USG should confine its remarks to expressions of satisfaction that the families have succeeded in emigrating. They suggest that we should not provide the media with details on the exchanges which led to their departure from

the USSR and should deflect any requests by the families to meet with the President or other major Administration figures. At Tab II is suggested press guidance. At Tab III is a memorandum from Kimmitt to Hill concurring with State's press guidelines.<sup>4</sup>

John Lenczowski, Jack Matlock and Bob Sims concur.

### *RECOMMENDATION*

That you approve the press guidance provided by State at Tab II, thereby authorizing the Kimmitt to Hill memorandum at Tab III.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/20/83). Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Matlock, and Sims initialed their concurrence.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 46](#).

<sup>4</sup> Tabs II and III are not attached to this memorandum and were not found.

<sup>5</sup> Poindexter initialed his approval.

**75. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 3, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Response on Shcharanskiy

Soviet Chargé Sokolov called me today in response to Larry's and my comments to him on Shcharanskiy on the fringes of your July 29 meeting.<sup>2</sup> Sokolov read the following statement:

"Our position on the matter, which is totally in the internal competence of the Soviet state, has been stated to the U.S. side more than once, including to the Secretary of State personally. That position remains unchanged."

I pressed Sokolov hard to state just what their position is. Sokolov refused to restate it, but he did refer to your meeting with Dobrynin on July 15.<sup>3</sup> As you know, our record of that meeting shows no response by Dobrynin to your points on Shcharanskiy.

We are not sure how to read this response. It may mean:

- 1) The Soviets do not want this sensitive subject discussed outside the KGB channels. An innocuous response keeps their paper trail essentially clean;
- 2) The message is merely a stall and does not convey either a positive or negative signal at this point;

3) They believe that Shcharanskiy has yet to fulfill their conditions for the agreement (i.e. his refusal to sign an appeal for early release on health grounds); or

4) It is a polite brushoff.

You should also be aware that our discussions with the Poles on a Zacharski/Shcharanskiy deal have been a dry well thus far.<sup>4</sup>

We will soon have another chance to test the Soviet response. Max is due to meet with Kondrashev on August 25, and he will raise the Shcharanskiy issue then.<sup>5</sup> The response then may clear up whether or not the Soviets have qualms over a discussion of the deal in formal diplomatic channels (You will recall in this regard that Kondrashev told Max "It so happens that it is in our interest to allow certain people to depart. If it happens that these are the same names brought to our attention by the U.S., this is purely coincidental. We will deny any deal.")

We have now made our position and that of the President on Shcharanskiy unmistakably clear for Soviet policymakers. At this point, I believe we should wait to see what comes of Max's talk.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive August 1-15 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on August 3.

<sup>2</sup> In a July 29 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: "I called in the Soviet Chargé today to deliver demarches on

two serious arms control compliance issues,” and that “at the conclusion of the meeting Larry Eagleburger pressed Sokolov once again on Shcharanskiy.” Shultz wrote: “On Shcharanskiy, Larry Eagleburger noted that we had not received a response to the points I had raised with Dobrynin on July 15. He told Sokolov that you [Reagan] have taken a personal interest in this matter, and have requested that we convey on your behalf to Andropov our expectation that Shcharanskiy’s release will go forward as discussed with Ambassador Kampelman in Madrid. [See [footnote 2, Document 104.](#)] Larry added that there was a new element in the case with the recent appeal by Shcharanskiy’s mother that he be released now due to his declining health. He told Sokolov that we were prepared to make a humanitarian gesture of our own, and to do so now. He urged Moscow to do so as well. Sokolov said he would have to stand on what the Soviets have said previously on Shcharanskiy, but would pass our latest message to Moscow.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (07/23/83–07/29/83))

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 73.](#)

<sup>4</sup> On June 29, 1981, Marian W. Zacharski was arrested by the FBI in California on espionage charges. Zacharski was a Polish citizen, working in the United States for the Polish American Machinery Company.

<sup>5</sup> Kampelman and Kondrashev were scheduled to meet at the CSCE meetings in Madrid.



## **76. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 4, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

US-Soviet Grain Agreement

A number of press accounts have treated the signing of the new grain agreement as a concession by Moscow.<sup>2</sup> While the negotiations did go very smoothly, we believe this interpretation is mistaken and will put us on the wrong footing, both domestically and in our continuing dialogue with the Soviets.

Two kinds of evidence suggest that the Soviet readiness to raise the LTA's purchase floor was not a political signal: first, the state of the international grain market; second, unfolding Soviet needs.

—In the world market, US stocks have become a much-larger factor in the past several years and now exceed 60% of world supplies. Without returning to near-exclusive purchases from the US, the Soviets may well also want to avoid buying too *small* a share of their imports from us. (The old floor—6 million tons—was barely 15% of the 35–40 million ton annual average of total Soviet grain imports over the past 4 years.) Driving down the US share only increases the leverage of other suppliers, with most of whom the Soviets will also be renegotiating their LTA's during the next several years. Finally, Soviet buyers have expressed concern that our PIK program will reduce American grain output; if this was in fact their worry, a higher floor in the US-Soviet LTA would serve the Soviet



interest by encouraging US production and thereby helping to keep the world market glutted.

—A glutted market, always valuable to the world's largest grain importer, is probably of *increasing* importance to the Soviet leadership now, for the level of imports has extremely sensitive political implications. With the reduction in Soviet grain imports in 1982 came a measurable drop in per capita consumption of meat and dairy products; particularly during a succession, this is a potentially dangerous course, as food riots in the past few years have made all too obvious. And in fact the most recent information we have suggests that the drop in food supplies for consumers is now being turned around; if the leadership has made a decision that these should continue to increase, the Soviets are almost certainly going to have to increase grain imports as well.

None of this is an argument for trying to use grain sales for political leverage against the Soviets; we have been down that road already. But on balance the evidence suggests that the Soviet stake in imports is still larger than ours; moreover, it reflects one of their most severe systemic weaknesses.

In this light, it would be especially unfortunate if it appeared that the Soviets had sent us a signal that we were now obliged to reciprocate. We need, especially in the coming period, to avoid giving undue weight and attention to Soviet gestures on the minor parts of the agenda, and even more to avoid imagining concessions where none have been made. Our credibility both at home and in Moscow will depend on this. *The Soviet decision was almost certainly made on economic grounds, as was ours.* Our policy interest is best served by keeping the issue in this perspective.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/1-15/83. Confidential. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Boeker. An unknown hand initialed for Sestanovich, Azrael, and Boeker.

<sup>2</sup> On July 28 in Vienna, the United States and Soviet Union reached agreement on a new long-term grain agreement to commence on October 1. "Under its terms, the USSR will purchase from the United States 9 million metric tons of grain annually, in approximately equal quantities of wheat and corn." (Telegram 212275 to all OECD capitals, July 28; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830431-0073) In telegram 10884 from Moscow, August 26, the Embassy reported on Secretary of Agriculture John Block's trip to Moscow and the signing of the agreement on August 25. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830492-0760)

## **77. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 4, 1983

### **BRIEFING ON THE SOVIET UNION**

**DATE AND TIME:** Friday, August 5, 1:30 p.m.

**LOCATION:** White House Situation Room

**I. *PURPOSE:*** To provide a briefing on the Soviet Union—Soviet views, intentions and policies.<sup>2</sup>

**II. *BACKGROUND:*** U.S.-Soviet relations are presently at a low ebb. Ongoing arms control negotiations have failed thus far in finding common conceptual ground. The Soviets also have not displayed any signs of moderation on such regional issues as Afghanistan or the Middle East. At the same time, considerable domestic and Allied pressures for enhanced dialogue and summitry are building.

In view of the current situation, a briefing has been scheduled to provide you with a comprehensive review of Soviet views of the current international situation and prospective developments, as well as Soviet intentions and policies. Specifically, the briefing will cover: 1) the nature of the Soviet system and underlying determinants of Soviet behavior, 2) leadership psychology, 3) Soviet threat assessment/view of Soviet international position, and 4) the Soviet foreign policy agenda and its implications for future U.S. decisions. Given the crucial upcoming decisions on our policies toward the Soviet Union that lie ahead, the briefing will provide an informative backgrounder which will be

useful in devising effective responses to the Soviet challenge.

III. *PARTICIPANTS:*

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State Shultz

Secretary of Defense Weinberger

Director of Central Intelligence Casey

William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Jack F. Matlock, NSC

Paula Dobriansky, NSC

John Lenczowski, NSC

IV. *PRESS PLAN:* Not applicable.

V. *SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:*

1. Briefing (30 minutes)

2. Qs and As (30 minutes)

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, undated

## BRIEFING OUTLINE

### I. INTRODUCTION

An attempt to describe how the Soviet leaders view the world and the implications of this for U.S.-Soviet relations. There is often a tendency to assume that the Soviets view the world as we would if we were sitting in Moscow. This is emphatically not the case, and today we shall try to explain some of the more important characteristics of Soviet thinking. John Lenczowski will discuss the nature of the Soviet system, Paula Dobriansky will take a look at how the Soviets view their international position and assess the threats to it, and Jack Matlock will describe the psychology of the Soviet leaders and discuss some implications for U.S. policy.

### II. NATURE OF SOVIET SYSTEM, FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS AND STRATEGY (Lenczowski) The USSR as a Communist Power

A. Distinction between a communist power and a traditional imperialist great power: limited versus necessarily unlimited objectives.

B. Various influences encourage us to believe that USSR is no longer communist:

1. Wishful thinking.
2. Mirror imaging.
3. Soviet disinformation.

C. Inescapable fact: USSR must be communist because of the role of ideology in the system.

1. Ideology as source of legitimacy.
2. Ideology as key to internal security system: Emperor's New Clothes.
3. A key index that this is so is to observe that ideology defines basic structure of society.

#### D. Ideology and Foreign Policy.

1. Ideology serves as frame of reference to view the world.
2. Ideology defines international reality as struggle between two social systems: capitalism and socialism, a struggle inevitably to be won by socialism.
3. Therefore ideology determines friends and enemies—it sets an international standard of behavior.
4. Ideology presents a discrete set of strategies and tactics of revolutionary behavior.
5. Ideology sets a standard of measurement of correlation of forces: strategic decisions to advance or retreat are made on the basis of "scientific" assessments of the correlation of forces. Ideological strength or weakness is the key criterion.
6. Ideology serves as a weapon of political influence: an instrument of subversion and deception.
7. Foreign ideologies (and therefore any competing version of the truth) are the principal threats to the Soviet system.

#### *Soviet Strategy*



A. Because USSR is prisoner of the ideology, its lies, and its predictions, it is compelled to try to fulfill those predictions. This means:

1. Creating false appearances—therefore a strategy of deception.
2. Creating new realities, by exporting revolution.

B. The principal means of Soviet expansionism is “ideological struggle”.

1. To win men’s minds.
2. To deceive those who cannot be won.
3. Therefore propaganda, subversion and disinformation are the key features of Soviet foreign policy.
4. Suppression of the truth is the ultimate objective—self-censorship by Soviet adversaries is prelude to political uniformity.
5. A principal effort: to define the acceptable vocabulary of international political debate—both words and issues.

C. Military power is the principal adjunct to this.

1. It can forcibly create the new reality.
2. It can serve to intimidate and accelerate the process of ideological subversion.

D. Struggle between two systems as a protracted conflict.

1. Soviet control over the time frame of the conflict enables them to control timing of attack and choice of battlefield while permitting possibility of strategic retreat.

2. Proper understanding of time permits strategy of attrition—nibble at edges of Free World, never risk final showdown.

3. Strategy of indirect attack:

—A deceptive means of escaping culpability.

—Use of proxies, front groups, agents of influence, etc.

4. Strategy of monopoly of offensive.

5. Strategy of psychological conditioning:

—War-zone, peace zone.

—Demarcation of scrimmage line.

—Soviets have conditioned us to believe that peace zone is inviolable but war zone is not.

—Therefore Soviets have developed a no-lose strategy: they have nothing to lose by continually trying to cross the scrimmage line.

III. SOVIET THREAT ASSESSMENT: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES (Dobriansky) A. *Zero-sum mentality*: The U.S. poses the greatest threat to Soviet security as it is the main obstacle to the achievement of Soviet geo-political objectives. Ergo, Soviet foreign policy is generally designed to reduce and curtail the U.S. geo-

political position. Moscow evaluates all international situations from one perspective—whether they would detract or enhance the Soviet position vis-a-vis that of the U.S.

*B. Soviet conception of a threat:* In contrast to the Western conception of a threat—an action which might undermine one's existing position—the Soviet definition also includes any actions which might frustrate potential Soviet gains. As the Soviets strive for absolute security, any attempts to upset the current balance or Soviet gains are perceived by Moscow as a threat. There are two underlying reasons: (1) Soviet penchant for expansionism to solve security problems (2) Existence of democratic societies poses constant threat to domestic Soviet stability by providing an example of an alternative social and political entity. Public and private Soviet complaints indicate that U.S. ideological offensive is taken seriously and regarded as an important threat.

*C. Role of military power in foreign policy:* Soviet leaders regard military strength as the foundation of the USSR's status as a global superpower and as the most critical factor underlying successful Soviet foreign policy. Yet, concern about the danger of nuclear war has been a serious consideration in Soviet foreign policy decisions. Essentially, the nature of the Soviet dilemma has been how to wage a successful expansionist foreign policy without unduly increasing the risk of a nuclear war.

*Soviet Assessment of Current International Environment/Projected Trends*  
*A. U.S.: Despite domestic opposition, budgetary pressures and Intra-Alliance tensions, the Soviets expect that the U.S. is likely to sustain*

*its present foreign and defense policies (i.e., MX, INF, etc.) which seek to curtail Soviet expansionism.*

B. *Western Europe:* Despite Intra-Alliance tensions, the peace movement, etc., the Soviets do not realistically expect a break up of NATO, and believe that Western European governments would continue to follow (by and large) the U.S. lead on major security issues.

C. *Third World:* Soviets anticipate acceleration of the process of disintegration, anarchy triggered by economic stagnation, border and resource disputes and the lack of stable political organizations. They anticipate many Third World crises which will present both opportunities and threats to Soviet security. Soviet concern is that a newly assertive U.S. bent on stemming Soviet expansionism would intervene in a future Third World conflict.

*Regional Geographic Assessments: Threats/Opportunities* (Countries are listed in order of priority from Soviet perspective) A. *Eastern Europe:* Only area which offers no opportunities, only potential threats; B. *Western Europe:* European military capability is minimal threat in short term, but with U.S. support it is a significant military threat. Substantial ideological/political threat, moderate opportunities.

C. *Asia:* High threat/high opportunity; East Asia—China, Japan, Korea—growing security threat; main option—containment; Southeast/Southwest Asia—opportunities, of immense strategic value.

D. *Middle East:* Moderate Threat/Moderate Opportunity; do not anticipate dramatic successes.

E. *Africa*: Low risk/low threat/moderate opportunities; no dramatic successes; recognition of gains and losses.

F. *Central America*: High risk/low threat/high opportunities; creation of strategic diversion—tying up U.S. resources, distracting U.S. attention from other critical areas, generating U.S. domestic cleavages.

#### IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET LEADERS (Matlock) A. *Some widespread characteristics*

—Communist ideology, Russian traditions and the imperatives of ruling a highly bureaucratized, multinational empire are fused in the thinking of the leadership.

—The legitimacy of the rulers rests entirely on the ideology; they must cling to it even if they do not fully believe it.

—Their first priority is preserving their system; their second is expanding their power, so long as it does not conflict with the first.

—Legitimacy and status are extremely important to them and comprise an important foreign policy objective. This contributes to an acute sense of saving face.

—Their attitude is fundamentally totalitarian: citizens are viewed as property of the state, allies as puppets (or else they are not really allies).

—They take a long-term view and do not accept defeats as permanent. A defeat in one area is viewed

as a challenge to find other means to achieve the same objective.

—They are persistent bargainers, adept at exploiting time pressures on the other side, but willing to strike deals rapidly if they feel compelled to.

—They are often prisoners of their own ideological proclivities and thus misjudge the effect of their actions on others.

—They are much more preoccupied with the United States than we are with them.

#### B. Soviet view of Reagan Administration

—Soviets cautiously welcomed the President's election because they were fed up with Carter and thought a Republican president might return to the Nixon-Ford policies.

—When they realized in early 1981 that there would be no return to "detente," they played with the idea of "waiting out" the Reagan Administration, in the hope that it would only last four years.

—They have been surprised and impressed by the President's ability to get his defense programs through, keep unity in the alliance, and get the economy moving again. At the same time, they have experienced a series of foreign policy defeats and growing economic difficulties at home.

—There are signs now that they are reassessing their foreign policy. They *may* feel overextended, and in need of some reduction of tension to allow more attention to domestic problems. They seem convinced



that the President is likely to be reelected, and if so must be asking themselves whether it might not be better to deal with him before rather than after his reelection.

—Given their preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations, they may well exaggerate the political benefits to the President in dealing with them. This could lead them to overplay their hand.

#### IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

A. The struggle is long-term. There are no quick fixes. This means that we must devise a strategy which can be sustained for a decade or, probably, more.

B. Two broad options in theory:

1. Unrelenting pressure on the Soviets; and
2. Negotiation of specific differences on basis of strength, with follow-up to keep gains permanent rather than temporary.

Only the second seems sustainable in a democratic society, but it requires a recognition that agreements are only stages in the struggle, not the end of it.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Presidential Briefing [1983–1984]. Secret. Prepared by Dobriansky. Copies were sent to Bush, Meese, Baker, and Deaver. Reagan initialed at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, the briefing took place on August 5 from 1:38 p.m. to 2:45 p.m. (Reagan

Library, President's Daily Diary) No minutes or summary was found. Reagan's diary entry for August 5 merely notes: "In-depth briefing in 'Situation Room' on Soviet U." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 255) <sup>3</sup> Confidential.

**78. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 10, 1983

SUBJECT

Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

In the memorandum attached at Tab A to the President, Secretary Shultz suggests that the appended speech on U.S.-Soviet relations be delivered by either the President or himself in the near future.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary's apparent rationale for this speech is that it would help gain public support for the Administration's policy toward the USSR and might profitably set the stage for his upcoming meetings with Gromyko or for the impending INF deployments. Since he is not clear on either the timing or the precise context of events in which the speech would be given, the implication he seems to be making is that the contents of this particular draft so skillfully present the Administration's not-easily-reconcilable objectives of resistance to Soviet expansionism and intensified dialogue that the speech is worth making for purposes of general public support.

The Secretary does have a point. His Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony on our Soviet policy was reported in considerably divergent ways by the press.<sup>3</sup> The *Washington Post* described it as outlining a policy of "opposition" to the USSR. The *New York Times* described it as focusing on "dialogue" with the Soviets. Other commentators described it as a mixed bag. In other words,

there is a strong case to be made to explain more clearly that the President not only wants to restore our strength and meet Soviet challenges, but is prepared to engage in genuine good-faith negotiations with them and explore avenues to secure a more peaceful, stable relationship.

My only problem with the message outlined in this draft is that it embodies some of the very inconsistencies detected by the press in the SFRC testimony. The first third of the speech describes the history of disappointments in U.S. dealings with Moscow and states that we have no illusions that Moscow will readily abandon its aggressive course. But the last part of the speech entertains precisely some of those illusions. What is the public to understand by such passages as this on page 12: "If we could eliminate some of the most important points of conflict, it would prove much easier to solve the remaining problems that divide us. On this basis we could begin to develop a relationship of very broad mutual benefit indeed."? Is this not the very kind of illusion and wishful thinking that has yielded us so many of the disappointments of the past? And do not such illusions erode our efforts to secure an adequate defense budget, not to mention public support for our efforts to resist communism in Central America?

I recognize that it is not an easy political task to resist the Soviets while simultaneously trying to negotiate with them and play the role of peacemaker. Perhaps if this draft were fixed up a bit it could help explain the complexities of our policy. Even as it stands, I think it makes a better explanation than the SFRC testimony did. Nevertheless, I think an undiluted message of "peace through strength" will be much more comprehensible to the public and capable of winning its support than the message in this draft.

Because the specific context for the speech has not been specified, I believe (as does Jack Matlock) that to decide on its tone and perhaps even its timing may be premature. A good case can be made that we should wait and see how the first Shultz-Gromyko meeting turns out and perhaps even how the INF situation develops in the early fall before we decide on the formal contents of the speech.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's memorandum and recommending that the three of you discuss a strategy for the speech.<sup>4</sup>

Fortier, Kraemer, Raymond, Sims and Sommer concur.

### *RECOMMENDATION*

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.<sup>5</sup>

### **Tab A**

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>6</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### SUBJECT

Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

I believe that the attached draft speech<sup>7</sup> on U.S.-Soviet relations contains an important message to the Soviets and would be effective in shaping European and American public opinion on East-West issues. In my opinion it manages to reconcile three key objectives that are not always easily combined:

- to provide a hard-hitting description of the character of the Soviet system and the disappointing experience of U.S.-Soviet relations;
- to highlight the post-Brezhnev succession as a possible (though not probable) turning point and to encourage a Soviet policy reassessment; and
- to emphasize U.S. negotiating flexibility as well as firmness.

The structure and tone are designed to convey a clear sense of political realism and moral purpose, while dispelling any suspicion of zealotry or intransigence. It thus continues and extends the strategic approach you approved for my SFRC testimony on U.S.-Soviet relations in June.

To maximize the anticipated benefits of the speech, I strongly recommend that you yourself deliver it on an appropriate occasion in the near future. There are several possibilities. I will be meeting with Gromyko in Madrid in early September, and the speech could be a useful scene-setter for these discussions, or for discussions with him later in the month at the UNGA. Alternatively, giving it in October might maximize its impact on domestic and allied opinion as the date of INF deployments approached. If you prefer, I could arrange to deliver the speech myself.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83–08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for action. Fortier, Kraemer, Raymond, Sims, and Sommer concurred with this memorandum. Lenczowski initialed for Fortier, Kraemer, and Sims.



<sup>2</sup> The memorandum at Tab A is attached and printed below.  
The draft of the speech was not found.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 61](#).

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 80](#).

<sup>5</sup> Clark checked the Approve option.

<sup>6</sup> Confidential.

<sup>7</sup> See [footnote 2, above](#).

## **79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, August 18, 1983, 2058Z

10508. Subject: CODEL Pell Discussion With Andropov.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. During an hour and three-quarter discussion with nine Democratic senators led by Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Andropov launched a Soviet anti-satellite initiative and engaged in unprecedented back and forth exchanges on most of the major US-Soviet issues. On ASAT, Andropov told the group that it was the first to be told the Soviet decision not to be the first country to launch into outer space any types of ASAT weapons; Andropov said that the Soviet Union would initiate a unilateral moratorium for as long as others, including the U.S., refrained from launching ASAT weapons of any kind. Andropov's prepared remarks on INF and START were along familiar lines. On INF, he chose to downplay and generalize the threat of retaliation to U.S. deployment: He said that deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles would have consequences "for us and for you" and that Americans would feel the difference between the situation before and the situation after deployment. The Soviet leader laid great stress on the freeze. On Central America, he said that things would not be solved by threat of arms, "arrogant military demonstrations", or interference in internal affairs. Following Andropov's prepared statement, Senator Pell read a statement summing up the views of his group (full text septel).<sup>2</sup> The Pell statement proposed, inter alia, greater political and military contacts between the two

countries, a U.S.-Soviet summit, and the consolidation of the START and INF negotiations. Senator Pell also expressed on behalf of his delegation concern about the Soviet military buildup; Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Poland, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central America; and concern regarding Soviet human rights performance, naming Sakharov, Wallenberg, Orlov and Shcharansky. The last half of the meeting was a give and take in which Andropov, with animation and sometimes heat, responded to the Senators. Pushed by Senator Pell on whether the Soviet Union was prepared to dismantle its ASAT systems, he bobbed, weaved, and finally changed the subject. Andropov gave a somewhat rambling response to the group's proposal for the summit. He said that the Reagan administration had put forward proposals on CBMs which boiled down to a discussion of the Hot Line and wondered how the two Presidents could sit down and talk about such minor things. He said that, until the Soviet Union is convinced that the U.S. is ready to discuss substantive, important issues, the summit would be meaningless. On Southern Africa, Andropov said that not a single Soviet soldier was, is, or would be in Angola. On Poland, he said that nobody had been able to discover any Soviet influence on the situation, including American representatives who have visited Poland and the Pope who—though not an American representative—acted like one. On Afghanistan, he said the Soviet position was unchanged, then challenged the U.S. to get out of Nicaragua and the French to get out of Chad and “then we’ll talk about Afghanistan.” Andropov took a tough position on human rights, specifically addressing the names Senator Pell had mentioned. He said that Sakharov was “mentally ill” and had written an article in “Foreign Affairs” urging the U.S. to declare war on the Soviet Union (sic). He said that Shcharansky must serve out his sentence before there can be discussion of his leaving; Andropov's interpreter Sukhodrev, questioned by

the Chargé following the discussion, said that Andropov's statement would not be inconsistent with a pardon for Shcharansky since Andropov had not said that Shcharansky had to serve his "full sentence." Andropov said the statement on Shcharansky also applied to Orlov; regarding Wallenberg, "he is not here." On the merging of START and INF, Andropov said that no decision had been made but that he saw no point in merging the two negotiations. Andropov was intellectually vigorous during the whole meeting, not flagging during the whole hour and three quarters. As on other occasions, he walked with a shuffle although unattended; and his hands shook occasionally especially when he seemed to be making deeply felt points. End summary.

3. The meeting was held at one p.m. August 18 in Andropov's Kremlin meeting room. Andropov was accompanied by First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, his aide Aleksandrov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities Ruben, and his interpreter Sukhodrev. On the American side were Senators Pell, Long, Bumpers, Leahy, Metzenbaum, Riegle, Sarbanes, Sasser, and DeConcini; Secretary for the Senate Minority (Griffin) and Senate staff members Ritch and Ashworth; and the Chargé. Andropov entered the room last, possibly to save on the amount of time he would have to stand up. Andropov sat at the head of a long table, with the two sides ranged on either side.

4. After the Soviet press was admitted—during which time Andropov smiled and joked—he greeted Senator Pell and his group and began by expressing his concern about the state of Soviet-American relations. He said that he saw the group as responsible political figures with an influence on policy making. It was not important that they were representatives of only one political party; he would say

exactly the same thing to Republican Senators. Andropov said that the tensions which characterized all areas of our relations are not the Soviet choice. There are some in Washington who prefer situations of tension and games played with no rules; but the Soviet Union does not share this view. Would the U.S. allow the other side to achieve superiority? Andropov doubted it and said that the Soviet Union could not allow it either. Soviet policy is directed at a level of accord assuring normal, stable, and good relations to the common profit and to the benefit of universal peace. The Soviet Government wants to conduct matters on an equal footing taking account of each other's legitimate interests.

5. Turning to INF, Andropov said that whether we can find a solution acceptable to both sides and thus arrest a dangerous new round will determine where we go from here. The Soviet side feels that in America people may not be aware of how much is at stake. Perhaps they believe that the issue is not important because it's thousands of kilometers away. But they are wrong, because deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles would have "consequences for you and for us." Americans would feel the difference between the situation before deployment and the situation after deployment. This is not a threat, but there is simply no other way out; such are the linkages inherent in this issue.

6. Continuing on INF, Andropov said that the Soviet Union proposes a balance at the lowest possible levels. It seeks equality via the largest possible reductions. Its first choice is that neither the USSR nor NATO should have any intermediate or tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. What is unfair about that? Only those who don't want equality think it's unfair. It provides truly zero levels with a solid reserve behind. Since the U.S. has shown no desire even to

discuss that option, Andropov went on, we came out with several constructive proposals. If those proposals took effect, there would be a threefold reduction in the quantity of medium nuclear systems on the Soviet and NATO sides. Moreover, NATO would only reduce airborne systems, while the Soviet Union would reduce missiles, including a considerable number of SS-20's. We would be left with less than we had in 1976, when nobody said we had particular superiority. Why is that unacceptable? We are very flexible; if the U.S. showed an interest in an honest agreement on an equitable basis, success in Geneva is still possible. But our flexibility has limits. The security of our people and of our allies means that we will make no unilateral concessions, not even five minutes before midnight.

7. Turning to START, Andropov said that if the negotiations failed, more sophisticated and horrendous weapons systems would emerge, causing disarray. Such systems are imminent. If the U.S. wants an agreement, it is wrong to portray some bombs and missiles as frightening and some as acceptable. Moreover, it's absurd to presume that you can compel the other side to reduce the basic components of its strategic forces while leaving yours a free hand. Andropov added that, as long as the U.S. position remains what it is, it is meaningless to show artificial optimism. Unless a solution is found, the threat of nuclear war will increase; we in the Soviet Union are against that.

8. Andropov then launched into a strong defense of a freeze on American and Soviet strategic arms. He said that military technology is moving faster than discussions to limit it. The risk is therefore that the talks will focus on yesterday's problems; a freeze would allow the diplomats to catch up with the arms makers. Andropov called for a no-increase rule on existing weapons, for no development and testing, and for limitations on modernization. He said the



Soviet side would also accept a freeze on nuclear components. In addition to checking the arms race and improving the political atmosphere, a freeze would make it easier to come to terms on cutting back our stockpiles.

Andropov contested statements that a freeze would solidify Soviet superiority in the strategic field. He said that during recent congressional hearings your Generals were asked if they would exchange nuclear arsenals with the Soviet forces; they said no. Andropov said that calls for a freeze were not coming only from the Soviet Union, but also from other countries and were not alien to political circles in the United States.

9. Andropov then moved on to the ASAT. He said that the danger of the arms race was spreading to outer space. The planet is saturated with nuclear weapons; now there is an effort to stuff outer space with it. Such a development must be prevented. He noted the concern of American legislators and a feeling against creating an ASAT capability or an anti-missile defense system involving the use of outer space. The Soviet Union proposes a ban on the use of force in outer space and from outer space.

10. Andropov outlined Soviet views on the prevention of militarization of outer space. He said it is necessary to agree on the full prevention of testing and deployment of any space based weapons designed to strike targets on the ground, in the air, or in outer space. We would agree to dismantle all existing ASAT systems and ban the development of new systems. Andropov said that detailed proposals would be submitted by the Soviet Union in the forthcoming UN General Assembly.<sup>3</sup>

11. He then unveiled a new Soviet decision which the Senatorial group "is the first to hear." The Soviet Union, he

said, [omission in the original] first to launch into outer space any type of ASAT weapons. The Soviet Government will introduce a unilateral moratorium for as long as others, including the United States, refrain from launching ASAT weapons of any kind. He said he would like to count on the U.S. as positively responding to this Soviet initiative.

(Comment: There is some ambiguity between this language as heard, and later TASS renderings of it. The issue is whether Andropov's language would exclude ground-based ASAT's or would exclude only orbiting ASAT's.)

12. Andropov then turned to regional issues. He had the impression that uppermost in the mind of many American politicians is the desire to explain away any international problem by blaming it on communist intriguers or Moscow's scheming. This approach can only multiply the explosive situations already existing in the world. In Central America, for example, causes of the problems run very deep. The threat of arms, "arrogant military demonstrations," or interference in internal affairs will not solve the problems but will only make them more dangerous. We are deeply convinced that only a political solution will help. Andropov gave credit to "those Latin American countries seeking solutions." He did not specifically name the Contadora Group. He said that the proposals for settlement advanced by Nicaragua and Cuba provide a good basis for solution." He did not specifically name the (#) is for solution. Everything must be done to ensure that the situation in and around Central America does not get out of control. Andropov said that throughout the world—for example, in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and elsewhere—the top priority for the Soviet Union is lowering tensions and removing conflict situations.

13. Andropov then made his only reference to the internal situation in the Soviet Union. He said that the Soviet

people, guided by the Communist Party, were involved in a great and difficult effort to enhance the efficiency of the economy, improve management levels, and achieve new levels of scientific progress. If you've followed these events, you will know that our plans for peaceful cooperation are long lasting. Our foremost goal is to elevate the material and spiritual levels of the Soviet people. Therefore the main goal for the Soviet foreign policy is peace and avoiding the threat of nuclear war.

14. Andropov closed his prepared remarks on a bilateral note. He said that the Soviet Union is open to fruitful mutually advantageous cooperation with all states, including the U.S. However complicated the world situation is, we look at it with optimism and confidence that common sense will prevail. The normalization of bilateral relations must be one of the major components of that process. Referring jocularly to his position as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Andropov said he would not be a good Chairman unless he said that the Soviet Union was in favor of various forms of parliamentary contacts and that this includes contacts with the U.S. Congress.

15. Following Senator Pell's exposition (septel), Andropov agreed, at Senator Pell's request, to a dialogue. Andropov, noting that Senator Pell had proposed a joint US-Soviet moratorium on anti-satellite testing and a ban on ASAT weapons, said he didn't see what remained to be discussed. If the U.S. says that it won't launch anti-satellite weapons into outer space, the problem is solved. He asked Senator Pell to call that to the attention of U.S. authorities. Senator Pell responded that his group advocated not just a moratorium, but dismantling of ASAT weapons with on-site verification, and noted that the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States in this field. Andropov agreed that there

should be verification but did not address the issue of on-site. Nor did he make any direct reference to dismantling or destruction of ASAT weapons. He appeared somewhat discomfited by Senator Pell's persistence on this issue; he finally changed the subject, noting that little time remained for other topics.

16. Senator Long then argued for finding a way for each side to have early warning before an attack was launched. Andropov remarked that for a start, the U.S. should not put missiles in Europe since it only takes six minutes for them (sic) to reach the Soviet Union whereas Soviet missiles take 20 minutes to reach the United States.

17. Responding to the Senators' opening statement that Soviet leaders were badly informed about the United States, Andropov conceded that there was some truth to this and that not enough is done to provide knowledge about the U.S. in the Soviet Union. But he complained that even the bare minimum that the Soviet side tries to convey to the American public does not reach it.

18. On the Senators' proposal for a summit, Andropov seemed to get a little beyond his brief. He said that the Soviet Union is for a summit in principle, but what would be discussed? Recently we understand that the Reagan administration has put forward proposals on CBMs which boil down to discussion on the modernization of the Hot Line and certain other issues of that low level type. Do you think it would be proper for the two Presidents to sit down and talk about telephones? As for our proposals, they have been passed over in silence. Andropov concluded, until we are convinced that the U.S. is ready to discuss substantive issues, a summit meeting would be meaningless.  
(Comment: Andropov is clearly confused about the

President's CBM initiative which was not proposed as a subject for discussion at a summit.)

19. Andropov took issue with the assertion by the Senators in one of their prepared questions that Afghanistan had caused the non-ratification of SALT II. He claimed that the U.S. had refused to ratify SALT II way before the Afghanistan problem appeared and that there was, therefore, no linkage there.

20. On the issue of the arms race, he asserted that the Soviet Union always had to play catch [up] to American military activities—first with the atomic bomb, then with MIRVs. At that point Korniyenko said that, at a time when there were no MIRVs, the Soviet Union had proposed a ban on them. Andropov then stated that the Soviet Union did not manufacture the cruise missile, the U.S. did; the Soviet Union therefore had had to try to catch up. The Soviet Union opposes any new spiral, any new type of weaponry. But if today the U.S. develops a new type of weapon, we will have to catch up.

21. On Southern Africa, Andropov said that, if you find a footprint of a single Soviet soldier or a single Soviet military unit in Angola, "then I'll surrender." He said that no Soviet unit was, is, or will be in that country. That is the Soviet approach toward Southern Africa.

22. Regarding Poland, he said that "your American representatives have visited Poland." The Pope has also visited Poland, although he was not your representative though he acted like one. They went there to find proof of Soviet influence on the situation in Poland, but nobody has yet found it.

23. On Afghanistan, Andropov said that the Soviet position has been that the Soviet Union will withdraw as soon as intervention ceases. But he'd also put it differently: Let the U.S. get out of Nicaragua, let French troops get out of Chad, and then we will talk about Afghanistan. Our position of principle on Afghanistan is unchanged.

24. The Soviet leader then took on the Senatorial group on the issue of human rights. He said it was an intricate and complex problem, with different understandings deriving from ideology, philosophy, and approach. We don't claim the right to make you think as we do; neither should you claim that right. The more often this issue appears, the more it leads to quarrels. It cannot help us achieve the ultimate objective of normal relations.

25. Andropov addressed one by one the names mentioned in Senator Pell's opening statement. On this subject he spoke with heat, his hands sometimes shaking. He said that Sakharov is mentally ill, although we don't say this publicly because we don't want to cast a slur on a member of the Academy of Sciences. He recently wrote an article in an American magazine (Korniyenko interjected that it was "Foreign Affairs") in which he urged the U.S. to declare war on the Soviet Union (sic). Andropov said he could produce thousands of letters from indignant citizens criticizing Sakharov's position. Would the Senators want his government to show disrespect for all these people in order to show respect for Sakharov?

26. Shcharansky, Andropov continued, was tried and convicted of espionage for a foreign power. There was nothing political about his actions. Therefore, my answer to you is "no." He is serving his sentence. He must serve his sentence before there can be a discussion about allowing him to leave. (Following the meeting the Chargé asked



Sukhodrev to check his notes on this passage, particularly whether Andropov was excluding the possibility of any pardon for Shcharansky. After checking, Sukhodrev said categorically that Andropov had not said that Shcharansky must serve his "full sentence"; therefore, Andropov's statement did not exclude a pardon, although of course Andropov was not explicitly including it or suggesting it.) On Orlov, Andropov said the same thing applied as to Shcharansky. On Wallenberg, Andropov said that the Soviet Union had said many times that "he is not here."  
(Comment: Andropov apparently did not know the Soviet position that Wallenberg died long ago in a Soviet prison.)

27. On Jewish emigration, Andropov read from a paper purporting to show that from 1945 until July 1983, 273,000 Jews have emigrated. This includes 20,000 to the U.S., 12,000 of them on temporary visas. Thus, there are no grounds for saying that the emigration rate is slowing down (sic). He said that 92 percent of all applications for emigration have been met. For the rest, most of those are people who have had access to state secrets. Aleksandrov interjected at this point that there are others serving terms as criminals, a comment which Andropov then repeated himself.

28. Andropov then addressed the issue of merging START and INF. He said that no decision has been taken as yet, since the Soviets wanted to see how the talks progressed. So far, the U.S. shows no desire for agreement in either set of negotiations; therefore, the Soviet side doesn't see any point in merging the two negotiations. Moreover, Andropov continued, if the Pershing II's and cruise missiles are deployed, that would put the whole thing into question.

29. In concluding, Andropov picked up on Senator Pell's reference to the Soviet Union and the U.S. as a bear and a

whale. He said he liked the metaphor. He said that a bear and a whale would not resort to nuclear arms. Therefore, our two countries should have the same mature approach.

30. At the end of the meeting, Andropov stood up, shook hands with every member of the American group, and walked with difficulty but without assistance into his anteroom. Apart from his difficulty in walking, an obvious shaking of his hands when he was stressing a point or holding a paper, and a few deep coughs, his health seemed very good. And his vigor in the discussion was sustained from beginning to end of the meeting.

31. Department distribute as appropriate.

**Zimmermann**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830007-0378. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. A notation in the telegram indicates that “#” indicates an omission in the original.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 10642 from Moscow, August 23, an informal translation by the Department of State interpreter of Andropov’s opening remarks was sent to the Department. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830483-0669) No separate telegram with Senator Pell’s remarks was found.

<sup>3</sup> On August 18, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN General Assembly a draft treaty on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from space against the earth. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 684–686.

**80. Memorandum From the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)  
to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 23, 1983

SUBJECT

Proposed Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

George Shultz has sent you a draft of a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations that he suggests you deliver sometime in the near future (Tab A).<sup>2</sup>

Although he suggests some alternative times to give the speech, his main rationale seems to be that the public needs a fuller explanation of our policy toward the Soviets—a follow-up to his own Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, since the substance of that testimony was reported in considerably divergent ways by the press, there is a good case to be made that further explanation to the public is necessary to clarify the confusion. This draft is quite good in many respects, although it does need a little work in removing a few inconsistencies.

Unless George has a more specific strategy in mind, I feel that it may be premature to decide on the final contents, tone and timing of the speech.<sup>4</sup> It may be a good idea to wait and see how George's first meeting with Gromyko turns out and how the INF situation develops in the early fall.

Perhaps the best thing to do at this point is for us to discuss with George a strategy for this speech and get a better idea of what he has in mind.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83–08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Lenczowski.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 78](#). Clark wrote at the end of the memorandum: “We will be meeting on this subject in preparation for George’s Madrid/Gromyko meeting when we return to Washington.” Reagan wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “I believe the speech should be given *before* George’s meetings with Gromyko. It might make these meetings more fruitful. RR.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President was at his ranch in California from August 15 to September 2. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Shultz was scheduled to meet with Gromyko in Madrid in early September at the CSCE meeting.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 61](#).

<sup>4</sup> Fortier and Keyes sent Clark a separate memorandum on August 23 regarding the draft speech. Clark’s stamp appears on this memorandum with the date “8/24,” so it seems the memorandum reached Clark after he sent the memorandum to Reagan on August 23. Fortier and Keyes wrote: “We share many of the concerns John Lenczowski expressed in his recent cover memo on State’s proposed U.S.-Soviet speech. Should the speech be given in its present form, *its internal inconsistency would guarantee politically motivated criticism from all sides.*” The memorandum continued: “the speech must also help people to understand that *U.S.-Soviet relations consist of much more than what we do and say directly to one another.* Rather, what we do in places as diverse as Chad, Central America and Lebanon will shape Soviet perceptions of us as well as create disincentives for additional Soviet adventurism. This is a crucial point, but one that is

frequently obscured by fashionable talk about the need for 'dialogue'. The speech should also make it clear that it is precisely our concern for general peace in the nuclear era that causes us to view action based on intimidation and force as a grave threat to human welfare everywhere. As long as Soviet behavior relies upon these tools, we cannot be hopeful about an *end* to the *overall* competition between U.S. and Soviet policies and aims." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83-08/09/83))

## **81. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Dear Mr. President:

Washington, August 27, 1983

I found it necessary to draw your attention once again to a question, the importance of which would seem to be beyond doubt. I have in mind the problem of limiting nuclear weapons in Europe, on which the next round of Soviet-American talks will begin in about a week in Geneva.<sup>2</sup> A decisive breakthrough at those negotiations could be of fundamental importance from the viewpoint of how matters will develop in Europe and throughout the world, and consequently—and not least—between the Soviet Union and the United States as well.

The Soviet Union has just taken another major step which, if properly evaluated by the United States, will in many respects facilitate reaching agreement in Geneva. We have declared our willingness to liquidate in the European part of the USSR those of our medium-range missiles which would be subject to reductions. Among them there would be a considerable portion of SS-20 missiles as well, namely, that portion of those missiles which would be in excess of the aggregate number of medium-range missiles of Britain and France. It goes without saying that this can be done only if mutually acceptable agreement is reached as a whole on the problem of limiting medium-range nuclear systems in Europe, including renunciation of the deployment of new American missiles there.



The question of redeployment of SS-20 missiles to be reduced would thereby be removed, too. Indeed, American representatives have repeatedly emphasized the great importance for the progress of the negotiations in Geneva of what would happen to the Soviet missiles to be reduced in Europe.

Having taken this serious step for the sake of reaching agreement, we expect that the reciprocal step of the American side will be such as to make a mutually acceptable agreement possible.

As you understand, Mr. President, a great deal depends on what the forthcoming round of the negotiations will result in; we believe that an agreement is still possible and achievable. The Soviet delegation in Geneva will have instructions to exert additional efforts to work out an agreement based on the principle of equality and equal security. For success to be achieved, however, it is necessary for the U.S. delegation also to have corresponding instructions to work in the same direction.

The Soviet leadership is deeply convinced that the situation truly dictates the need for a broad, considered approach and for taking bold political decisions looking to the future. For its part, the Soviet leadership is acting in this manner. I would like to hope that your government and you personally will approach the resolution of the task we face with a sense of high responsibility for the fate of peace and international security.

With respect,

**Yu. Andropov**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985-1986, E.4 President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret. A typed notation on the letter reads: "Translation from the Russian." The letter was forwarded to the President with an attached covering memorandum from Shultz on August 29 (see [Document 82](#)).

<sup>2</sup> INF negotiations were scheduled to resume in Geneva on September 6.

## 82. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 29, 1983

### SUBJECT

Andropov's Proposal to Destroy Missiles

In an August 27 *Pravda* "interview," Andropov offered to destroy all missiles to be reduced under the Soviet proposal to limit SS-20s "in Europe" (probably referring to those missiles deployed west of their proposed 80-degree line) to the level they attribute to British and French missiles.<sup>2</sup> He has now sent you a letter (Tab 1),<sup>3</sup> formally conveying that offer.

In the letter, Andropov portrays this move as "a serious step" toward a mutually acceptable agreement and states that the USSR expects a comparable reciprocal step from the US that would make such an agreement possible. He states that Moscow believes that agreement is still "possible and achievable," and that the Soviet Delegation will have instructions to "exert additional efforts" toward agreement in the next round.

Under their previous position, the Soviets maintained that the primary method of reduction would be destruction, although a certain percentage of systems could be withdrawn from Europe. We have pressed the Soviets in Geneva for some time as to whether or not any SS-20s to be reduced under their proposal would be destroyed, or merely relocated to the eastern USSR. Thus, the Soviet move is, at a minimum, a welcome clarification of their position. It is, however, also significant in that the Soviets have offered, for the first time, to destroy a number of new

systems (i.e., 80-100 SS-20s). Of course, the basic problems in the Soviet position—inclusion of British and French forces, a ban on any US INF missile deployments, and no limits on new SS-20 deployments in the Far East—remain.

The Soviet move is of course primarily directed toward European public opinion. It would not directly affect the options now before you with regard to possible new elements in our own INF position (i.e., inclusion of aircraft, regional subceilings, a proportional reduction of Pershing II). However, we can expect the Soviet move to find some resonance here and in Europe; it will likely generate additional pressures—both from publics and from some of the Allies—for movement on our part when the INF negotiations resume on September 6.

We will be in a better position to develop your response to Andropov's letter as a result of decisions to be taken on our INF position. In your letter we would then be able to outline the substance of any new elements of our position. My meeting with Gromyko in Madrid on September 8 would provide an opportunity to convey your response. These steps, properly presented to the Western public, will allow us to maintain the initiative and sustain Allied support for our deployments.

The NATO Special Consultative Group meeting scheduled for September 2 offers an opportunity to inform the Allies of Andropov's letter. Andropov may be sending similar letters to Allied leaders; if so, we can use this SCG to coordinate our replies.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Brezhnev

(8290913, 8391028, 8391032). Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the routing slip for Shultz's memorandum reads: "Sep 02 83 Pres Noted."

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 10897 from Moscow, August 27, the Embassy reported: "In a pre-vacation interview, leader Yuri Andropov has made his most significant statements in months on INF and China. Responding to questions by *Pravda* August 27, Andropov clarified that the Soviet Union would be prepared to destroy all missiles—including SS-20s—reduced in Europe under an INF agreement. His remarks revealed no change in the Soviets' insistence on taking into account UK/French systems or in their opposition to any U.S. deployments." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830494-0455) <sup>3</sup> See [Document 81](#).

## 83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 30, 1983

### SUBJECT

My Meeting with Gromyko in Madrid

### *I. Our Strategic Approach*

My meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid will be the first of a number of sessions with him in September.<sup>2</sup> I see this series of meetings as an opportunity to pursue our testing strategy with the Soviets in a way that maximizes pressure on them to be forthcoming on issues we can identify as ripe for doing business, and, possibly, to attenuate their response to the prospect of U.S. INF deployments in Europe later this fall. Substantively, the Soviets have been responding in small ways to our testing (on the Pentecostalists, the grains agreement, CSCE, and even in START and MBFR). Having back-to-back meetings in September gives us a chance to create bureaucratic incentives for positive decisions in Moscow by putting issues before Gromyko in Madrid to which he should respond three weeks later.

Realistically, we cannot expect major movement from the Soviets in the weeks and months ahead: they are in a sour mood, and are facing a serious political defeat on INF deployment. Hence, we will not want my meetings with Gromyko to be seen as harbingers of a major breakthrough, or even a significant improvement in relations. If European pressures grow for a delay in INF deployment we may have to put less emphasis on the progress we have made and



more emphasis on continuing Soviet intransigence. We want to maintain hope that obstacles to progress can be overcome; but suggesting that the Soviets are being less obstructionist than they really are could jeopardize INF deployments and our strategic programs.

The risk we currently face, however, especially with the allies, is not one of excessive expectations. Rather, they are worried about no progress at all, and as the INF deployment date approaches they will see a danger of all-out confrontation. These mounting concerns are being used to bring pressure on us to make concessions to the Soviets in arms control. For the present, I believe one antidote may be public perception that some modest movement in other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations is possible. At the same time, we must counter any new over-optimism which could eat into support for our rearmament program by continuing to point to Soviet obstructionism on the essential issues.

The setting seems more favorable than for my meeting with Gromyko a year ago. We are regaining the initiative in international affairs from the Soviets. Our economic recovery and improved ties with our allies and friends give us reason for confidence in dealing with the USSR; we have a lead in the INF debate in Europe; and the prospect of your and Cap Weinberger's visits to Asia will demonstrate that we are on the move there as well.<sup>3</sup> Of course, we will need alert U.S. diplomacy if we are to manage the strategic/MX debate here and the INF "hot autumn" in Europe successfully. We also face problems in the Middle East which give the Soviets satisfaction. But overall they will be on the defensive, trying to walk the line between demonstrating their unhappiness with the INF deployments and threatening counter-actions, and keeping the door open to dealing with the U.S.

We understand Gromyko's people have recommended to him that he engage me in a broad review of the relationship in the shorter Madrid meeting, and reserve discussion of specifics for New York. At Madrid, I will certainly want to convey to him that we are sticking to our broad agenda, and that there can be no basic improvement in relations before they show us in deeds that they are willing to act on our concerns about human rights and regional issues as well as arms control and bilateral matters. I will underscore our willingness and ability to sustain and win a long-term competition and undercut any illusion that they can simply wait us out.

But it would be a mistake, as I see it, to play Gromyko's game by putting off discussion of specifics to New York. On our side, we have, as you know, serious problems about treaty compliance in the arms control field and about fulfillment of their earlier commitment to liberate Anatoliy Shcharanskiy by early 1984 (assuming he appealed for early release, which he has been unwilling to do so far). We have major concerns over Soviet activities in Central America, Libyan forces in Chad, and Soviet-encouraged Syrian intransigence in the Middle East. I will want to press all these issues: they cannot wait.

At the same time, in order to get the most from the multiple-meeting scenario I should be in a position to demonstrate that we are ready to move toward settlements that are consistent with the interests of both countries. I do not expect Gromyko to be a willing partner: diplomats on the defensive rarely are. But rather than debate him on philosophy or on INF, I would like to put forward some new ideas in the arms control field. My hope would be that some of the modifications we are making in our negotiating positions in key negotiations—START, INF and MBFR—will combine with our continuing military buildup and our

revived activism in the Third World to make the case for restraint and compromise more credible within the Kremlin.

The decisions we will be considering on arms control issues over the coming weeks will therefore be critical to success in my September meetings with Gromyko. If we wish to give the Soviet bureaucracy a push, in other words, we also need to give a push to ours.

Following the Madrid session, we may wish to consider whether we should invite Gromyko to Washington after the New York meeting. In that case he could meet with you as well as me. If properly managed such a visit could drive home both the seriousness of your message and contribute to the perception that we are doing our utmost to probe for Soviet flexibility. It would also position us well to make use of what may have to be our second theme of the fall—that despite our efforts we are prevented from moving forward on the issues by Soviet intransigence.

## II. *The Madrid Agenda*

At Madrid, I plan to take up all four areas of our long-standing agenda with Gromyko, but I will want to lead with human rights and arms control.

*Human rights* will head my list both because of its importance and the CSCE context of our meeting. Unless we have some word on Shcharanskiy before we meet, I will give his case—and the promise Max Kampelman was given for his release—top priority. In addition to Shcharanskiy, I will mention Sakharov, the Pentecostalists, Soviet Jewry and the recently established “Anti-Zionist Committee,” and the Soviet spouses of Americans that the Soviets are not allowing to emigrate. To put these cases in a broader

framework I will also elaborate the themes of my CSCE speech, on the connection between human rights and security.

Gromyko will, as always, attach highest priority to *arms control*, arguing that for Moscow this is the litmus test of U.S. seriousness in pursuing more constructive relations. I will need to be able to deal with arms control in this meeting in a way that denies him the claim that we are intransigent in this important area. Accordingly, I propose to emphasize two basic themes:

—that we are serious about reaching agreements in START, INF and MBFR, and are prepared to be flexible as long as the end results meet our criteria of reductions, equality, stability, and verifiability;

—but that Soviet failure adequately to address our concerns about compliance with existing agreements will undercut any prospects for reaching agreements.

On specific negotiations, I propose to proceed as follows:

—On INF, I would like to give a substantive reply to Andropov's weekend message to you<sup>4</sup> by previewing with Gromyko the new elements of flexibility that Paul Nitze will be outlining in the first days of the new round in Geneva. One thought would be to hand him your answer to Andropov. At the same time, I will want to reiterate that any increase in tensions from Soviet counter-deployments will be the Soviets' fault.

—On START, I will point to the important changes tabled by Ed Rowne in the last Geneva round, and emphasize our flexibility in finding a mutually acceptable way to reduce the throw-weight disparity. Given Moscow's complaints that

our proposal seeks radical restructuring of Soviet strategic forces, I would like to inform Gromyko in Madrid that at our UNGA meetings later in the month, I will be prepared to address possible changes to the framework of the U.S. proposal, *if* the Soviets are prepared to take similar steps to meet our basic concerns.

—On MBFR, I plan to pick up on Dobrynin's reference to the possibility of additional verification measures, and urge that the Soviet negotiator present more specific ideas when he and Ambassador Abramowitz resume their private exchanges in Vienna.

As for compliance, the Soviets have to understand that much is at stake. I intend to voice in strong terms our concerns about the new large phased-array radar's compatibility with the ABM Treaty. I will state bluntly that the Soviet claim that the radar is for space-track rather than ABM purposes is implausible, and that failure to resolve the situation will undermine our arms control efforts. I will also reiterate our dissatisfaction with Soviet explanations about the PL-5's consistency with SALT II, and point to the corrosive effect on mutual confidence of Moscow's telemetry encryption practices.

I also plan to press Gromyko on *regional issues* of importance to us. On Central America, I will reiterate our warnings against the introduction of Cuban combat troops or jet aircraft into Nicaragua and emphasize the danger that current Soviet policies—particularly the large supply of arms—could lead to a confrontation. Larry Eagleburger has just warned the Soviets about Syrian foot-dragging on a pullout from Lebanon, but I would plan to press the point again with Gromyko. Afghanistan will, of course, be touched on, but New York on the eve of the UNGA Afghanistan debate is probably a better place to press the

Soviets. We want to keep up the pressure on the Soviets over Afghanistan, and if we are careful should be able to assure that they take the blame for any failure of the UN-sponsored negotiating effort currently underway. Similarly, in order to keep the Soviets from claiming that lack of consultation on southern Africa excuses their foot-dragging there, I plan to offer Gromyko another side meeting at senior working level—with Chet Crocker on our side as before—at the UNGA.

I plan to use *bilateral issues* essentially as means to suggest to the Soviets that further progress may be possible in our bilateral relationship if they are willing to meet our concerns on other, more vital issues. If we can develop negotiating positions on the consulates and exchanges agreement in time, these could serve as examples. But I will underscore to Gromyko that small steps forward in such areas cannot substitute for agreement on more substantive questions.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 8/16–31/83. Secret. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Burt and Azrael forwarded the memorandum to Shultz through Eagleburger under cover of an action memorandum on August 30. Simons drafted the August 30 action memorandum on August 26, which was cleared by Palmer, Kelly, and Sestanovich.

<sup>2</sup> Shultz and Gromyko were scheduled to meet in Madrid during the CSCE on September 8.

<sup>3</sup> Reagan went to South Korea from November 12 to 14 and visited China in late April 1984. Weinberger was on a trip to Asia from September 23 to October 3, visiting China,



Japan, and Pakistan. A joint State-Defense message noted that Weinberger would be “prepared to discuss with the Chinese the full range of Asia-related security issues, including the Soviet threat, Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and Afghanistan, as well as other issues of mutual concern.” (Telegram 206535 to multiple Asian capitals, July 23; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830419-0910)

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 81](#).

# **September 1983-October 1983**

## **“Controlled Fury”: Shutdown of KAL 007**

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### **84. Editorial Note**

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### **85. Telegram From the National Security Agency**

Washington, September 1, 1983, 0156Z

Source: Reagan Library, Intelligence Directorate, NSC Records, 1981-1989, Series I: Subject File, Korean Airlines Disaster 09/01/1983: (09/01/1983-09/15/1983); NLR-262-1-17-4-7. Secret; Spoke; Flash. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

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### **86. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, September 1, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and John Hawes (EUR/RPM); cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Simons initialed for Hartman and Palmer.

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**87. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark).**

Washington, September 1, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, KAL Shoot Down 09/01/1983; NLR-195-6-57-1-6. Secret. Sent for information. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**88. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, September 1, 1983

Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret; Sensitive.

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**89. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, September 2, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Burt, Hartman, and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 2.

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**90. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, September 2, 1983

Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. On September 2, Reagan returned to Washington from his ranch in California, arriving at the White House at 5:43 p.m. The NSPG meeting Clark discussed in this memorandum began in the Situation Room at 6 p.m. From a comment in Shultz's memoir (see Document 84), it is clear that Clark was with Reagan in California, and likely returned with him to Washington on Air Force One. See also footnote 3, Document 88.

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**91. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of a National Security Planning Group Meeting**

Washington, September 2, 1983

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, Box 9, Notes Set B, 1983 #25-41. No classification marking. The editor transcribed this text from Weinberger's handwritten notes of the NSPG meeting. An image of the notes is Appendix D. The NSPG meeting to "discuss the Soviet attack on the Korean civil airliner" was held in the Situation Room from 6 p.m. to 7:57 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No formal record of the meeting was found.

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**92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, September 3, 1983, 1451Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830008-0162. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer, Burt, McKinley, and in S/S-O; approved by Eagleburger.

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**93. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, September 3, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 9/1-15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R. Braibanti on September 2; cleared by M. Wiznitzer (PM/RSA), L. Einaudi (ARA/PPC), and for information by M. Minton (EUR/SOV).

Braibanti initialed for all clearing officials. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum of this packet, indicating Shultz saw it.

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#### **94. Editorial Note**

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#### **95. National Security Decision Directive 102**

Washington, September 5, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 102, U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner. Secret. On September 6, Clark sent the signed NSDD to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Vessey, Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, Wick, and Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration J. Lynn Helms. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron November 1983 (2/4))

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#### **96. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, September 5, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot



96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by J.H. Smith (L/LEI) and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for all clearing officials.

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### **97. Editorial Note**

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### **98. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State and the Embassy in Spain**

Moscow, September 6, 1983, 1935Z

Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC USSR File, USSR-KAL Incident (09/01/83) (3); NLR-170-17-40-1-9. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Leningrad, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Seoul, and Tokyo. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

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### **99. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President Reagan**

Washington, September 6, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR-324-11-25-2-0. Confidential. A note on the routing slip indicates that

Poindexter presented this information to Reagan during his daily briefing on September 7.

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**100. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, September 7, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/10/1983]; NLR-332-14-35-1-4. Secret. A covering memorandum dated September 10 to Clark from Lilac and Robinson indicates the NSC received this set of papers.

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**101. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Madrid**

Washington, September 8, 1983, 0630Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830516-1096. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow, Seoul, Tokyo, the White House, and USUN. Drafted and approved by Kelly. Cleared in S/S-O and the KAL Working Group.

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**102. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, September 8, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/07/1983]; NLR-332-14-32-1-7. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.

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**103. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, September 8, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR-324-11-25-6-6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.

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**104. Memorandum of Conversation**

Madrid, September 8, 1983, 2-2:30 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; approved by Shultz. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Madrid. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I went over to our ambassador's residence after lunch to prepare for Gromyko's arrival. I planned to take him into a small room with only our interpreters and try to talk to him directly, first about human rights and then about the KAL downing.

When he arrived, we went into the study for half an hour. The atmosphere was tense. He was totally unresponsive." Shultz continued: "I then turned to the Soviets' attack on KAL 007. Once again, Gromyko was totally intransigent. I regarded this meeting as a last effort to come to grips with this crisis with him on a human level, but it was fruitless." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 369-370)

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### **105. Memorandum of Conversation**

Madrid, September 8, 1983, 2:30-4 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; cleared by Matlock, Hartman, Burt, and Palmer; approved by Shultz. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Madrid.

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### **106. Editorial Note**

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### **107. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, September 8, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 8.

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**108. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House**

Madrid, September 9, 1983, 0152Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

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**109. Memorandum From Richard Levine and Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, September 9, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/09/1983]; NLR-332-14-33-4-3. Confidential. Sent for action. Cleared by Lilac and Robinson. Sommer initialed for Levine, Lilac, and Robinson.

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**110. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon)**



Washington, September 9, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400641. Secret. Casey forwarded the memorandum to Clark on September 12. In an attached covering memorandum to Clark, September 12, deGraffenreid noted: "The DCI marked this IMMEDIATE, so I am sending it to you directly without complete staffing. However, Gates' points seem well taken, and I recommend that it be circulated widely on our staff and Gates' points fully considered." Clark wrote "NO" to the side of this recommendation and noted at the bottom: "Let's hold up for now." In a follow-up note to Poindexter, deGraffenreid reported: "Bob Gates called to say he had just learned that the DCI sent his memo here. He is a bit worried that because his criticism of State could be misinterpreted that we limit distribution of his memo. I agree. We can just pull out the thoughts."

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**111. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (Casey) to the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council**

Washington, September 12, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. No classification marking. Although an unidentified "Attachment 1" is noted at the bottom of the memorandum, no attachment was found.

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**112. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs**



**(Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, September 15, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Simons; cleared by Niles. Simons initialed for Pascoe. Kelly initialed the memorandum for Burt. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 16. An administrative action changed the title of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs on September 15.

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**113. Memorandum From Robert Lilac of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, September 19, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT: [Korean Airlines KAL 007: Intelligence] (Binder); NLR-332-14-55-2-1. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Sommer, deGraffenreid, Raymond, and Robinson concurred. Lilac initialed for Lenczowski, and a note indicates that Raymond's concurrence was verbal. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**114. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (Casey) to the**

## **National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council**

Washington, September 21, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

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### **115. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, September 23, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1-8 1983. Secret; Wnintel; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by James F. Schumaker (EUR/SOV); cleared by Simons, Kelly, Vershbow, Donald Graves (INR/SEE), and in substance by [name not declassified] (CIA/SOVA; J. Beyerly (Emb Moscow). Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 23. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Brackets are in the original. All tabs are attached but not printed.

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### **116. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates)**

Washington, September 27, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, September 20-30 1983. Secret. In a cover note to Shultz, Gates wrote: "Mr. Secretary: As you requested last Saturday morning [September 24] after breakfast, I have jotted down some thoughts along the lines that I was expressing at the table. They are strictly personal. I hope they are of some use to you." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears at the top of the note, as well as a handwritten note that reads: "R.B. Pls see me re this. CBA's are focal point."

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**117. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, September 27, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on September 21; cleared by Burt and Eagleburger. Drafting information is from another copy. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, 1983 Sept 1-8)

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**118. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)**

Washington, September 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. This memorandum is unsigned.

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### **119. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

New York, September 29, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (09/29/1983-09/30/1983); NLR-775-10-11-3-5. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "The boycott of flights in and out of the Soviet Union will come to an end on Thursday, September 29th. In anticipation of this, you will want to keep the President informed of our efforts here in New York to shape the continuing international response to the KAL incident."

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### **120. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, September 29, 1983, 1523Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830565-0577. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, USIA, and for information to Stockholm, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Munich, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, USCINCEUR, USDeIMBFR Vienna, and the Mission in Geneva.

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### **121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, September 30, 1983, 1532Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830568-0222. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Leningrad, USIA, USUN, Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague, Berlin, USNATO, Bern, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Seoul, Tokyo, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, and the Mission in Geneva.

**122. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, October 1, 1983, 0934Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830570-0390. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to USNATO, Tokyo, Beijing, London, Paris, Rome, Seoul, the Mission in Geneva, USUN, Bonn, and USDelMBFR Vienna.

**123. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, October 3, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive.



Forwarded through Eagleburger. Printed from a copy that indicates Eagleburger initialed the original.



## 84. Editorial Note

On September 1, 1983, a Soviet jet fighter shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, which had mistakenly strayed into Soviet airspace near Sakhalin Island, killing all 269 people on board. In his memoir, Secretary of State George Shultz noted that he received a call at 6:30 a.m. informing him that the airliner had “‘disappeared’ over Soviet territory: it had probably been shot down by the Soviets.” He further recalled that “at 8:20 a.m. [EST], I called Bill Clark, who was with the president in California. [Reagan was on holiday, scheduled to return to Washington on September 4.] President Reagan already had been notified. We exchanged information, as yet somewhat sketchy. I told Larry Eagleburger to call in Oleg Sokolov, the Soviet chargé. Within an hour, much more information was coming in: the CIA had a transcript, I was told, of the Soviet pilot’s conversation with his ground control, who ordered him to shoot the aircraft down, the pilot’s acknowledgement, and then his confirmation that he had been successful.

“A heated internal debate bubbled up over whether we could use such intelligence without dangerously compromising the means by which we got it. I told Eagleburger to work on the CIA, and he convinced them that the stakes were so high and that they must agree I could use it, both with the Soviets and in public. The debate now shifted, with even greater intensity, to what our public statement should be and who should make it. The president agreed that I should hold a press conference and get the facts out quickly. How should we characterize them? A decision had to be made now about how the United States would treat this disaster. What was said in the next hour or so would shape our reaction in a fundamental way. People

began to give me drafts of what I should say. I found them all dangerously overdrawn, couched in an ominous tone that might suggest some form of U.S. military reaction or retaliation. I rejected the confrontational rhetoric.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 361)

At 10:45 a.m. EST, Shultz held a press conference at the Department of State and outlined the available facts as follows: “At 1400 hours Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) yesterday, a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747, en route from New York to Seoul, Korea, departed Anchorage, Alaska. Two hundred and sixty-nine passengers and crew were on board, including Congressman Lawrence P. McDonald [D-Georgia].

“At approximately 1600 hours Greenwich Mean Time, the aircraft came to the attention of Soviet radar. It was tracked constantly by the Soviets from that time.

“The aircraft strayed into Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula and over the Sea of Okhotsk and over the Sakhalin Island. The Soviets tracked the commercial airliner for some 2½ hours.

“A Soviet pilot reported visual contact with the aircraft at 1812 hours. The Soviet plane was, we know, in constant contact with its ground control.

“At 1821 hours, the Korean aircraft was reported by the Soviet pilot at 10,000 meters. At 1826 hours, the Soviet pilot reported that he fired a missile, and the target was destroyed.

“At 1830 hours, the Korean aircraft was reported by radar at 5,000 meters. At 1838 hours, the Korean plane disappeared from the radar screen.

“We know that at least eight Soviet fighters reacted at one time or another to the airliner. The pilot who shot the aircraft down reported after the attack that he had, in fact, fired a missile, that he had destroyed the target, and that he was breaking away.

“About an hour later, Soviet controllers ordered a number of their search aircraft to conduct search-and-rescue activity in the vicinity of the last position of the Korean airliner reflected by Soviet tracking. One of these aircraft reported finding kerosene on the surface of the seas in that area.

“During Wednesday night, U.S. State Department officials, particularly Assistant Secretary [for European Affairs Richard R.] Burt, were in contact with Soviet officials, seeking information concerning the airliner’s fate. The Soviets offered no information.

“As soon as U.S. sources had confirmed the shooting down of the aircraft, the United States, on its own behalf and on behalf of the Republic of Korea, called in the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in Washington this morning to express our grave concern over the shooting down of an unarmed civilian plane carrying passengers of a number of nationalities. We also urgently demanded an explanation from the Soviet Union.

“The United States reacts with revulsion to this attack. Loss of life appears to be heavy. We can see no excuse whatsoever for this appalling act.” (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, page 1; brackets are in the original) A brief question-and-answer session followed. According to Shultz, Roger Mudd, co-anchor of NBC Nightly News, characterized his press conference as “controlled fury.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 362)

At 1:07 p.m. EST, the Soviet Union issued the following statement via TASS: "An unidentified plane entered the airspace of the Soviet Union over the Kamchatka Peninsula from the direction of the Pacific Ocean and then for the second time violated the airspace of the U.S.S.R. over Sakhalin Island on the night from August 31 to September 1. The plane did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries, and did not enter into contact with the dispatcher service.

"Fighters of the anti-aircraft defense, which were sent aloft toward the intruder plane, tried to give it assistance in directing it to the nearest airfield. But the intruder plane did not react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan." (John F. Burns, "Moscow Confirms Tracking of Plane," *New York Times*, September 2, 1983, page A1; Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, page 2)

At 2:33 p.m. on September 1, White House Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes read the following statement on behalf of President Ronald Reagan at the Sheraton Hotel in Santa Barbara, California: "I speak for all Americans and for the people everywhere who cherish civilized values in protesting the Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian passenger plane. Words can scarcely express our revulsion at this horrifying act of violence.

"The United States joins with other members of the international community in demanding a full explanation for this appalling and wanton misdeed. The Soviet statements to this moment have totally failed to explain how or why this tragedy has occurred. Indeed, the whole incident appears to be inexplicable to civilized people everywhere.

“Mrs. Reagan and I want to express our deepest sympathy to the families of the victims. Our prayers are with them in this time of bereavement, and they have my personal assurance that I will make every effort to get to the bottom of this tragedy.

“I have ordered flags of the United States flown at half staff at all Federal installations and U.S. military bases around the world.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, page 1221)

## **85. Telegram From the National Security Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 1, 1983, 0156Z

Follow-up two to Critic 2-83.

(SC) A probable Republic of Korea civil aircraft was reflected descending over the Soviet littoral on 31 August 1983.

(SC) The aircraft was reflected at 5557N 16515E at 1617Z heading southwest to a position at 1818Z of 4723N 14245E. The aircraft was identified as a border violator at 1821Z located at 4710N 14235E. The aircraft then continued southwest to a last noted position of 4617N 14115E at 1838Z. Additionally two Soviet Sokol (4716N 14246E) based fighters were probably escorting the aircraft from 1818Z to the aircraft's last noted position. Also at least three additional fighters were active from Sokol and Sovetskaya Gavan' Vanino (4902N 14014Z) in defensive patrols in areas bounded by 4617N 14035E to 4830N 14335E between 1821Z to 1941Z.

(SC) The probable civil aircraft was noted descending in altitudes from 100 hectometers to 50 hectometers between 1818Z and 1830Z. The aircraft operated at speeds up to 900 kph. The fighters operated at speeds up to 950 kph and altitudes up to 95 hectometers.

(SC) According to a recently available Soviet tactical fighter communications, at least one Sakhalin Island based fighter performed live missile firing during the mid-1800Z hour of 31 August 1983.



Comments: (SC) Believe this activity may represent hostile action against a South Korean civil airliner which was reportedly lost over the Soviet littoral area. According to a collateral source a United States Congressman possibly was on board the aircraft.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Intelligence Directorate, NSC Records, 1981-1989, Series I: Subject File, Korean Airlines Disaster 09/01/1983: (09/01/1983-09/15/1983); NLR-262-1-17-4-7. Secret; Spoke; Flash. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

**86. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 1, 1983

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations after the Korean Plane: The Near Term

Over the next hours and days, we will be concentrating on making sure the Soviets pay an international price for an act that was stupid at best, malicious at worst, and barbarous in any case.<sup>2</sup> Here we are proceeding on two main tracks:

—We are calling a UN Security Council meeting to put them before the tribunal of international opinion.<sup>3</sup>

—We are seeking an emergency session of the ICAO Council to mobilize the world civil aviation community,<sup>4</sup> and we are examining ways to penalize Aeroflot. Neither the US nor South Korea has direct flights with the Soviet Union, of course, so broad international support will be required. The international pilots' association is already engaged, and we support NSC staff suggestions that we lobby in international meetings for the following actions:

1. Immediate allied and third country agreement to refuse to accept Aeroflot flight plans for a specified period. This will be particularly attractive as a signal of international solidarity, and appears to be the most achievable of these steps.

2. Review all outstanding discussions between the USSR and international civil aviation bodies with a view to

interrupting arrangements such as routing awards, requests for waiver of landing fees, etc. This is likely to be harder to get, but might be possible in tandem with refusal to accept Aeroflot flight plans.

3. Review all outstanding US, allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry and seek agreement to terminate or suspend these deliveries. This may well be hardest to achieve, both because it is a pocketbook issue and because it would raise the ghost of oil and gas sanctions, but could be worth a try.

We are working to put these issues in decision form preparatory to a possible NSC meeting Saturday.<sup>5</sup>

Bilaterally, in addition to our demands for an explanation, we are taking or have proposed to you the following actions:

—We are instructing our delegation to the international communications conference in Tashkent this week to spotlight the shutdown in its interventions, and not to accept any invitation from the Soviets. We considered withdrawing the delegation, but most members have already left, and we think it unwise to use international meetings of this kind for sanctions.

—As you are aware, we have proposed to withdraw the note given the Soviet Foreign Ministry August 31 proposing an 18-month extension of the bilateral Transportation Agreement that expired in June, subject to negotiation of amendments.<sup>6</sup> In this case, we hesitated to recommend a step further dismantling the structure of the bilateral relationship, but the practical effect will be small, at least at the outset, and the political signal unmistakable.

How we choose to reflect our outrage in US-Soviet bilateral relations beyond these steps will depend importantly on two factors:

—1. *The Soviet response.* The TASS report and Gromyko's very slight expansion on it in his message to you were not only inadequate, but incomplete: they note that a plane violated Soviet airspace over both Kamchatka and Sakhalin; and claim it did not have navigational lights, did not respond to queries and did not enter into contact with the "dispatcher service"; and did not react to signals and warnings from Soviet fighters trying to direct it to the nearest airfield, but continued on.<sup>7</sup> The denouement is not described. The Soviets know they have a problem, but have not yet decided how to handle it.

—2. *Our own intelligence analysis.* We are currently sifting and collating the data to determine what did and did not happen, relative to internationally accepted procedures. There are still very important uncertainties, e.g. communications capabilities, attempts and failures, degree of daylight, degree of Soviet ground command and control. [5½ lines not declassified]

The TASS report and Gromyko message have made it harder for the Soviets to admit wrong-doing, so we should not be optimistic. At the very best, the Soviets could admit obliquely that they made a mistake, and we may determine that they either made appropriate efforts to warn and force down the plane, or were unable for technical reasons to do so. In that case, the impact on our relations will be serious—since no conceivable rationale could justify the act—but not fundamental. If, on the other hand, the Soviets present no frank and conciliatory explanation of their action, and we determine that the claims of good-faith efforts in the

TASS and subsequent statements are lies, the effects will be deep and long-lasting.

However, important uncertainties concerning both the facts and Soviet intentions are likely to subsist. In that gray type of situation, public and political opinion in the West will be united in condemning the Soviet action, but divided as to whether it was a blunder or a crime. Both publicly and privately, we should handle the issue in a way that stresses Soviet irresponsibility and callousness. We have a policy framework vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which accommodates this approach.

Both in public and in private, we should put the emphasis on the loss of human life and on Soviet willingness to resort to force; explain (along the lines of your suggested CSCE speech for Madrid) that the incident shows once again the interrelationship between security and human rights issues, since excessive security-mindedness in contravention of normal international practice appears to have led to tragic loss of human life; and note that this point has been and will continue to be at the center of all our discussions with the Soviets under this Administration.

I have three specific recommendations for action vis-a-vis the Soviets over the next week, in line with this general approach:

—1. We should tell the Soviets that the working lunch/working session format agreed to for your Madrid meeting with Gromyko would not be appropriate under these circumstances. We must face the possibility that the Soviets will respond by cancelling the whole meeting.<sup>8</sup> In that case, however, we would be on the high ground of being willing to continue talking but not to socialize, while they would be insisting unreasonably on socializing too,



and they will probably grumble but assent to this proposal. You will recall that Khrushchev used the U-2 shootdown to cancel the Paris Summit,<sup>9</sup> with widespread sympathy from others; we would in fact have implemented a similar step, but on a more modest scale and on purely humanitarian grounds.

—2. You should feature this incident both in your CSCE remarks and in your opening presentation to Gromyko on the same grounds we will be taking in public: the Soviet penchant for force, Soviet callousness and the interrelationship between human rights and international security. Jack Matlock has suggested, and I agree, that you identify three conceptual problem areas to Gromyko in your opening remarks: use of force to settle disputes, the cost of armaments, and bilateral trust and confidence. This is a perfect example of what has gone wrong in relations, and who is at fault, and should serve to exemplify these three themes.

—3. We should explain publicly that we are taking these steps in the bilateral dialogue to register our extreme unhappiness and concern; that the United States, South Korea, and others will continue to pursue the issue in international fora to make the Soviets realize the gravity of what they have done; and that while we are aware of our responsibility to work with the Soviet Union as well as other countries to find peaceful solutions to international issues, the irresponsibility the Soviets have shown in this instance will inevitably make this work more difficult in the period ahead.

Finally, there is one step in US-Soviet relations I believe we should *not* take in the immediate near term because of the shootdown: telling the Soviets about adjustments in our position in INF. This will require a decision over the



weekend. I continue to believe that the substantive proposals we have made are correct, and that the US position should be developed along those lines this fall. There is no better bulwark of American strength vis-a-vis the USSR than Alliance unity behind the 1979 dual decision, and to maintain it through a difficult autumn we must demonstrate our vigorous pursuit of the Geneva negotiations. We should use this argument to press for a decision this weekend in favor of our proposals. But I also believe the scenario we initially envisaged is no longer viable after today, and that we should delay our presentation of new proposals to the Soviets. It would be incongruous for you to present them to Gromyko in Madrid September 8 under present circumstances. Rather, I would recommend that after the President sees Paul Nitze Sunday, we hold the new position until the following week. This would permit us to consult on it in the Alliance at the SCG meeting now scheduled for London September 12,<sup>10</sup> and allow Paul to present it in Geneva later in the week and you to follow up on it with Gromyko in New York.

Otherwise, I think we should hold off deciding what further steps we should take in bilateral relations and in arms control until after the Madrid meeting. At this point I suspect we will find it inappropriate to invite Gromyko to Washington after our UNGA sessions, but there are still so many uncertainties that we need to see how things develop before proceeding further. Clearly, the tenor of our relations with the Soviets will be even more sober than before the shutdown; what cannot be clear is how the incident should affect the specifics of our discussions across the spectrum of the agenda.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Drafted by Simons and John Hawes (EUR/RPM); cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Simons initialed for Hartman and Palmer.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 84](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [footnote 5, Document 89](#).



<sup>4</sup> According to the United Nations' International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) website, the ICAO is a "specialized agency of the United Nations. . . created in 1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of international civil aviation." The organization "sets standards and regulations necessary for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity. . ." The ICAO met later in September to review the KAL incident. See the official website of the ICAO. See [footnote 2, Document 112](#).

<sup>5</sup> The meeting to discuss the KAL shootdown was an NSPG meeting that took place on Friday, September 2, from 6 to 7:57 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No formal record of this meeting was found; however, see [Document 91](#) for a transcription of Weinberger's handwritten notes from the meeting.

<sup>6</sup> See [Document 63](#).

<sup>7</sup> The message from Gromyko is attached but not printed. The TASS statement was issued 22½ hours after the plane disappeared, and merely confirmed that "its jet fighters in the Far East had intercepted and warned an 'unidentified plane' intruding into Soviet airspace. But it made no mention of any attack on the plane." (John F. Burns, "Moscow Confirms Tracking of Plane But TASS Statement is Silent About an Attack on Airliner," *New York Times*, September 2, 1983, pg. A1) See [Document 84](#).

<sup>8</sup> Shultz and Gromyko met as scheduled in Madrid on September 7 and 8. See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).

<sup>9</sup> Khrushchev and President Eisenhower were scheduled to meet in Paris shortly after Frances Gary Powers's U-2 plane was shot down and crashed in the Soviet Union. See [Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. X, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, Part 1, Document 147](#)  and [Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. X, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Part 2, Document 27](#) .

<sup>10</sup> The NATO Special Consultative Group met in London on September 12. The Embassy summarized the meeting in telegram 19405 from London, September 12, and forwarded the text of Burt's public statement after the meeting in telegram 19374 from London, September 12. (Both in Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

**87. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 1, 1983

SUBJECT

Responding to the Soviet Attack on a Korean Airliner

The shooting down of a Korean airliner demands a serious Western response. The scale of the tragedy is dramatic—surely one of the worst in civil aviation history. We cannot know for sure at this moment whether the action was the result of an authorization by Moscow or merely the work of a local commander. Neither answer should give us much encouragement. If the latter proves true, it suggests that Soviet decision making routines are so rigid that war could ignite as a result of inflexibility; if the former is correct, it suggests that the Soviet leadership has decided to issue a major provocation to our allies. It is also possible that the action was authorized by Soviet military officers as a signal to Andropov of their independence, or to influence the succession struggle.

While there will be a tendency on the part of some to want to view this incident in a narrow context it is worth noting that, in addition to turbulence in Central America, Chad and Lebanon, the Soviets have now decided to create a serious incident in Asia. This means that for the first time in a long while serious trends are unfolding in every principal theater. We have to soberly consider whether this may in fact be a deliberate message from the Soviets on the eve of the talks in Madrid: Do business with us or we can

make things infinitely worse for you. By the way, given what we know about the Soviet system, it is hard to believe that a decision of this type was not—in the two-and-a-half hours the plane was being hounded by Soviet fighters—referred at least as high as the Chairman of the General Staff.

We need to think hard about an appropriate response. One of the things that seemed to me unfortunate about the Secretary's immediate decision to go to Madrid—before all the relevant information on the incident was even at hand—is that it removed an important tool for trying to leverage an effective allied response. My sense is that the allies want us at Madrid so badly that they would be prepared to join in some serious response if they felt the alternative would be the cancellation of our appearance.

Words alone are not enough, but words can be important and we must choose them carefully. Instead of an unfocused outrage, we need—at the moment—to crystallize our rage into certain compelling themes:

—*The first is to note that this sort of behavior is completely uncivilized.* Not only is this true, it also strikes the Soviets in a very vulnerable area: the need of the regime to establish its legitimacy domestically by demonstrating that the Soviet Union is no longer an outcast but rather the equal of any other state.

—*Second, we should note, sadly, that the incident again forces us to make a critical distinction between what the Soviets do and what they say.* This has relevance for many things, not least of which is INF.

—*Third, we need to make people understand that this is not an isolated and inexplicable incident but seems*



*rather part of a pattern of Soviet intimidation through force.* We have seen in recent days continuing Soviet threats against Japan,<sup>2</sup> Soviet advisors in Chad to assist with Libya's aggression (a fact that, curiously enough, has still not been publicized), and Soviet unwillingness to calm the situation in Lebanon.

It seems to me that the President should himself communicate these themes. Indeed, nothing could more dramatically illustrate the contrast between the President's concern for humanity and the Soviet Union's persistent callousness—in short, a Presidential appearance at this moment would tellingly demonstrate that it is the Soviet Union—and not the President—that “militarizes” everything it touches.

There are concrete actions we should consider as well. Rather than accepting a pro forma Soviet “regret,” we might ask for an internal investigation with the results reported to the world. This, after all, is what civilized nations do. It is what we did after Klaus Barbie;<sup>3</sup> and what the Israelis did after the tragedy at the Lebanese refugee camps. Other examples abound. Moreover, the Soviets recently held a widely publicized investigation of a Volga boating accident in which a hundred people were killed on a pleasure cruise. In a rare break with precedent, a Politburo member led the investigation and a number of responsible officials were publicly fired for negligence. We could make the point: Is the Soviet Union so callous toward the outside world that it is unwilling to do the same when over two hundred innocent people are killed as a result of Soviet actions.

There are other steps we should consider, though each has its pros and cons, such as 1) collective Western prohibition on Aeroflot flights until either such an investigation is held



or—somewhat softer—until the Soviets apologize and agree to full compensation; 2) accelerating the planned deployment of F-16s to Japan (so that we look like we are responding prudently to violence and uncertainty rather than initiating an arms buildup); and 3) discouraging the Japanese from further work with the Soviets on oil drilling in the Sakhalin Island area. There are other forms of cooperation we should urgently reconsider and suspend—not as a sanction, since the feebleness of each gesture would make us look weak—but rather as an inevitable consequence of our disgust.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, KAL Shoot Down 09/01/1983; NLR-195-6-57-1-6. Secret. Sent for information. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 17066 from Tokyo, September 1, the Embassy reported: "an official of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) announced in a press conference on August 30 that the Soviet Union deployed more than 10 MIG-23 aircraft to an existing military airfield on Etorofu Island in the Soviet-occupied northern territories just north of the Japanese island of Hokkaido." The JDA seemed unsure if this was a temporary or permanent deployment by the Soviets. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830505-0453)

<sup>3</sup> Klaus Barbie was the Nazi Gestapo chief in Lyon, France during World War II. After the war, he was employed by U.S. Army intelligence, which later helped him evade capture and flee to South America. In August the Department of Justice released a report admitting that the Nazi war criminal had been in the employ of U.S. Army intelligence and apologized to France for helping him escape.

## 88. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 1, 1983

### SUBJECT

U.S. Response to Soviet Attack on Korean Airliner: Current Status and Next Steps

As you return for Saturday's NSC meeting,<sup>2</sup> I want to review for you the situation with regard to the Korean airliner and the next steps we are working on for your consideration.<sup>3</sup>

### *The Current Situation*

The Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian aircraft resulting in the deaths of two hundred sixty-nine people, including approximately thirty-five Americans, was a callous and brutal act that is certain to have far-reaching international impact. It is obvious that our own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union cannot remain unaffected by a fresh and particularly irresponsible Soviet resort to force and violence. Indeed, we have already taken some unilateral punitive steps, and we will need to consider other possibilities in the days and weeks ahead. At the same time, we must also ensure that the Soviets pay the full political costs of their actions in ways which go well beyond the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. Thus, it is essential that we work to build and sustain the broadest possible international response to this appalling act.

Twenty-four hours after the Korean aircraft was shot down there remain a number of gaps in our knowledge of the events leading up to the attack. For example, it remains

unclear how the Korean flight crew could have strayed so far off course and within Soviet airspace. It is not entirely certain whether the pilots of the Soviet interceptors knew that the Korean aircraft was a civilian airliner, although some evidence suggests that they did. The extent of involvement in the incident by Soviet ground controllers and higher authorities in Moscow is also unclear. However, it is clear beyond any doubt that Soviet aircraft did move into close proximity before firing at the airliner and that the attack was carried out in disregard for the loss of life that resulted. By any recognized standards of international law and conduct, the Soviet attack must be regarded as deliberate and unjustified.

Moreover, the Soviets have sidestepped our diplomatic efforts to elicit an explanation of the incident. As you know, Larry Eagleburger called in Soviet Chargé Sokolov this morning to demand an explanation. This afternoon Sokolov telephoned Rick Burt to convey a "personal message" from Gromyko to me that acknowledges Soviet interception of the airliner but not a Soviet role in its destruction. I instructed Rick to inform Sokolov that Gromyko's response was totally inadequate and to reiterate our insistence on a satisfactory explanation of the affair. We have issued a public statement to this effect.<sup>4</sup>

As you know, CINCPAC is already conducting a search and rescue mission in the area where the aircraft appears to have gone down. We plan to request access to Soviet territorial waters to facilitate this search, and to pave the way for possible salvage operations later on.

### *Elements of a U.S. Response*

As you know, we have formed an interagency task force to examine the various aspects of the case, and to consider

different responses that the U.S. and other concerned nations could take. The U.S. response must involve both steps in our bilateral relationship and a far-reaching effort to build and sustain a strong international response. We have thus far identified the following general areas for action.

*A. Bilateral Steps*

1. We have already notified the Soviets that the U.S. will not move forward with the planned extension of the bilateral agreement on cooperation in Transportation. This agreement provides for cooperation in various areas of transportation technology, including civil aviation safety and high-speed water-borne transport.
2. We will have to consider urgently what impact this incident should have on my planned meeting with Gromyko at Madrid. I intend to go forward with the meeting and to use it as a vehicle for conveying to the Soviets at Politburo level our strong revulsion at their actions and our determination to respond vigorously.
3. We are in contact with a number of prominent Americans who are planning to travel to the USSR in the near future, including Congressmen Gray, Boxer, and Solarz. We are not actively discouraging their travel, but are recommending that, if they feel they must go ahead with their trips, they convey their views on this incident to the Soviets in the strongest terms.
4. We are instructing our delegation to the international communications conference in Soviet Central Asia this week to spotlight this incident in what they say, and to refuse all Soviet social invitations.

5. We are examining a number of other options for steps across the gamut of our bilateral relations, including in the economic area. For instance, we might consider reviewing all outstanding equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry, while pressing our allies to undertake similar steps.

### *B. Multilateral Initiatives*

1. We have called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and will use this forum to condemn the Soviet attack in the strongest possible terms and seek a resolution calling for a special international investigation. In particular, we intend to use the Council debate to expose Soviet efforts to evade responsibility for the attack by including in the U.S. statement verbatim excerpts from the communications of Soviet pilots who fired the missiles. We will be pressing other nations to join with us in issuing condemnatory statements both in the Council debate and outside it.

2. We are urgently considering steps to organize and support international action against Soviet civil aviation interests, particularly Aeroflot international operations and flights by third-country airlines to the Soviet Union. For example, we could seek immediate allied and third-country agreement to refuse to accept Aeroflot flight plans for a specified period. We would pursue actions of this kind within organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, but much work will also have to be done in bilateral consultations with other nations. In this connection, we are studying ways to exploit the building condemnation of the Soviet attack by private organizations, such as the International Pilots Association.

3. We have looked at the possibility of bringing a case before the International Court of Justice, but this procedure would be time-consuming at best, and probably inconclusive.

### *C. Public Diplomacy*

1. The statements already issued by you and me put us in the correct position of condemning in strongest terms the Soviet attack, while calling on them to explain it if they can.<sup>5</sup> By contrast, the weak and evasive Soviet statements issued thus far will only fuel international skepticism of whatever line Moscow may ultimately adopt to “explain” its actions.

2. We have already approached our European and Japanese allies to urge that they issue similar condemnatory statements. The British have already made a strong statement, and we will continue pressing others to follow suit.

3. We will be developing on an urgent basis a public diplomacy strategy to exploit this incident. As we implement this strategy, we must recognize that U.S. leadership will be essential. However, we will want to avoid repetition of the “Olympic Boycott” syndrome in which the U.S. role overshadowed that of other nations and private interests. Instead, the U.S. should encourage initiatives by others and adopt a supporting and facilitating role where possible and appropriate.

I believe that, taken together, these steps put us on the right track in developing the U.S. response to the Soviet attack. We will be constantly reevaluating and exploring new possibilities in the days and weeks ahead, and offering recommendations for your review.



<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> September 3.

<sup>3</sup> Reagan was at his ranch in California when the shootdown occurred. He returned to Washington on the afternoon of September 2. His diary entry for Friday, September 2 reads: "Then as the week went by the Soviets shot down a Korean Airliner with 269 passengers—53 of them Americans including Cong. Larry McDonald. The traffic in conference calls got heavy. We were due to return to Wash. on Labor Day but realized we couldn't wait so we left on Fri. It was heartbreaking—I had really looked forward to those last 3 days. When we got in Fri. I went directly to an N.S.C. [NSPG] meeting re the Soviet affair. We're going to try & persuade our friends to join us in banning Aeroflot flights & in demanding reparations for the victim's familys." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 259) The NSPG meeting took place on Friday, September 2, in the White House Situation Room from 6 p.m. to 7:57 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) See [Document 91](#).

<sup>4</sup> In his memoir, Shultz recounted this meeting: "By 12:30 p.m., we got the first response from the Soviets when Oleg Sokolov came into the State Department. Gromyko, he told us, said KAL 007 was warned off but kept on. Sokolov speculated that the plane probably crashed, adding 'This is what they told me to tell you,' a highly unusual comment coming from a Soviet official." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 363)

<sup>5</sup> For Shultz's press conference at 10:45 a.m. on September 1 and the President's statement later that day, see [Document 84](#).

**89. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 2, 1983

SUBJECT

Your Participation in the September 2 NSC Meeting: Talking Paper on KAL Follow-Up

The following paper reflects our luncheon discussion today on the structure you will wish to give your remarks.<sup>2</sup>

*I. Overall Objective*

—This terrible tragedy paradoxically gives us an opportunity to reinforce the President's overall policy of strength and purpose. We should use it.

—We should punish the Soviets for their barbaric action, but we should above all speak and act so as to point up how it shows the differences between our two systems. We should not act as though this incident has come as a big surprise. Instead, it only portrays what we have long known about the Soviet system. But we should work to ensure that others—at home and abroad—understand this point.

—This does not mean that we should shy away from talking to the Soviets. I plan to see Gromyko next week so I can tell him face-to-face what we think of the Soviet action and to insist on a real explanation.

—On that point, we must also be sure we show it is the Soviets against the world, and not just the U.S. against the

Soviet Union. This afternoon's preposterous TASS statement shows clearly that the Soviet tactic is to try to turn this into a U.S.-Soviet issue.<sup>3</sup> We should not play their game. Our game should be international solidarity.

## II. *The Shootdown and the Most Serious Issues*

—We should capitalize on this stark reminder of the contrast between us and the Soviets to advance on the most serious issues we face.

—On *Central America*, I see this as a golden opportunity to get rid of the Boland/Zablocki Amendment.<sup>4</sup>

—On *Lebanon/Syria*, if we need to build our strength in the area we now have a much better political context than before to do it.

—On the *defense budget and especially MX*, the Soviets have just reminded the American people and our Allies how dangerous they are, how easily they throw their military strength around, and how much we need a strong defense. We should drive the message home.

## III. *Mobilizing International Solidarity*

—We have moved quickly to mobilize the international community to express its outrage and impose costs on the Soviets, especially in the aviation field. We are meeting daily with our European and Asian Allies and friends. We should keep it up.

—The UN Security Council met this afternoon at the request of the U.S., Japan and South Korea.<sup>5</sup> I will be

asking Jeane Kirkpatrick to come back and take over our effort there.

—You have before you a list of seven measures we are proposing for immediate action (attached at Tab 1):

1. Refusing to accept Aeroflot flight plans;
2. Suspending non-safety-related discussions between the Soviets and other national civil aviation bodies;
3. Boycotts against Aeroflot;
4. Censuring the Soviets at a special meeting of the ICAO Council next week;
5. Reaffirming our existing sanction against Aeroflot flights to the U.S.;
6. Making a claim against the Soviets for the death of our citizens; and
7. Cancelling interline ticketing arrangements with Aeroflot.

—Some of these are actions for governments to take, others for private organizations like pilots' unions.

—On those that require government action, we met with Transportation and the FAA this morning, and are in agreement with them that we should proceed.

—On those requiring private action, Larry Eagleburger met with Lane Kirkland and we met also with the Airline Pilots' Association and the Air Transport Association to see what they are prepared to do, and we will be following up.

—We may find that not all these proposals are feasible, but I would like your authorization to begin exploring them with private groups and foreign governments.

#### IV. *U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Relations*

—The defense budget, Central America and the Middle East are important elements in the U.S.-Soviet equation, but we need to decide how to handle others that are more directly bilateral.

—I am thinking about three categories.

—1. On the *Madrid meeting with Gromyko*, I intend to shorten and toughen it, drop the working luncheon we had agreed to, and focus the whole meeting on three topics:

—the shutdown;

—human rights, especially Anatoliy Shcharanskiy;  
and

—arms control treaty compliance.

—We have to make the Soviets at the highest levels of government understand how dangerously and irresponsibly they are acting, and tell the world we are making these points. That is why I need to meet Gromyko in Madrid.

—2. On *other bilateral topics*, we have already told the Soviets we are not moving to renew the *Transportation Agreement* that expired in June because of the shutdown.

—I also want your agreement not to proceed at this point to renew discussion of *consulates in Kiev and New York and a new exchanges agreement*. I have supported these steps

because both things would be in our long-term interest and we should go ahead at some point. But that point is not now.

—3. On *arms control*, it is important not to turn an opportunity to shift weight against the Soviets into a defeat for the U.S. This is especially true concerning Europe and in the arms control field. We want to keep things focussed on what the Soviets have now done rather than on what we are not doing.

—For that reason, Mr. President, I think we should make the *INF* decisions that have been proposed, but *not* make this public, and *not* convey it to the Soviets in Geneva at this point. We would tell our Allies, but hold off going to the Soviets and publicizing your decision until later in the month.

## V. *Presidential Action*

—Mr. President, you have already taken the lead to turn the anguish we all feel into support for your policy of strength and purpose. The American people will expect you to continue.

—I have here a statement (at Tab 2)<sup>6</sup> that I would like you to make tomorrow morning, so that it gets picked up in the Sunday papers.

—It tells the world that today's Soviet statement on the KAL shootdown is preposterous. It says you have instructed me to go to Madrid for a short, blunt meeting with Gromyko to tell him of our extremely serious concerns about Soviet behavior in this and a number of other areas. It says you have directed me to pursue the initiative which the world aviation community itself has undertaken to



make clear to the Soviets that they have created a real danger to international travel and travellers' safety.

—By Tuesday,<sup>7</sup> we should have the actual tapes of the Soviet conversations before the shootdown. Making excerpts public would be a very effective step, and I think we should do so.

—We are checking with other governments with citizen victims about their plans for memorial services, and keeping in touch with Congressman McDonald's family on their plans. I think a memorial service at the National Cathedral with you and the Ambassadors of those countries in attendance would be a fitting gesture, and if you agree I will be recommending a time to you soon.

## **Tab 1**

### **Options Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>8</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### *Near-Term Actions on Civil Aviation*

At today's NSC meeting, we should consider concrete measures to register our condemnation of the Soviet attack on the Korean Air Lines aircraft and to impose a real cost on the Soviets.<sup>9</sup> To maximize the cost and impose it quickly, we should concentrate on steps that can most efficiently exploit international outrage and generate multilateral solidarity. The world's attention is focused on Soviet use of unprovoked force against peaceful air travellers.

Thus, we believe it important that our measures be concentrated in the civil aviation area and fully reflect the international outrage this incident has evoked. We need to

spark international penalization of this egregious act without lending credibility to the inevitable Soviet claim that we are using the incident to freeze East-West relations even further. By sticking to the humanitarian and air safety aspects, in other words, we can avoid sacrificing the unity of outrage that presently exists. We think the following package of measures strikes the right balance.

1. *We should seek immediate agreement by as many countries as possible to refuse to accept flight plans for Aeroflot for a minimum period of 30-60 days or until the Soviets have provided a satisfactory response to the international community.* This would have the immediate advantage of registering a broad international condemnation of the Soviet action, but within a specific time frame so that it would be acceptable within the international community. Critical to the success of this effort will be securing the cooperation of the Canadians (since Montreal is the only remaining Aeroflot destination north of the Rio Grande), the Japanese, the Koreans, and several European countries. We would begin by diplomatic approaches to these critical countries and expand the effort, assuming we have a reasonable chance of success.

2. *We should seek to suspend non-safety related ongoing discussions between the USSR and other national civil aviation bodies* with a view to interrupting such arrangements as route awards, requests for the waiver of landing fees, etc. This measure, which would be raised with other governments in connection with step one, might have considerable impact on Soviet plans to expand their civil aviation operations worldwide, but could be acceptable to many in the international community, since it would not affect current operations once the steps taken under option #1 were terminated.

3. *Boycott.* The Air Line Pilots' Association (ALPA) has already communicated with Andropov, Dobrynin, and ICAO, and is considering steps to implement an international boycott aimed at halting Aeroflot service outside the USSR and international airline service to Moscow as well. In addition, airlines may wish to join this effort. Other American labor leaders as well as foreign pilots' groups may be contemplating similar steps.

We will be meeting with these groups to learn more about their intentions, which could well serve to emphasize the level of international reaction.

4. *Initiate procedures to censure the USSR at a special meeting of the ICAO Council next week.* The President of the ICAO Council is attempting to arrange an urgent meeting of the Council, at which we will seek an ICAO investigation of events leading to the destruction of the KAL flight. That meeting will probably occur early next week. We may wish to ask the UN Security Council to reinforce this request. Our subsequent tactics will depend on developments in both fora.

5. *Strong Reaffirmation of Existing Sanction.* We would make a strong public reaffirmation that our present suspension of all regularly-scheduled Aeroflot service to this country remains the policy of this Administration and we have no plans to alter it. U.S. reactions to the shutdown showed that much of the public is not aware of this sanction, which has been very keenly felt by the Soviets. There has been pressure building to lift this sanction so that the reaffirmation would further underscore our abhorrence of this particular Soviet action.

6. *Claims.* Under international law, the U.S. would be entitled to make a claim against the Soviet Union for the

wrongful death of our citizens. Korea and other affected countries would also have this right. There is precedent for making such a claim for compensation and for demanding that they take all appropriate measures to prevent a recurrence, inform us concerning those measures and punish all persons responsible for the incident. We will prepare such a claim against the Soviets, to be conveyed through diplomatic channels, and discuss the matter with the Koreans with a view to including any claim they may wish us to present on their behalf.

*7. Cancel interline ticketing arrangements with Aeroflot.* At present, Aeroflot has arrangements to write tickets for travel on other airlines. If this and the attendant appearance of Aeroflot flights in other airline computers were cancelled, this would present the Soviets with serious impediments to selling tickets for travel into and outside the USSR. We will investigate the feasibility under U.S. domestic law of requiring our airlines to cancel these arrangements and the willingness of other countries to join us in similar steps.

We also considered a review of all outstanding U.S., Allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry. On balance, we think this would get in the way of achieving the more immediate steps above and might even jeopardize the safety of international aviation operations by cutting sales of necessary safety-related equipment to the USSR.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Hartman and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed

for Burt, Hartman, and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 2.

<sup>2</sup> These talking points for Shultz were prepared for the September 2 NSPG meeting on the KAL incident. See [Document 91](#).

<sup>3</sup> The TASS statement was issued on the September 2. For the full text, see "Text of Tass Statement On Downing of Airliner," *New York Times*, September 3, 1983, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Representatives Boland and Zablocki proposed an amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act to stop U.S. support for covert military operations in Nicaragua.

<sup>5</sup> For the full text of the September 2 statement of Charles M. Lichenstein, the Acting Permanent U.S. Representative to the United Nations, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 3-5. The *New York Times* reported that several UNSC members denounced Soviet actions as "barbarous," "nothing short of murder," and "quite simply a massacre in the sky." (Bernard D. Nossiter, "'Murder' and 'Massacre' Charged As U.N. Council starts Its Debate," *New York Times*, September 3, 1983, p. 1) The Security Council held six meetings between September 2 and 12 to consider the KAL incident. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1983, pp. 218-223.

<sup>6</sup> Tab 2, a Draft Presidential Statement, was not found.

<sup>7</sup> September 6.

<sup>8</sup> Secret.

<sup>9</sup> This options paper was distributed to participants for the September 2 NSPG meeting. (National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner)

**90. Memorandum From the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)  
to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 2, 1983

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting: Soviet Shoot-Down of KAL Airliner

*INTRODUCTION*

The shooting down of a Korean airliner demands a serious international response. The scale of the tragedy is dramatic—surely one of the worst in civil aviation history.

The Soviets have a long history, beginning in 1946, of shooting down unarmed aircraft near their borders. Moreover, they have had a policy of electronic deception of radio air navigation aids which have lured many aircraft across their borders, only to be shot down. This is the second time they have shot down a Korean airliner.

Some will want to view this incident in a narrow context. However, it is worth considering whether the Soviets were deliberately seeking an opportunity to increase tensions in Asia in order—after events in Lebanon, Chad, Central America—to test us in multiple theaters simultaneously. It is entirely likely that the decision to attack the airliner was made at a very high level.

It is therefore important that you focus the discussion at today's meeting on the broader ramifications of this incident. What does it say about how far the Soviets may now be prepared to go in trying to intimidate our Asian



allies—who, like the Japanese, have shown some greater willingness to take new steps for effective defense—or our European allies on the verge of INF deployments? What does it say about the growing cynicism and boldness of the current Soviet leadership? And, based on the answer to this question, what does it say about the character and possibilities for our bilateral relationship in the immediate future?

The chief dilemma over the near term is how to translate the concern of the world into meaningful actions without making it appear that we are improperly capitalizing on the tragedy itself. How to devise measures that can be sustained? How to focus the existing rage in ways that enable us to influence domestic and international reaction of others on important issues before us; e.g., Soviet supported terrorism, use of chemical biological weapons, etc.

In past cases where the Soviets have committed egregious crimes they and their apologists have attempted through disinformation and lies to turn the focus away from their actions and somehow blame the U.S. or its allies. Unless we take the offensive they will try to put *us* on the defensive.

We need to think hard about an appropriate response, and we have to consider what message the Soviets may have tried to send as George Shultz prepares to meet next week with Gromyko in Madrid. If we decide that meeting should proceed, as George has announced, we need to consider very carefully the message we want to send.

## *OBJECTIVES*

Your personal statement and early return have already set the tone of our concern.<sup>2</sup> We must now ensure that follow on actions are directed and structured to achieve recognizable and coherent objectives. These objectives must be shared by the American people, the Congress, our major allies and reflect our status as leader of the free world. We believe that our actions in the coming days and weeks must be designed to achieve the following objectives:

- *Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register an Appropriate Political Protest.* The incident presents us with the opportunity to reverse the false moral and political "peacemaker" perception that the Soviets have been cultivating. Their active propaganda in this regard has cast the Soviet Union as flexible, legitimate and searching for peace. This has, in turn, created severe problems in our efforts to convince the free world of their true objectives. Actions to achieve this objective should be aimed at securing domestic and international support for your programs to strengthen western security.
- *Justice.* We must be seen as a leader (but not alone) in the international community in calling for justice. Civilized societies demand punishment and restitution in order to deter and raise perceived costs of future egregious acts. Despite numerous incidents of this kind, the Soviets have never acceptably investigated, reported or identified their victims. We must demand that they do so now. In order to be effective, the action we take to achieve this objective must be tailored to appear proportional to the crime. We cannot be perceived as too harsh, too weak or ineffective in the sanctions we call for or endorse.

- *Bolster the confidence of Intimidated States.* What we do or fail to do in supporting the Koreans and Japanese in the days and weeks ahead will be a telling signal to friends and allies alike. We must be responsive and cooperative, without appearing excessive, particularly in the case of military support.

### *ILLUSTRATIVE ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES*

- *Actions to Reverse Soviet "Peacemaker" Image and Register Political Protest.*

- A major Presidential speech addressing the objectives and methods of Soviet grand strategy.

- Review the degree to which our presence at negotiating tables with the Soviets reinforces the idea that the Soviets are good-faith negotiators. Consider withdrawal from various or all negotiations.

- Diplomatic effort to secure public statements and resolutions condemning the Soviet Union in relevant international fora.

- Major information campaign by USIA.

- Consider cancelling the forthcoming Shultz-Gromyko meeting. Such a meeting could be boycotted until the Soviets provide an explanation for the incident, an apology and reparations.

- Consider closing the Soviet consulate in San Francisco; it is a center for their spy network against the U.S. electronics industry.

- *Actions to secure justice.*

—Soviets grant unimpeded Western access to crash site.

—Soviets publicly document to world-wide aviation bodies their procedures in the case of airliners crossing into Soviet airspace.

—Soviets provide specific assurances against destructive force being used again against straying airliners.

—Consider seizure or attachment of Soviet owned commercial assets in the U.S. in connection with filing an international claim against the USSR on behalf of American citizen victims.

—Soviets document that no future incidents of electronic desception of radio air navigation signals will occur.

—Soviets must provide full reparations to Korea and to the families of the dead on accepted international scales.

—Options should be prepared concerning internationally implementable procedures to impede Aeroflot activities, world-wide, and discourage flights to the Soviet Union for a specified period of time.

—Review all outstanding U.S., allied and third country equipment sales to the Soviet aviation industry and seek immediate agreement from as many countries as possible to terminate or suspend indefinitely these deliveries.

- *Actions to Bolster Confidence of Intimidated States*

- Lease or sell AWACS to Japan to help defend regional air routes.
- Possible acceleration of F-16 deployment in Japan.
- Carrier battle group deployment to the region.
- Discussions with allies in the area to bolster regional security arrangements.

The NSPG meeting tonight will be too brief to discuss all of these matters. This paper, however, provides you with some thoughts to guide the discussion. Most importantly, in whatever we decide to do or not to do, we should keep these objectives in mind.

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR 108, NSPG 0068, 2 Sep 83 Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. On September 2, Reagan returned to Washington from his ranch in California, arriving at the White House at 5:43 p.m. The NSPG meeting Clark discussed in this memorandum began in the Situation Room at 6 p.m. From a comment in Shultz's memoir (see [Document 84](#)), it is clear that Clark was with Reagan in California, and likely returned with him to Washington on Air Force One. See also [footnote 3, Document 88](#).

<sup>2</sup> In addition to the September 1 statement (see [Document 84](#)), Reagan spoke to the press at Point Magu Naval Air Station when he was departing from California. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, pp. 1223-1224.

# **91. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 2, 1983

NSC—Sit [Situation] Rm [Room]

President

V.P.

GPS [George Shultz] Even if USSR thought it was a US recon [reconnaissance] plane—they shot it down w/o any inquiry. No hotline, etc.

Shows they'd do a 1st strike. We should use this to help us get Big Defense Budget & to get rid of Boland-Zablocki amend [amendment].<sup>2</sup>

& maybe in Lebanon.<sup>3</sup>

Sanctions—try not to hurt us.

USSR—says they regret loss of human life but blame us.

Options State Civil aviation options RR [Ronald Reagan]  
But something to get reparations CW [Caspar Weinberger]  
—Ct [Court] of Int'l Justice—& direct demand of USSR for  
reparations RR—they shot down our planes in 50s & 60s  
RR—what if we just turn around a USSR ship going into  
Corinto<sup>4</sup>

CWW—seek meetings of NATO & ASEAN



RR—get other countries to join with us for reparations & in actions to block USSR Aeroflot RR—make public list of US planes shot down by USSR in 50s & 60s Don Regan— Economic sanctions probably won't get agreement of other countries Stop tourism & ask other nations to do same until we could get answers fr [from] USSR

Stop imports from USSR—allies wouldn't [unclear— budge?]

Titanium & chrome No on blocking USSR assets deposited CWW rescue task force INF

GPS Gromyko meeting

General Vessey—[unclear—Soviet recon missions?]

RR need arms reductions. We should proceed & meet with them.

Rescue mission

Reparations.

Stop sending ships to Nicaragua or we'll stop them for you GPS Mistake not to go to Madrid Mistake to refuse to talk to people Shorter meeting

Agenda

Shoot down

Human rights—Shcharansky Compliance with treaties Ed Meese—need to do more things that relate to air safety Memorial service at Nat'l Cathedral and [unclear— churches?]

RR—Attitude

INF—great opportunity to go after USSR—the best way to stop deployment—if you eliminate then we won't deploy. But we [unclear—can or could?] leave table if you [unclear—leave Eur?]

You have [unclear]

Statement by President Planning—what can be done on behalf of victims [unclear—Tape?]

GPS—Range of options

[unclear—Comments?]

[unclear—call for?] react [reaction] & condemnation & general support Lebanon—McFarlane

<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, Box 9, Notes Set B, 1983 #25-41. No classification marking. The editor transcribed this text from Weinberger's handwritten notes of the NSPG meeting. An image of the notes is [Appendix D](#). The NSPG meeting to "discuss the Soviet attack on the Korean civil airliner" was held in the Situation Room from 6 p.m. to 7:57 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No formal record of the meeting was found.

<sup>2</sup> See [footnote 5, Document 89](#).

<sup>3</sup> Weinberger wrote "Arms reduction" in the margin in a box on the left-hand side.

<sup>4</sup> Corinto is a port city on the northwest Pacific coast of Nicaragua.

## **92. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 3, 1983, 1451Z

252822. Eyes Only for Chargé. Subject: Eagleburger-Sokolov Meeting September 2: Korean Airliner Incident; Lebanon.

1. S—Entire text

2. Summary: Soviet Chargé Sokolov called on Under Secretary Eagleburger September 2 to deliver Soviet démarche on Korean airliner incident. Démarche is substantively identical to TASS statement released earlier in the day (minus direct personal attack on President), alleging airliner was on pre-planned, U.S.-sponsored espionage mission and accusing U.S. of “dirty insinuations” about Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup> In response, Eagleburger handed Sokolov copy of statement made by the Secretary prior to the meeting rejecting substance of TASS statement.<sup>3</sup> In response to question from Burt, Sokolov said he had no reply to U.S. request concerning search and rescue operations in Sea of Japan. Eagleburger also used meeting as opportunity to deliver démarche on Lebanon situation condemning August 31 TASS statement and unconstructive Soviet behavior in area. Sokolov rejected U.S. characterization of USSR and its behavior and stood by TASS statement. End summary.

3. Soviet Chargé Sokolov called on Under Secretary Eagleburger at 1800 September 2 at his request to present a Soviet oral statement on the KAL shootdown. Eagleburger was accompanied by EUR Assistant Secretary

Burt, EUR/SOV Director Simons and Eagleburger aide Johnson; Sokolov was alone.

4. Sokolov began by saying he assumed Eagleburger had read that afternoon's TASS statement, but he was instructed to make an "oral statement" which repeated some of the TASS elements but was not confined to them. He drew Eagleburger's attention especially to the last paragraph, and left a Russian text with an unofficial embassy English translation (Department's translation below, para 9).

5. After reading through the Soviet statement, Eagleburger commented that we had indeed seen the TASS statement, and handed Sokolov a copy of the Secretary's remarks to the press at 1745 (septel). Sokolov said he would study it. Eagleburger said we would make the White House aware of the Soviet statement.

6. Eagleburger then said he would like to switch subjects, and provided Sokolov with the text of a U.S. démarche on the situation in Lebanon (text in para 10).

7. After glancing through the text, Sokolov said he would reiterate the substance of the August 31 TASS statement on this subject. In the Soviet view it accurately describes both the situation and the actions of the various parties. He could not accept our characterization of the Soviet Union or Soviet behavior. The Soviet position was well known, and he did not have to repeat its details.

8. Burt asked Sokolov whether he had a reply to our request concerning search and rescue efforts involving the KAL aircraft. Sokolov said the Embassy has received only some coordinates for planes flying September 2, and had not received a reply to our request.

9. Begin text of Soviet démarche on Korean airliner incident (Department's translation):

—On the night from August 31 to September 1 of this year, an unidentified plane grossly violated the Soviet state border and intruded deep into the Soviet Union's air space. The intruder plane had deviated from the existing international route in the direction of the Soviet Union's territory by up to 500 kilometers and spent more than two hours over the Kamchatka Peninsula, the area of the Sea of Okhotsk, and the island of Sakhalin.

—In violation of international regulations, the plane flew without navigation lights, did not react to radio signals of the Soviet dispatcher services, and itself made no attempts to establish communication contact.

—It was natural that, during the time the unidentified intruder plane was in the USSR's air space, Soviet anti-air defense aircraft were ordered aloft which repeatedly tried to establish contact with the plane using generally accepted signals and to take it to the nearest airfield in the territory of the Soviet Union. The intruder plane, however, ignored all this. Over Sakhalin Island, a Soviet aircraft fired warning shots with tracer shells along the flight path of the plane.

—Soon after this, the intruder plane left the limits of Soviet air space and continued its flight toward the Sea of Japan. For about ten minutes it was within the observation zone of radar systems, after which it could no longer be observed.

—The American side has already been informed that, as a result of measures we had taken, debris of an aircraft were discovered in the vicinity of Moneron Island. The facts which became known thereafter give ground to believe that

the itinerary and the nature of the flight were not accidental. One's attention is drawn to the fact that already in the first report about the disappearance of a South Korean airliner, reference was made to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

—It is indicative that now, after the fact, the American side not only officially admits the fact of that plane's violation of Soviet air space, but also cites data which indicate that the relevant U.S. services followed the flight throughout its duration in the most attentive manner.

—So one may ask that, if it were an ordinary flight of a civil aircraft which was under continuing observation, then why were no steps taken by the American side to end the gross violation of the air space of the USSR and to get the plane back to an international flight route?

—Why did the American authorities, which now resort to all kinds of dirty insinuations about the USSR, not try to establish contact with the Soviet side and provide it with the necessary data about this flight? Neither was done, although the time for this was more than sufficient.

—It is appropriate to recall that instances of deliberate violation of the state frontiers of the Soviet Union by American planes, including in the Far East, are far from rare. Protests have repeatedly been lodged with the U.S. Government in this regard.

—In the light of these facts, the intrusion into the air space by the mentioned plane cannot be regarded in any other way than a pre-planned act. It was obviously thought possible to achieve special intelligence objectives without hindrance using civilian planes as a cover.



—Moreover, there is reason to believe that those who organized this provocation had deliberately desired a further aggravation of the international situation, striving to smear the Soviet Union, to sow hostility to it and to cast aspersions on the Soviet peaceloving policy. This is also illustrated by the slanderous propaganda campaign which has been unleashed in the United States and which has been joined by American officials.

—The Soviet Union, as is known, has expressed regret over the loss of human life and at the same time has resolutely condemned those who consciously or as a result of criminal disregard have allowed the death of people and are now trying to use this occurrence for unseemly political purposes.

—It should be clear to the U.S. Government that continuation by them of a policy aimed at whipping up further tensions in Soviet-American relations and in the world as a whole neither would be in the interests of our two countries, nor would it help resolve the major problems which really exist.

[Omitted here is the text of the démarche on Lebanon.]

**Shultz**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830008-0162. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer, Burt, McKinley, and in S/S-O; approved by Eagleburger.

<sup>2</sup> See [footnote 3, Document 89](#).

<sup>3</sup> Shultz issued a statement at 5:45 p.m. on September 2 to rebut the TASS statement. (Department of State *Bulletin*,

October 1983, p. 5) See also Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 364.

**93. Information Memorandum From the  
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council  
(Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 3, 1983

**SUBJECT**

The Soviet Union and the Western Hemisphere

This memorandum assesses the Soviet Union's growing involvement in the Western Hemisphere. The Executive Summary, Tab 1, includes suggested talking points for your meeting with Gromyko at the UN. Tab 2 provides additional background information on: the Soviet Union's evolving attitude toward the Americas, possible future Soviet actions, the U.S. response, and how to discuss this problem with the Soviets.<sup>2</sup>

**Tab 1**

**Executive Summary of a Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, undated

**THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE  
(Executive Summary)**

The Soviet Union's growing assertiveness in the Western Hemisphere poses new challenges for the U.S. Until the mid-1970's the Soviets placed the region at or near the bottom of their foreign policy agenda. But during the 1970's the Soviets had reason to reevaluate their assumptions about Latin America. The Soviets apparently

have now accepted the validity of the Cuban “armed struggle” thesis, at least for Central America.

Elements of the trend toward greater Soviet involvement include the use of Cuba as a political-military proxy, increased weapons deliveries to Cuba, intensified use of Cuba as a Soviet military platform, military assistance for Nicaragua and Grenada, and expanded trade with South America.

The cumulative effect of Moscow’s actions in the Western Hemisphere is to undermine the two-ocean security buffer that the U.S. traditionally has relied upon for protection of the Americas from its major adversaries. There is also a growing danger that Soviet miscalculation of how important the region is to the U.S. could lead to a superpower military confrontation.

Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere seems unlikely, even in response to INF deployments in Western Europe. There are, however, a number of steps Soviets might take over the next few years that would cause the U.S. serious problems. Of most immediate concern is the possibility of:

- expansion of direct Soviet military involvement in Nicaragua,
- support for Cuban combat troops in Nicaragua,
- delivery through intermediaries of sophisticated weapons to the Salvadoran guerrillas.

There are no magic “linkage” or “talking tough” strategies that will make the Soviet threat in this hemisphere disappear. The core of our response must remain the set of concrete actions we take *in this hemisphere* to demonstrate

our resolve and to make the region a less favorable environment for the Soviets.

But our concrete actions can be reinforced by a policy of communicating our concerns clearly and forthrightly to the Soviets so that they can avoid a miscalculation that could be disastrous for both sides. Our recent actions—the President's strong public commitment to protecting U.S. interests in Central America, the *contra* program, the training facility in Honduras, and large-scale military maneuvers—provide a window in which we can now convey a somewhat sterner message to the Soviets.

Our most serious and immediate concern is the Soviet/Cuban role in Central America. We want the Soviets to 1) pressure Cuba and Nicaragua to end their support for Salvadoran and other Central American revolutionaries, and 2) sever Soviet/Cuban military ties with the Sandinistas. By setting forth these long-range objectives to the Soviets at this point, we can help them avoid miscalculation and condition them to their ultimate acceptance. We should place our Central America concerns within the broad trend of increased Soviet involvement in the Western Hemisphere, however, lest the Soviets be encouraged to move in areas where we have neglected to raise objections.

We suggest that you make your UN meeting with Gromyko the primary vehicle for a broad discussion on Latin America. Following are points that might be included in the discussion:

- Soviet and Cuban actions in the hemisphere have grown increasingly bold and provocative over the last few years.

—These actions include support for Central American subversives, the military buildup in Nicaragua, the modernization of the Cuban armed forces, growing Cuban/Soviet security ties with Grenada and Suriname, and more intensive Soviet use of Cuba as a military platform (mention as an illustration the recent TU-142 Bear F ASW aircraft flights out of Cuba, since we have not raised this with the Soviets yet; we should not, however, label the flights “unacceptable.”)

—We do not view these as isolated actions, but as part of a pattern of increased Soviet interference in the Americas. We note with particular concern that the Soviet Union now seems to support fully the Cuban doctrine of “armed struggle” as the best path to revolution in Central America.

—The U.S. has important interests in Central America; the Soviet Union does not. The Soviet Union and Cuba should have no illusions about our determination to uphold our interests. Such illusions will only increase the chance of dangerous confrontation, which neither side seeks.

—You should also know that we will hold the Soviet Union responsible for the activities of its clients that directly or indirectly affect U.S. interests in the Americas. This includes the sending of jet fighters or armed Cuban forces to Nicaragua, or any similar escalation, which would be simply unacceptable.

—We are pursuing a policy that we hope will lead to a peaceful solution to the Central America crisis.



—U.S. policy is working. We intend to provide the Salvadoran government with enough military assistance to turn the tide against the FMLN-FDR, and we will continue to press for reforms to broaden that government's popular appeal. In contrast, there is every indication that the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is losing popular support and that the *contras* are growing, and will continue to grow, in strength.

—In sum, it is clear that events in Central America are running in our favor.

—We intend to press our advantages until Nicaragua and Cuba terminate their support for Central American revolutionaries and Nicaragua severs its military ties with the Soviet bloc. We also support the Contadora process, and hope that it can reach a solution consistent with these goals, as well as the other goals of the Act of San Jose.

—But if the negotiations process fails, you should know we are prepared to employ the other means at our disposal to uphold our interests.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 9/1-15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by R. Braibanti on September 2; cleared by M. Wiznitzer (PM/RSA), L. Einaudi (ARA/PPC), and for information by M. Minton (EUR/SOV). Braibanti initialed for all clearing officials. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the covering memorandum of this packet, indicating Shultz saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Tab 2 is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Braibanti.

## 94. Editorial Note

After the National Security Planning Group meeting on the evening of September 2, 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz and members of his staff worked to find a balance between dealing with Soviet culpability in the downing of KAL 007 and maintaining recent progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. (See [Document 91](#).) As Shultz recalled in his memoir, by September 3: “Our approach was still evolving, but already decisions had been taken on what *not* to do. We were not going to cancel my meeting with Gromyko. We were not going to pull out of the INF and START talks. This was not going to be easy to manage. The knee-jerk reaction of Cap and other hardliners was to stop all contacts. Others pointed to the Nixon-Kissinger ‘linkage’ approach to US-Soviet relations to argue that we must not move forward in any area when an outrageous act is committed in another area. I regarded President Reagan’s support for Paul Nitze and Ed Rowny’s return to the arms control talks as courageous in this charged atmosphere.

“I told my staff I wanted four papers, one on financial claims against the Soviets, another on how to approach the United Nations, a third on civil aviation matters, and a fourth on the nature of potential boycotts. [See [Document 100](#).] ‘We must bring other countries along with us,’ I instructed.

“As we sought to prove what had happened, evidence mounted against the Soviets. Public emotions escalated correspondingly. By noon on Sunday [September 4], we received from the Japanese the actual tape recording of the Soviet fighter pilot talking with his ground controller: the pilot had followed the airliner, assessed and reported on its position, and under orders from his ground control, shot it

down. The pilot's words, 'The target is destroyed,' would chill the world when it was played at the United Nations and subsequently on the news, worldwide." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 366)

According to the President's Daily Diary, there were two meetings on the KAL incident on September 4: From 9:30 to 10 a.m. President Ronald Reagan met in the Oval Office with Vice President George Bush, Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Chief of Staff James Baker, Counselor to the President Edwin Meese, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs William Clark, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, and other White House staff; then from 10:05 to 12:45 p.m., the President and his team met with Congressional leaders in the Cabinet room. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary that evening: "To the Oval Office for a meeting with Congressional leadership—Dems. & Repubs. Met with our team at 9:30 A.M.—general meeting at 10 A.M. Meeting was very good—ran til 1 P.M. Dealt 1st & longest with Korean plane. Ran a tape of conversation between 2 Soviet pilots including the one who stated he had locked his radar guided air to air missiles, launched them & 'target destroyed.' I'm going on air 8 P.M. tomorrow night to tell the story & announce our plans. Strom Thurmond made a great suggestion. We know the whereabouts of many K.G.B. agents [. . .]. We're looking into the practicality of this. [. . .] That would be shooting ourselves in the foot." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 259; brackets are in the original)

Shultz recalled in his memoir that during this meeting there was speculation over "whether Gromyko would cancel our meeting in Madrid under these circumstances.

Cap argued once again that we should be the ones to cancel.

“Afterward, President Reagan telephoned to ask me about the idea of the KGB expulsions. He didn’t think much of the idea; neither did I. The Soviets would retaliate with their own expulsions, I said, and that would hurt us, as an open society, more than it would hurt them. ‘We do not want to turn this whole thing into a U.S.-Soviet issue,’ I stressed once again.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 366)

On Labor Day, September 5, Reagan wrote in his diary: “only thing scheduled for the day was lunch at the pool with the Wicks & at 8 P.M. a T.V. speech on the Korean airline massacre. Well I put on my trunks but the speech draft arrived at 9:30 A.M.—in fact 2 drafts. I didn’t like either one so I spent the day til 5:15 P.M. rewriting. It turned out OK & everyone seems to think it was A. O.K. I spent the day in my trunks sitting on a towel in my study but changed into a blue suit for the speech. It went well & everyone seemed pleased.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 260) A handwritten draft of this speech is in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Subject File, Korean Airlines Shootdown (08/31/1983–November 1983) (12/22). Shultz recalled: “I made a note to check carefully the president’s upcoming speech, which would be televised nationwide Monday evening, to be sure that someone didn’t slip the KGB expulsion idea in at the last minute. Only I and a very few others knew how intent the president was on developing his relationship with the Soviets and that he had sent a personal letter to Andropov in early July.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 366) For Reagan’s letter, see [Document 70](#).

At 8 p.m. that evening, Reagan delivered a televised address to the nation from the Oval Office on the Soviet attack on KAL Flight 007. After expressing his condolences, Reagan declared: "But despite the savagery of their crime, the universal reaction against it, and the evidence of their complicity, the Soviets still refuse to tell the truth. They have persistently refused to admit that their pilot fired on the Korean aircraft. Indeed, they have not even told their own people that a plane was shot down." Reagan continued by presenting the available facts of the case. Then, in a dramatic moment, he played the tape of the communications between the Soviet pilot and ground control, and explained the actions of the pilot. Reagan concluded: "They deny the deed, but in their conflicting and misleading protestations, the Soviets reveal that, yes, shooting down a plane—even one with hundreds of innocent men, women, children, and babies—is a part of their normal procedure if that plane is in what they claim as their airspace.

"They owe the world an apology and an offer to join the rest of the world in working out a system to protect against this ever happening again." For the full text of Reagan's speech, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, pages 1227-1230.



## 95. National Security Decision Directive 102<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 5, 1983

### *U.S. RESPONSE TO SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF KAL AIRLINER (U)*

#### *INTRODUCTION*

This directive defines the measures the United States will undertake to respond to the Soviet Union's shooting down of a Korean Airlines civil airliner, an act that resulted in the loss of 269 lives. This action demands a serious international and U.S. response, with primary focus on action by the world community. This Soviet attack underscores once again the refusal of the USSR to abide by normal standards of civilized behavior and thus confirms the basis of our existing policy of realism and strength. (U)

#### *OBJECTIVES*

- *Seek Justice.* We must consult with, and help to lead, the international community in calling for justice. Civilized societies demand punishment and restitution to deter, and raise the costs of, future egregious acts. We have a responsibility to impress upon the world that the Soviets, at a minimum, owe the international community:

- A full account of what happened, an apology, an admission of responsibility, and appropriate punishments to those responsible. (U)

—Immediate access to the crash site for joint efforts by Korea, Japan, and the United States to recover the bodies of their citizens and, if possible, the wreckage of the Korean airliner. (U)

—Firm assurances that the USSR will not use destructive force against unarmed aircraft in the future, including necessary alterations in Soviet procedures for handling cases in which aircraft mistakenly cross its airspace. (U)

—Agreement to provide compensation for the benefit of the aggrieved families and KAL. (U)

- *Demonstrate Resistance to Intimidation.* Bolster the confidence of our Asian friends, and others, and demonstrate that Soviet intimidation will not achieve its intended end of discouraging our friends from cooperating with us, particularly on mutual security concerns. (S)

- *Advance Understanding of the Contrast Between Soviet Words and Deeds.* Soviet brutality in this incident presents an opportunity to reverse the false moral and political “peacemaker” perception that their regime has been cultivating. This image has complicated the efforts of the Free World to illuminate the USSR’s true objectives. (U)

## *ACTION*

In order to realize the objectives above, the United States will take the following bilateral and multilateral actions in the areas of diplomacy, aviation security and safety, and regional confidence building:

- *Diplomacy and Justice.* The following steps should be continued or undertaken immediately to mobilize the

international community:

—Conduct intensive efforts to secure coordinated international action. (U)

—Seek maximum condemnation of the Soviet Union in the U.N. Security Council and provide wide dissemination of statements made in these sessions. (U)

—Announce that the US-Soviet Transportation Agreement will not be renewed and suspend all discussion on the issue of consulates in Kiev and New York and on a new exchanges agreement. (U)

—Continue to conduct a search in international waters, in consultation with Japan and Korea, for the remains of the aircraft. Assure the government of Korea that we will vigorously support their request to conduct, participate in, or observe salvage operations. Indicate our clear willingness and desire to assist the government of Korea in recovering the bodies and flight recorder as appropriate and in accord with international law. (U)

—Make joint request with the government of Japan for Soviet authorization for access to Soviet territorial waters and airspace to search for remains of the downed aircraft. (U)

—Initiate a major public diplomatic effort to keep international and domestic attention focused on the Soviet action and the objectives outlined above. (U)

• *Aviation Safety and Security.* The United States will work with—and help to lead—other members of the international community in formulating and implementing measures that

will adversely affect the operation of the Soviet national airline, Aeroflot. The United States will also focus immediate attention on measures to enhance airline safety and security, while vigorously pursuing recovery efforts and the issue of reparations. Accordingly, we will:

—Seek international governmental support for punitive actions in the civil aviation area for a period to be determined, with duration dependent upon the extent to which the Soviets demonstrate a willingness to honor essential standards of aviation safety. If the Soviets fail to provide concrete reasons to show that they are truly willing to observe such standards, we will consult with other nations about renewing the measures. (S)

—Specifically seek immediate agreement by as many countries as possible to stop Aeroflot flights into their countries, to cancel interline ticketing arrangements, and to take other possible measures to inhibit Aeroflot operations. We should especially seek Canada's and Japan's support for these and other possible sanctions against Aeroflot. We will avoid any actions that could affect the safety of international civilian aviation. (S)

—Support appropriate measures against Aeroflot by U.S. and international non-government groups, in their efforts to isolate Soviet aviation. Consult with other governments to further this objective. (S)

—Work to suspend non-safety related discussions between the USSR and other national civil aviation bodies. (S)

—Work to achieve a meaningful censure of the Soviet Union at a special meeting of ICAO Council, with reinforcing measures at ICAO to be pursued.<sup>2</sup> (S)

—Develop an omnibus U.S. claim against the Soviet Union for compensation for the loss of life and property. Offer to present to the USSR similar claims on behalf of the Korean victims. Also coordinate claims with the governments of other countries with citizens on the aircraft to dramatize the USSR's responsibility for its actions. (U)

—Reaffirm the existing U.S. sanctions against Aeroflot that predate the Soviet attack on KAL. (U)

- *Regional*

—Recognize that this act occurs in a theater where the Soviets have increasingly sought to intimidate our friends and discourage them from expanding security cooperation with the United States. (S)

—Continue to consult actively with our Asian friends to develop measures we can take to further bolster their confidence. Provide tangible signals to the Soviets through this allied cooperation that the USSR's campaign of intimidation will only accelerate, not retard, our support for friends. (S)

—Actions taken to advance this objective need not be directly linked to the aircraft tragedy, but should stand as a quiet, independent signal to the Soviets of our resolve to resist their intimidation. (S)

## *IMPLEMENTATION*

The Secretary of State, in concert with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of USIA, and the Administrator of the FAA, will develop a coordinated action plan to implement the provisions of this Directive. This plan should include a legislative, public affairs, and diplomatic strategy and be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by Wednesday, September 7, 1983.<sup>3</sup> (U)

Under the direction of the Secretary of State, an interagency group will continue to evaluate and explore additional possibilities for international and U.S. actions consistent with this Directive. The first report on this continuing effort should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs by September 14, 1983. (U)

**Ronald Reagan**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 102, U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner. Secret. On September 6, Clark sent the signed NSDD to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Kirkpatrick, Vessey, Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole, Wick, and Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration J. Lynn Helms. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron November 1983 (2/4))

<sup>2</sup> The International Civil Aviation Organization Council met September 15-16. See [footnote 2, Document 112](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 100](#).



**96. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 5, 1983

SUBJECT

Your Presentation to Gromyko at Madrid

Attached is a revised version of the presentation I am suggesting that:

- incorporates the points you wanted made on our direct military-to-military links proposal;
- reflects the more forthcoming tone and specific requests the Soviets have been making about our search operations near the crash site;
- tells Gromyko formally that it is not now possible to proceed with extension of the Transportation Agreement or further discussion of consulates and a new exchanges agreement; and
- puts U.S. markers on Central America and the Middle East on a contingency basis only, since taking the initiative on regional issues is too likely to invite a broad-ranging diatribe designed to divert attention from the issues you wish to raise.

The NSC has asked for a new Memorandum to the President on the Gromyko meeting to help prepare for your pre-departure meeting tomorrow, and we have sent it to you separately.<sup>2</sup>

The presentation I am suggesting focusses on three set of issues: the airliner (and the President's proposal for military-to-military communications links), arms control treaty compliance (missile testing and especially the radar), and human rights (Shcharanskiy plus Jewish emigration/anti-Semitism).

All three issues fall basically into the same category of Soviet behavior that constitutes a threat to international order. On all three we are justly accusing the Soviets of irresponsible conduct that makes it difficult to move forward in any field, and demanding corrective action at Gromyko's level. All three fit well within the conceptual framework suggested by Jack Matlock for the meeting as originally planned: we cannot solve all problems, but we need to deal seriously with the three interrelated problem areas of use of force to settle disputes, the high and rising level of armaments, and the shortage of trust and confidence in the relationship.

At the same time, there is a basic tension between the airliner tragedy, arms control compliance and the Middle East/Central America—where we wish basically to warn the Soviets at Gromyko's level—and Shcharanskiy—where we want the Soviets to release him. The tougher we are on the first three, the less forthcoming Gromyko is likely to be on Shcharanskiy.

There is no way to eliminate this tension, but we can perhaps reduce it by shaping the tone, order and format of your presentation. Our suggestions are embodied in the attached text. They are:

—Use Jack's conceptual framework in setting the scene, and key each issue you raise to it: the airliner illustrates use of force, but also the Soviet arms buildup, and it

damages trust and confidence; arms control compliance is a trust and confidence issue first, then an arms buildup issue; Shcharanskiy is pre-eminently a matter of trust and confidence; we wish to move forward if the Soviets are willing, but they are making things immensely difficult by their actions and unwillingness to explain on all these issues.

—Break the meeting into a session with advisors dealing with the airliner and arms control compliance, and a more private session on Shcharanskiy and Jewish emigration/anti-Semitism.

—Conclude the session with advisors by a summation that ticks off the small steps we have managed to take in recent months, before asking for the private meeting, and finish on a more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger note, in order to set a more positive tone for an exchange on Shcharanskiy.

—Frame your remarks on Shcharanskiy in terms of the Soviet leadership's commitment to release him but also the opportunity for them to gain credit for a compassionate gesture at this time, and the danger of further damage if they do not follow through, and of catastrophe if he dies in prison.

An oblique mention of our offer to trade for Shcharanskiy is included in your points. We have discussed whether this mention should be more explicit, and you may wish to consider this point further. Our tentative conclusion, however, is that the mention should remain oblique for two reasons:

—If the Soviets decide to release Shcharanskiy as a humanitarian gesture, we would be better off without a trade;

—The Foreign Ministry is not always informed about discussion of trades, and if Gromyko weighs in in Moscow following a heated conversation with you the option could be eliminated.

Gromyko will have his own agenda, and at least two options for deflecting your stress on Soviet international misbehavior. One is to launch into a complaint along the lines of the egregious TASS statements of recent days that the Soviets were defending their territory against U.S. intelligence penetration.<sup>3</sup> The other is a long and bitter monologue about alleged U.S. lack of interest in making the world a safer place, which raises a whole series of topics, probably including the Middle East. I suspect he may try to use both.

Contingency responses in case he specifically raises the RC-135 and intelligence charges are included in your book, and we will also have for you specific material to counter a Gromyko diatribe on U.S. intelligence activities by citing confirmed facts about the airliner shootdown.

The best antidote to a diversionary monologue is firmly but calmly to seize and keep the initiative, and stick to your three topics. I have revised my earlier view that you should raise Central America and the Middle East in this meeting. To do so would be too much of an invitation to Gromyko to declaim. But if he raises regional issues (and only in that case), you should take the opportunity to lay down the appropriate markers on both the Middle East and Central America. Contingency talking points are at the end of the attached presentation. Otherwise, I think you should tell him that the meeting is short and that you would like to defer extended discussion of other topics to New York.

## **Attachment**

Washington, undated

*YOUR MEETING WITH GROMYKO AT MADRID  
SUGGESTED OPENING REMARKS*

*I. INTRODUCTION*

At the end of our meeting in New York last year, we agreed that it would be a good thing for us to meet before another year had gone by, if progress on the various issues in our relations justified it.<sup>5</sup>

I wish I could say that was the reason we are meeting now. It would be an encouraging sign not just in our relations but in international relations generally if we were able to say that we had gotten together in Madrid because we had succeeded in making enough progress in resolving differences between our two countries to warrant meeting earlier this year.

I regret that this is not the case. But we must frankly face the fact that it is not the case. And I would be less than candid and less than realistic if I told you that we think the progress that has been made so far makes us optimistic about the larger prospect in our relationship.

*II. THE KAL SHOOTDOWN*

Your brutal attack on an unarmed civilian airliner has shocked all Americans profoundly. The explanation offered by TASS is preposterous. Your attempt to turn a tragedy where very many lives from many nationalities were lost

into a problem in U.S.-Soviet relations is repugnant. The act itself, and your reaction, point up for us the many and profound differences between our two countries.

I do not intend to discuss this aspect here. But I would like to explain to you how this terrible event looks to us in the total context of our relations, so that you will understand at the outset how the United States is approaching this meeting and the meetings we will have later in the month in New York.

This tragedy and your reaction to it have made us more aware than ever that the central issue between our two countries is how to improve world security and make our appropriate contribution to establishing a basis for peaceful resolution of international disputes. This is a grave responsibility. We take our portion of it very seriously. It is impossible for us to have confidence that you take your share of responsibility with equal seriousness. In general, we face three interrelated types of problems, and last week's destruction of the Korean airliner by Soviet military forces in the Far Eastern area brought these problems together for us with almost overwhelming vividness.

The first problem is the high and increasing level of armaments. I will not dwell on our concerns about the level of Soviet armaments in this area: our negotiations in Geneva touch on certain aspects of the problem, and our concerns and those of the East Asian countries are well known to you. President Andropov's statement to *Pravda* that the Soviet Union would be willing to destroy missiles withdrawn from Europe under an agreement with us seemed to us a step in the right direction.<sup>6</sup> But it still did not address our underlying concern about unlimited increases in Soviet military capacity in the area—a concern



we share with all your other neighbors and other countries in the region as well.

The second problem is the shortage of trust and confidence in our relationship. I do not know if the lack of confidence which your pilot's action showed was as shocking to you as it was to me and to the President. I would be happy to hear from you that it was. What I can tell you is that our confidence in the ability of our two countries to conduct necessary business together has received another blow. We know that our two countries are fated to live together on a dangerous planet, and that we have a common responsibility of historic magnitude to control the dangers we face together, and to reduce them. But your unprovoked and unjustifiable action has shown once again that we have a limited fund of trust and confidence with which to work, and that the base for progress we have managed to build is terribly narrow, and the road ahead terribly hard.

The third problem is the use and encouragement of force to settle international disputes. For us, your action last week was an outrageous example of your country's willingness to use force in situations where my country—and the rest of the world—believe and earnestly desire that peaceful solutions can be found.

This is not a new concern of ours. It is one that President Reagan and I share with all our predecessors since the war. Over the past two years, you have heard Secretary Haig and me discuss it with respect to Afghanistan, with respect to Kampuchea, with respect to the Middle East, with respect to southern Africa, with respect to Central America and the Caribbean. It lies at the heart of our approach to your military buildup, to our discussions on arms control.

I know that you and your colleagues in the leadership do not accept this analysis of the problems between us. That is part of the problem too. But I must tell you that the airliner tragedy convinces us more than ever that if we are to put our relations on a more constructive course, you and your colleagues must recognize that the United States and the rest of the world community are convinced that you will use your vast military forces with restraint and with responsibility. That is precisely what you did not do last week.

These are the fundamental questions that were raised by your action. But they are not more fundamental than our anguish about the very many American lives that have been lost. For these reasons I ask you formally, once again, for a full and reasonable explanation of how this tragedy took place; for all the information that is available to you about the fate of the plane and its passengers; for permission for our forces to participate with yours in the search now going on off Sakhalin Island; and for prompt access if the plane and any bodies are recovered. I would like to be encouraged by our recent exchanges concerning coordinates and other data about our search operations in the area.

### *III. ASSURING AIR SAFETY: THE MILITARY LINKS PROPOSAL*

In the wake of this tragedy, ensuring the safety of peaceful international air travel is an issue on which the whole world must cooperate. We must take every feasible step to make sure that this sort of thing cannot happen again.

The Soviet Union must give the assurances the world needs and take specific steps to ensure the safety of international

civil aviation.

But I would also like to remind you that even before this tragedy we proposed to you a number of measures we could take to improve communications between us.

Our discussions on adding a facsimile transmission capability to our hotline communications have made the most progress, but we had also proposed direct links between our military authorities. In fact, our delegation to Moscow described our concept to you at some length early last month.

Had such links been in place last week, it is conceivable that this tragedy could have been averted. They would have provided one way for you to seek additional information and clarify the identity of the plane your interceptors were pursuing.

I would urge you most seriously to consider our proposal for direct communications links between our military authorities once again, and I would appreciate a considered reply at the earliest possible opportunity.

#### *IV. ARMS CONTROL TREATY COMPLIANCE*

I wish I could tell you that the airliner tragedy is the only instance that has reinforced these concerns in recent weeks and months. Unfortunately, we also find ourselves with increasing evidence of actions that raise questions about the Soviet Union's compliance with its obligations under existing arms control agreements.

I cannot emphasize too much how such actions erode the trust and confidence we must have that you will punctiliously carry out your treaty commitments to us, and

how important it is to any progress in arms control that you address our concerns seriously and specifically. If we cannot be sure that treaties signed in the past are being carried out, then we will not be able to move forward with you to sign new agreements.

These are not new concerns. Secretary Haig already raised with you the troubling situation we see with regard to use of chemical and biological weapons. Today, I would like to stress two areas of concern that have arisen more recently.

For six months we have been discussing with you the questions we have about the ICBM first flight-tested on February 8, 1983. Despite the assertions your government has made, we remain unconvinced that this missile qualifies as a permitted modernization of an existing type of ICBM under the terms of SALT II. Moreover, the denial of telemetric information vital to verifying compliance—also inconsistent with the terms of SALT II—has simply reinforced our suspicions. We think the importance of the problem warrants a more forthcoming response in future discussions in the SCC and through diplomatic channels.

Even more serious questions have arisen in connection with the new large phased-array radar that you are constructing near Krasnoyarsk. Your claim that this radar is for space-tracking purposes is thoroughly implausible, since the radar is of the same type as ones you have specifically identified as being for ballistic missile early warning. Thus we demand a more convincing explanation for this radar in view of its apparent inconsistency with the ABM Treaty.

## *V. GENERAL MEETING SUMMATION*

It is precisely because fundamental problems in our relations are involved that we seek adequate and

responsible Soviet explanations and actions on issues like these.

We are not seeking to destroy anything of what we have managed so painfully to achieve in the way of trust, confidence and mutually beneficial structure in our relations. It is your actions or refusal to take actions that pose a threat to the narrow base we have established. Our policy is unchanged. It will be based, as before, on strength, on realism, and on willingness to explore with you those areas where our two countries can work together to mutual benefit.

We do not underestimate the significance of the small steps we have managed to take together in recent weeks and months. The conclusion of the CSCE review conference here in Madrid is one of them: it is not a perfect outcome, and because of Malta it has been a difficult outcome, but it is a beneficial outcome.

The grains agreement we signed two weeks ago in Moscow was a similar beneficial step. The President and I appreciate the release of the Pentecostalists who were in our Embassy and their families. We have agreed to renew the atomic energy agreement that expired in June. Even in the difficult arms control area, we have had useful discussions on confidence-building measures and on nuclear non-proliferation. And, although we have not yet gotten to the essential differences in our major negotiations, both sides have shown encouraging flexibility in START, in INF and in MBFR.

At the same time, it must be perfectly clear to you that such steps cannot be taken in isolation from other elements in the relationship. This last week has provided two fresh examples. As a result of your action in the Pacific, it is not

possible for us to proceed with extension of the Transportation Agreement that expired in June, and it is not possible at this time for us to follow up on your agreement in principle to renew discussions on opening consulates and on a new exchanges agreement.

Speaking for the United States, however, I can say that the President and I intend to continue the effort to develop a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union is willing to work with us to do so. The steps our two countries have taken perhaps show that we can do some serious business even in difficult times. I will want in New York to go over the whole range of issues between us.

For our part, we know we cannot hope to solve all problems at once. But our two countries must face the fact that the larger problems cannot be resolved in isolation from the others. And, in a spirit of realism and candor, I must also say that the Soviet actions and inactions I have described earlier make it immensely more difficult to move forward.

*NOTE: We continue to believe that you should discuss human rights issues one-on-one with Gromyko. After summing up, therefore, we suggest that you ask for a private session following the general meeting.*

## **VI. PRIVATE SESSION ON SHCHARANSKIY AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

The airliner tragedy is a human rights issue for us too, but I wanted to meet with you privately to discuss the more familiar problems of human rights in our relationship.

I cannot exaggerate to you the importance of these issues for both the present and the future. It remains true that no



other area of the relationship has such potential for improving or damaging American trust and confidence in the possibility of our countries doing serious business.

The President and I continue to believe that the best way to deal with these issues in our relations is quietly and privately. That is why I asked for this private session.

The case of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy is of very great concern to us, precisely because it so clearly involves the issue of trust and confidence.

As I noted in the general meeting, the President and I appreciated the way you dealt with the Pentecostalist matter after the President's meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin in February. We have been trying to deal with the Shcharanskiy case in the same quiet way.

That is why we were encouraged by President Andropov's letter to Marchais, and why we authorized Ambassador Kampelman to enter into confidential discussions with Mr. Kondrashev.

I must say we were initially encouraged by those discussions. They seemed to us to hold out some hope of progress without damage to the positions of principle on either side.

In particular, we were encouraged by Mr. Kondrashev's clear and solemn statement on behalf of the highest authorities in his government that Shcharanskiy could be released by February 1984.

We therefore made clear both to Mr. Kondrashev and to other authorized interlocutors that we on our side would be prepared to take steps of interest to the Soviet side if this commitment were in fact honored.

Our position remains the same, and we are interested in substance rather than in form. However, it is our impression that the Soviet side is no longer interested in moving forward to resolve the Shcharanskiy case, and is in fact departing from what we understood was a commitment.

I would like to hear from you urgently on what the official Soviet position on this matter is, and what the Soviet Union expects from the United States if it is to be resolved.

We have other serious concerns in the human rights field, and I will want to discuss some of them in New York. We are, for example, worried not only about the radical decline in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union but also about what appears to us to be growing official encouragement of anti-semitic activities in the Soviet Union. In particular, the establishment of the so-called "Anti-Zionist Committee" can only be called a step that confirms this impression. You should be aware that we will have nothing to do with it, and will encourage private citizens to treat it with the contempt it deserves.

At the same time, the Shcharanskiy case is critical. Our relations will benefit if it can be resolved soon: there is no better time for this compassionate step. But our relations will inevitably be damaged even further if Shcharanskiy is made to serve his full term. We have conflicting reports on his state of health, and I would not want to make a judgment. But if he were to die in prison, it would be a catastrophe.

## **VII. *CONTINGENCY POINTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL AMERICA (IF GROMYKO RAISES REGIONAL ISSUES)***

We have a limited amount of time, and I would propose that we defer extended discussion of these kinds of issues to New York. I have only two points to make:

—We have had a number of exchanges on the Lebanon situation in recent days, and I merely wish to reiterate a number of points to you.

The situation is dangerous for all the area parties and for both our countries, and the root of that danger is the continued presence of foreign troops in Lebanon. Our objective is the elimination of the foreign troop presence in that country, so that the Lebanese government can establish full sovereignty on its own territory. With our encouragement, the Government of Israel has agreed to withdraw its forces in a situation where Syria does the same, and in fact took a first step in this direction last weekend even without Syrian agreement to follow this course. The unwillingness of Syria to remove its forces from Lebanon is an obstacle to progress with consequences that are dangerously serious to all of us. I would urge you once again to use your influence with Syria to encourage a more constructive approach.

—With regard to Central America, I would like to reiterate with utmost seriousness what I told you when we first met last year: that your military shipments to Cuba far exceed what Cuba needs for self-defense and are being used by Cuba to fuel dangerous tensions in the region; that you cannot escape responsibility for this effect of your actions; and that the arrival of Cuban combat troops and jet combat aircraft in Nicaragua would be unacceptable to the United States. We have no motive to make Central America an issue in our relations, but you may be sure that we will defend our interests.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by J.H. Smith (L/LEI) and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for all clearing officials.

<sup>2</sup> An unsigned memorandum from Shultz to Reagan is *ibid*. A note on the routing sheet reads: "Taken to Sec's home by J. Howe 9/5 per CH." However, there is no indication the memorandum was sent to Reagan. It covers most of the same points in Burt's memorandum to Shultz regarding the upcoming meeting with Gromyko: the KAL incident, arms control compliance, and human rights. Before he departed for Madrid, Shultz and Reagan met in the Oval Office the next morning, September 6. See [Document 97](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 92](#).

<sup>4</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>5</sup> See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 221](#).

<sup>6</sup> See [footnote 2, Document 82](#).

## 97. Editorial Note

From 9:30 to 10:12 a.m. on September 6, 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz met with President Ronald Reagan in the Oval Office to discuss Shultz's planned meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko in Madrid. Other participants in the meeting included Vice President George Bush, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman, and Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff Jack Matlock. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary entry for that day: "N.S.C. meeting with Geo. S. to discuss his meeting with Gromyko. Some are opposed but I think George is right—he should see Gromyko & eyeball him on the Korean plane shoot down. There were 61 Americans on that plane. This could be the 1st time Gromyko has been put on the defensive." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 260) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "the president authorized me to meet with Gromyko in Madrid. He agreed that we should keep the focus on human rights and KAL 007. 'We will continue with the arms control talks, but we can't do anything more than that,' he said. We discussed whether KAL 007 was shot down with full knowledge by the top Soviet political leadership. We didn't know for sure about that, but certainly the top political leadership orchestrated the Soviet response. 'Their reaction to the event demonstrates the mentality that allowed it to happen in the first place,' I said. 'They still continue to blunder.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 367)

## **98. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State and the Embassy in Spain<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, September 6, 1983, 1935Z

11305. Madrid Pass to Secretary's Party. Subject: Definitive Soviet Statement on KAL Downing.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. In stating that Soviet fighters “stopped the flight” of KAL 007, an authoritative Soviet Government statement has effectively admitted to having downed the Korean jetliner. The statement directly contradicts several points of President Reagan’s September 5 speech,<sup>2</sup> implies that the decision to shoot down the Korean aircraft was made at a relatively low level, and lays all responsibility for the tragedy at the feet of the United States. End summary.

3. Soviet admission. An authoritative statement by the Soviet Government on the KAL tragedy was simultaneously broadcast over Soviet television and carried by TASS the evening of September 6. The piece, stating that planes of the Soviet air defense forces “fulfilled the order of the command post to stop the flight” after it allegedly ignored tracer warning shots, effectively admits the Soviets downed the unarmed KAL airliner. The government statement nonetheless lays all blame for the incident at the feet of “the leaders of the United States of America,” which it accuses of having cynically organized the flight for reconnaissance purposes.



4. Soviet version of events. According to the statement, the “intruder plane” entered Soviet air space over Kamchatka “in an area where a most important base of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR is located” “at the same time” as an RC-135 was flying “near the Soviet border at the same altitude.”<sup>3</sup> Of several interceptors scrambled, one monitored the RC-135 while another signalled to the “intruder plane” that it had entered Soviet air space. This warning was ignored. When the aircraft approached Sakhalin, interceptors again attempted to establish contact, “including with the help of the general call signal on the international frequency of 121.5 megacycles.” These signals “had to be received by the intruder plane” but it did not respond to these or other signals. The statement then notes that “Soviet radio control services picked up short coded radio signals transmitted from time to time, such signals that are usually used in transmitting intelligence information.”

5. Implying that the shootdown decision was made at a relatively low level, the statement continues that “the anti-aircraft forces command of the area” analyzed the route of the aircraft passing as it did over “strategically important areas,” and arrived at the conclusion that it was a reconnaissance aircraft performing “special tasks.” “As envisaged by international rules,” the fighter plane fired warning shots, but these were ignored, as were demands to fly to a Soviet airfield, and the aircraft tried to evade pursuit. Then, “the interceptor-fighter plane of the anti-aircraft defenses fulfilled the order of the command post to stop the flight.”

6. Soviet justification. The Soviet statement justifies “stopping” the aircraft on the grounds that the interceptor pilots had no idea that this was a civilian aircraft and that such action is “fully in keeping with the law on the state

border of the USSR" which in turn is "fully in accord with international regulations." The statement declares that it is one of the commonly recognized principles of international law that every state has the sovereign right to protect its borders, in particular its airspace. The Soviets continue to claim that the aircraft had no navigation lights, and that night-time visibility was bad. "The assertions of the United States President that Soviet pilots knew that it was a civilian aircraft are not in keeping with reality."

7. President contradicted. At several points, statement directly disputes statements by President Reagan in his September 5 speech. It alleges that—contrary to President Reagan's assertion—Soviet fighters are in fact capable of communication on the international emergency frequency and sought to communicate with the KAL aircraft on it. It accuses President Reagan of cynicism in remarking that "no one will ever know" how the KAL 747's navigational computers were programmed. The plane's deviation from its flight plan was not, according to the statement, a technical error, but a plan to carry out an intelligence operation.

8. Alleged U.S. motives. The statement, in speculating on U.S. motives for utilizing the KAL aircraft for an alleged provocation, points the direction of future Soviet propaganda damage limitation. The U.S., hoping to avoid the solution of major international tensions, according to the Soviets, chose the moment carefully to have maximum impact on arms control efforts. Using the incident to distract attention from Soviet peace initiatives, the USG is accused of seeking to intensify confrontation with the USSR in accordance with "the President's credo—peace through strength." The statement ends with the sentence: "The entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and fully with the leaders of the United States of America."

9. Comment. This evening's statement represents the definitive Soviet explanation of the KAL tragedy. Despite the statement's expression of condolences to the families of the KAL dead, there is no contrition in the Soviet statement, no admission of responsibility, nor willingness to take steps to ensure it is not repeated. This is the statement of a regime caught in an abhorrent act it can no longer deny, and seeking desperately to avoid the consequences.

10. Embassy is distributing to U.S. and West European press the following statement, attributed to an Embassy spokesman: Begin text: The Soviet statement is much too little and much too late. While the Soviets have finally been compelled by the weight of the evidence to admit that they shot down the Korean airliner, virtually every other element in their statement is obviously designed to evade their full responsibility for the atrocity which they have committed. End text.

**Zimmermann**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC USSR File, USSR-KAL Incident (09/01/83) (3); NLR-170-17-40-1-9. Confidential; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to Leningrad, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Seoul, and Tokyo. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 94](#). For the text of the September 6 Soviet statement, see the *New York Times*, September 7, 1983, p. A16.

<sup>3</sup> In a statement on September 5, Eagleburger explained: "A U.S. RC-135 aircraft was in the vicinity of the Korean

airliner on August 31 when the airliner was initially detected by Soviet radar. Both aircraft were then in international air space. The U.S. routinely conducts unarmed RC-135 flights in the international air space off the Kamchatka Peninsula to monitor by national technical means Soviet compliance with the SALT treaties. The Soviets conduct similar monitoring activities near U.S. missile testing sites. The Soviets are aware of our flights and track them routinely. They know that our aircraft do not enter their air space. The Korean aircraft's inadvertent entry into Soviet territory should have been an early and strong indication to the Soviets that the flight was not a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft." (Telegram 253015 to Montreal, September 7; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830511-0542)

## **99. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 6, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

Developments on Korean Airlines Incident

Today's major development in the Korean Airlines incident was the Soviet announcement acknowledging for the first time that they had downed KAL 007, but reiterating in stronger terms their now familiar claims regarding U.S. responsibility for this action.<sup>2</sup> I issued a statement at 6:00 p.m. refuting the Soviet claims,<sup>3</sup> and Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly then called in Soviet Charge Sokolov to deliver formally the text of our message.<sup>4</sup> We believe that this prompt, public U.S. rejection of Soviet claims will enable us to maintain the initiative in the continuing public affairs struggle.

On the diplomatic front, we are sending separately for your approval messages to Thatcher, Kohl, Nakasone and other key leaders asking their support for your proposals. Department officers called in today Embassy officers representing European neutrals and a group of key African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries to request their support for your proposals.<sup>5</sup> Although noncommittal, the Embassy representatives were generally positive. The reactions to Assistant Secretary Burt's September 5 briefing of NATO, ANZUS, Japan, Korea and other Asian Embassies<sup>6</sup> have not yet begun to come in, except for a call from the French Embassy reporting that France would support us in efforts to strengthen ICAO. On the non-official side, the reported decision by the International Association



of Airline Pilots' Associations to recommend a boycott of services to and from the USSR by its member unions for period of 60 days was a most encouraging development.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick's presentation in the Security Council today was most effective, and we continue to receive considerable support in the Council from other countries.<sup>7</sup> The debate will continue through the end of this week. There seems to be a good likelihood that a resolution, which may be tabled tomorrow, could receive the nine votes needed for passage (though a Soviet veto will doubtless be cast). I am working with CAB Chairman McKinnon on a directive to US carriers ending interline arrangements with Aeroflot. We have initiated the steps required to close the remaining two Aeroflot offices in the United States. Secretary Dole has sent a message to her counterparts in more than forty countries requesting their support for our efforts, particularly in ICAO.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR-324-11-25-2-0. Confidential. A note on the routing slip indicates that Poindexter presented this information to Reagan during his daily briefing on September 7.

<sup>2</sup> The Soviet statement claimed: "The Soviet pilots, in stopping the actions of the intruder plane, could not have known that it was a civilian aircraft." The statement continued: "It was flying without navigation lights, at the height of night, in conditions of bad visibility and was not answering signals." The statement also "charged that the airliner had been on a spying mission for the United States and that 'the entire responsibility for this tragedy rests wholly and fully with the leaders of the United States of America.'" (John F. Burns, "Moscow Concedes A Soviet



Fighter Downed Airliner, *New York Times*, September 7, 1983, p. A1) The full text of the September 6 statement by the Soviet government is available in *New York Times*, September 7, 1983, p. A1.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of Eagleburger's statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 253973 to Moscow, September 7, the Department reported that "Kelly called in Soviet Chargé Oleg Sokolov at 1930 EDT to hand over a copy of public statement made earlier in evening by Acting Secretary Eagleburger." The report continued: "Kelly reiterated continuing U.S. dismay with unresponsive nature of Soviet statements and emphasized need for Soviet Union to make full accounting of incident." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830513-0934)

<sup>5</sup> Telegram 254088 to all diplomatic posts, September 7, provided "materials for briefing foreign governments on Soviet destruction of Korean airliner, U.S. actions taken in response, and U.S.-proposed international measures for responding to Soviet actions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 253010 to multiple diplomatic posts and all NATO capitals, September 6, reported on Burt's briefings and efforts to garner international support for U.S.-proposed measures against the Soviets. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830511-0516)

<sup>7</sup> For the text of Kirkpatrick's statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 8-11.

**100. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 7, 1983

**SUBJECT**

Transmission of Implementation Strategy for NSDD on the U.S. Response to the Soviet Destruction of the KAL Airliner

We are attaching an implementation strategy for the NSDD on the U.S. response to the Soviet destruction of the KAL airliner.<sup>2</sup> Several of the steps have already been taken or are already in process. This study reflects the input of the KAL interagency group and the papers prepared by its working groups which are attached.<sup>3</sup> The paper has not been cleared by the IG but it has been distributed to the member agencies. Should we receive substantive comments from them, these will be reported to the NSC staff.

**Charles Hill<sup>4</sup>**

**Tab 1**

**Strategy Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>5</sup>**

Washington, undated

*Strategy Paper for Implementation of NSDD on the KAL Incident*

The Soviet attack on an unarmed Korean passenger airplane is a clear violation of international law and a threat to international civil aviation security. While the immediate threat is particularly in or near the Soviet Union, the Soviet action raises serious questions regarding the system as a whole. The NSDD defines the measures the United States will take with the international community to promote our objectives of seeking justice, demonstrating resistance to intimidation, and advancing understanding of the contrast between Soviet words and deeds. The strategy for implementing these specific measures including diplomatic, public diplomacy and congressional approaches as developed by the KAL IG follows below. Also described are issues for future decision. The detailed papers prepared by the various IG working groups are attached at the annex.

The NSDD sets out specific actions for seeking justice in five areas:

1. *Full Accounting.* Even though the Soviets have now admitted downing the KAL aircraft, our most immediate requirement remains pressing the Soviets for a full accounting of the incident, including access to the crash site, recovery of the victims, technical equipment (black box), wreckage and other material such as personal property and a thorough and impartial investigation of what happened. We have already made these demands forcefully, both in diplomatic channels and publicly. Secretary Shultz will be making these points at the highest level with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid on September 8 and the issue will be pursued through vigorous intervention in the appropriate international organizations.

2. *Develop Omnibus U.S. Claim.* A draft United States claim for reparation, in the form of a diplomatic note, has been prepared and circulated to other interested governments whose nationals perished in the tragedy, with a request that they take similar action. The note is a concise statement that we consider the Soviet action as wrongful under international law, giving rise to a Soviet obligation to make reparation. After responses from other governments, we will present the Soviet Chargé with the diplomatic note on September 12.<sup>6</sup> This claim will be supplemented with details and documentation after consultations with the families of the victims. We have invited those family members who will be in Washington for the memorial service to a briefing on the claim at 4:00 p.m. on Friday, September 9.

3. *Measures Against Aeroflot.* The NSDD calls for the United States to work with and help to lead other members of the international community in formulating and implementing measures that will “adversely affect” Aeroflot’s operations. Unilaterally, we have already:

- reiterated the existing sanction suspending regularly-scheduled Aeroflot service to the U.S.;

- notified the Soviets we will not renew our bilateral transportation cooperation agreement, nor proceed with discussions on consulates in Kiev and New York and on a new cultural exchanges agreement;

- the Department of State is sending a letter for the President’s signature requesting the CAB to initiate action to suspend relations between U.S. carriers and Aeroflot as well as Aeroflot’s remaining commercial activities in the United States;

—began to undertake the necessary steps prior to informing the Soviets of the closure of the Aeroflot offices in New York and Washington.

Multilaterally, we are seeking the isolation of the Soviet Union in world aviation until it provides a satisfactory response to our collective concerns for aviation safety. Specifically we have proposed that for an initial period of 60-90 days:

—that other governments suspend Aeroflot's operations to and from their territories;

—that they suspend interline arrangements between their respective carriers and Aeroflot, and other commercial opportunities for Aeroflot, such as sale of tickets;

—that they investigate other possible restrictions on support services.

A crucial ingredient in this strategy is that the U.S. not be seen to be ahead in its reaction and that it consult fully with its friends and allies in developing a coordinated, coherent and sustained international reaction. Thus, while we should continue to discuss our proposed measures publicly in general terms, we should continue now to avoid specifics so that the ongoing consultative process can reach agreement on specific steps. We are urging the key European countries to coordinate their actions and not undercut one another.

The key element in the diplomatic strategy is Secretary Shultz' participation at the Madrid conference, where he will have intense consultations with five of the countries (Italy, FRG, France, U.K. and Canada) whose cooperation is essential. Japan, not present in Madrid, will be handled

bilaterally. His speech to the CSCE plenary on September 9 will include a full statement of U.S. condemnation and the implications for East-West relations. We have encouraged other ministers to do the same, and the response has been excellent.

Multilaterally, the NATO Allies, Japan, Korea, ASEAN, ANZUS and other key countries of Europe and the third world have been briefed in Washington. This approach has been reinforced in capitals. We have forwarded to the White House letters from the President to the heads of government of the U.K., FRG, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Canada. Letters are under preparation to other leaders, including France, Italy, Ireland and Australia. Secretary Dole has sent messages to her counterparts in the key ICAO Council member countries to ask their support in ICAO, and also in adopting the proposed civil aviation measures against Aeroflot.

Our top priority will be to monitor this diplomatic offensive and apply the necessary measures to follow up the NSDD.

4. *Private boycott.* A worldwide aviation industry response would help isolate Soviet aviation and promote a satisfactory Soviet response to aviation safety concerns. The decision by the International Federation of Airline Pilot's Associations to institute a 60-day boycott of flights to and from the USSR is very encouraging. To be effective, any boycott must remain a private, not a USG, initiative. Our strategy should be to maintain contact with U.S. pilot and other groups through one or two key representatives to keep up to date on actions being taken by the aviation industry. We will use these contacts to give them a signal: that we favor all efforts consistent with U.S. law and policy to isolate Soviet aviation in order to elicit satisfactory



Soviet response to the case and the safety concerns it raises.

5. *International Organizations.* We will sustain the efforts to obtain appropriate action in appropriate international organizations. Our objectives are the broadest condemnation of the Soviet Union, an investigation, and remedial actions to enhance flight safety and prevent a recurrence of this tragedy. Tactically, we should keep Japan, Korea and others in front while mobilizing broad support for constructive remedies. Specifically, in the international organizations, we should:

- seek a strong resolution at the September 15 ICAO Council meeting, in which we would seek to condemn this Soviet violation of international law, express shock and outrage at the Soviet Union's callous disregard for human life and its refusal to cooperate in search and rescue as well as investigation efforts, and direct the ICAO Secretary-General to conduct an immediate investigation. We have the votes for a resolution along such lines;

- seek a tough UNSC resolution equally critical of the USSR, but not as detailed as the ICAO resolution seeking many cosponsors;

- seek no emergency special session of the General Assembly, but seek a new agenda item for the plenary, or as a second choice, committee consideration. We will raise the issue under existing agenda items in committees, consulting with allied and friendly delegations;

- work for a good resolution at the New Delhi conference of the World Tourism Organization in

early October;

—raise the issue in the UNESCO Executive Board,  
IPU and Subcommittee on Human Rights.

International Court of Justice direct adversary proceedings would have only symbolic value since the Soviets have not accepted the ICJ's mandatory jurisdiction. We may, however, wish to demand that the Soviets enter into a special agreement with us for referral of this case to Court if only to have the Soviets publicly reject impartial scrutiny of their action. An advisory opinion proceeding is also possible but has many disadvantages for USG interests.

*Demonstrate and Encourage Resistance to Soviet  
Intimidation*

The NSDD cites the objective of bolstering the confidence of our Asian friends. Central to any effort to support NE Asian nations in their resistance to Soviet intimidation will be the necessity to demonstrate consistency and steadiness in U.S. diplomatic policies and security presence within the region. In large part, this would represent a continuation of policies and programs already in train, though these could be highlighted as locally appropriate by specific U.S. statements and actions. We should bear in mind, however, that regional anti-Soviet sentiment could be undercut by too explicit or vigorous U.S. encouragement.

—A basic theme of the President's visit to the East Asian region later this fall will be a reaffirmation of the American commitment to the peace and stability of the region. The KAL incident will inevitably increase the force and importance of the President's statements.

—In Japan, we must continue close consultations with the GOJ—both on immediate questions related to the KAL incident as well on the longer-term coordination of our national policies towards the Soviet Union, letting the Nakasone government take the lead in any capitalizing on domestic anti-Soviet feelings.

—With the PRC, we should follow through with the Secretary of Defense's visit and the easing of technology transfer requirements, but, given China's own strong condemnation, we do not need to underscore for Beijing the implications of Soviet behaviour in the KAL incident.

—With the ROK, our short-term requirement will be to continue close consultations with Seoul, while over the longer-term we will need to provide continuing assurances of the firmness of our security commitment, including our readiness to support Korea's considerable defense efforts and our intention to maintain the U.S. troop presence in Korea.

### *Confidence-Building Measures.*

Since the KAL incident was one in which improved communications channels could well have been used, we should:

—Renew through diplomatic channels at a high-level our proposals to the Soviets for consideration at a Washington follow-on meeting of communications improvements beyond solely the Hotline upgrade; and

—Simultaneously publicize our call to the Soviets for expanded communications for the prevention of such incidents, specifically citing the KAL tragedy, underscoring the U.S. flexibility in exploring various proposals, and noting previous Soviet assertions that such measures were unnecessary.

*Public Diplomacy.* In addition to the extensive media coverage and public affairs support for the U.S. position given to date by USIA, the Agency plans several steps in the immediate future:

—VOA will maintain an intensified broadcast schedule to the Soviet Union in several languages;

—the incident will continue to be a prominent item for all VOA language services;

—public affairs guidances reflecting and supporting Administration policy have been and will be sent to USIA posts;

—Agency foreign press centers in Washington and New York will continue to arrange interviews, press backgrounders, or on-the-record briefings for the foreign press on the incident.

—We must bear in mind the sensitivities and perceptions of our Asian allies, particularly Japan. This should include consultation with our allies, not only to keep them informed, but to offer an opportunity for them to join in our efforts.

*Congressional Strategy.* We are working on a draft text of a joint Congressional resolution. We do not anticipate any difficulty in passage when Congress returns September 12. The effort already begun to keep Congress fully informed

through briefings will continue, but with an expanded focus to include those committees of both Houses dealing with tourism and aviation as well as foreign affairs, armed services, and intelligence. The State Department is continuing its briefings of key staffers prior to the reconvening of Congress. Once Congress reconvenes on September 12, we will offer formal briefings for members on the event itself and on the actions we are taking and considering.

*Outstanding Issues.* The KAL IG has surfaced two issues for future decisions:

1. *Abrogation of the bilateral US-USSR Civil Aviation Agreement.* Those who argue for abrogation believe it is a small but necessary step to demonstrate our revulsion, particularly in view of the actions we are asking other countries to take. Further, if the U.S. ever decides to initiate service, termination of the bilateral would not pose a further substantial obstacle to restoring service. Others prefer to keep the Agreement in place as a basis for reestablishing a more normal civil relationship if conditions should permit. These argue that abrogation could be portrayed as going farther than other countries (those that suspended operations temporarily, for example) and could be used as an indication that the U.S. was intent upon a confrontation with the USSR.

2. *Whether a subsequent CAB order should suspend a) relations of foreign carriers with Aeroflot, even within the U.S. or b) carrier relations with Aeroflot wholly outside the territory of the U.S.* Some argue that we should refrain from any punitive action against foreign carriers at least as long as there is some basis to hope that these carriers, or their

national governments, will take these actions on their own. Such action at this point could seriously compromise our chances of obtaining the cooperation of our key Allies in measures against Aeroflot. Others believe that this is a necessary step, and that failure to face it would make us look weak.

*Future Action.* The NSDD states that the duration of punitive action is dependent upon Soviet willingness “to honor essential standards of aviation safety,” and directs work to achieve censure in ICAO “with reinforcing measures at ICAO to be pursued.” We are now examining existing ICAO commitments to determine how they can be strengthened, and develop appropriate recommendations. If the existing measures are adequate and the problem is enforcement, we should also examine whether it is in our interest to propose new arrangements providing for international punitive sanctions in the event a state fails to meet its obligations under the existing Convention.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/10/1983]; NLR-332-14-35-1-4. Secret. A covering memorandum dated September 10 to Clark from Lilac and Robinson indicates the NSC received this set of papers.

<sup>2</sup> See NSDD 102, [Document 95](#).

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed are the following papers, which were also incorporated into the strategy paper: “Private Boycott of Soviet Aviation;” “Claims;” “10 Strategies for Dealing with the KAL Incident;” “Isolation of the Soviet Union in Aviation (A Strategy for the U.S.);” a memorandum on “Strategy for Dealing with Congress on the KAL Incident;” “USIA Public Affairs Followup regarding the KAL



Plane Incident;" and "Proposed Public Posture and International Public Diplomacy Strategy."

<sup>4</sup> Deputy Executive Secretary Covey signed for Hill above Hill's typed signature.

<sup>5</sup> Secret.

<sup>6</sup> Acting Assistant Secretary of State Kelly presented the note to Sokolov on September 12. For the statement issued at the time and the note, as well as a note presented on behalf of the Korean Government, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 14-15.

## **101. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Madrid<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1983, 0630Z

Tosec 90120/254963. Subject: Soviet Statement on KAL Airliner.

1. (C—Entire text.)
2. Shortly after midnight Washington time Soviet Embassy DCM called Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Kelly at home. DCM Sokolov stated that he was under instructions to deliver immediately an oral statement from the Soviet Government to the USG "in conjunction with Soviet statement issued September 6."<sup>2</sup> Sokolov continued that Ambassador Dobrynin who arrived Washington evening September 7 had advised him statement would be coming and he was to deliver regardless of hour.
3. Sokolov began to read statement reported below over phone. After several minutes Kelly interrupted and told Sokolov to meet him at Department. Sokolov arrived at 1:00 am at Department and read text which follows.
4. Following Sokolov's rendition, Kelly responded, asking Sokolov to inform Moscow. Kelly said that any blackening of Soviet name occurred when Soviet authorities shot down an innocent unarmed Korean airliner which had strayed off course. Kelly rejected allegations in Soviet statement, emphasizing rejection that USG had had a role in the Korean airliner flight. As to the questions presented in the Soviet statement, Kelly said that the [garble—answers] are contained in the tape which Ambassador Kirkpatrick played

on September 6 at the United Nations. Those tapes demonstrated clearly the culpability of the Soviet Government in this atrocity. Sokolov said that he would relay Kelly's comments to Moscow.

5. Begin text of Soviet statement: The facts set forth in the published statement of the Soviet Government of September 6, clearly indicate that the intrusion of the South Korean plane into the Soviet airspace in the Far East on the night from August 31 to September 1 has been organized by U.S. special services. This is confirmed also by other information in our possession, but we do not intend to make it public through reasons of secrecy.

There is no doubt that it was a major intelligence operation executed in a strategically important region of the Soviet Union, with the use for such purposes of the specially equipped plane with passengers aboard.

The fact that it is not for the first time that the U.S. intelligence does use South Korean passenger planes for its dirty aims, is not a secret at all. That inhumane practice has more than once led to the death of innocent people.

The U.S. leadership, irrespective of whether or not it is informed in advance of each of these actions, bears full responsibility for such barbaric practices and its tragic consequences.

As for this particular case, the entire ensuing development of events leaves no doubt that U.S. special services acted with the knowledge and approval of the highest authorities.

Otherwise a whole number of (word indistinct) could not have occurred without the approval of U.S. leadership:

Why did the South Korean plane, going from the U.S., soon deviate from the established international route by almost 500 kilometers, and not to the left at that—that is toward the open but to the right—in the direction of the USSR territory?

Why was the route of that plane over the USSR territory going precisely over the important military installations?

Why was the plane flying in violation of all navigation rules and did not react to the attempts of the Soviet air defense means—both ground ones and air ones—to make contact with its crew?

Why didn't the U.S. air navigation services, tracking the flights of planes in the area of their responsibility, not sound alarm when the plane left the corridor earmarked for it, and the plane went into the Soviet territory?

Why didn't the Japanese air navigation services do the same when the plane did not appear in due time and place in the area of their responsibility?

Why didn't either the U.S. or Japanese authorities come into contact with the Soviet side until it was too late?

Instead of asking oneself all these and many other questions and find those responsible of such "strange" happenings, which led to the tragic consequences, the U.S. leaders, including the President himself, immediately came out with quite unpardonable, unbecoming of statesman, insinuations against the Soviet Union, trying to blacken it in the eyes of world public.

To say nothing of the fact that it is impermissible in general for statesmen of one state to resort to such statements—both in terms of their contents, and language—with regard

to another state with which diplomatic relations are maintained, it is quite clear that all this is in gross contradiction with the statements of the U.S. leadership regarding its desire for the normalization and bettering of relations with the USSR.

Moreover this type of behavior of the U.S. administration gives ground to believe that, taking into account the kind of outcome of intelligence operation which [garble—really?] occurred, the administration had planned it beforehand and then unleashed a broad provocative campaign aimed not only at blackening the USSR, but also at bringing tensions in the world at large even higher. In conjunction with other actions of the U.S., the anti-Soviet campaign unleashed, clearly tells that all that is being done to try to justify the militaristic course pursued by the U.S. which evokes an ever greater condemnation and rebuff on the part of the peoples of the world.

The Soviet side, while resolutely and indignantly rejecting the attempts of the U.S. Government to relieve itself of the responsibility of the deaths of the people flying aboard the South Korean plane, and to shift that responsibility onto the Soviet Union, warns the American side against dangerous consequences of continuation by the United States of its present irresponsible course in the relations with the USSR and in the world arena in general. End text.

6. Above text is from Sokolov's personal longhand translation from Russian. Sokolov said Soviets do not plan to make this statement public.

**Eagleburger**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830516-1096. Confidential; Flash; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow, Seoul, Tokyo, the White House, and USUN. Drafted and approved by Kelly. Cleared in S/S-O and the KAL Working Group.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 98](#).



**102. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1983

**SUBJECT**

The Next Soviet Move in the Korean Air Lines Massacre: Disinformation and Distraction

On the basis of standard Soviet practices, their bizarre midnight demarche<sup>2</sup> and today's recent announcement that "they had now found wreckage and papers,"<sup>3</sup> it is likely that the Soviets are about to engage in a massive active measure to show the world that KAL 007 was on a spy mission for the U.S. We strongly suspect that the Soviets will produce forged documents, tapes or equipment allegedly recovered from the wreckage. We believe this could occur as early as tomorrow at a scheduled press conference in Moscow.

—When the Soviets have committed their most egregious crimes, they and their apologists, both here and abroad, have attempted to turn such incidents somehow into the blame of the U.S. or its allies.

—Routinely, on almost any international question, the Soviets try to cast themselves as flexible and legitimate interlocutors searching for peace. Although other countries often recognize this image to be false, out of fear they are required to pay it homage. For this reason, success in these matters for the Soviets is a question of damage limitation by

distorting the truth of their crimes, diverting world attention and raising doubts in peoples' minds about Soviet culpability. The Soviet handling of this event has been standard operating procedure: (1) denial, (2) counter charges against the West; (3) laying the groundwork for justification of their action; (4) mobilizing their apologists to proffer exculpatory explanations (e.g., the Soviet "paranoia" argument); (5) distracting international attention with accusations of crimes committed by the "imperialists", and (6) finally the Big Lie: the creation of a Western crime, even worse than the Soviet crime.

—A constant theme in Soviet active measures is the dirty work of Western spies.

While a Soviet forgery offensive will appear transparent, and indeed ludicrous, to most Americans, it will nevertheless be difficult to deal with internationally. Because the Soviets inspire fear, and because their latest terrorist act indeed does succeed in terrorizing people, there will be a willingness to accept even the most incredible Soviet charges. And on top of this, we are burdened by the fact that the media have a congenital desire to give credence to Soviet explanations and prove the U.S. Government to be a liar. Thus, it is critical that our strategy include the following considerations:

—Keep the Soviets on the defensive. This can be done by reminding the world of the many other Soviet crimes that are ongoing. E.g., people are being massacred daily in Afghanistan. We could publicize the daily death toll. USIA has just produced a film on the Soviet war there. We could ask Congress for permission to show this film in the U.S.

and the President could show it to the people on prime time TV.

—We should at the highest level dismiss the Soviet forgery as a lie and a typical active measure. All appropriate government press spokesmen should be prepared to pass out already-prepared State Department reports on the methods and themes of Soviet active measures. Talking points should also be prepared.

—We should then avoid giving credence to the false Soviet charge with detailed U.S. response, or else their effort will have been successful in distracting the world from their crime. A detailed response will lead to numerous questions about U.S. intelligence activities, and even if we are successful in “proving” that this flight was not an intelligence mission, the aroma of involvement by U.S. intelligence activities will remain.

—We might even try to preempt a Soviet forgery offensive by giving press briefings on the subject and voicing our suspicion that this may be the Soviets’ next move. This could be done by a senior foreign policy official.

We have tasked CIA and the State Department Active Measures Working Group to begin to prepare material in anticipation of what we suspect may happen. If the Soviets do in fact engage in this exercise, we suggest that the President may wish to consider further direct sanctions against the Soviets because by then the issue will have become, despite our best effort, a serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation.

## *RECOMMENDATION*

1. That you authorize us to develop a strategy to preempt a Soviet forgery offensive.<sup>4</sup>
2. That you authorize us to develop a strategy of response to such a forgery offensive.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/07/1983]; NLR-332-14-32-1-7. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 101](#).

<sup>3</sup> The *New York Times* reported that “the Soviet Ambassador said on Thursday [September 8] that his Government had found debris from the downed South Korean airliner in international waters and would turn the recovered materials and documents over to Japan, Foreign Ministry officials said. The envoy, Vladimir Y. Pavlov, in a meeting with Yoshiya Kato, head of the ministry’s European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, also said the Soviet Union would report on its search operations off the Soviet island of Moneron, near Sakhalin, in accordance with ‘international practices.’” (“Soviet Envoy Pledges to Give Jet Debris to Japan,” *New York Times*, September 9, 1983, p. A11)

<sup>4</sup> On the Approve line, Clark wrote: “Had Eagleburger call Koppel.” Presumably, Clark is referring to Ted Koppel who was the host of ABC’s “Nightline” news program, which had been covering the KAL story.

<sup>5</sup> Clark checked the Approve option.

**103. Memorandum From John Lenczowski and Kenneth deGraffenreid of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1983

**SUBJECT**

Preemption of a Soviet Forgery Offensive

One way the President could preempt a Soviet forgery offensive designed to "prove" that the Korean airliner was on a spy mission would be for him to call Andropov on the Hot Line and give him a simple message: that he personally would regard a Soviet forgery offensive as a direct message that Moscow is not interested in improving or stabilizing relations with the U.S.

Such a move by the President would not be publicized whatsoever, nor would Secretary Shultz, or anybody else in the government know about it lest it be leaked even for ostensibly benevolent purposes. In this way the Soviets would get the message that these are President Reagan's personal feelings on the matter and not anything worked out as part of an interagency political strategy whose script the President was following.

Such a move would have to be undertaken as soon as possible: it may be necessary to do it before a press conference scheduled for tomorrow in Moscow.

***RECOMMENDATION***

That you discuss with the President the possibility of a Hot Line call to Andropov as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File September 1983; NLR-324-11-25-6-6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lenczowski initialed for deGraffenreid.

<sup>2</sup> The Approve option is checked and the word "discuss" is circled. Poindexter wrote under the approval line: "This would not be call but a teletype message on the 'hot line.'"



## 104. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Madrid, September 8, 1983, 2-2:30 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.—Secretary Shultz  
William D. Krimer, Interpreter  
USSR—Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

*Secretary Shultz* wanted to spend a few minutes to discuss some matters with Foreign Minister Gromyko in private. They were closely related to the subject matter of the Madrid Conference and concerned commitments a representative of the Soviet Government had made to President Reagan through Ambassador Kampelman on behalf of the highest authorities of the Soviet Union, specifically that Shcharanskiy would be released upon completion of half his sentence.<sup>2</sup> We believed that in the Soviet interpretation this would be in February 1984, although our own information was that Shcharanskiy first went to jail on September 15. Kondrashev had promised that he would check the appropriate date. There was also a commitment to release certain other people whose names had been furnished to Kondrashev.

Based on these commitments to Ambassador Kampelman, which he had reported at a meeting in Washington with President Reagan and the Secretary, we had moved ahead to agree on the concluding document here in Madrid. We still assumed that all the commitments made to us will be fulfilled.

We had made clear both to Mr. Kondrashev and to other authorized interlocutors that we on our side would be

prepared to take a step of interest to the Soviet side if this commitment were in fact honored.

Our position remains the same, and we are interested in substance rather than in form. However, it is our impression that the Soviet side is no longer interested in moving forward to resolve the Shcharanskiy case, and is in fact departing from its commitment. This would be a major breach of the confidence in commitments which is required for any government to deal with one another.

We have other serious concerns in the human rights field. We are concerned that steps be taken to secure family reunification and to unite divided spouses. We are worried not only about the radical decline in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union but also about what appears to us to be increasing antisemitic activities in the Soviet Union.

At the same time, the Shcharanskiy case is critical. There is no better time for this compassionate step. But our relations will inevitably be damaged even further if Shcharanskiy is made to serve his full term. We have conflicting reports on his state of health. But if he were to die in prison, it would be another major catastrophe.

What is the official Soviet position on this matter?

*Gromyko* said his response would be simple.<sup>3</sup> No commitments of any kind had been given to the US side by the Soviet side. If something had been understood in terms of the commitment that *Secretary Shultz* had referred to just now, it could only have been the result of a misunderstanding unless, indeed, it was a deliberate distortion. The Soviet position with regard to Shcharanskiy was as previously stated, and *Gromyko* would ask the Secretary not to search for any sort of loopholes in that

position. He had nothing further to add and would not add anything to what he had said on this subject. He asked the Secretary to proceed on this basis. As for the Secretary's hints to the effect that unless something was undertaken to meet the wishes of the US side in this matter, relations between our countries would be complicated even further in a negative direction, such remarks are inappropriate. He could not accept such a direction of thinking on the US side. Indeed, the US side would bear full responsibility for the consequences of such an approach.

In a word, he had nothing further to add on this matter and would ask the Secretary not to raise it again. Indeed, there were many important problems arising between our two countries, as well as problems that had arisen long ago, which required mutual efforts for their resolution. Basically they concerned matters of broad importance and were of wide international significance. So far—and when he said “so far” he had in mind the present US Administration—the US side had not displayed any willingness to work toward a solution of these problems. He was prepared to discuss them today with a view to finding common language and bringing the positions of the sides closer together. If the Secretary was equally inclined to discuss these problems, that could defuse the present tense situation and exert a beneficial influence on Soviet-American relations, as well as upon the world as a whole. This was what Gromyko wanted to talk about today, and he asked the Secretary for his views.

*Secretary Shultz* said that he was deeply shocked and disappointed by Gromyko's comments regarding the Shcharanskiy matter. Ambassador Kampelman was an exceedingly careful man and had held extensive discussions with Kondrashev whom we had regarded as a representative of the Soviet Government, authorized to

undertake commitments. There was no possibility at all that Ambassador Kampelman could have been mistaken, because he had been trained as a lawyer and was very familiar with this particular issue.

*The Secretary* was surprised and shocked that Gromyko was now disowning these commitments because they had been very clear. He would go beyond that and say that his comments regarding the importance of cases like Shcharanskiy's were a correct description of the attitude of people in the US, and elsewhere, to the relations between our two countries. As for Gromyko's suggestion to discuss a wide range of issues dealing with the relations between us, the Secretary emphasized that no one had pushed harder than he to use this occasion for that purpose; but the current situation resulting from the Korean airliner tragedy made this meeting one which was taking place under conditions of great strain, it was, therefore, unsuited to the discussion of broader issues, although he would point out to Gromyko that arms control matters were currently the subject of discussions between the delegations in Geneva and elsewhere. He would repeat that Gromyko's response was a great disappointment to him because when they both agreed to hold this meeting several weeks ago, they had thought that they could use it to explore and make progress in the relations between our countries. What would happen subsequently, of course, remained to be seen. Speaking for his government, he could only hope that Gromyko's response would be such as to make further progress possible.

*Gromyko* interrupted the Secretary at this point and said that he had no intention of discussing the Korean airliner matter today and would not discuss it until after they had exchanged views on several more substantive and serious matters. After that he would be prepared to listen to the

Secretary and provide a response. He stressed that if Secretary Shultz first spoke on that subject, he would not be in a position to respond. On the other hand, after discussion of broader issues he would be prepared to discuss the matter of the airliner incident and, indeed, would have something to say to the Secretary even if the Secretary did not raise it. He repeated that at the outset of their broader meeting, he did not intend to talk about the airliner matter.

*Secretary Shultz* interrupted to say that it was up to Gromyko to determine what he wanted to discuss, but on the other hand it was for the Secretary to determine the subject he wanted to raise.

*Gromyko* said that in that case the Secretary might find himself talking to himself, alone in this room. As he had said, he would not discuss the Korean airliner matter at the beginning of the broader meeting.

*The Secretary* said he would start his statement on the subject of the airliner; if Gromyko wanted to stay, that was up to him to determine, but that was what he had been instructed to do.

*Gromyko* repeated that he would be prepared to talk about the airliner matter later, after he had a chance to exchange views on truly substantive and important matters, even if only briefly. He would suggest that they agree on an agenda for the broader meeting. This was a perfectly legitimate request. This is the way in which his discussions with former Secretaries of State and, indeed, with Secretary Shultz had always been conducted. As for the Shcharanskiy matter, the Secretary had said that Ambassador Kampelman was a good man. Perhaps this was so, or perhaps he was a bad man or just an average man. It

seemed to him they were not discussing the merits of Ambassador Kampelman. He had told the Secretary the Soviet position on this matter as it actually was. Of course, he believed Shultz when he had said he was disappointed but that, of course, was up to the Secretary himself.

*The Secretary* said that he was more than disappointed. A commitment had been made to our Government, as reported by someone in our Government who was a careful listener, and it was with respect to this commitment that the Secretary expressed surprise at Gromyko's statement.

*Gromyko* noted that the Secretary was surprised and disappointed, but he had presented the Soviet position as it actually was.

*Secretary Shultz* referred to Gromyko's suggestion to agree on an agenda and the readiness at each side to discuss this, that or other question that may be put on such an agenda. If Gromyko was not prepared to discuss the Korean airliner, Shultz would nevertheless express to him the US point of view on that incident. If Gromyko wished to reserve his reaction until later, that would be up to him to decide.

*Gromyko* said that the Secretary was mistaken in saying that Gromyko was not prepared to discuss this matter. He had only said that he would not agree to exchange views on this matter at the very start of their broader meeting. He would be prepared to exchange views after discussing the important questions he had in mind, i.e., the Geneva negotiations on nuclear arms. After that he would be prepared to listen to Shultz and reply. He would ask the Secretary not to engage in attempts to repair his statements. They found themselves in a situation where, if the Secretary would start with the Korean airliner matter he might find himself in this room alone. Gromyko believed



that he had been invited here to exchange views on those questions that both sides wished to discuss. It seemed to him that Shultz was creating artificial difficulties. He would not object to exchanging views on the Korean airliner, but only after discussing more substantive issues.

*The Secretary* suggested that the principal purpose of this private meeting was to give Gromyko the background of the Shcharanskiy case as we understood it in the US Government, and to say to Gromyko that we hoped that the great tensions created by the Korean airliner shoot-down would be resolved in such a way as to make it possible to make progress at their level as well as in Geneva and elsewhere. He suggested that they go to the other room. He had some points he wished to make and then they would see.

*Gromyko* said again that on the first matter raised by the Secretary he could not add anything else. He would only ask not to pick some different Soviet position out of the air, as it were. As for the second matter, he would be prepared to talk about it after an exchange on substantive and important matters on which he had a great deal to say. He suggested they join the rest of their colleagues.

*The Secretary* said he always felt deprived at his meetings with Gromyko because he saw his hand gestures and his facial expressions, but did not hear the translation until later. He thought the interpreter should be trained in duplicating Gromyko's gestures and expressions.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret;

Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; approved by Shultz. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Madrid. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I went over to our ambassador's residence after lunch to prepare for Gromyko's arrival. I planned to take him into a small room with only our interpreters and try to talk to him directly, first about human rights and then about the KAL downing. When he arrived, we went into the study for half an hour. The atmosphere was tense. He was totally unresponsive." Shultz continued: "I then turned to the Soviets' attack on KAL 007. Once again, Gromyko was totally intransigent. I regarded this meeting as a last effort to come to grips with this crisis with him on a human level, but it was fruitless." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 369-370)

<sup>2</sup> In his memoir, Shultz recalled that during the spring of 1983 "in Madrid, Max Kampelman, our negotiator at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was getting messages through his KGB contact, Sergei Kondrachev, that did not come through Foreign Minister Gromyko and that suggested some positive movement. The Soviets were not living up to the words on human rights that they had agreed to in the Helsinki Final Act. We insisted on deeds, actions. At the least, a few controversial dissidents should be allowed to emigrate as a beginning. Max seemed to be getting somewhere. Through Max's discussions with Kondrachev in the spring of 1983, the Soviets agreed that they would release Anatoly Shcharansky unconditionally if he would write a letter to Soviet authorities requesting his release. Kampelman pointed out that any requirement of a confession of guilt or any use of a word such as 'pardon' would be unacceptable to Shcharansky. Kondrachev asked Max to write down what he thought Shcharansky would be willing to sign. Max wrote, 'I hereby request that I be released from prison on the grounds of poor health.' That was all. Kondrachev

understood that this meant release from the Soviet Union as well as from prison. He checked with what he described as 'the highest authority,' and, after checking, he agreed." After consultations with his wife, Shcharansky rejected the deal." (Ibid., pp. 273-274)

<sup>3</sup> Of this meeting, Gromyko recalled in his memoir: "We held this meeting on the day after our speeches, in an old mansion that had no doubt once belonged to a grandee and was now the US ambassador's residence in Madrid. It took no great perception to see that Shultz looked depressed. We had what is called a frank discussion.

"He started off straight away about human rights in the Soviet Union.

"I tactfully pointed out: 'It doesn't make sense to discuss this subject, as it only concerns our internal affairs.'

"Shultz then repeated almost word for word what he had just said, adding, 'The President instructed me to say this.'

"Again I told him: 'We have no intention of discussing our internal affairs with anyone.'" (Gromyko, *Memoirs*, p. 298)

## 105. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Madrid, September 8, 1983, 2:30-4 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.—Secretary Shultz  
Assistant Secretary Richard Burt  
Ambassador Arthur Hartman  
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock  
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter  
USSR—Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov  
Ambassador Makarov  
Mr. Viktor Sukhokrev, Interpreter

*The Secretary* thought it would be fair to say that when he and Foreign Minister Gromyko agreed to hold this meeting several weeks ago, he had hoped that this meeting might make a modest step forward in the relationship between our two countries. Instead, the destruction of a civilian airliner carrying 269 people by a Soviet military aircraft has created a major new obstacle to progress.

*Gromyko* interrupted at this point, threw his glasses on the table, stood up and said he refused to discuss this matter as he had told the Secretary earlier.<sup>2</sup>

*The Secretary* interrupted and said he strongly insisted on such a discussion, that he had instructions to discuss this matter with Gromyko in order to draw his attention to how deeply this action had shocked all Americans. We were shocked by the cost in human life.

*Gromyko* interrupted again to say that he knew this without the Secretary telling it to him. He proposed that they first discuss an agenda on what issues were to be taken up at today's meeting.

*The Secretary* said that he would take up the Korean airliner shoot-down right now. If Gromyko did not want to listen, that was his privilege.

*Gromyko* said he proposed that they discuss the major, important questions of curbing the nuclear arms race, and did not agree to start off on another issue.

*The Secretary* said that we must start with the question of the Korean airliner since it was on everyone's mind as *Gromyko* surely heard in the conference room during the last two days. We must know the facts and how the Soviets plan to deal with them.

*Gromyko* said he knew this without the Secretary telling him, only he knew the facts of the matter better than anyone, i.e., he knew the truth.

*The Secretary* repeated that his agenda called for first discussing the question of the Korean airliner tragedy.

*Gromyko* repeated that he wanted to talk about nuclear arms first; later he would be ready to discuss the question of the airliner.

*The Secretary* said that the airliner matter was of first importance and this was the subject he proposed to discuss with *Gromyko*. *Gromyko* need not listen if he did not choose to, but he himself intended to explain his concerns.

*Gromyko* said he was reaching the conclusion that the Secretary did not want to discuss any other problem. In that case they had nothing to discuss at this meeting. The Secretary was in the clutches of an artificially built scheme.<sup>3</sup>



*The Secretary* interjected that if Gromyko did not want a meeting, so be it, and rose from his seat. He was disappointed that Gromyko did not want to hear our position. He pointed out that the other matters Gromyko had mentioned were the subject of discussions in Geneva and elsewhere but here, today, and under these circumstances, he had to address the problem that was foremost not only in his mind but also foremost in the views of most people throughout the world. Many Foreign Ministers had raised the question of the meeting here; airline pilots are very concerned; so are publics everywhere.

*Gromyko* said that the Secretary had already said a great deal on this question. He could report to the United States that he had only one matter to discuss, but Gromyko would report to his Government and to the whole world that the US side refused to discuss matters of such enormous importance as curbing the nuclear arms race and preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and that he himself was prepared to discuss nuclear weapons. He added that he was entirely prepared to discuss other matters as well, including the Korean airliner matter. But priorities had to be agreed upon first and he would note that this was the first time that he found himself in a situation where the Secretary of State of the United States was attempting to impose an agenda for a meeting without taking into account the views of the other side.

*The Secretary* said that if Gromyko did not want to discuss this question with him, that would be his choice. But the Secretary's choice was to convey to Gromyko the information he had regarding this matter.

Pacing and greatly agitated, *Gromyko* said he would tell the Secretary what it was he was proposing to discuss. He



proposed first of all to address the question of our negotiations in Geneva, i.e., the question of nuclear arms. If the Secretary was not prepared to respond, that would be acceptable, but he insisted on first presenting his views. Later on he would be prepared to listen to the Secretary's setting forth whatever he believed necessary. He would repeat that he was prepared to discuss this matter and set forth the position of the Soviet Government and the Soviet leadership, to set out their views on critical questions. But he would also repeat that he had never encountered a situation when the other side tried to impose an agenda on him. He wanted to talk about the Geneva negotiations on nuclear arms. It would be up to the Secretary whether or not he wanted to respond. The Secretary was mistaken if he believed that Gromyko was trying to aggravate the relations between our countries. He had met many times with officials of the United States but had never encountered a situation such as the one he was encountering now. It was for this reason that he proposed first to work out an agreed agenda. For his part, he wanted to set forth the Soviet position on nuclear arms and then would be prepared to listen to the Secretary talk on the airliner matter. He did have something to say on that score. At this point, Gromyko being the guest, the Secretary sat down and said, "proceed," and Gromyko resumed his seat.

*Gromyko* wanted the Secretary of State to know that in his view there was no more important issue between us than the question of nuclear arms and that of preventing nuclear war. The Secretary had referred to the airliner matter as a question of first importance, but in his view the foremost importance should be attached to the urgent need of halting the arms race and preventing nuclear war. He was quite confident that the Secretary himself believed this indeed to be the case. He was certain that no American in his right mind would regard this question as anything but

Number One. Gromyko was speaking here on behalf of the Soviet Government and the entire leadership of the Soviet Union, including Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. He was authorized to draw the attention of the Secretary and the President of the United States to the fact that the Soviet leadership was deeply convinced that the world today was in an extremely dangerous state. It was sliding closer and closer toward the abyss of nuclear war. The situation is getting worse and worse. It was for this reason that he regarded this question as Number One today. There were no other countries in the world today that had to bear such a great responsibility for preventing this slide toward nuclear war as the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union was conscious of its responsibility in this respect and was drawing the proper conclusions from this fact. In the view of the Soviet leadership the US authorities, on the other hand, were not conscious of their responsibility, did not correctly assess the situation and underestimated its gravity. If it were otherwise, US policy today would be entirely different.

What we were witnessing today was a colossal increase in the production of arms and above all nuclear arms in the United States. Furthermore, whatever proposals aimed at curbing the arms race and limiting, let alone reducing, nuclear arms had been made by the Soviet Union, they had all been rejected out of hand, one after the other. No matter what had been proposed by the Soviet side, everything had been rejected. And yet, it was the United States and the Soviet Union together that had assumed the international obligation to prevent war and especially nuclear war. A document to that effect had been adopted by both sides, a number of joint and unilateral statements had been made by both countries to the effect that they would

do all in their power to make sure that such a tragedy would not happen. This was under a previous Administration; but it was a formal agreement obligating both sides to take all steps necessary to prevent war. There were a number of differences today between our two countries, including some very major differences, and of course no one had the right to ignore these differences. However, up to now, and by this he meant up to the present Administration of the United States, the United States had also taken a positive view of the necessity of seeking solutions to these differences. There were many documents and unilateral statements by former Administrations to the effect that this was absolutely necessary. The Soviet Union urgently called upon the United States to take this into account, and he would express the hope that both countries would seek practical and peaceful solutions to these differences. Even the present Administration had made statements in favor of contacts and dialogue. The Soviet leadership still had a glimmer of hope, paradoxical as it may seem, that this view would be reciprocated on the US side, and the present meeting also testified to the fact that even under such unfavorable conditions dialogue between the two countries and contacts between its leading statesmen were important and necessary.

Summing up, Gromyko wanted to say that even taking into account the differences between us, it was necessary to seek solutions at the negotiating table and not allow the leaden storm clouds hanging over the world today to result in a nuclear downpour. He was certain the Secretary knew very well what such a calamity would entail for both our countries and for the whole world.

*Gromyko* wanted to remind the Secretary of an occasion when President Nixon was in power and had come to Moscow for a meeting with Brezhnev.<sup>4</sup> Upon entering

Brezhnev's office, Nixon had said that according to American scientific experts and their calculations, the Soviet Union and the United States had amassed a nuclear arsenal that would be sufficient to destroy each other seven times over. Isn't this too much, Nixon had asked. Brezhnev had replied that Nixon was right and that Soviet calculations showed the same thing—seven times over. It was too much, he had agreed. Brezhnev had then added that they should seek solutions to defuse that situation. One might very well ask how many times over we could destroy each other today and did this not surely make it incumbent on both our countries to display the necessary care and solicitude to prevent this situation from escalating and to build bridges between us wherever possible.

The world today was in a very fragile state, and it was necessary for us to be extremely careful. It was for this reason that he wanted to appeal to the President of the United States, to the Secretary of State and to the entire leadership of the US to do everything in their power together with the leadership of the Soviet Union to avert conflict, seek agreed solutions, and bring our positions ever closer together on all the issues between us. On the other hand, he would ask, what would follow if the United States proceeded with its intention of stationing new nuclear weapons in Europe? What would happen then? Obviously the Soviet Union and its allies will not be caught napping and will do everything necessary to preserve the equality in arms existing today. Peace will become more fragile. Thus, the question of what will happen can only be answered by pointing out that the world will become even more fragile than it is today. It was for this reason that it was incumbent on both sides to have a correct assessment of the current situation and to take up the kind of positions at negotiations that would bring us closer together.

In this connection, Gromyko wanted to draw particular attention to the proposal on nuclear missiles which was recently advanced by President Andropov.<sup>5</sup>

[Gromyko in an aside assured the Secretary that he was not greedy and did not have any malicious plans to take up the Secretary's time by lengthy presentations of Soviet views.]

What were these proposals? Earlier, when discussing reductions in the numbers of missiles stationed in Europe, the Soviet side had proposed that excess missiles be transferred beyond the Ural Mountains to the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union. The US side had maintained that such missiles could easily be redeployed back to Europe subsequently. Although this was a somewhat primitive kind of reasoning—because after all missiles were not something that were put in a basket to be shipped at will—the Soviet side had taken this US concern into account and was now saying that it would dismantle such excess missiles, including the SS-20s that the United States and its NATO Allies were concerned about. The Soviet side had clearly stated now that they would be dismantled. The Soviet leadership had hoped that this would build a bridge, drawing the positions of the sides closer together; but now it turned out that even this was not to the liking of the US side. This was one major point to which Gromyko wanted to draw the Secretary's attention.

His second point concerned the fact that the US Government and some US Allies, particularly Britain and France, although the Federal Republic of Germany could also be heard from here, were trying to prove that British and French nuclear missiles should not be taken into account. He wondered what sort of simpletons did the US side take the Soviet leadership for. Britain and France were US Allies and their nuclear missiles were part of NATO's

arsenal. It was therefore obvious that they would have to count in the balance. He was not saying they should be reduced, but only that they be taken into account. Previous US Administrations, in particular President Carter's, had realized this, and President Carter himself had told Gromyko that the Soviet side was right in maintaining that British and French missiles were aimed at the Soviet Union. He said that he had given this matter a great deal of thought but had not yet found a way to resolve it. Yet, ultimately, the solution to this matter had to be found. He wanted to emphasize this to the Secretary, that it was necessary to take into account British and French missiles, for otherwise they would become a sort of special premium for NATO's arsenal. He wanted to convey this thought to the Secretary as forcefully as he could so that no illusions be harbored on the US side. If they are not taken into account, there is no basis for an agreement (*'isklyvehenna dogovorennost'*). If the United States planned to deploy its new missiles in Western Europe come what may, what he had just said would not impress the Secretary. But if the US side was truly prepared to make an effort at bringing the positions of the sides closer together, then this statement of his would be meaningful.

*Gromyko* said that he had wanted to present the overall Soviet position without going into various details. He had wanted to make these two points which, of course, had various aspects. But, these aspects were being dealt with in Geneva at the START negotiations and at the negotiations to limit medium-range nuclear missiles. He had simply wanted to draw the Secretary's attention to some of the crucial aspects of these matters in the hope that perhaps the Secretary and the President would bear them in mind if they still believed that it was necessary to improve relations between our countries and to achieve a reduction in international tensions. He would assure the Secretary



that the Soviet Union wanted to have good relations with the United States and even at present would make every effort to even out the sources of friction between us. This is what he wanted to convey to the Secretary on a question that concerned the entire world, including the people of the United States, for he was sure that the people of the United States, like the people of the Soviet Union, did not want war but instead craved peace. He was sure that no one in their right mind in any country would welcome the prospect of war. He would conclude by noting that in the past the Secretary had made a few good speeches on this subject.

*Secretary Shultz* wanted to assure Gromyko that no one in the world was more dedicated to the preservation of peace than President Reagan. His concern over the threat to peace emanating from the buildup in nuclear arms had been fully borne out by his proposal for drastic reductions in strategic arms and complete elimination of an entire class of nuclear missiles—intermediate-range nuclear forces. Nor did his concern stop there: he was also advocating reductions in the area of conventional arms, elimination of chemical and biological weapons as well as a number of other initiatives. It was because of this very fact that in spite of the upheaval in the United States over the shoot-down of the Korean airliner, President Reagan had sent Ambassador Nitze to Geneva, where he would also soon be joined by Ambassador Rowny. Further, Ambassador Abramovitz would continue his efforts in Vienna.

And yet, it was not nuclear arms that were the number one issue today, nor the destruction of the Korean airliner. The number one issue today was human life and it was because of this that nuclear weapons with their holocaustical nature were so threatening and it was also this that triggered the indignation throughout the world over the shoot-down of

the Korean airliner. Nowadays multitudes of people fly all over the world and, naturally, now wonder about the safety of flight in airliners. The real concern is over human life and over what can happen as a result of the recent occurrence.

Therefore, the Soviets must recognize that the loss of 269 human lives had a stunning impact throughout the world. We wanted Gromyko to understand how deeply this action had shocked all Americans. We were shocked at the cost in human life. We were shocked at the apparent lack of effort to identify the aircraft, to communicate with it, or to assist it back on course. We were shocked at the refusal to acknowledge the destruction of the aircraft until just the day before yesterday, and the refusal to assume responsibility for the action, or to cooperate in efforts to search for survivors, if any, or their remains. The Soviet Union had not even allowed members of families in mourning to go to the scene and throw flowers on the water in commemoration of their loved ones. We are shocked at the efforts of the Soviet Government to shift responsibility and to levy entirely baseless and unsubstantiated charges against the United States Government. They surely must be seen as pure fabrications. Quite frankly, the Secretary was personally shocked by Gromyko's statement yesterday.<sup>6</sup> The Soviet Government has stated flatly that it will take the same action in the future in similar circumstances. Yesterday Gromyko not only reaffirmed this position but stated that Soviet law requires such barbarism. Yesterday Gromyko said that Soviet territory was sacred. Our territory is sacred to us too. But for us human life is also sacred. Therefore, we balance our concern over the security of our territory against the sacredness of human life. President Reagan shares these sentiments in full. He had asked the Secretary to use this meeting to seek an explanation of this

incident and to secure the Soviet Government's cooperation in conducting search and rescue efforts, in compensating the families of those who lost their lives and in adopting measures to see to it that we and the whole world can agree to prevent such tragedies in the future.

Only through a full accounting of this incident can the damage it has done to our relationships begin to be repaired, the Secretary said. The Soviet Union must accept financial responsibility for this action. There can be no legal or moral basis for evading such an obligation. We sought Soviet cooperation in the organization of thorough search and rescue efforts. We provided the details requested by the Soviet side with regard to these proposed efforts, but we haven't heard anything further. We also wish to discuss positive steps which the Soviet Union can take in conjunction with all other nations to ensure that this tragedy is never repeated. We have earlier made proposals to the Soviet Union for direct communications links between our two military commands. Had such links existed in this case, a further channel to secure information on this flight would have existed and ensured against any mis-identification, although we believe that the aircraft in question could so easily have been identified that if this was not done, it should have been.

*The Secretary* wanted to emphasize to Gromyko that the American reaction to this incident stems from a commitment to human rights and to the importance of the individual human being, which is at the heart of our political and social system. These were the very considerations which give so much drive to our efforts toward reduction of nuclear arms.

*The Secretary* wanted to ask Gromyko: "Will you take part in an accounting of this tragedy, in an international effort to

ensure that all the facts are known? Will you compensate the families of the victims? Will you permit us to search the waters for any possible survivors or remains? And will you take part in a constructive way to search for means to assure that a tragedy such as this can never happen again?" These are the questions the Secretary had for Gromyko. He had tried to provide a background for our feelings on this matter.

*Gromyko* noted that the Secretary had started to speak on the main issue between us which Gromyko had raised at the very beginning of this talk, but had then switched to the question of the airliner incident. Gromyko very much regretted that the Secretary had not wished to speak on the important main issue in greater detail, or to present the views of the US Administration on the major nuclear question, that of reducing the nuclear arms build-up, of preventing war and slowing the nuclear arms race. Perhaps the Secretary intended to present the position of his Government later; if so, Gromyko would be prepared to listen at any time.

As for the Secretary's remarks concerning the airliner incident, the Secretary would be making a gross error if he thought that Gromyko would present some sort of defensive remarks in connection with what the Secretary had said. Absolutely not. Quite the contrary, Gromyko would level a charge against the US side on behalf of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet side accused the US side of having undertaken a large-scale hostile action against the Soviet Union. This was the only way that what had happened could be assessed. Of course, the Secretary would know better than Gromyko whether this action had been instigated by the highest authorities of the United States or whether US special agencies had perhaps acted within the framework of some general instructions in

undertaking this action. But the Soviet side had no doubt whatsoever that the entire incident had been pre-planned. All the statements made by the US side since the incident could not dispel this conviction of the Soviet side.

*Secretary Shultz* interrupted to tell Gromyko that this conviction had no basis in fact whatsoever.

*Gromyko* noted that the aircraft had deviated from the established international route by almost 500 kms, and not toward the left, that is toward international waters, but to the right, toward USSR territory. In fact, the plane was deep in Soviet territory and had spent more than two hours in its air space. How did this happen? Had the US Government answered this question? Indeed, it had not; this question was being carefully avoided. Was it not clear to the US Government that this flight took the aircraft over important prohibited areas of the USSR with installations of strategic significance. This is also being avoided. Was this deviation accidental or was it not? It could not have been accidental. How would the United States act if airplanes of other states flew over secret US bases? And why did this plane, flying deep in Soviet air space and over Soviet strategic bases, not obey the signals provided for in international law, given by Soviet ground services as well as Soviet air defense aircraft, signals that were both visual and radioed, as well as the physical maneuvers of the fighter interceptors? What happened? Had the pilot and crew suddenly lost their minds and had turned into idiots? Such things do not happen. They not only failed to obey all signals. They even ignored them demonstratively and flouted international standards as well as Soviet laws which are well known to all, since they have been published. Why was one of the United States' planes accompanying the airliner although it did so at a distance, outside Soviet air space? Isn't that significant? Evidently it was impossible to

conceal this fact. Why didn't the Japanese air navigation services notify the Korean plane and advise it to correct its flight pattern? He believed that US control of these air services is close indeed. Why didn't the US authorities get in touch with Soviet authorities either in Washington or elsewhere? Why did they fail to draw the attention of the Soviet side to the fact that this was an error, either in Moscow or locally, unless its intentions were hostile? After all, hours had passed where minutes would have been sufficient.

*Secretary Shultz* interrupted to say that this was a clear effort to avoid answering relevant questions by posing questions which have obvious answers; it was not worth the time to sit here. These questions are basically ridiculous and what's more Gromyko knew that very well. It therefore seemed to the Secretary that we had nothing further to discuss on this subject or perhaps any other.

*Gromyko* resumed by charging that the fact cannot be avoided: the United States organized this whole criminal action. The Soviet Union bore no responsibility for this matter, not financial responsibility nor any other. Those who organized this whole incident were responsible.

*Gromyko* also noted that the Secretary had linked this incident with human rights. Supposedly nuclear war had nothing to do with human rights although it would be a catastrophe costing hundreds of millions of lives. Here, in this distorted way, the Secretary had tried to link this incident with human rights. This was his response: The Soviet side charges US authorities with the responsibility for this action. The Secretary would know best what the relations were between the US central authorities and its various agencies and how this incident was organized. He



accused the US, and he had nothing more to say on this matter.

*Gromyko* further noted that the United States had undertaken many actions against the Soviet Union in many different areas. US authorities seemed to believe that there was no limit to such actions. And yet, there was very little left to be done to worsen the relations between our countries further. The Soviet Union regretted this fact, but responsibility for it rested on US shoulders. He noted that our respective representatives in Geneva could indeed achieve some things with respect to the important question of nuclear arms, but at the higher level you have little or no taste for any progress. The Secretary had limited himself to some very general comments on nuclear arms. That was not enough. *Gromyko* was prepared to listen to any response the Secretary might have.

As for the general tone of US officials when talking about the Soviet Union and the socialist system, they had used up an entire dictionary of salty words of abuse. The Soviet side decisively rejected and condemned these words and methods. They were totally unworthy of the high calling of statesmen. Abuse could not cover up the true aspects of US policy, the attempts to fuel the arms race and where the true blame belonged.

*The Secretary* interrupted *Gromyko* to say that his statements were growing more outrageous by the minute. We were constantly engaged in discussing issues, but *Gromyko* had refused to come to grips with Korean airliner tragedy. This was shocking. *Gromyko* had leveled unfounded charges against us in order to cover up the need for a complete accounting of the facts on a Soviet atrocity. This was even more shocking. In view of this, there was nothing further to discuss.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko in Madrid September 8, 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer; cleared by Matlock, Hartman, Burt, and Palmer; approved by Shultz. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in Madrid.

<sup>2</sup> Matlock later recalled: "When Shultz announced he was prepared to discuss only the Korean airliner incident and started to set forth the American position, Gromyko exploded in fury and stood up as if to leave, literally throwing his glasses on the table. The rest of the delegation also rose, apparently uncertain as to whether the boss was on his way out. Shultz, seated across the table from him, also stood, as if prepared to see him out. Gromyko, pacing the floor, started a harangue that went on for a full twenty minutes. In his excitement he frequently interrupted Viktor Sukhodrev, his interpreter, in mid-sentence, so Shultz grasped only snippets of Gromyko's outburst.

"Once Gromyko started talking, his colleagues took their seats and began taking notes. Shultz stood with a look of amazement on his face and interjected periodically that he was following President Reagan's instructions. Gromyko thundered that *he*, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, was not subordinate to Reagan and did not take orders from him. Those of us who were present were glad that a table separated the two. Shultz was outwardly calm, but his cheeks were flushed with anger." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 68)

<sup>3</sup> In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “the plenary session developed into a brutally confrontational meeting. At one point, Gromyko stood up and picked up his papers as though to leave. I think he half-expected me to urge him to sit down. On the contrary, I got up to escort him out of the room. He then sat down, and I sat down. After the meeting ended, my interpreter, Bill Krimer, told me that he had been interpreting in high-level meetings with the Soviets for seventeen years and had never seen anything remotely like it.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 370)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to the meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 23, 1972, when they discussed SALT. See [\*Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 262\*](#) and [263](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 82](#).

<sup>6</sup> The *Washington Post* reported that in his speech at the closing session of the CSCE conference on September 7, Gromyko warned that “any future violations of ‘sacred’ Soviet borders, such as the South Korean airliner’s intrusion into Soviet air space last week, would receive the ‘full brunt’ of Kremlin retaliation.” (Peter Osnos, “Gromyko Threatens Further Soviet Violence,” *Washington Post*, September 8, 1983, p. A1)

## 106. Editorial Note

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George Shultz endured two tense meetings in the wake of the KAL disaster on the afternoon of September 8, 1983, in conjunction with the CSCE meetings in Madrid. (See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).) Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff, who attended these meetings, later wrote that when the larger plenary meeting ended: "Shultz, who rarely showed emotion, was fuming. As soon as Gromyko left the room in Ambassador Hartman's company, Shultz summoned Rick Burt, Mark Palmer, and me and said, 'If you fellows ever advise me to see that so-and-so again, you're fired!' We knew he wasn't serious, so we assured him, tongue in cheek, that such a thought would never cross our minds." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pages 68-69) As Gromyko recalled the meeting in his memoir: "That was virtually the end of my talk with Shultz. It was probably the sharpest exchange I ever had with an American Secretary of State, and I have had talks with fourteen of them." (Gromyko, *Memoirs*, page 301)

According to the President's Daily Diary, Shultz and President Ronald Reagan spoke via telephone on September 8 from 10:32 to 10:39 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Shultz recalled in his memoir that when the meeting with Gromyko ended: "I called President Reagan and told him that Gromyko couldn't bring himself to answer any of my questions. The meeting became so outrageous and pointless that we just ended it. But I told the president that the French and the other allies were hearing from their pilots' unions and I believed that by the time the night was over, most of our allies would agree on significant actions: amendments on air traffic control

through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); prohibition of normal liaison operations with the Soviets by NATO military attachés; a call for better military and civilian coordination of flights; a move to take these matters to the UN Security Council; explicit support for the five South Korean demands of the Soviets; and support for a two-week moratorium in air traffic to and from the Soviet Union, starting on September 15.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 370) In his diary entry for September 8, Reagan wrote: “Talked to Geo. S. in Madrid—he terminated the meeting with Gromyko who insisted on repeating the Soviet lies about the Korean Plane Massacre. George says our allies may be hanging with us on taking more action against the Soviets. We’ll know more tomorrow.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981–October 1985, page 261) Shultz also reported on the meetings to Reagan and the Department of State in a telegram; see [Document 108](#).

Matlock concluded in his book: “The meeting was traumatic for both. In his otherwise bland and uninformative memoirs, Gromyko devotes three pages to his encounter with Shultz in Madrid, repeating in a tone of high dudgeon words he had used then. It made no sense to discuss human rights with Shultz, he said, ‘as it only concerns our internal affairs.’ And he included his accusation that the Korean airliner had been sent by the United States to spy.” [See Gromyko, *Memoirs*, pages 298–301.] Matlock continues: “When he was in Madrid it is possible that Gromyko did not have a full report on the KAL incident. But the Soviet navy managed to recover much of the wreckage and the plane’s black box. By the time Gromyko wrote his memoirs, he should have been informed that there was no evidence that the plane had been on a spy mission. Possibly he never asked and was never told. The Soviet cover story was for him the truth. He would

have considered any attempt by Soviet officials to question that version an act of disloyalty." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 69)



**107. Information Memorandum From the  
Chairman of the Policy Planning Council  
(Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL Affair's Impact on US-Soviet Relations

Under Jeremy Azrael's chairmanship, we have again assembled our "Red Team" of Soviet specialists. The attached paper is their analysis of the KAL affair's likely impact on Soviet policy, especially on US-Soviet relations.

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared by the "Red Team" of the Department of State<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, September 8, 1983

*Red Team Special Edition:  
The KAL Affair's Impact on US-Soviet Relations*

Ten months after Leonid Brezhnev's death, Yuri Andropov and the Soviet leadership face their most serious foreign policy crisis. The international outcry over the KAL shoot-down leaves Andropov and his colleagues with three major tasks: to limit the damage, to deflect the outrage, and to regain some initiative on broader East-West issues, especially arms control. Moscow's unyielding initial approach to the incident may put those objectives still further out of reach. The Soviets' principal challenge now is to find a way to put the issue behind them as soon as possible. They probably believe their best hope lies in

making the issue US exploitation of the shoot-down rather than the shoot-down itself, in capitalizing on any West-West tensions that may emerge, and in using the incident to show that the dangers of East-West confrontation are very real.

### *Internal Decisionmaking*

The initial decisions for dealing with the “intruding aircraft” were almost certainly governed by a combination of rigid standard operating procedures and the ingrained security-mindedness that created them. It is, and will probably remain, unclear who actually gave the order to destroy the aircraft, but even if it was approved in Moscow it was probably not handled as a matter of high policy, or seen as an opportunity to put pressure on the West. It is still less likely that it reflected military dissatisfaction with Andropov, or an effort by the military to undermine his security and arms control policies.

Despite overall policy unity between the civilian and military hierarchies, the incident may prompt the political leadership to reexamine whether the military’s operational procedures autonomy is too great, particularly where international repercussions are possible. (A mere regimental officer is reportedly empowered to order an intruding military aircraft shot down.) Yet whatever its conclusions, and even if it appears that Soviet rules of engagement were breached, we should not expect the leadership to be willing to offer an outright apology. This would not only be a greater slap at the military than Andropov can probably afford; it would also be inconsistent with his own campaign of vigilance against foreign enemies and with a conviction that to do so would signal dangerous weakness. For these reasons, despite the international

price that has been paid, the leadership will likely continue its counter-offensive on the issue of the downing itself, although with tactical adjustments as events dictate.

### *Assessing the Damage*

Particularly if it remains unyielding, the leadership will soon have to consider the consequences of an atmosphere of growing US-Soviet confrontation that could engulf other East-West questions. Should it accept a broader breakdown of US-Soviet relations? If so, can it still advance its objectives in Western Europe—in particular, delaying if not blocking INF deployments? If not, how can it contain and compartmentalize the confrontation?

Moscow's answer will become evident in its approach to a series of coming events: Gromyko's speech to the UNGA; his bilateral(s) with the Secretary; the substance of Soviet positions in the arms talks and even the extent of Soviet participation in them. The Soviets will have to react to the isolation represented by a spreading pilots' boycott, and review its policy towards the ROK. In addition, they will have to react to a volatile Middle East situation and US demarches on the subject, evaluate their stand on particular human rights issues (especially Shcharanskiy), and so on.

Soviet decisions will depend on a still unfolding assessment of how much lasting damage has been done to the USSR's international position. Naturally, if within two or three weeks it appears that the storm will soon blow over, Moscow's policies—especially a renewed INF offensive—will emerge on former lines. At present, however, the high pitch of Western rhetoric is surely read by the Soviets as evidence that the US and allied governments expect less

public pressure on them to produce tangible progress in East-West relations, especially to reach arms control agreements. The Reagan Administration's very tentative shows of interest in doing business are seen to have receded to be replaced in all likelihood by a greater propensity to treat propagandistically issues that earlier they might have hoped would be confined to a low diplomatic key (e.g., arms control compliance and human rights). And, having earlier looked like a would-be peace candidate, the President is perhaps thought to be weighing the advantages of running for reelection on sharper, anti-Bolshevik themes.

Ordinarily, Moscow would be fully prepared to hunker down for the duration of a chill in East-West ties. Yet given the short time remaining before INF deployments, the increased Western freedom of action that accompanies the chill could very quickly have a significant political-military effect, above all in Europe. This is likely to strengthen the view that, even if a period of confrontation should be accepted on most other issues on the East-West agenda, much more active efforts will be needed soon to repair or at least limit the damage to Soviet negotiating credibility in arms control; without such efforts the Soviets will have still less hope of averting INF deployments, much less of producing a deal on terms acceptable to them.

This analysis is the more likely to be accepted by the leadership because it does not require that Soviet *strategy* change fundamentally. It will continue to seek exacerbated tensions within the Western alliance by trying both to arouse European fears, which are presumed to be higher than American, and to appear to meet European demands, which are thought to be lower. But given the weakness of the Soviet position, the same *tactics* employed to date may no longer seem adequate. As a result we are likely to see

an intensification and acceleration of Soviet effort, both to demonstrate reasonableness and to suggest just how bad a deterioration in East-West relations could become. Gromyko's speech in Madrid is a strong indication that the Soviets are moving in this direction.

### *INF and Other Arms Control Issues*

The outline of intensified and accelerated Soviet efforts may be clear enough, but both the hard and soft sides of Soviet policy will present certain dilemmas for the leadership:

—While the rhetorical atmosphere is still hot, the Soviets are likely to fear that concessions they offer will be lost in the KAL din, or merely pocketed by the West. It is not their style to make concessions to improve the atmosphere, lest the real bargaining begin (and end) on disadvantageous terms. Despite this, Moscow will certainly attempt an early resuscitation, probably with embellishments, of the arms control initiatives already taken just before the KAL incident, i.e. the ASAT test moratorium, and Andropov's SS-20 dismantling commitment. Beyond these proposals, more consideration will probably be given to accelerating whatever time-table of *new* offers had been devised for the fall. These may well include new suggestions in MBFR and an elaborate CDE proposal, to create the impression of possible progress across the board. Yet the heart of this campaign, if it is to have any chance of success, will remain INF. As a result, whatever incentives existed for putting forward a highly attractive new formula (perhaps a modified walk-in-the-woods offer) will also increase. All these initiatives can actually make direct use of the public's sense that a confrontation is at hand: the Soviets will offer their initiatives, perhaps directly to European governments

rather than to the US, as a contribution to calming the inflamed international situation.

—While stimulating hopes for a breakthrough in this area, the Soviet leadership may also want to review (and perhaps accelerate) measures already planned to increase European fears. The KAL crisis itself can be a basis for driving home the point that innocent bystanders, even allies, suffer when the US drives up East-West tension: hair-trigger responses, launch-on-warning procedures all become necessary—although dangerous—measures of self-defense. As a backdrop to this argument, Soviet counter-deployment threats may also become more explicit. Threats to cut off talks will also become more frequent (although this was likely even before the KAL incident). While recognizing the risk that an actual walk-out might only worsen their image in the West, the Soviets are also likely to consider the advantages of withdrawing dramatically (“more in sorrow than in anger”) from INF and/or START. If done early, this step could focus pressure on the US to take steps that would make the resumption of negotiation possible. Finally, to add to tensions, Moscow may launch an escalated counter-intelligence campaign—perhaps involving expulsions of Western (especially US) diplomats, discovery of “nests of spies”, etc.

### *The Rest of the Agenda*

Even as it intensifies its traditional hard-and-soft tactics, Moscow is likely to protect itself by imposing certain limits on each arm of its policy.

—In seeking to *intimidate*, it will want to avoid authorizing operations that risk new incidents in which the Soviet Union would again be in the dock. What would otherwise



be routine military procedures are likely to get much closer scrutiny; continuing submarine probes in Swedish waters, for example, may now seem more ill-advised.

—In projecting *flexibility* on arms control, the Soviets will continue to fear conveying an impression of overall weakness. On issues that involve their international legitimacy and reputation, where the KAL affair has been most damaging, they are likely to doubt that any symbolic concessions will restore their good name, such as it was. This will be especially true as well of issues on the US-Soviet bilateral agenda; the Soviets will not be disposed to make the concessions that could improve relations or produce agreement. For example, barring a Soviet decision that the US-Soviet downturn must be kept strictly limited, the release of Shcharanskiy will seem unnecessary, even pointless (all the more so since his case involves the domestically charged themes of spying and vigilance). If Moscow for a time expects bad relations to prevail, then it may even decide to get the worst over with (as it did in exiling Sakharov immediately after Afghanistan).

Finally, on the issues of geopolitical rivalry, the leadership's objectives and risk calculations will remain largely unchanged, and their policies unadjusted in the wake of the KAL affair. While remaining extremely cautious in circumstances that carry the risk of direct confrontation with the US, they will be eager to show that the Soviet Union cannot be pushed around with impunity, and that US involvements are dangerous and costly, both for us and for those we convince to work with us. Yet these same considerations have obviously guided Moscow for some time, as the risks involved in the Syrian SA-5 deployments have shown. The extreme dangers created by Soviet policy in the Middle East are not lessened as a result of this incident, but they do not appear to be greater. In other

areas, where they can trip us up without incurring greater risks of direct confrontation, the Soviets are less likely to cooperate with us, particularly on issues like a Namibia settlement where the success for us will inevitably be much larger than for them.

In sum, it is our judgment that in pressing to blame the US for the incident the Soviets will not make an active effort to limit the damage to the US-Soviet relationship wrought by the KAL affair, or even to isolate the incident within the broader US-Soviet agenda. Rather, Soviet strategy—as evidenced by Gromyko’s defiant stance at his meeting with the Secretary in Madrid<sup>3</sup>—will be one of toughing it out with Washington, while seeking to reinvigorate Moscow’s carrot-and-stick strategy vis-à-vis Western Europe. Any impulse Soviet leaders may feel toward taking the initiative to defuse the latest tensions through more accommodating policies on US-Soviet issues is likely to be outweighed by instinctive Russian defensiveness and a desire to avoid appearing weak when under siege, and by the view that nothing short of fundamental concessions of principle will elicit a positive U.S. response.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 8.

<sup>2</sup> Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael, R. Baraz (INR/SEE), W. Courtney (PM), D. Johnson (P), and Vershbow.

<sup>3</sup> See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).

## **108. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Madrid, September 9, 1983, 0152Z

Secto 9022. For the President From Secretary Shultz. Subj: My Meeting With Gromyko, September 8, 1983.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. As I reported to you earlier,<sup>2</sup> today's meeting was totally unsatisfactory, and the statement I made to the press after Gromyko left said just that.<sup>3</sup> In fact, his behavior and his treatment of the KAL atrocity were nothing short of outrageous.

3. Gromyko made clear from the outset that his strategy for the meeting was to concentrate on arms control, so that he could claim afterward that we are refusing to discuss peace and war—but prefer to whip up anti-Soviet feeling with the airliner incident we engineered in order to stoke the arms race. Both in a short private meeting in which I raised Shcharanskiy and other Soviet human rights issues, and the longer meeting with aides that followed, I drove home that American and world outrage at the massacre made human rights the necessary focus of this meeting.

4. I told him that the number one issue for us is not arms control, but human life. It is human life that makes nuclear weapons important, and our concern for human life is at the core of our outrage over the airliner. I told him it has had a tremendous impact on our people and the world community, and that the Soviets would have to give adequate responses and restitution if they wanted to repair

the damage to our relations. I went through all four categories of international demands on them: full accounting, financial responsibility, cooperation on search and rescue efforts, and concrete measures to assure that it never happens again. Gromyko had repeated that their territory is sacred, and I told him that ours is sacred to us as well, but I stressed that for us human life is also sacred, and what we are talking about is the relationship between human life and security.

5. Gromyko for his part wanted to talk about arms control, and went through the weary list of Soviet proposals without saying anything new about any of them. To short-circuit his clear intention to claim later that we will talk only about the airliner “provocation” and not about arms control, I told him that no man in the world is more dedicated to peace than you are, and mentioned your proposals for real arms control in START, INF, MBFR and CBW. I pointed out that despite the shutdown you had sent Nitze back to Geneva and would send Rowny and Abramowitz back to negotiations too precisely because of your commitment to peace and progress in arms control. But I insisted that this meeting was about human rights, and the rights of the KAL travellers in particular.

6. Forced to address the issue, Gromyko was even more outrageous in private than he was on the Madrid podium yesterday or than the Soviets were in the statement they gave us early this morning.<sup>4</sup> He took his cue from that statement, and related the same set of rhetorical questions based on the filthy theory that the KAL flight was a U.S. intelligence operation, all put in the most insulting possible way. He told me that far from being put on the defensive the Soviets will henceforth accuse us of undertaking a “gross instigation” against them. They would pay no financial or other compensation, he said.

7. Rather than listen to more of his diatribe, I interjected that his effort to avoid answering relevant questions by asking easy-to-answer irrelevant ones was revolting and that there seemed no purpose in continuing a discussion of this subject, and perhaps any other.

8. Gromyko was, therefore, totally unyielding on all our concerns. In our private meeting he denied that the Soviets had made any commitment whatsoever concerning Shcharanskiy,<sup>5</sup> and his diatribe in the larger meeting went on at high pitch. The discussion was tense and often heated. We were both on the point of walking out of the smaller meeting, and Gromyko began the general session by heading for the door, so that the first quarter-hour took place standing. He sat down after it was clear to him that an early end to the meeting would suit me fine. Jack Matlock has seen lots of Gromyko theatricals, but noted for the first time in his experience that Gromyko seemed on the verge of losing control of himself. Our own interpreter has been doing high-level U.S.-Soviet meetings since 1963, and says he has never seen a tenser one. So Gromyko appears to have been genuinely agitated.

9. After his last three meetings with American Secretaries of State Gromyko has made an airport statement before returning to Moscow. Today he told the press he had nothing for them "for the time being." The Soviets have now announced a Moscow press conference for tomorrow afternoon, but my guess is that Gromyko will also make a statement when he leaves for Paris tomorrow and will claim publicly that I refused to talk about peace and war and pounded away on an incident we are creating to blacken the Soviets, stir up war psychosis and gain military superiority. I think we should respond by stating that I pointed out to Gromyko that a host of serious arms control proposals demonstrate your commitment to peace, but that



the Soviets are the only ones who apparently do not see that respect for human life is the foundation of international security.

10. I think the meeting showed that the Soviet leadership is at this point totally unwilling to accept their responsibility for taking innocent lives, that they are digging in on a hard line, and that they will be trying vigorously to blame us for the atrocity, against all the evidence and against all reason. They are agitated and worried. The short-term result is that we are engaged in a propaganda exchange where we have all the real assets but will still need to remain resolute and alert. Their strategy will be to keep trying to make this a U.S.-Soviet issue and to frighten others off by fueling fears of confrontation, particularly in the arms control field. Our answer should be to continue our effort to catalyze the world community's demands for an honest explanation, an apology, full compensation and adoption of measures to keep this sort of thing from ever happening again. That is the best way to prove to the Soviets that they face the world, rather than just us. But an essential part of our strategy must also be to keep the administration's commitment to genuine arms control absolutely clear.

11. I also think we are making progress in mobilizing international response to the massacre. In this meeting we saw something of the Soviet leadership's state of mind as international pressure mounts. Gromyko was reacting verbally as a cornered beast would physically.

**Shultz**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Flash; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 106](#).



<sup>3</sup> See Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, p. 12.

<sup>4</sup> See [footnote 6, Document 105](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [footnote 2, Document 104](#).

**109. Memorandum From Richard Levine and Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 9, 1983

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's Meeting with the President

The primary purpose of tomorrow's meeting is for Secretary Shultz to give the President and you a personal debrief on his bilateral meeting with Gromyko and to report on his efforts to galvanize international reaction to the KAL massacre.<sup>2</sup>

We think it important that you try to steer the discussion to some specificity, particularly with regard to additional pressure we should put on our Allies and friends to take stronger action.

There follows some points you may wish to make:

—The proposed NATO response of a two-week suspension of their interaction with Aeroflot is not enough.

—The USG has extended tougher sanctions against Aeroflot.

—We, with State in the lead, should continue to apply pressure to our Allies and friends to extend the suspension of interaction with Aeroflot to sixty days.

—The USG still has the unilateral capability to stop foreign airlines operating in the US from booking flights to or from

the US that involve Aeroflot. State opposes this option because of its extra-territoriality implications. While it is not the preferred option, you may wish to resurface it. Mention of it may be useful in getting State to take a tougher line (i.e., hardline letters and contacts) with our Allies.

—The Airline Pilots boycott of flights to the USSR will just switch air travelers to Aeroflot if foreign countries still accept Aeroflot flights. Thus, it is very important that the Allied severance of relations with Aeroflot be extended for as long a period of time as the Airline Pilot boycott (i.e., 60 days).

### *RECOMMENDATION*

That you raise these points with the President and Secretary Shultz.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT (Arms Transfers): [Korean Airlines] KAL [09/09/1983]; NLR-332-14-33-4-3. Confidential. Sent for action. Cleared by Lilac and Robinson. Sommer initialed for Levine, Lilac, and Robinson.

<sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, on Saturday, September 10, Reagan and Clark met with Shultz in the Oval Office at 10:29 a.m. Kelly and Sommer were present in the meeting as well. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary on September 10: "Met with George S. 10:30 A.M. Nancy had left for Phoenix—back Sun. Nite. George reported in full on meeting with Gromyko. No doubt Gromyko was on the defensive & 'discombobulated.' I think it was our round. We've learned by continuing to electronically process the tapes to bring

out the few unintelligible lines that a Soviet pilot did report firing his canon. We don't know if that was *at* the KAL or as a signal—"tracers." The Japanese tapes of the Korean transmissions give no hint that the pilot was aware of the Soviet planes even being in the air. We made this new information public." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. 1, January 1981–October 1985, pp. 261–262)

<sup>3</sup> Although no recommendation was checked, Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Judge noted."

**110. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (McMahon)<sup>1</sup>**

DDI #6508-83

Washington, September 9, 1983

SUBJECT

Crisis Management: The Korean Airliner Incident

1. Before the events of the last week get too far behind us I want to set down for you two problems that I perceive in the handling of the Korean airliner incident. [*portion marking not declassified*]

2. First, as I have mentioned to you, the interagency meetings that were held on this subject had a great number of participants. The SIG chaired by Larry Eagleburger had some 25 people there and the subsequent IGs had between 40 and 50 people in the room—standing room only.<sup>2</sup> Under these circumstances, it was very awkward to present intelligence briefings with anything like the completeness and the detail that senior policy officials needed to have. Even the FAA was reluctant in the IG meetings to provide details on some of their activities. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. The State Department seems institutionally incapable of having a small meeting—or saying no to people. The only remedy for this in my view—and perhaps showing my earlier colors—is for this kind of incident or crisis management to be carried out by the NSC with the attendance at meetings limited to a very small number of

people (8-10) where all the information available to all of the Agencies can be placed on the table and actions and decisions be taken on the basis of the full range of data. *[portion marking not declassified]*

4. Second, the way the incident was managed by the Department from the standpoint of the release of intelligence information was at minimum awkward and more often highly risky for sources and methods. Because so many bureaus and parts of State and other elements of the government were involved in acquiring information and putting it out, it was inevitable that a great deal of information would be made available to the press by government officials. The problem is that there were so many people involved in the process that no one person or single institution had any purview over what was to be released and was able to make distinctions between what was sensitive and what was more usable. NSA did its best working with State but there were other institutions involved as well, including DoD and the NSC Staff. Here again, in future incidents, having a small group chaired by the NSC where the public relations and Congressional liaison people could be included would permit decisions to be made and the coordination of information to be released carried out much more effectively and with less cost to sources and methods. *[portion marking not declassified]*

5. In sum, the handling of this problem was simply too diffuse and involved too many actors sitting at the table. The result was a significant lack of discipline in the release of intelligence information, in part based on a lack of understanding of what was sensitive and what was not, and no centralized coordination of the release of information. *[portion marking not declassified]*



6. I know that there are significant bureaucratic equities involved in the handling of incidents such as this. I am well aware of differences between State and NSC over who should handle these matters. I simply would suggest that you weigh in with Judge Clark that from the standpoint of intelligence equities, these affairs in our view are far better handled by a group such as the Crisis Pre-Planning Group or small ad hoc committees chaired by the NSC than by the "town meeting" approach of the Department of State.<sup>3</sup>  
[portion marking not declassified]

**Robert M. Gates<sup>4</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400641. Secret. Casey forwarded the memorandum to Clark on September 12. In an attached covering memorandum to Clark, September 12, deGraffenreid noted: "The DCI marked this IMMEDIATE, so I am sending it to you directly without complete staffing. However, Gates' points seem well taken, and I recommend that it be circulated widely on our staff and Gates' points fully considered." Clark wrote "NO" to the side of this recommendation and noted at the bottom: "Let's hold up for now." In a follow-up note to Poindexter, deGraffenreid reported: "Bob Gates called to say he had just learned that the DCI sent his memo here. He is a bit worried that because his criticism of State could be misinterpreted that we limit distribution of his memo. I agree. We can just pull out the thoughts."

<sup>2</sup> No record of these meetings has been found.

<sup>3</sup> On an attached routing slip, deGraffenreid wrote to Clark: "Judge: Gates' points are good, but a key element of the facts is missing: the VP *personally* decided not to go the SSG route on KAL, as we had done on Lebanon. Also, while

SSG and CPPG meeting are good and necessary, SIG/IG work must back them up. (I would venture to say that 1/5 of all meeting attendees at KAL SIGs were from the intelligence community—CIA, NSA, and DIA, INR)."

<sup>4</sup> Gates signed "RG" above his typed signature.

**111. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (Casey) to the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council<sup>1</sup>**

NFIC-9.1/68

Washington, September 12, 1983

**SUBJECT**

Protection of Sensitive Intelligence

The President recently decompartmented and declassified, in furtherance of national policy, certain sensitive intelligence regarding the South Korean airliner atrocity. I am now concerned that additional disclosures are being made without authorization through some combination of an impression that related matters may now be discussed and a relaxation of discipline arising from the fact that authorized disclosures have been made.

Each authorized recipient of classified or compartmented intelligence is hereby reminded that the obligation to maintain the security integrity of such information remains fully in effect. Any disclosure without the requisite approval remains a serious security violation which can result in severe penalties.

Please bring this to the attention of all recipients of classified intelligence in your department or agency and require that renewed care be exercised at this time to protect intelligence sources and methods from damaging revelations.

**William J. Casey**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. No classification marking. Although an unidentified "Attachment 1" is noted at the bottom of the memorandum, no attachment was found.

**112. Information Memorandum From the  
Assistant Secretary of State for European and  
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State  
Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 15, 1983

SUBJECT

Possible Further Steps on KAL Issue

The major upcoming events in our response to the KAL shutdown are the airline boycott and the ICAO Council meeting, beginning today.<sup>2</sup> Both will be high-visibility events and should generate numerous media stories on the world community's continuing response to the massacre. The pilots' boycott will also be well underway by that point with appropriate disruptions in Soviet connections with the outside world. By early next week, however, pressures may begin to mount again for more U.S. and international steps.

We were aware that the first few days of this week would be difficult for our policy. Congress is back and there are pressures, particularly in the Senate, to take strong actions against the Soviets. At best, it will take a few days for your briefings, and those of others, to calm the waters and create an understanding of what we are doing and why we are doing it. During this period, we will want to ensure that our rhetoric is consistent with the rest of our policy, and hence avoid giving the impression that Soviet actions are so awful that fiercer measures are essential.

Our basic message should be that the President's policy on this extremely difficult problem has been highly successful. His approach has demonstrated statesmanship at its best

and has been so judged by much of the American public. The rest of the world has drawn the same conclusion; as a result, other countries, and especially major Allies, have been willing not just to follow our lead but also to take independent action expressing outrage and calling for justice and restitution. The contrast between the response to our current policy and the Olympic Boycott and pipeline episodes could not be more striking. In those earlier cases, the major press story within two or three days was the argument between the United States and its Allies. This time, the vast majority of the Allies are working together to carry out the package you developed in Madrid. The world, including the Soviets, sees us working together, not in conflict.

We have a range of options for further steps. Most of them risk sacrificing the solidarity that has been the secret of success so far.

We can dribble out a few more small steps such as removing Aeroflot from the U.S. computerized reservations system or termination of the bilateral civil agreement (although we think the latter step would be a mistake) within the current policy. The CAB proposal for additional actions against third country airline ties with Aeroflot could be instituted, but its extraterritorial aspects would inevitably get us into damaging arguments with our Allies. There are probably a few other items of a similar nature, but they are insufficiently weighty to satisfy those who want unilateral steps that really hurt the Soviets.

The same is true of an intermediate category of steps more serious than those considered so far but not serious enough to do much damage or garner much credit. Illustratively, this category could include: denying entry to Soviet shipping; invoking the Baker Amendment to deny visas to



Soviet visitors on grounds that the USSR has violated the Helsinki Final Act; or not renewing White House accreditation to Soviet correspondents in Washington. Basically, these are Carter Administration-type steps, taken more out of weakness than out of strength, and they would probably be reversed before too long.

Such steps have the same basic defect as the smaller steps: they would whet appetites, but are not strong enough to satisfy those pressing for genuinely punishing measures. And, in each case, there are good substantive reasons not to take these steps. Cutting off shipping would affect grains, phosphates and vodka (for Pepsico), cause a virtual *de facto* grain embargo, and arouse powerful interests here. If we do not renew the White House accreditations, we would face almost certain retaliation against our already overburdened American correspondents in Moscow, and a strong reaction from their home offices. Finally, invoking the Baker Amendment would put us on uncertain legal grounds and open the way to unending political battles over every visa for a prominent Soviet visitor. (We should instead amend the McGovern Amendment to give us discretion to refuse visas on foreign policy grounds.)

Finally, truly major retaliatory steps have also been suggested. They include:

- a grain embargo or abrogation of the long-term grain agreement;
- drastically reducing the official Soviet presence in the United States;
- closing down the INF, START, and MBFR talks;

—economic warfare actions against the USSR (including stopping or reducing imports, blocking Soviet financial assets, etc.).

The arguments against all these steps are well known: a grain embargo is politically unacceptable and has been specifically ruled out by the President; a major expulsion of Soviets in the U.S. would bring retaliation that would destroy our intelligence, DATT, and political/economic reporting operations in Moscow and the Soviets would continue to have their large establishment in New York; closing down arms talks would be the best favor we could do for the Soviets, since it would cripple European support for the INF dual decision at a critical time; and strong economic measures would require a Presidential declaration of national emergency and undoubtedly bring a more intense replay of the U.S.-against-the-Allies scenario of the Olympics and pipeline sanctions.

None of these actions would produce any useful long-term impact on the Soviets. What we have done so far has had impact—the Soviets consider “rhetoric” a political act, and see the international solidarity against them as something we have generated. Whether that impact is short- or long-term depends on whether we can sustain our current approach. An unending series of unilateral steps would be an admission by the Administration that its original measured response based on international solidarity was inadequate. Furthermore, such actions would directly contradict the Administration’s strongest argument—that we have been right about the Soviets all along, and that our policies of realism, strength, and willingness to talk are *the* effective long-range approach for dealing with the Soviets.

The actions we should take are those that are consistent with this policy. We should certainly reinforce our effort to

extend the scope and increase the effectiveness of the world-wide response. With the ICAO Council underway, we will soon have eliminated the reasons that led to our initial reticence to publicize others' efforts and identify ourselves with them. We might want to praise some groups and countries publicly for supportive actions and perhaps increase pressure on the reluctant ones.

There is one set of two steps we should take immediately. The Soviets have refused to accept the claims we have submitted on our own behalf and on behalf of Korea.<sup>3</sup> We should keep up our pressure on the Soviets over the claims question, and I will be calling Sokolov in soon to reiterate our legal argument that they must accept our claims. Given Congressional attitudes, I have concluded that the option of taking our claim against the USSR to the International Court of Justice has particular attraction at this time. L and EUR are sending you a separate memo on how this can be done, including on how it can best be coordinated with the claims of other governments.

Other domestic steps:

—The basic thrust of our approach should be that the U.S. has an effective national security policy in place and that the best way to make the Soviets pay for their action is to implement the President's policies. Thus, our lobbying energies should be devoted to passage of the defense budget (particularly the MX) and support for our policies in Central America and Lebanon.

We can work the KAL theme effectively into our presentations on these issues, but we should make these basic elements of our policy, not the airliner, the cutting edge of our approach.

—We should follow up on the President's call for upgrading our radio broadcasting and other international communications efforts. This is a natural issue to promote in the face of Soviet lying and attempts at self-justification.

—The President has already promised we would do more to tighten technology transfer controls because of this incident. A renewed effort to move the COCOM process along seems to be a particularly appropriate response.

There are some steps that could be taken on regional issues in response to the KAL incident that would clearly show us as a global power willing to defend our interests. They include:

—Reviewing our covert action activities with an eye toward increasing pressures on the Soviets in Afghanistan and perhaps producing some major insurgent victories. We are seeing if the freedom fighters hold Soviet prisoners whose presence in the West refocus international interest on Afghanistan during this year's U.N. debate. We should look once again at eliminating some tenuous Soviet footholds in the Western Hemisphere. A dramatic reversal of Soviet influence even in a vestpocket country or two would strongly suggest that the tide continues to run against the Soviets.

—Redouble our efforts at exposing KGB agents and embarrassing Soviet establishments abroad. There is relatively little reason at the moment to treat the Soviets tenderly around the world. The incident at Leningrad gives us extra cause to be a bit tougher in

third countries, and if it were to be repeated, here as well.

Finally, the question of high-level meetings with the Soviets must be factored into our response. I have sent you a separate memorandum on this subject.<sup>4</sup>

Whatever steps we take, however, we should recognize that pressures to do more will continue from those who see the airliner tragedy as a way to undercut the third element of our policy approach, and seek to use it to assure that the U.S. and the USSR neither talk to nor do any serious business with each other for years to come. It is chimerical to believe that we can sustain strength and realism over the long term without willingness to talk. The three elements of our approach will stand together, or they will not stand at all. Thus, it is essential that we continue to rely on close consultations with Congress and our media blitz to get us through the next few weeks rather than a new sanction a day. Over the longer term, statesmanship—continuation of the combination of strong condemnation and measured action the President chose—will prove a far greater bulwark of American strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union than a series of pinpricks, or lurches on major issues, or a combination thereof.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, September 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Simons; cleared by Niles. Simons initialed for Pascoe. Kelly initialed the memorandum for Burt. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 16. An administrative action changed the title of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs to the Assistant

Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs on September 15.

<sup>2</sup> At its September 15–16 meeting in Montreal, the ICAO Council adopted a resolution condemning Soviet actions in the downing of KAL 007. The resolution also directed the ICAO Secretary General to investigate the incident. For the text of the resolution and the statement by the FAA Administrator at the meeting, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 17–20.

<sup>3</sup> See [footnote 6, Document 100](#).

<sup>4</sup> Not found.



**113. Memorandum From Robert Lilac of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL Shootdown—Background Paper

In response to this morning's discussion at our 7:30 a.m. staff meeting, we are presenting you some considerations for possible use when you talk to Secretary Shultz.

State has told us that the background paper (aka white paper) idea is the result of a conversation between Shultz and the President. We do not debate the genesis—there is debate on the staff concerning whether the paper should be produced and also the substance of the paper.

The paper (draft attached Tab B)<sup>2</sup> tells the story *as we know it*. There is no way to tell the actual story unless the Soviets make a full accounting and the results of the ICAO investigation (if ever conducted) are known. Therefore, we run the risk of having the media, the Soviets, and every other detractor focus on taking apart *our* story. Every ambiguity, confusion, or mistake by us or the Koreans is offered as mitigation for Soviet action (see the Pincus piece in Sunday's *Post*).<sup>3</sup> Our story accurately depicts facts, as we know them, which has never been done in one document; but such a document could reopen the discussion about [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. As of today, the media hype on the incident has slowed down on attacking the U.S. version. If we wish to keep attention on

our understanding of the shootdown, then the paper should be printed. However, discussion of the mundane facts about U.S. radars, etc., tends to trivialize the cold-blooded horror of the Soviet act. We run the risk of diverting attention and having to again defend our actions before, during, and after the incident.

There is also the substance of the paper. A straightforward factual accounting is best. However, there is also a case for presenting the story as an incident typical of Soviet behavior. However, we could be accused of using the paper as a propaganda piece rather than as a straightforward presentation of the facts.

In sum, we do not yet have all the facts. More evidence will come if the “black box” is found (by us or the Soviets). We need the investigation to attempt to determine why the airliner strayed off course. If we produce the background paper this week it will be out of date quickly and could be used against us as more of the story is told—especially while the President is at the U.N.<sup>4</sup>

### *Recommendation*

That you discuss the background paper with Secretary Shultz using the talking points at Tab A.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert Lilac Files, Arms Transfer, Subject File/1981-84, AT: [Korean Airlines KAL 007: Intelligence] (Binder); NLR-332-14-55-2-1. Secret. Sent for action. Lenczowski, Sommer, deGraffenreid, Raymond, and Robinson concurred. Lilac initialed for Lenczowski, and a note indicates that Raymond's

concurrence was verbal. Clark's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> The draft paper, entitled "The Destruction of KAL 007: A Special Interim Report, [Draft 2: 9/18/83]," 69 pages in length, is attached but not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Pincus, "The Soviets Had the Wrong Stuff," *Washington Post*, September 18, 1983, p. C5.

<sup>4</sup> Reagan was scheduled to give the opening address to the UNGA on September 26. See [footnote 6, Document 117](#).

<sup>5</sup> The talking points for Clark are attached but not printed. Clark did not initial approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

**114. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Foreign Intelligence Council (Casey) to the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the National Foreign Intelligence Council<sup>1</sup>**

NFIC-9.2/69

Washington, September 21, 1983

SUBJECT

Guidelines for Protecting Sensitive Intelligence Information Relating to the KAL Shootdown Incident (U)

1. My memorandum of 12 September (Attachment 1)<sup>2</sup> stated my concerns regarding unauthorized disclosures regarding the KAL incident. My intention and that of the Intelligence Community is that it is now time to circle the wagons and stop talking. Contrary to any speculation which bringing down the veil generates, the only intended hiding is of sources and methods. The story has been told accurately and to push further will not provide valuable clarification but rather will put unnecessarily at risk future intelligence support to our national security. Any further discussion of the incident is not authorized; however, if pressed, you may quote from the official U.S. Government release at Attachment 2.<sup>3</sup> (C) 2. All individuals are again reminded of their obligation to protect sensitive intelligence information. I would consider any further disclosures without my specific approval to be damaging to the national security and a serious security violation. Any discussion of information about the KAL Shootdown incident, other than the statement in Attachment 2, even if already in the public domain can lead to classified subjects and should be avoided. I have identified at Attachment 3 some of the most sensitive subjects that *must* be avoided.<sup>4</sup>

(U) 3. Please bring this to the attention of all personnel in your department or agency. (U) William J. Casey

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1983, 400683. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 111](#).

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed.

**115. Information Memorandum From the  
Assistant Secretary of State for European and  
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State  
Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 23, 1983

**SUBJECT**

Soviet Officials Criticize Military over KAL: Divisions Within the Ranks or  
Good PR Strategy?

In recent days a number of mid-level Soviet officials have voiced "unofficial" criticisms to Westerners and Western media about the way in which the Soviet military handled the Korean Airlines incident. Thus far we have noted three instances in which Soviet officials have criticized their military before Westerners, and sought to excuse in some manner the political leadership for what happened.

On September 17, London Times correspondent Richard Owens reported from Moscow that "according to well-informed sources" Yuriy Andropov had been taking a rest cure in the Northern Caucasus at the time the KAL plane was shot down. He was "appalled" when he heard the news and rushed back to Moscow to handle the situation. "The Soviet leader was acutely aware of the long term impact on Soviet relations with the West, . . . but had been obliged to support the military actions."

On September 18, Pravda's Chief Editor Viktor Afanasyev told BBC in London that while he believed the KAL plane was on a spy mission and that the Soviet pilots were not at fault for being unable to distinguish between an RC-135 and a 747, he deeply regretted the fact that innocent people had died, and thought that Soviet "military people



[were] guilty” for not admitting immediately that they had shot down the KAL plane. Afanasyev also noted that Andropov had been on holiday at the time of the incident (Tab A).

Finally, on September 21, Viktor Linnik of the Central Committee’s International Information Department told BBC TV in Edinburgh that Soviet pilots had made a mistake in downing the South Korean airliner. He admitted that there was strong evidence that the KAL plane was not on a spy mission, but said Soviet pilots were “trigger happy” because “U.S. reconnaissance planes were flying over the area all the time.” Subsequently, on September 22, Mr. Linnik reversed himself in an interview with Independent Television News (Tab B). On this occasion, he said that there was strong evidence the plane was spying, and that he had not meant to say the reverse in the previous interview but had been trapped into it by BBC’s line of questioning and his own unfamiliarity with the English language. (It should be noted that Linnik’s English is so good that according to Embassy Moscow “in a non-Russian setting, one would not know that he is a Russian.” However, the manner in which the questions were posed could have confused him and caused him to answer wrongly.)

### *Conclusions*

From these three episodes, we see emerging a general “unofficial” line which deviates from the official Soviet line in significant respects and makes the Soviet position somewhat more palatable to Western listeners. The “unofficial” line is as follows: the KAL plane was probably on a spy mission, although there is no absolute certainty of this; the Soviet pilots, if they had identified the plane as

civilian, wouldn't have shot it down; the decision to shoot the plane down was a local one—Andropov wasn't involved; and the Soviet military should have come clean sooner with the news that they had shot down the plane.

These “unofficial” criticisms could conceivably reflect real divisions within the Soviet leadership. However, the consensus of opinion among CIA, EUR/SOV, INR and Embassy Moscow is that they do not. While it is likely that there are some tensions over aspects of the military's performance, the “unofficial” criticisms of the military by Soviet officials probably are part of an orchestrated campaign designed to confuse the Western public about Soviet behavior and intentions. The purpose of such a campaign would be to induce receptive Westerners to rationalize Soviet behavior (“if Andropov had only known,” etc.) and therefore to excuse it as an aberration. This in turn would blunt international outrage at Soviet actions, while allowing them to hold the same official policy line.

### *Other Lines*

This “unofficial” position contrasts rather interestingly with what the Soviets are telling “captive” audiences. [*3½ lines not declassified*] 1) the Soviet Union had shot down the plane with the full knowledge that it was a passenger plane; 2) the decision to shoot down the plane was not given from the Kremlin but based on standing orders; and, 3) the pilot of the SU-15 which downed the aircraft would have been court-martialed if he had refused to shoot down the plane. No mention was made of the spy plane excuse, though [*less than 1 line not declassified*] did express regret for the loss of 269 lives.

The “unofficial” line also contrasts interestingly with the views expressed by one [*less than 1 line not declassified*] official. [*2 lines not declassified*] the Soviet destruction of KAL 007 was a “horrendous mistake” on the part of the local Soviet military commander. He said there was no reasonable excuse that could be offered for the incident, criticized the manner in which the Soviet Government had initially handled the affair, and expressed concern about the effect the destruction of the Korean airliner would have on U.S.-Soviet relations. Perhaps here we have one genuine dissenting voice.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1-8 1983. Secret; Wnintel; Nofoin; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by James F. Schumaker (EUR/SOV); cleared by Simons, Kelly, Vershbow, Donald Graves (INR/SEE), and in substance by [*name not declassified*] (CIA/SOVA; J. Beyerly (Emb Moscow). Hill’s handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on September 23. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Brackets are in the original. All tabs are attached but not printed.

**116. Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy  
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence  
Agency (Gates)<sup>[1](#)</sup>**

Washington, September 27, 1983

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations (Further on Breakfast Conversation)

1. It is probably true that US-Soviet relations are as pervasively bleak now—and prospectively—as at any time since Stalin’s death. Yet while Washington typically regards history as beginning with the last inauguration, the Soviet perspective is longer. So should ours be.

2. From the standpoint of both sides, “detente” quickly soured. As early as the 1973 Yom Kippur War, many in the US judged that detente had not changed Soviet behavior much. From the Soviet side, defeat of the US-USSR Trade Act in the US Senate in January 1975 signaled trouble. Since at least the mid-1970s, with only a few brief promising moments, the relationship has deteriorated more or less steadily. The roll call of actions and reactions on both sides during the past eight years adversely affecting the relationship is impressive (and instructive).

—*1975*: The Trade Act; Soviet intervention with Cuba in Angola; massive Soviet help to Hanoi resulting in US expulsion from Vietnam; cancellation of a range of bilateral meetings; quarrelling over the meaning of the Vladivostok Accords on SALT II; and the change in tone at the end of the year in the US pre-election climate amid charges of a sell-out in Helsinki at CSCE.

—1976: Public abandonment by US of “detente” and stalemate on bilateral issues during the US elections.

—1977: The new US President’s letter to Sakharov<sup>2</sup> and human rights offensive; US abandonment of Vladivostok approach in SALT for a radical deep cuts approach; no progress on arms control; Soviet support for insurgencies in Southern Africa; intense Soviet propaganda against deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW or neutron bomb).

—1978: Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia; US normalization of relations with China; MIG 23 in Cuba issue; Korean airliner shootdown; first US measures on technology transfer.

—1979: MX decision; Soviet brigade in Cuba controversy; US Ambassador killed in Kabul;<sup>3</sup> Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Soviet-Cuban support for Nicaraguan resolution; NATO agrees to deploy INF; failure of SALT II.

—1980: US sanctions in response to Afghanistan; US warnings on Poland; US promoted boycott of Olympics; US election.

—1981-83: This period is more familiar and the list of bilateral problems is long, culminating in the second Korean airliner shootdown.

3. This long but still incomplete listing is offered to make two points:

—The halcyon days of US-Soviet detente lasted less than 2½ years in the early 1970s and the trend in the bilateral relationship has been generally downhill under three successive Presidents of both parties.

(Some would begin the decline with the Yom Kippur War, thus including a fourth President—the one who began the process).

—Every time an opportunity to begin reversing that downward trend has presented itself—and there have been some—events or actions in Washington, Moscow or in the Third World have killed the opening. In short, the Soviets see their problems with the US as transcending this Administration. And this makes overall developments and the future all the more worrisome to them.

4. There is no doubt they see this Administration as more dangerous than its predecessors—but less because of its attitudes and rhetoric than the fact it has been more successful than its predecessors in countering the USSR in at least three major areas:

—*Defense*. A massive US rearmament long feared by the Soviets threatens to offset their strategic gains 20 years in the making.

—*Third World*. The US and its friends are causing the Soviets real trouble in Afghanistan, Mozambique, Chad, Angola, Namibia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. The kind of moves the Soviets made easily in 1975–1979 are now more complicated and difficult. Momentum seems to be changing.

—*INF*. Defeat of ERW in 1978–79 was a major Soviet victory, vindicating “differentiated” detente which set the US aside and focused on the West Europeans. Deployment of INF will be a major Soviet defeat, far offsetting ERW strategically and calling into doubt an important Soviet objective of detente—undermining



European commitment to strengthening NATO militarily.

5. All this has taken place against a backdrop in Moscow of Brezhnev's long physical decline and Andropov's succession. Despite a good deal of wishful thinking in the West, Andropov is the first General Secretary to come from within the security service-military sector; he shares their values and ruthlessness and depends upon their political support. I believe that Moscow's behavior in the Yom Kippur war and its turn to more aggressive exploitation of Third World opportunities in 1974-75 was due in some measure to the elevation to the Politburo in 1973 of Andropov, Gromyko and Defense Minister Grechko (Succeeded by Ustinov in 1976). Their influence in foreign affairs became clearly dominant as Brezhnev's vigor declined in the mid to late '70s. They now control that policy. While some point out (and take encouragement from) broad "continuity" in Soviet foreign policy since Brezhnev's death, I would suggest this derives from Andropov-Ustinov-Gromyko domination of that policy before Brezhnev died—a policy of aggressive intervention in the Third World, the opening to China, and brute force where deemed necessary and low risk (as in Afghanistan). They are a very tough bunch. And, as you noted at breakfast, Andropov's supposed mastery of clever manipulation and political maneuvering has not prevented them from some pretty ham handed efforts at bullying and intimidation when a lighter touch would have paid them important benefits (even as inspiring fear sometimes pays benefits).

6. All that said, and despite the past eight years or so of post-detente problems, the Russians—in my view—still recognize the need to do business with the US and will do it with this Administration, but probably not until 1985.

They cannot “write off” any Administration and are prepared to be patient for the US side “to come around”. A range of economic, political and strategic motives *impels* the USSR to cultivate ties with the US, though not at any price. The past eight to ten years repeatedly have illuminated Soviet limits:

—They will not abandon an active role in the Third World, promoting radical causes and anti-Western movements. Indeed, while they will move cautiously where the US has great preponderance of military power (e.g., Central America), their cost-benefit calculus elsewhere probably has shifted toward greater risk-taking.

—They will not tolerate attempts to interfere in or change their domestic policies, for example, on human rights. They will, however, use Soviet Jews, dissidents and political prisoners as bait or “trading truck” with the US.

—They will not allow the US to use arms control to restructure Soviet strategic forces; they will not dismantle their heavy missile force to satisfy us on throwweight.

—They will not be cowed by threat of sanctions or of economic warfare; they know the Europeans and Japanese too well.

—They will abandon none of their global pretensions or ambitions; the best that can be achieved is a stable stand off in Europe and between the US and Soviet strategic forces (whether through arms control or tacit arrangements), and some thawing in atmosphere—reduction of tensions. Hopes for (and

promises of) more have contributed to bilateral tensions (and political problems here).

### *The Next Year*

7. Given the foregoing, what specifically can we expect in the next year? The bilateral prospects are bleak. The KAL shootdown makes it difficult for the US to initiate a dialogue at least for the rest of this year. We will then be in the midst of INF deployment and the Soviet reaction thereto. They *will* react and I predict one or another of their early responses will further worsen US-USSR relations. By then the US will be in the middle of an election campaign, during which the Soviets will be hoping with all their hearts for defeat of the President. Even if they conclude he will be re-elected, it would come too late to cut a quick arms control deal. In sum, I believe bilateral relations will be in a deep freeze until 1985 when the US will be in a position to seize the initiative. The Soviets probably will make new offers in INF and START this fall, but they almost certainly will not provide a basis for compromise or agreement.

### 8. Elsewhere:

—*Middle East:* Syria holds high cards in Lebanon and the Soviets will continue to stake Assad. They probably believe the changes are good for eventual emergence of a pro-Syrian government in Beirut. To bolster Assad, the Russians could send a token detachment of troops to Damascus, as well as new tactical surface to surface missiles, pilots and more aircraft. They are helping to rearm the PLO. They will not themselves militarily challenge US and Israeli power in Lebanon, but no doubt see opportunities to

tie up American forces there indefinitely—with growing political costs in the US and in the Arab world—even as they work to block negotiated outcomes. Their worries probably are that Israel will re-enter the fray if Syrian or PLO role becomes too threatening and that US power will somehow induce Assad to compromise.

—*Third World*: The prospects are for greater military and subversive intimidation of *Pakistan's* Zia and the *Iranians* to reduce their support for Afghan insurgents; continued indirect support of *Nicaragua* coupled with warnings to both Havana and Managua that they not provoke the US too seriously; greater attention to opportunities in the *Philippines*, especially if the situation there worsens, and in *Chile*; continued support for Qadhafi's destabilizing efforts in *Central* and *West Africa*; and continued efforts to improve relations with *China*.

—*Europe and Japan*: Once INF deployment begins, the Soviet focus will shift to preventing full deployment both diplomatically and by making deployment as painful and costly domestically as possible. The FRG will be the main target both for intimidation and persuasion. The economic card will be flashed prominently. Intimidation will be the order of the day vis-a-vis Japan in an attempt to tone down or "de-fang" Nakasone.

9. In sum, the next year will see the Soviet Union pursuing a continued aggressive policy in the Third World, taking a tough line on INF deployments and waiting out the US elections in anticipation of a change for the better in 1985 whoever is elected.

10. Given this bleak forecast, how do we get through the next year without a further dangerous increase in tensions? The major *foreseeable* problem will be the Soviet response to INF and the US response to that. Missiles in Eastern Europe are probably the minimum possible Soviet reaction, perhaps with a periodic deployment of cruise missile carrying submarines near US coasts (analogous response). They cannot do this all at once, so it would extend over several months. A matter of fact US response to these long anticipated developments would help avoid an action-reaction-action-reaction cycle that could get out of hand. We need to keep our eye clearly on our political and strategic objectives and not get caught up in one-upmanship.

11. Beyond this the relationship might be kept from deteriorating further by proceeding with routine business and meetings, making clear to Moscow our understanding that some lines of communications must be kept open. An important role in this can be played by Art Hartman in Moscow and State's dealings with Dobrynin here—no effusive warmth but correct, candid conversations. As mentioned at the breakfast, a new initiative on confidence building measures could form part of a substantive agenda for such conversations—and be very consistent with global concerns growing out of the KAL shutdown. A continued business-like approach at START will help. These types of actions, if done properly, need not involve the US signaling eagerness to resume business as usual, but rather a need to keep talking to one another. Use of the Ambassadors is unobtrusive and does not convey high level eagerness “to get on with it” that some sort of senior private envoy or intermediary suggests. In my view this sort of keeping the lines open is the best way to get through the year and to set the stage for possibly some improvement in the relationship in 1985.

12. A note of caution to close. I mentioned above the times in recent years when promising dialogue has been cut short by events. There are all too many places these days where such events can take place. It will take considerable skill and luck just to keep things from getting even worse during the next year.

**Robert M. Gates**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, September 20-30 1983. Secret. In a cover note to Shultz, Gates wrote: "Mr. Secretary: As you requested last Saturday morning [September 24] after breakfast, I have jotted down some thoughts along the lines that I was expressing at the table. They are strictly personal. I hope they are of some use to you." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears at the top of the note, as well as a handwritten note that reads: "R.B. Pls see me re this. CBA's are focal point."

<sup>2</sup> See [\*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 5\*](#).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Adolph Dubs, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, was kidnapped and killed in Kabul on February 14, 1979. See [\*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan\*](#).<sup>3</sup>



## **117. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 27, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL: Managing the Next Phase

The month since the shootdown has shown the Soviets at their worst and the U.S. at its best. Our task has been twofold: first, to highlight the moral and political lessons—that the Soviets were acting like Soviets, and that we have the right policy for dealing with them over the long haul—and, second, to mobilize the international community to demand justice and restitution.

I think we have been successful on both counts. At home, there has been some criticism and some natural pressure for stronger unilateral acts, but by and large your message that this is an issue of the world against the Soviets has been persuasive, and your firm but moderate approach has carried public opinion with it and gained us new support. Internationally, the “automatic majorities” that have supported Soviet positions and refused honest criticism of the USSR in recent years have vanished, and governments and private groups have imposed an unprecedented series of concrete measures against the USSR.

We are now entering a new phase. Emotional reactions will level off, and political calculation will resurface. People in and out of government everywhere have learned what you and others knew all along about the Soviets, but this is not enough. We need to initiate a series of steps that keep the lesson of Soviet misconduct before the world, but without

playing to the counter-strategy the Soviets have now put in place.

The Soviets have clearly begun to implement a program designed to eat away at the solid front of world outrage by playing on the ambiguities of the evidence; to divide the U.S. from the rest of the world by portraying KAL as a U.S.-Soviet issue; and to put the issue behind them by renewed concentration on carrots and sticks in the arms control field.

To manage the next phase, we will require a comprehensive program. Some of these steps are already underway; others need to be put in place soon; others are for further down the road.

First of all, we should *keep the lesson of KAL before the public and the Congress* in our public statements and in our continuing work on defense issues on the Hill.

Diplomatically, we should *follow up strongly in Asia*. Working closely with our Asian allies and friends on KAL has materially strengthened their confidence in the U.S. as a reliable ally. With regard to China, we should expect the Soviets to exploit any possibility of improving relations with the PRC to escape from the KAL box and regain some leverage on us, but Cap's trip to Beijing should help keep the Chinese on an even keel. Further along, your Far Eastern trip in November will be an opportunity to consolidate area gains.<sup>2</sup>

In Europe, looking beyond the INF debate (where your decision to move forward on INF should help us materially), we should also engage the Allies in an intensified dialogue to draw the consequences of what KAL has shown about the Soviets for *European defense*

*spending*, and for our part we should be making the same points in pressing our *critical security assistance requests* involving Europe in the Congress.

We should keep up the pressure in a number of fields. We have a running start: the widespread condemnations of the Soviets at the normally supine UNESCO Executive Board and General Conference September 22-23 and in the OAS are examples of what we should be seeking.<sup>3</sup> Over the next weeks and months, we should proceed in the following areas:

1. *The Search and Rescue Effort.* The Soviet turnover of debris on Sakhalin Island on September 26 proceeded smoothly. By diplomatic note, however, we protested strongly the Soviet exclusion of Korean representatives and advised the Soviets that because Korea is the owner of the aircraft, and because Korea has authorized only the U.S. and Japan to conduct search and recovery operations, no other country including the USSR, is entitled to search for and recover such materials in international waters. The note also stated our expectation the USSR will not interfere with U.S. recovery operations.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, the Navy will continue its intensive search efforts, in cooperation with Japan, expanding the search area as necessary, and we have put plans in place for handling the flight recorder should it be recovered, including inviting a ICAO observer aboard a U.S. search vessel.

2. *The Public Boycott.* A number of potential participants did not join the two-week suspension of air service to and from the USSR, and that suspension will end September 29. We have continued our efforts to bring other countries in, with stress on key Asian and Latin American countries that have regularly scheduled Aeroflot service. Meanwhile, we should consult closely with the participating NATO

Allies, Japan and Switzerland about extending the boycott. We must be realistic, however, and as emotions cool, we must expect less extensive support than over the past three weeks. We should thus avoid any public confrontation with the Allies over extension, since this would play into Soviet hands and undo much of what we have accomplished to date.

3. *The Private Boycott.* Consistent with U.S. law and practice, we will continue to follow the independent efforts of pilots and other private sector groups to express their indignation in concrete work actions. In the long run these may prove the most effective concrete measures taken.

4. *The Diplomatic Front.* We will be keeping up international pressure in a number of fora:

—*ICAO.* Here we will need to work closely with Allies and concerned developing countries to prevent the Soviets from watering down the tough investigation mandated by the Extraordinary Council September 16,<sup>5</sup> and to get a solid interim report from the SYG when the 110th Council organizational session meets October 14. The complete report should be ready for the Regular Council session scheduled for December 14-16.

—*Aviation Safety Measures.* We are now examining existing ICAO commitments to determine how they can be strengthened, and are supporting the French proposal that the Chicago Convention be amended to outlaw use of force against civilian aircraft, subject to the provisions of the UN Charter.

—*UN General Assembly.* We are studying effective ways to raise KAL in the General Assembly following your speech



Monday.<sup>6</sup> Friendly countries will be encouraged to raise this issue under every suitable agenda item.

—*Fifth World Tourist Organization (WTO) Assembly in New Delhi, October 3-14.* The USSR and Korea are members, and we are asking key WTO capitals to cosponsor or support a resolution condemning the Soviet action and endorsing the right of all people to travel for tourism in safety.<sup>7</sup>

—*International Parliamentary Union (IPU) Conference in Seoul, October 3-10.* Our delegation is exclusively Congressional, and we are consulting with the delegates on how best to proceed about raising the KAL issue in Seoul.

5. *Claims.* The Soviets have twice rejected notes demanding compensation on our behalf and Korea's, and have done the same with similar notes from other countries.<sup>8</sup> We have warned them that continued refusal to accept these notes is yet another act giving rise to right of redress under international law, and we are urgently pursuing the question of presenting our claims to the International Court of Justice in conjunction with other claimants, particularly the Canadians and British whose initial reactions have been tepid. We are also soliciting preliminary Japanese, Korean and Australian views. If these governments' final responses are negative on simultaneously filing an application to the ICJ, we are considering seeking their support in making parallel demands on the Soviets to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ or another international tribunal.

6. *Public Diplomacy and Congress.* You have given the lead to the whole government in keeping the issue before the public, and this effort will continue. USIA will continue to give the tragedy priority attention, with major play in the

immediate future to the ICAO Council Resolution and the ICAO investigation. On September 20 we forwarded the text of a special report on the incident to the White House,<sup>9</sup> and publication of an appropriately updated document will be a strong public diplomacy initiative. With the Congress, we will be following up on the unanimous Joint Resolution condemning the Soviets. Here we must keep in mind that Congressional support is neither monolithic nor permanent, and that many members will continue to urge strong unilateral sanctions against the USSR. We will therefore need to keep key members fully briefed on developments, to demonstrate that international condemnation plus your measured response focussing on civil aviation is producing a far more effective and lasting reaction than a series of unilateral steps that simply feed Soviet efforts to "bilateralize" the issue.

If we can continue to manage the KAL issue successfully along these lines, we will not only keep pressure on the Soviets to provide the restitution the world demands, but we will improve the prospects for forward movement on our larger foreign policy goals as well.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on September 21; cleared by Burt and Eagleburger. Drafting information is from another copy. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, 1983 Sept 1-8)

<sup>2</sup> See [footnote 3, Document 83](#).

<sup>3</sup> During the September 26 Executive Board Plenary Session of UNESCO, the KAL incident was discussed at length, with presentations from Ukraine and the Korean Ambassador and then a retort by the Soviets. (Telegram



35850 from Paris, September 27; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830559-0749) The OAS Permanent Council met on September 21. In a statement on September 22, Speakes expressed Reagan's thanks for the OAS member nations' expressions of condolence. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, p. 1327)

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 274915 to Moscow, September 27, the Department reported that "Acting EUR Assistant Secretary Kelly presented diplomatic note to Soviet DCM Sokolov at 1600 hours Monday, September 26." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830557-1018)

<sup>5</sup> See [footnote 2, Document 112](#).

<sup>6</sup> Reagan addressed the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly on the morning of September 26. While the main focus of his speech was peace and cooperation in arms control, he made two references to the KAL tragedy, connecting Soviet actions in this incident with broader complexities in U.S.-Soviet relations. "Reactions to the Korean airliner tragedy are a timely reminder of just how different the Soviets' concept of truth and international cooperation is from that of the rest of the world. Evidence abounds that we cannot simply assume that agreements negotiated with the Soviet Union will be fulfilled." Later in the speech, he stated: "In recent weeks, the moral outrage of the world seems to have reawakened. Out of the billions of people who inhabit this planet, why, some might ask, should the death of several hundred shake the world so profoundly? Why should the death of a mother flying toward a reunion with her family or the death of a scholar heading toward new pursuits of knowledge matter so deeply? Why are nations who lost no citizens in the tragedy so angry? The reason rests on our assumptions about civilized life and the search for peace. The confidence that

allows a mother or a scholar to travel to Asia or Africa or Europe or anywhere else on this planet may be only a small victory in humanity's struggle for peace. Yet what is peace if not the sum of such small victories?" The full text of the speech is printed in [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 169\*](#).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> In telegram 21034 from New Delhi, October 15, the Embassy reported that the WTO "meetings were largely successful and all US principal objectives were achieved." The United States "succeeded in gaining sufficient votes to pass a resolution 'deeply deploring' USSR action in downing KAL 007, a civilian aircraft. Resolution cites negative impact on tourism of actions of this type." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830600-0243)

<sup>8</sup> A September 16 Department statement noted: "Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt called in Soviet Minister Sokolov and presented him with a second diplomatic note demanding that the Soviet Union accept diplomatic notes which the United States had attempted to present the Soviet Union on its behalf and on behalf of the Republic of Korea. These notes demand compensation from the Soviet Union for the lives and property of U.S. and Korean nationals lost as a result of the wrongful shootdown of Korean Air Lines #007 on September 1." The full text of the September 16 diplomatic note follows this statement. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, p. 21)

<sup>9</sup> This draft paper was sent to the White House on September 19. See [footnote 2, Document 113](#).

**118. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (Clark)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 28, 1983

SUBJECT

KAL: The Forgotten Elements

Tocqueville once observed that under despotisms people are told nothing, while in free societies they are told everything. In the latter case, fundamental questions are sometimes obscured by a forest of detail. The validity of this observation has been driven home anew in the KAL incident. There, both the press and the bureaucracy have focused on a disparate array of issues: the retrieval of debris, the duration of the boycott, the pursuit of claims, the functioning of Soviet air defenses, airline safety measures, and so forth. These are all laudable objects of attention—and indeed the President's public posture has been just right. The Secretary's memo to the President continues to focus on these matters, and the follow-up actions he recommends are essentially correct.<sup>2</sup> I do believe, however, that his memo overstates the actual punitive effect of what our allies have done to date. Indeed, there is evidence that the pilots' association—demoralized by the limited duration of official boycotts—may be on the verge of relaxing its measures as well.

*Are there, however, important—if subterranean—fundamentals that are now being lost sight of as we grind away on operational matters? I think so. To me the neglected questions are as follows: What does the incident*

and its handling tell us about relations between Andropov and the Soviet military? Second, leaving aside the precise motivation for the attack, what impact is the incident likely to have on the security attitudes of our Asian partners (and others). And, if the most likely long-term reaction from them is greater fear rather than responsiveness, what can we do to offset this tendency? Third, apart from our statesmanlike public posture, are we adequately communicating—through quiet measures in Afghanistan and elsewhere—the kind of firmness that can signal the Soviets that we can impose real costs, as well as symbolically effective ones.

Regarding the first question, much confusion exists. For example, in discussing the unusual prominence of the Soviet military in “explaining” the incident, some columnists have suggested the military is now in a more dominant position than ever. Another possibility, however, is that Andropov has pushed the military onto center stage to distance himself from world opprobrium and to protect his own position in the succession crisis. Some speculate that the Soviet general staff—miffed at certain decisions that have not gone their way—deliberately failed to notify the political authorities as a show of independence. If so, then similar such displays may occur in the future. We may not be able to precisely answer any of these questions, but we need to put our best minds to the task. These are not just theoretical questions, inasmuch as the answers hold vital implications for U.S. foreign policy over the next year and beyond.

Second, how is the incident likely to affect our security partners, and what does it suggest in terms of an *increasing* Soviet tendency to use force for intimidation? You correctly advised State not to put out the line that recent Soviet toughness in the Middle East and elsewhere

is a *consequence* of the KAL. Indeed, if anything, the KAL shootdown is but part of a pattern of toughness worldwide. That pattern is longstanding, and comes as no surprise, but we still need to ask ourselves *whether that pattern has not recently taken a noticeable turn toward the worse*. The answer would appear to be yes. In addition to the obvious examples: ever more aggressive support for client states and an unwillingness to try to shape a face-saving retreat in Afghanistan (indeed, the Soviets have suddenly begun to increase their Afghan infrastructure on the Iranian border), we have less obvious indicators, such as provocative submarine intrusions in the northern flank that have caused some Norwegians and Swedes to believe the Soviets are self-consciously accelerating their war planning. And we have seen Soviet nuclear threats to Japan and Korea that are so blunt as to be reminiscent of the Khrushchev era.

I believe that consciously—or subconsciously—this pattern of more overt intimidation is having some effect. If so, we may find the short-term outrage and cooperation (in Europe and Asia) giving way to greater implicit fear of the Soviet Union—and hence greater accommodation. If we are to offset this we must do *more* than consult. We need to concentrate on measures—described in the original decision memo but ignored in the current State plan—such as deployments of F-16s to Japan, AWACs, and so on. These measures do not need to be advertised publicly; indeed, they shouldn't. But we have to be clear enough about their importance internally that the bureaucracy does not lose sight of them.

Finally, there is the question of the signals we privately send to the Soviets. I am myself confused by the Secretary's recent reassurance to the allies that we do not intend to allow the incident "to throw our policy toward the



Soviet Union off course.” If he means we won’t sidetrack arms control, that is one thing. But I assume our policy toward the Soviets continues to be a mix of incentives and disincentives, of dialogue and firmness. If so, then, if anything, the Korean incident suggests we need to *more comprehensively enrich our package of available disincentives*. That to me is the importance of the Afghan measures I recommended to you at the time of the shutdown—measures which Diane Dornan has now fleshed out.

Moreover, if the trend of Soviet intimidation by force continues, and indeed if dramatic new incidents arise, then we will also need other tools with which we can work. The *New Republic* wrote that the Korean incident demonstrated that—given the futility of sanctions—the West has no effective response to Soviet brutality.<sup>3</sup> We cannot allow this perception to take root. The most effective long-term response is the one we have emphasized—rebuilding our strength. The problem is this may not deter the Soviets *over the near term* where they will enjoy the fruits of their own extended buildup and years of Western disinvestment in defense. We need to then concentrate on political-military measures we can take to increase costs over the near term. At our earlier direction, the CIA has been working on a series of papers on the vulnerabilities of key Soviet proxy states. The problem is that these studies are not due to be completed until late next year, [*1½ lines not declassified*]. *These studies need to be accelerated and a parallel and highly restricted policy group established to develop contingent responses based on this work.*

One final note. One of the signal achievements of this Administration has been to elevate the importance of public diplomacy. The danger in this is that sometimes public



diplomacy serves as a tempting substitute for real policy. We cannot allow that to happen here.

How then to translate all this porridge into action? I recommend the following:

First, we should concur generally in the work program outlined by the Shultz memo, though we will want to follow the International Court of Justice option closely to ensure we do not have to pay a heavy price for the involvement of others. Roger Robinson will monitor this package.

Second, Jack Matlock, Ken deGraffenreid and I should convene a small group of Soviet experts—both inside the government and out—to review the data and explore the implications of the incident for Soviet internal politics and future decision making. We will submit a short report directly to you.<sup>4</sup>

Third, the Korean incident has made the political-military dimension of the President's Asian trip more important than before.<sup>5</sup> I recommend that you send a directive to Shultz and Weinberger making this point and directing that Gaston and I jointly chair a small panel—comprised of Howe, Wolfowitz, Armitage, and General Thompson—to explore trip-related political-military proposals that help to build upon existing regional concern in light of the shutdown.

Fourth, we need quick follow-through by CIA on the Afghanistan options. Moreover, we need to ask Casey to accelerate and restructure the proxy vulnerability work. (We will prepare a separate memo on this should you concur.)<sup>6</sup>

Fifth, in order to be better prepared to have quiet but effective responses to future Soviet intimidation, Jack and I should take the lead in transforming the CIA studies into action proposals. This should be a highly restricted effort.

Roger Robinson, David Laux and Jack Matlock concur.

### *Recommendation*

That you sign your memo at Tab I to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz's memo.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, KAL (3/3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. This memorandum is unsigned.

<sup>2</sup> Attached at Tab A is the September 27 memorandum from Shultz to Reagan; see [Document 117](#).

<sup>3</sup> See Joseph Finder, "Reagan's Big Schtick," *New Republic*, vol. 189, Issue 14, pp. 13-15.

<sup>4</sup> Reagan traveled to Tokyo from November 8 to 12 and Seoul from November 12 to 14.

<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> Tab I, the undated memorandum from Clark to Reagan transmitting the copy of Shultz's September 27 memorandum (see [footnote 2, above](#)), is attached but not printed. Clark did not check his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

## **119. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 29, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

KAL: My Talks in New York

My discussions of the KAL incident thus far in New York have confirmed the correctness of the basic approach contained in my memorandum to you of September 27.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, I have found broad support here for the way in which you have handled the KAL tragedy and an encouraging understanding among a wide range of countries, by no means restricted to the NATO Allies, of what this incident tells us about the Soviet Union.

My discussions in New York have also made clear that our efforts following the September 29 end of the two-week boycott of service to and from Moscow by most of our key Allies should concentrate on two key areas, namely,

(1) efforts in ICAO to obtain a clear and conclusive report on the shootdown, with recommendations for follow-up action in that organization to prevent future occurrences of this type; and

(2) continued pressure on the Soviet Union, together with the other countries whose nationals perished in this tragedy, to provide compensation.

We should also press forward with the search effort. If we can recover either or both of the flight recorders, we will be in a better position to put to rest once and for all any Soviet allegations that the KAL aircraft was engaged in a

spy mission on behalf of the United States. Our handling of the search effort, in particular the inclusion of ICAO representatives as well as officials from several other of the countries involved, and our readiness to allow the ICAO to analyze the recorders if they are found, puts us on the high ground as far as this important aspect is concerned.

In my talks here with Allied and other friendly Foreign Ministers, I have explored with them the possibility of extending the boycott beyond September 29. Not unexpectedly, I have detected that we should avoid high-level pressure on our friends and Allies to extend the boycott so as not to place in jeopardy what we have accomplished to date. Rather, I believe we should declare victory in view of the impressive line-up of countries which joined the boycott, while privately encouraging key countries to continue this effort. We should also continue to work quietly with the pilot groups and other unions which might be prepared to continue their boycott of service to and from the Soviet Union.

The KAL tragedy will doubtless figure importantly in my press backgrounder in New York on Friday afternoon.<sup>3</sup> On this occasion and elsewhere, the press will seek to draw us into a dispute with our Allies regarding the extension of the boycott. Given the success which you have achieved thus far in establishing a common, consistent and coherent international reaction to the KAL tragedy, I believe that we should refrain from any public criticism of our Allies for not extending the boycott and, as I suggested above, call attention to the impressive participation in this manifestation of revulsion at the Soviet action. This is the line which I propose to take at my Friday press backgrounder.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (09/29/1983-09/30/1983); NLR-775-10-11-3-5. Secret; Sensitive. In an attached covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: "The boycott of flights in and out of the Soviet Union will come to an end on Thursday, September 29th. In anticipation of this, you will want to keep the President informed of our efforts here in New York to shape the continuing international response to the KAL incident."

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 117](#). Shultz was in New York for the UN General Assembly session.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.



## **120. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, September 29, 1983, 1523Z

12430. Geneva for USINF. Subject: Andropov Blasts U.S., Addresses KAL.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: Andropov's September 28 statement raises to the most authoritative level long-standing Soviet criticism of the Reagan administration and of the President personally.<sup>2</sup> It is pessimistic about future dealings with the administration, asserting that there can no longer be any illusions on this score, but balances this pessimism with sober assurances that "Soviet policy is not based on emotion." The General Secretary's response to the President's INF initiatives was negative,<sup>3</sup> but essentially nonsubstantive, and does not rule out further Soviet examination of our proposals. In endorsing in toto the Soviet version of the KAL affair, Andropov was bowing to the inevitable. The fact that it has taken him nearly a month to do so is as significant as the fact that he has now associated himself with the coverup.

3. We read this highly defensive statement as an attempt to recapture the arms control high ground Andropov staked out in his August 29 *Pravda* interview,<sup>4</sup> only to lose it three days later with the KAL shootdown. Andropov's tough language on the United States probably reflects accurately high-level Soviet resentment over what they regard as U.S. exploitation of the KAL affair. Aside from simple spleen-venting, the statement's objective is to focus foreign



attention away from KAL and back on the coming battle over INF deployments. End summary.

*Harsh Words for the U.S.*

4. Andropov's September 28 statement is the strongest and most comprehensive attack on the United States by a Soviet leader in years. The substance of most of his allegations (U.S. efforts to attain world dominance; administration "slander" of the Soviet Union; Washington's having undertaken a "crusade" to rid the world of the USSR) have appeared regularly in Soviet press criticism of the administration over the past three years. Andropov has raised them to the most authoritative level and has catalogued them in unprecedented detail. He has also used his strongest language to date in describing President Reagan personally. Andropov characterizes the President's UNGA performance as "convincing no one" and accuses him of setting the tone of anti-Soviet rhetoric for the administration. He complains that unidentified leaders of the U.S. have resorted to "foul-mouthed abuse mingled with hypocritical sermons on morality and humanity" in their attacks on the Soviet Union and its people.

5. The most disturbing element of Andropov's remarks on the U.S. is his assertion that "recent events"—presumably KAL—have "dispelled any illusions about the possibility of a change for the better" by the administration. This language recalls articles by lower-level Soviet spokesmen (e.g. Arbatov and Bovin) last year suggesting that it would prove impossible to conduct serious business with the administration. While he makes no bones about his view of the administration and its approach, however, Andropov stops short of burning any bridges and stresses the basic continuity of Soviet policy in arms control and other areas.

While expressing Moscow's indignation over its handling by the U.S., he concludes that Soviet nerves are "strong," and that Soviet policies are not "built on emotions."

### *INF—U.S. Proposals Not Rejected*

6. The continuity of Moscow's approach in the wake of KAL comes through strongly in Andropov's handling of INF and security issues in the second half of his speech. This part of his statement could have been written before August 31. Its appeal to the European peace movement and suggestion that Europeans are "hostages" to U.S. INF policy are standard Soviet themes, as is Andropov's suggestion that European leaders are inadequately protecting their peoples' interests in supporting the two-track NATO decision. His statement that deployment would be a step of major proportions by the U.S. against the cause of peace seems designed, like the first part of his statement, to keep the focus on the United States as the "problem" in arms control.

7. Andropov's response to the President's most recent INF initiative failed to address the substance of the new U.S. proposals. Instead, Andropov complained that the "so called new move" was simply a rehash of past U.S. proposals which would bless U.S. deployments while requiring unilateral Soviet reductions. Like Gromyko in his September 26 toast to visiting Czech Foreign Minister Chnoupek, however, Andropov did not reject the detailed elements of the U.S. proposals, or even divulge their contents.

### *First Statement on KAL*

8. Andropov's statement marks his first public mention of, or association with, the KAL tragedy. Using the incident as an illustration of U.S. willingness to stop at nothing to advance its militaristic designs, Andropov endorsed in toto Moscow's version of the event as articulated in the September 6 Soviet Government statement.<sup>5</sup> There is no way, in our view, that he could have avoided this. The fact that he waited almost a month to do so is probably as significant as the fact that he has finally associated himself with the shootdown.

### *Defensive Tone*

9. Nonetheless, the KAL incident largely set the stage for Andropov's statement, and is no doubt responsible for the defensive tone which runs throughout it. Like Marshal Ogarkov's article a week before,<sup>6</sup> Andropov convey's an impression of the Soviet Union's being pressed hard by United States military and ideological initiatives. He digs deep—to Vietnam, to distortions of the U.S. role in Lebanon—to portray the U.S. as the real locus of evil in the world. He takes pains to emphasize that the Soviet Union threatens no one, has no aggressive designs on any other country, does not intend to change other nations' social order. But he is concerned to reassure the Soviet people that Soviet defense capabilities are capable of discouraging any attacks.

### *Comment*

10. Andropov's statement simply makes clearer what was already obvious—the period ahead will be a frigid one in U.S.-Soviet relations, and Moscow will do nothing to make our life easier. His tough treatment of the U.S. probably

reflects accurately high-level Soviet perceptions that the U.S. exploited Moscow's mishandling of the KAL episode, and will not miss future chances to gouge the Kremlin. At the same time there is clearly an operational side to the Soviets' rhetoric. Andropov, like Ogarkov and the Soviet media in general, is seeking to make the U.S. "the problem", and to get out of the glare of KAL. The Soviets no doubt see some advantage to making the Europeans and others believe the bear has been backed into a corner and could lash out. They hope that this will translate into pressure on Washington in Geneva.

11. At the same time Andropov's speech, as he stated explicitly, was an appeal to the Soviet man in the street. His message was twofold. On the one hand his appeal was a patriotic one. While less blatant than Ogarkov's the week before, Andropov's was a call to rally round the leadership at a time of national danger. At the same time, he sought to reassure the populace lest their fear of war lead to despair. Most importantly, he sought to make clear that Andropov was personally in control and able to deal with the threat from without.

**Hartman**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830565-0577. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, USIA, and for information to Stockholm, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Munich, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, USCINCEUR, USDeIMBFR Vienna, and the Mission in Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 12421 from Moscow, September 29, the Embassy reported that Andropov's statement was read on

the *Vremya* news program on September 28. A printed version appeared in Soviet papers on September 29, which differed slightly from the other text. The Embassy commented: "A passage on the value of joint Warsaw Pact military exercises replaced three paragraphs on ideological competition which appeared in the press. The change had no apparent substantive significance, and we are unable to explain why it occurred." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830566-0109) For the text of the statement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1983*, pp. 881-816.

<sup>3</sup> In his address to the 38th Session of the UNGA in New York on September 26, Reagan proposed several new arms control initiatives. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1983*, Book II, pp. 1350-1354) See also [footnote 6, Document 117](#). In his memoir, Shultz wrote that Reagan "called for global limits on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and without giving up on our ultimate goal of the complete elimination of these weapons, asserted that the United States was open to negotiation over the number of Pershings and GLCMs to be deployed in Europe. He also proposed discussions on verifiable limits on some Soviet and American land-based aircraft." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 371)

<sup>4</sup> See [footnote 2, Document 82](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 98](#).

<sup>6</sup> Ogarkov's September 22 TASS article was discussed in telegram 12073 from Moscow, September 22, and telegram 12158 from Moscow, September 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830549-0006 and D830562-0007 respectively)



## **121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, September 30, 1983, 1532Z

12494. Subject: The KAL Tragedy and Soviet Political-Military Relations.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: The KAL tragedy has evoked interest in the role of the military in the Soviet power structure, a question we examine in this message. We find it credible and in keeping with Soviet tradition that a military commander took the decision to shoot down the plane. The authority to deal with intruders has always belonged to the military and was recently confirmed in new legislation. Although it has been speculated that the military took its decision in a defiant mood, to flex its muscle, it seems more plausible to us that in a situation of imperfect information, the military acted at the last moment in accordance with their standing instructions and in the absence of any other guidance on this incident.

3. The question of the military role in subsequent Soviet handling of the episode is more open to question. There is no evidence of differences within the political leadership over the decision to close ranks behind the military after the fact, a common Soviet reaction when confronted with hostile world opinion. The civilians would have shared with the military a sense of the sanctity of Soviet borders, would have seen quickly that the military had acted within its authority, and would have found it difficult to admit to their



own public that any component of the Soviet state had made an egregious error.

4. At the same time, we find it significant that the substantial Soviet effort to explain the shootdown and later to shift blame to the U.S. has been a joint undertaking of the propaganda apparatus and the military. Senior civilian leaders—except Gromyko, who couldn't avoid the issue in Madrid—[garble] clear of public identification with the issue for a month until Andropov put his blessing on the Soviet official version of the incident. Nor was there any public acknowledgement in the minutes of the weekly Politburo meeting that the subject was under discussion in the leadership, although the major public statements of September 2 and 6 were the acknowledged product of leadership deliberation.<sup>2</sup> In short, none of the political leaders wanted to hold the KAL hot potato.

5. Whatever the civilian leaders think of the military handling of the KAL issue, they heed closely the views and the needs of the armed forces. They are conscious of the key role played by the military in the Brezhnev succession and the likelihood that a similar role will belong to the armed forces in the next succession. Party control of the army is still a cardinal principle of Soviet politics, but the growing prominence of military leaders in national security decision making in the later Brezhnev years, perhaps epitomized in Brezhnev's October 1982 meeting with military commanders and highlighted in the new accessibility of top military figures to the press and foreign leaders, has compelled the party to reckon with the military viewpoint and perhaps adopt it as the national consensus on many key issues. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

## Hartman

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830568-0222. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Leningrad, USIA, USUN, Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, The Hague, Berlin, USNATO, Bern, Dublin, Helsinki, Stockholm, Vienna, Seoul, Tokyo, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Department of Defense, and the Mission in Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> For the September 2 statement, see [Document 84](#). For the September 6 statement, see [Document 98](#).

## **122. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, October 1, 1983, 0934Z

12501. USINF USSCC USSTART. Subject: US-Soviet Relations After KAL—The View From the Kremlin.

1. (C—Entire text).

2. Summary: The KAL tragedy has produced some of the most hostile anti-US rhetoric to come out of the Soviet Union in the post-war era. Has it caused parallel changes in how the Soviet leadership views the administration and in its willingness to engage on issues of concern to us? While it is still early for definitive conclusions, we suspect not.

3. The limited steps taken by Moscow last summer toward a more positive agenda were of ambiguous significance at best. It seems unlikely that they would have led to major moves in areas of importance to us before the INF drama had played itself out. Even then, we suspect Andropov's willingness to start a real dialogue with the President would have depended on other factors—primarily his assessment of the President's reelection prospects. We doubt that KAL has changed this calculus in any fundamental way. We are—as Andropov's September 28 statement made clear—in for a frigid fall and winter.<sup>2</sup> But a Soviet reassessment and move toward engagement next spring cannot be ruled out. End summary.

*After KAL—Questions*

4. It has been a month since KAL went down in flames over the Sea of Japan. With Andropov's speech September 28, Moscow's transfer of KAL articles recovered since the tragedy, and the beginning of the end of international civil aviation sanctions against the Soviets, the time is ripe to assess where KAL has left US-Soviet relations, and where they may go from here. (We address the question of the leadership's handling of the episode and the role of the Soviet military in a separate telegram).<sup>3</sup>

5. KAL was Andropov's first foreign policy crisis. Moscow's handling of the affair has been an unmitigated disaster from the standpoint of Soviet international interests. However "necessary" the Soviets cover-up of the shootdown may have been in domestic terms (and our sense is that the Soviet people have generally responded to the leadership's appeals to their patriotism and innate suspicion of foreigners), it has cut the ground out from Soviet efforts to deal with such pressing issues as INF and put to rest any illusions that Soviet international behavior under the ostensibly sophisticated Andropov would be more benign than under his predecessors.

6. Soviet efforts to shift the blame for their atrocity on to us have not washed. But their failure to avoid responsibility for the incident has been accompanied by some of the most lurid rhetoric toward the United States, the administration, and the President personally that we have seen since the height of the cold war. Is this simply the lashing out of a desperate power caught in an act it cannot explain? Or has the incident and US handling of it really changed Kremlin perceptions of the President and his administration's motivations, and with it the Soviet leadership's willingness to do business with the US in the months ahead? In either case, what are the implications for the future course of US-Soviet relations? How one answers those questions

depends very much on one's analysis of the Soviet leadership's view of the administration before August 31. There are at least two variants.

### *KAL as the Final Straw*

7. The first way of interpreting the Kremlin's view of the US before August 31 has been popularized by such well-connected but relatively low-level Soviet spokesmen as USA Institute Director Arbatov and columnist Aleksandr Bovin. In articles published in late 1982, both suggested that Moscow had in effect written off trying to do business with Washington during President Reagan's term in office, especially after the President's Orlando speech.<sup>4</sup> They elaborated on this theme, seeking to portray the Soviet leadership as personally offended by the administration's ideological bent, and determined to do nothing (e.g., accept a summit) which might make the President's reelection more likely.

8. Proponents of such a view might argue (although we have not yet heard such sentiments here) that US handling of the KAL incident was in effect the straw which broke the camel's back—an experience which confirmed the leadership's worst fears as to the President's motives, and which reinforced its determination to do everything possible to bring him down in 1984, no matter what the risk. They would view Andropov and his colleagues as backed into a corner in the wake of KAL, and left with no choice but to fight back. This would manifest itself in a tightening up of internal order, an accelerated arms program, a willingness to break off the INF talks after (or even before) deployment, stirring up the pot in regional hotspots, and more overt threats in Europe. The objective would be intimidation: to create a climate of fear and



apprehension among US allies and the US electorate which would cripple the President at the polls in November.

### *Another View*

9. We have tended to regard such a perception of the Soviet leadership's stance toward the administration as self-serving, since it is what the Soviets want some of the fainter-hearted in Europe to think. But we see no signs that the dire scenario outlined above is upon us. That being said, there is no question that the leadership is united in its strong distaste for the President's policy and its public enunciation, and were well before August 31. Their willingness to engage even to the limited degree they have since 1981 has been in spite of their feelings for the President, rather than because of them. There has doubtless been a strong predisposition to wait the President out.

10. We believe, however, that at least by the spring of this year, the Soviets were coming to the conclusion that this was not a viable option. By then, our efforts to restore military parity had the support of Congress and the public and had begun to have some effect; Williamsburg proved that the alliance was not about to come apart over INF and the Siberian pipeline;<sup>5</sup> and our economy was beginning to turn up. President Reagan had begun to look like a two-term incumbent. Moscow's positive response to his expression of concern about the Pentecostals,<sup>6</sup> and their subsequent hints of greater flexibility in START appeared to have been indicators of a dawning Soviet awareness that they could not afford to wait the President out on every issue. Additional signs were the warm treatment of Secretary Block,<sup>7</sup> the willingness to discuss at least aspects of the President's initiative on CBM's in the



communications field,<sup>8</sup> readiness to resume negotiations on new consulates and on an exchanges agreement,<sup>9</sup> and Soviet agreement on the Madrid final document.<sup>10</sup>

11. As of August 31, however, our guess is that this somewhat more positive Soviet approach was by no means universal or definitive. Summer press speculation on a rush to the summit by Andropov was premature. Many of the developments on which such speculation was based were ambiguous at best in terms of what they told us of Soviet motivations and objectives. Andropov's tete-a-tetes with Harriman, Pell and Winpisinger,<sup>11</sup> for example, were essentially end runs of the administration to important elements of the US electorate. Moscow's acceptance of a new long term grains agreement served its interests as well as ours.<sup>12</sup> The Soviets had backed out of their Madrid assurances on Shcharanskiy even before the ink was dry on the Madrid compromise.<sup>13</sup> Rather than reflecting a decision to engage the administration in any meaningful way, these steps in many respects can be seen as tactical moves by the Kremlin for limited objectives, and from which Moscow could reap credit for the "good will" they displayed in the run-up to INF deployments. Then KAL changed the script.

12. Aside from the tenuousness of Soviet interest in early engagement with the administration prior to KAL is the fact that the timing was all wrong for such a move from Moscow's standpoint. Even, as we think likely, if the Soviets were moving to the conclusion that they would ultimately have to do business with the President, they recognized that the immediate forecast was for a worsening, rather than an improvement, in bilateral atmospherics. INF loomed large, and Moscow clearly had a no-holds-barred offensive planned for the fall (Andropov's August 29 *Pravda* interview was the opening salvo).<sup>14</sup> If deployments

nonetheless occurred (as we believe they had concluded they would), there would be a Soviet response. Only after that, and once Moscow had had time to see where things stood in terms of public dynamics in Europe, might the Soviets have been prepared to shift positions substantially on issues of concern to the administration. The stakes in Europe, and internal pressures to see the game through, would simply have been too high to make a move before this possible. Even then, given Moscow's distaste for the President and preference for "lyuboy drugoy" ("anyone else"), the Soviets would have been unlikely to open up a serious dialogue with the administration unless the President looked a very strong bet to be reelected. Thus, even if KAL 007 had never strayed off course, it seems doubtful that there would have been any but cosmetic movement in US-Soviet relations before next spring.

### *Implications*

13. What are the implications of such an assessment of Soviet motivations before August 31 for our policy toward Moscow in the year ahead?

14. The first is that we need to be careful in interpreting Soviet rhetoric. As we have noted, the KAL affair has been an unmitigated disaster for the Kremlin, and the Soviet leadership doubtless feels we exploited its predicament. We suspect there is a lot of behind-the-scene finger-pointing going on now, and a parallel need to demonstrate "toughness" toward the administration. Rhetoric is a natural outlet for such feelings, and, as Andropov's statement made clear, it is likely to be unprecedented in its stridency. We are seeing more than simple spleen-venting, however. The Soviets hope that vituperative attacks on us and the kind of defensive saber-rattling we have seen lately

will frighten our allies and others into pressuring us to back off and make concessions in INF. (This may be coupled with further Soviet INF initiatives; see para. 15 below.) We can take a lot of the steam out of such tactics by conveying a sense of strength, confidence and responsibility in our own statements. The President's UNGA address was right on the mark.<sup>15</sup>

15. A second point is that the period ahead is going to be a sterile one in terms of the agenda we have been pressing on Moscow since 1981. Moscow's natural inclination to wait the administration out has almost certainly been reinforced by the KAL affair. But if we have it right, there was little prospect of meaningful concessions any time soon in any case. In the months ahead, we would expect that:

—On human rights issues, prospects are bleaker than ever. The general tightening up we had seen even before KAL is likely to continue and may accelerate.

—On regional issues, an area where we had made little progress even before August 31, we can expect no favors. We would be surprised, however, to see a more activist Soviet policy. Moscow's relative quiescence in the developing world under Andropov has been more a function of real constraints at home and unfavorable circumstances abroad than a bow to our concerns. These factors remain as real now as they did a month ago.

—On arms control issues, we remain pessimistic that there will be serious Soviet moves this year, but we do expect an eleventh hour INF proposal—or even more than one—aimed at deferring—and thereby stopping—deployments. But we doubt such a gesture will amount to more than a propaganda ploy which, while it will complicate our plans, is unlikely to meet our needs. (Our belief that Moscow has

not yet played out the skein of INF negotiating ploys leads us to the conclusion that the Soviets will not stage an early walk-out from Geneva; they will need a forum for the introduction of their new initiative(s).) A more serious approach in INF, we believe, is imaginable only after deployments have occurred despite Moscow's best efforts, the Soviets have responded with "counter-measures," and they have had time to assess the result. That, we would guess, is likely to take us at least through March 1984.

16. A final point is that KAL has not necessarily put paid to prospects for successful engagement with the Soviets between now and November 1984. Soviet rhetoric will continue to blow strong in the months ahead; it may even intensify as the INF issue enters its final phase. But, as veteran Soviet diplomat Lev Mendelevich reminded us last week, we should not underestimate Moscow's capacity for changing course when it serves its interest. If Ronald Reagan looks vulnerable next spring, Yuri Andropov will do everything in his power to prevent his reelection, and the intransigence and rhetoric we will see this fall will simply be prelude to more of the same next year. If, on the other hand, we get safely past deployments; if we maintain alliance unity in the face of an inevitable Soviet response; and if our economy looks as strong next spring as it does now, Andropov is capable of drawing the logical conclusions. He will recognize that circumstances for finally coming to terms with the President will never be better, and he may not wish to lose the opportunity.

**Hartman**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830570-0390. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to USNATO, Tokyo,



Beijing, London, Paris, Rome, Seoul, the Mission in Geneva, USUN, Bonn, and USDelMBFR Vienna.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 120](#).

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 121](#).

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 15](#).

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the G-7 Economic Summit held in Williamsburg, Virginia, May 28-30; see [footnote 5](#), [Document 53](#), and [footnote 3](#), [Document 60](#).

Documentation on the Siberian pipeline, is scheduled for publication in [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. VII, Western Europe, 1981-1984](#).

<sup>6</sup> See [Documents 34](#), [46](#), and [74](#).

<sup>7</sup> Secretary of Agriculture John Block went to the Soviet Union August 24-26 to sign the new 5-year grain agreement and "received a warm reception during his visit to Moscow." (Telegram 10884 from Moscow, August 26; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D8300492-0700).

<sup>8</sup> See [Documents 38](#), [42](#), and [44](#).

<sup>9</sup> See [Document 54](#).

<sup>10</sup> At the CSCE meeting in Madrid, a Concluding Document was signed on September 9. The text is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 53-60.

<sup>11</sup> Harriman met with Andropov on June 2. (Telegram 6967 from Moscow, June 3, and telegram 168467 to Moscow, June 17; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830315-0815 and D830345-0234 respectively) Senator Pell led a delegation to Moscow, meeting with Andropov on August 18; see [Document 79](#). William W. Winpisinger was the International President of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.

<sup>12</sup> See [Document 76](#).

<sup>13</sup> See [Document 75](#).

<sup>14</sup> See [Document 82](#).

<sup>15</sup> Reagan addressed the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly on the morning of September 26. See [footnote 6](#), [Document 117](#) and [footnote 3](#), [Document 120](#).



**123. Information Memorandum From the  
Assistant Secretary of State for European and  
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State  
Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 3, 1983

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations Post KAL-007

As most participants in your Saturday session on U.S.-Soviet relations concluded, the KAL shoot-down, while not changing the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, has modified the timetable in a way which could in turn have significant impact upon those relations.<sup>2</sup> Prior to that event, we had underway a process of gradual and tentative expansion of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue. This expansion affected the level of contacts, with two Gromyko meetings scheduled this month alone and the possibility of a Summit next year, and their substance, with agreements on grain, consulates and cultural exchanges in hand or in prospect, with progress on specific human rights cases, and movement on MBFR and START.

Our objectives were to restrain the Soviet reaction to INF deployment, to reassure the European and American people during a difficult period, and to open the prospect for significant East-West agreements in several areas. The key element of the pre-KAL U.S. strategy, both for restraining the Soviets and for achieving significant new agreements, was movement on START. For the Soviet part, there was some tentative evidence of a willingness to also move in START and meet us half-way on several other issues which divide us.

While the KAL shoot-down has not necessarily derailed this strategy, its evolution has been slowed to the point where there is little prospect for meaningful movement in U.S.-Soviet relations before the U.S. electoral season intervenes next summer. As a consequence, the plight of KAL-007 has also diminished our ability to restrain the Soviet response to INF deployment or to modify Soviet behavior in other areas. In shooting this plane down, the Soviets had made it more difficult for us to expand either the form, or the substance, of our dialogue, as we had intended.

### *Continuing Incentive for Dialogue*

As your discussions in New York have illustrated,<sup>3</sup> there is general and, I believe, justified view that the Soviets are likely to maintain their current tough and unyielding attitude for some time, probably through 1984—unless they see a greater likelihood than they now do of getting something substantial in negotiations with the United States. Events in the coming months, in particular INF deployment, will lead the Soviets toward further steps which are likely to increase still more the strain upon our relations. While it remains unlikely that the Soviets, in reacting to our deployment, would court a major confrontation—over Cuba or Berlin, for instance—we cannot be certain. In any case, there are measures short of nuclear deployments to Cuba or pressure on Berlin which could force U.S. responses, and Soviet countermeasures, the net effect of which could produce confrontation, or something approaching it.

Another INF move is probable, designed to stop our deployments. There is some evidence the Soviets could be considering a unilateral withdrawal combined with a joint moratorium on new deployments. We also should not rule

out a more major "peace initiative," e.g., proposal for a summit premised on no U.S. deployments. Over the next six weeks they could focus on raising the level of fear, getting Europeans really scared and then hit with their peace initiative. On balance, however, we think a basically tough stance is most likely—with only a cosmetic move on INF.

Other factors will also intervene throughout the year to further complicate the U.S.-Soviet relationship. In the early months of next year, for instance, the Chinese Prime Minister will visit Washington, and the President will visit China. These events, and the statements which will accompany them, will further feed Moscow's sense of encirclement. Stimulating Moscow's paranoia can be beneficial, in giving the Soviets a motivation to improve their own ties to Washington, but for this benefit to be realized, we must be in a position to channel Soviet frustrations in positive directions. This will be difficult in early 1984. Later in the year, the U.S. election campaign will divert Washington attention, and affect, in ways not yet fully predictable, Soviet calculations.

American military power and other factors impose important disincentives to provocative Soviet action. Yet vigorous and, when possible, positive dialogue can also help avoid misunderstanding or miscalculation, and add incentives for restraint to Moscow calculations.

In the current, pre-deployment period, American initiatives to explore areas for agreement with the USSR can pay immediate benefits, in allowing us to occupy the high ground in public perceptions and in calming the mood in the United States and particularly Europe. Such initiatives can perhaps also temper decisions which will be made in Moscow in these months, the results of which will become apparent only after the U.S. deployment begins.

But with Allied confidence in our ability to deploy on schedule growing, our principal concern should gradually shift toward the management of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the post-deployment period, when new and threatening Soviet statements and actions must be anticipated. Given the pressures to which U.S.-Soviet relations will be subject throughout 1984, it is in our interest that we fully engage all the governors on that relationship which a dialogue can provide.

### *Incentives for Restraint*

As before KAL-007, arms control, particularly START, will have to carry the weight of any positive effort to restrain Soviet behavior. To take steps now on arms control may be politically difficult; significant movement in other areas is almost certainly out of the question at least for the immediate future. In INF, we can and should elaborate upon our new offer in the coming months. We must recognize, however, that we have taken the last major unilateral step we can afford in this negotiation, and prospects for progress now really do depend upon Soviet movement, which is improbable before December. In MBFR, we should pursue the bilateral dialogue which the Soviets have agreed to open, and also take a forward step in the multilateral negotiations. Yet we should recognize that there is nothing we can offer the Soviets in this negotiation which would affect their concerns over INF deployment.

Only in START, ultimately the more important of the two nuclear negotiations, could the prospect of a mutually advantageous accommodation significantly affect the Soviet behavior in other areas. In particular, only the prospect of achieving meaningful limits on the strategic threat could

help offset the consequences on U.S. INF deployment for Soviet planners.

Unfortunately, the now-approved “build-down” concept will not strike the Soviets as a plausible basis for negotiated arms control, although we can expect them to seize upon aspects of the idea to impose unilateral constraints upon American force planning. Neither should we expect the other modest steps on START which were discussed at the NSPG to lead to a more optimistic Soviet assessment of the prospects for this negotiation.<sup>4</sup> If strategic arms negotiations are to play any significant role in either Washington’s or Moscow’s calculations over the coming months, we will need to revitalize consideration of steps designed to merge the U.S. and Soviet negotiating frameworks.

In moving toward a more dynamic START negotiation, we cannot realistically aim for an agreement, even a Vladivostok-type framework agreement, by next year. START remains, however, the most powerful of the positive potential governors on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. It is thus an important device with which to help manage this relationship through what is likely to be a rough period.

### *Opening Channels*

We also need to consider steps to restore the appearance of a dialogue between Washington and Moscow. President Reagan has not yet responded to Andropov’s message on INF of several weeks ago.<sup>5</sup> He should do so soon, and we should let this become publicly known. When and if significant decisions are taken on START, we might consider despatching Brent Scowcroft to Moscow as a Presidential envoy to explain the new American ideas.

Lower level exchanges with the Soviets (e.g., Chet Crocker with his counterpart, perhaps Max Kampelman with appropriate Soviet officials on human rights and CSCE follow-up, perhaps further talks on hot-line upgrade and other CBM's) should continue. We also might consider sending someone from the Department to Moscow for another review of the bilateral relationship, as part of showing that a dialogue still exists. We should not anticipate, however, that these lower level exchanges can make more than a marginal impact, either perceptually or substantively, on the dialogue.


Thus we also need to consider when and how to resume contacts at your level. As substantive developments allow, I recommend you take up again your discussions with Dobrynin on START, MBFR and other issues, letting the fact, but not the content, of these meetings become publicly known. The next natural occasion for a meeting with Gromyko will not occur until next Fall's UN General Assembly, unless a Ministerial level opening of CDE this January is agreed. I understand the reasons you prefer that such a CDE session not be held. Yet the potential benefits, in terms of renewing the high level U.S.-Soviet dialogue and demonstrating continuity in the East-West relationship in the immediate aftermath of INF deployment, are sufficiently great that I recommend you not exclude altogether the possibility of eventually agreeing to join in a January meeting in Stockholm. Neither should we entirely exclude, at this point, the possibility of proposing a meeting with Gromyko at some other neutral site this Fall, although we will want to be wary of feeding unrealistic hopes for a last moment breakthrough on INF just as the deployments begin.



<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, ES Sensitive, October 1-8 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Printed from a copy that indicates Eagleburger initialed the original.

<sup>2</sup> Shultz held regular Saturday morning meetings with various Soviet experts to discuss issues and policies related to U.S.-Soviet relations. There was no consistent note taking for these meetings.

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 119](#).

<sup>4</sup> An NSPG meeting on START took place on September 29. See [Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 80, footnote 2](#) .

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 81](#).

**October 1983-February  
1984**

**“The Winter of Soviet  
Discontent”: INF Walkout,  
the War Scare, and the  
‘Ivan and Anya’ Speech**

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**124. Information Memorandum From the Director of  
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
(Montgomery) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, October 11, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, October 1-31 1983. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Wayne Limberg, INR/SEE; cleared by L. Carter, NESA/SOA. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 11.

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**125. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, October 11, 1983, 12:30-1:45 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/11/1983-10/24/1983]. Secret. According to a typed notation from Matlock, the meeting took place at "The Buck Stops Here" cafeteria. A covering memorandum from Matlock to Clark on October 14, is stamped "RCM has seen," indicating that McFarlane saw the memorandum of conversation.

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**126. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan**

Washington, October 12, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Kenneth deGraffenreid Files, Subject File, [Active Measures: 1983-1985]. Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by deGraffenreid. Reagan wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "Could I have the attached for possible use in Sat. Radio broadcasts? RR." On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote to Linhard: "Bob, See President's note. Judge would like to have a radio address prepared for Pres that talks about Soviet active measures in a general way. JP."

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**127. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, October 19, 1983, 1245Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830010-0138. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

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**128. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, October 25, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 10, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (10/22/1983-10/31/1983); NLR-775-10-25-5-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Tefft; cleared by Pascoe and Niles. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 26. In the upper right-hand margin is a typed note to Burt from Shultz: "An excellent memo. Pls turn into a Sec-Pres, undated, to send over on Friday. G." An undated, unsigned copy of a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan is *ibid*.

**129. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, October 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive Chronology (10/28/1983-11/14/1983); NLR-775-1-58-3-4. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe on October 25. McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 29.

**130. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, October 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83-10/31/83); NLR-748-24-38-10-9. Secret.

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**131. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan**

Washington, November 1, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83-10/31/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. With the resignation of Clark, Reagan appointed his deputy, Robert "Bud" McFarlane to the position of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs on October 17.

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**132. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1983 (10/20/1983-11/07-1983); NLR-362-3-14-1-0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes

Only. Although undated, the memorandum was likely sent on November 3 or 4.

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**133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, November 9, 1983, 1744Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830658-0555. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

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**134. Article in the National Intelligence Daily**

Washington, November 10, 1983

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 88T00528R: Policy Files (1982-1984), Box 1, Folder 1: VC/NIC Chron January-March 1984. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified].

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**135. Editorial Note**

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### **136. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan**

Washington, November 16, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Chron (Official) November 1983; NLR-362-6-10-5-7. Secret.

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### **137. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, November 18, 1983, 3-4:15 p.m.

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Eagleburger; approved by Shultz on December 6. Shultz's approval is noted on another copy. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1983 Soviet Union Nov) A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. The surnames for Kondrashev and Kvitsinskiy are misspelled throughout the document. On the cover note from Eagleburger, Shultz wrote: "LSE, excellent summary."

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### **138. Notes of a Meeting**

Washington, November 19, 1983, 7:30 a.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, [Saturday Group Notes] (November-December 1983). No classification marking. The meeting took place in the

Secretary's Dining Room at the Department of State. In his book, Matlock explained the origin of the small group meetings: "Despite his impatience to get relations with Moscow on a constructive track, Reagan did not seem to be focusing on the substantive issues. Decisions were stalled by squabbles among the various agencies. Shultz noticed this, of course, and tried to break the logjam within the administration by starting a series of Saturday breakfasts for senior officials. Shultz and McFarlane asked me to organize the meetings and act as executive secretary. They wanted to make sure that all the participants could be seated around a single table in a dining room on the eighth floor of the State Department. They also insisted that the fact of the meetings, as well as the content of the discussions, be kept confidential." (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, p. 75)

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**139. Action Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, November 22, 1983

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/16-30/83. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Sestanovich; cleared by Azrael and Kaplan. Forwarded through Eagleburger, who wrote in the margin: "G.S.: This is very much worth reading. LSE." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22, and Hill's

handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on November 28.

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**140. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, November 22, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer on November 16. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 22.

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**141. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, November 23, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1D, 1983—Soviet Union—November. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley; cleared by Simons and Palmer. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Simons initialed for Palmer. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. Two handwritten notes in the upper right-hand corner read: "Given direct to McFarlane by GPS 12/3" and "done & given to Bud." McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and Hill's handwritten

initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on December 3.

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**142. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, December 7, 1983, 1607Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

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**143. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, December 12, 1983, 1531Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830731-0263. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Brussels, Copenhagen, Ottawa, and Rome.

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**144. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**

Washington, December 13, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/13/83); NLR-748-24-43-1-3. Confidential. Sent for information. A

handwritten note at the top of the page by McFarlane reads: "This just doesn't seem plausible to me (i.e. severe anxiety & fear of war). M."

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**145. Memorandum From the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations (Nitze) and the Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, December 15, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret. Forwarded through Adelman. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

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**146. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger)**

Washington, December 16, 1983

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive December 1983. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley on December 9; cleared by



Simons, Palmer, Haass in substance, Kelly, and Baraz for information. An unknown hand initialed for Dunkerley. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 16. A stamped notation indicates Eagleburger saw the memorandum on December 19. He wrote in the margin: "Very good piece! LSE."

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**147. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**

Washington, December 19, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1983. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. A handwritten notation in the upper right-hand corner, likely by McFarlane, reads: "Return by courier."

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**148. Talking Points Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency**

Washington, December 19, 1983

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986), Box 14, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1-31 Dec '83). Secret. The talking points were likely drafted by Gates for Casey's discussion with Reagan on the "Spy War" and the general reporting on the increased Soviet intelligence activities related to the "war scare." (See Document 135.) In his memoir, Gates recalled: "Casey met with Reagan on December 22 and advised him that we had learned that in



November there had been a GRU (Soviet military intelligence) instruction to all posts to obtain early warning of enemy military preparations so that the Soviet Union would not be surprised by the actual threat of war. All posts were to try to determine 'the enemy's' intentions and actions. Finally, the GRU elements were to create new agent groups abroad with the capability of communicating independently with GRU headquarters. The DCI told the President on that December day that the KGB and GRU information 'seems to reflect a Soviet perception of an increased threat of war and a realization of the necessity to keep intelligence flowing to Moscow during wartime or after a rupture in diplomatic relations.'" (Gates, *From the Shadows*, pp. 271-272) No record of a meeting with Casey on December 22 appears in the President's schedule. However, a telephone call from Reagan to Casey at 5:15 p.m. was noted. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) On December 23, Casey sent the President a memorandum dated December 22 on "the Spy War and Doomsday Talk," which directly correlates to these talking points; however, the memorandum was a short summary and did not include as much detail on Soviet collection activities. In the covering memorandum to Reagan, Casey wrote: "In line with our telephone conversation, I am sending a little reading for your trip west: First, is a memo reporting on the latest development in the ongoing espionage war. Together with the report I sent to you a few weeks ago, it may say a lot about the Soviet state of mind today. There are other reports indicating a range of reaction from prevailing nervousness to fear and grudging respect for our policies in the Soviet view of the state of our relationship today. Whether this represents a threat or an opportunity is the continuing question." (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980-1986), Box 1, Folder: Meeting w/the President (Backup) (10 Jan '84))

**149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, December 23, 1983, 2239Z

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.4, President/Andropov Correspondence. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hill; cleared in S/S-O and by McFarlane; approved by Dam. Sent for information Immediate to Shultz. A handwritten note reads: "Letter delivered to Gromyko on 12/24—no cable (reported by phone)."

**150. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, December 26, 1983, 1448Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83-12/28/83); NLR-748-24-46-6-5. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Reagan initialed this copy of the telegram, indicating that he saw it.

**151. Report Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency**

Washington, December 28, 1983

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/20/83-12/28/83); NLR-748-24-46-8-3. Secret; [handling

restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [3 names not declassified]. Reagan initialed this copy of the report, indicating that he saw it.

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**152. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, January 4, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/03/84–01/04/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on January 3. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A handwritten note on a Department of State copy of this memorandum reads: "Original Sec/Pres hand carried by GPS to WH." A telegram was drafted for Hartman in Moscow on January 4 reporting on this meeting. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 2C, 1984—Soviet Union—January)

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**153. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Bosworth) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, January 5, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 1/1–15/83. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Forwarded through Eagleburger. Eagleburger's Executive Assistant, William Montgomery, initialed for Eagleburger. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum,

indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on January 5. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Bosworth wrote: "The attached memorandum is an effort by Jeremy Azrael and Steve Sestanovich to identify some US initiatives that may deserve consideration as you prepare for your meeting with Gromyko. We are aware that each of these initiatives raises serious bureaucratic, political, and strategic problems. However, we are also conscious of the problems that could arise from a continued stalemate in US-Soviet relations and believe that this is the almost certain outcome of our standing pat on attempting to revive our former 'small step' gameplan." See footnote 4, Document 31.

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**154. Memorandum From the Deputy White House Chief of Staff (Deaver) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan**

Washington, January 5, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR, President's Soviet Speech (01/16/84) (2). Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to the Vice President. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Additionally, a stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner indicates that he saw it.

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**155. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**

Washington, January 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR, President's Soviet Speech (01/16/84) (2). Confidential. Sent for information. Sestanovich wrote next to Fortier's name and initials: "(dictated and signed in his absence) S.S." Brackets are in the original.

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**156. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**

Washington, January 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400010. Secret. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Matlock, deGraffenreid, Lehman, and Raymond. McFarlane's stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "John—Don't you expect this was Seweryn Bialer? He has left a lot of people very nervous in Eur." Seweryn Bialer was a professor of Political Science at Columbia University who focused on Soviet and contemporary Russian studies.

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**157. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**

Washington, January 11, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System II Intelligence Files—INT #2, Folder #2, 8490035-8890278. Secret. Sent for information. McFarlane's stamp appears on the



memorandum, indicating he saw it. He also wrote in the margin: "Jack—I have sent this to Shultz & Casey asking their views on" and drew an arrow to the final paragraph of the memorandum.

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### **158. Editorial Note**

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### **159. Memorandum of Conversation**

Stockholm, January 18, 1984, 3-8:10 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/24/84-01/25/84). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock noted: "Although it is an advance, unofficial copy which has not yet been reviewed by Secretary Shultz, you may wish to review it. It is being handled on very close hold in State, and Shultz has given orders that only one file copy be held in the Executive Secretariat." Although several copies of this text were found, no final version with Shultz's clearance was located. McFarlane's stamp appears on the covering memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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### **160. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House**



Stockholm, January 19, 1984, 0103Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840037-0071. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State.

**161. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, January 25, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, January 16-31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to Seitz, Burt wrote: "Ray—I have done the attached memo in its present form because of the extreme sensitivity of the subject matter, given that we are not yet even back into negotiations with the Soviets. However, given that the Secretary now is clearly interested in the topic, I think he will find this memo of interest. I hope he will find the time in the next few weeks to read it. Rick." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22, Arms Control (01/24/1984-03/25/1984)) In a covering memorandum to Shultz on January 25, Eagleburger wrote: "Rick has done an excellent analysis of two approaches to a merger of the INF and START negotiations and of the advantages and disadvantages of each. "Rick suggests that we consider first the more modest alternative of a 'compartmentalized merger.' That approach will be easier to sell in Washington and may be more appealing to Moscow but is likely to result in little more than a return to stalemated nuclear arms control talks in a slightly different package. As Rick suggests, the 'full merger' approach

promises more benefits but also poses greater risks. In the end, we may not want to make that leap, but I suggest you discuss the full merger idea with Ken, Rick and Jon before ruling it out." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on Eagleburger's memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984-1989, January 16-31, 1984)

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**162. Memorandum From Donald Fortier of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)**

Washington, January 27, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84-01/31/84). Confidential. Sent for information. In a handwritten note to McFarlane at the bottom of the page, Poindexter explained: "Bud, This is in response to Jim Baker's question to me earlier in the week. Bob Sims has provided copy to Jim. Jim and Paul Laxalt appear on Sunday talk shows and they may use the points made here. John."

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**163. Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, January 26, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (01/27/84-01/31/84). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The

meeting took place in Poindexter's office. Reagan initialed the memorandum of conversation, indicating he saw it.

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**164. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Andropov to President Reagan**

Moscow, January 28, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev (8291507, 8490115). No classification marking. In a covering memorandum to Reagan, Shultz explained that Dobrynin delivered this letter from Andropov during their meeting on January 30. (See Document 165.) The Soviet Embassy provided the translation of this letter. A routing slip indicates McFarlane sent the memorandum to Reagan for information on February 1.

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**165. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**

Washington, January 30, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 11, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/29/1984-01/31/1984); NLR-775-11-13-3-2. Secret; Sensitive. A cover memorandum shows that it was drafted by Burt.

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**166. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan**

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—(1/26/84–2/13/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it, and wrote at the bottom, “P.2 of Andropov’s letter—he suggests that they want an elimination of nuclear weapons? In Europe that is. Let’s take him up on that.” See Document 164.

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**167. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane).**

Washington, February 6, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (02/04/84–2/11/84). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane’s stamp appears on the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

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**168. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, February 7, 1984, 1201Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840003–0057. Confidential; Nodis.

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**169. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz**

Washington, February 8, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1984-02/08/1984); NLR-775-11-14-5-9. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Palmer. Hill's handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on February 8.



**124. Information Memorandum From the  
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and  
Research (Montgomery) to Secretary of State  
Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 11, 1983

SUBJECT

CIA Report on Soviet Policy in Afghanistan

A recent CIA report [*less than 1 line not declassified*] confirms earlier indications that the Soviets remain committed to their long-term goal of subduing the Afghan insurgency despite the protracted military and economic costs. Moscow recognizes that this process will take years and is ready to shoulder the burden. It is not planning, however, to increase its troop levels.

The report, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] provides [*less than 1 line not declassified*] insights into Soviet thinking on Afghanistan to date. According to the report, the Soviets are aware that:

—the Babrak Karmal regime is incapable of defending itself and would be overthrown if Soviet support were withdrawn;

—the USSR must continue to control all government and industrial, (i.e., urban) centers and lines of communication and transportation in Afghanistan until the Afghan army has been sufficiently retooled and a new generation of Afghan leaders trained in the USSR;



—Afghanistan must be restructured and administered along Soviet lines, the final subjugation and pacification of Afghanistan will take several decades if not longer.


The Soviets recognize that their efforts to rebuild the Afghan army have not yet succeeded but that they are not prepared to increase the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. [2 lines not declassified] it may reflect some of the findings of the inspection of the military situation in Afghanistan conducted by Marshal Sokolov in early August.

The Sokolov mission prompted speculation that the Soviets were unhappy with the lack of progress in Afghanistan and were contemplating drastic changes in their policy including Babrak's replacement. [1 line not declassified] As a recently completed SNIE on Afghanistan argues, the Soviets may change their tactics but there are no signs of a fundamental shift in strategy or goals.<sup>2</sup> They will probably stick with Babrak if for no other reason than they have no alternatives at present.

[5½ lines not declassified] since the Afghan adventure would last years and involve sustained Soviet assistance, some belt-tightening must take place. This may be an effort to answer long-standing Soviet military complaints that the Afghans were unable to pull their weight and that more resources were needed.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979-1983, Lot 96D262, Super Sensitive, October 1-31 1983. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Wayne Limberg, INR/SEE; cleared by L. Carter, NESA/SOA. Hill's

handwritten initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 11.

<sup>2</sup> Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XXXIV, Afghanistan, February 1981-October 1985* .

## 125. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 11, 1983, 12:30–1:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

### PARTICIPANTS

Sergei Vishnevsky, *Pravda* Columnist

Jack F. Matlock

*Background:* Vishnevsky, whom I had met during my tours in Moscow, telephoned October 7 to say that he was in the U.S. for a few weeks (ostensibly to replace temporarily the *Pravda* correspondent in New York, who has terminal cancer) and would like a meeting, completely off the record. After consulting Judge Clark, I agreed to meet with him for lunch on October 11.

*Vishnevsky's Comments:* Though his presentation was rather disjointed, he made the following points of possible interest, presenting everything as his "personal view:"

—The state of U.S.-Soviet relations has deteriorated to a dangerous point. Many in the Soviet public are asking if war is imminent. He himself is worried and personally uncomfortable because now he must write nothing but propaganda about the U.S. rather than the more objective stories he prefers, and was permitted to write in the mid-70's.

—The Soviet Union is now run by a triumvirate of Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko. They have been in the leadership so long that they tend to be rigid about basic policy issues. (In this regard, he observed, "President Reagan is mentally and physically ten years younger than

his age; our leaders are ten years older.”) But the Soviet leaders recognize that they need a decrease in tension to concentrate on economic reform (he spoke of the economy as being “a total mess, and getting worse”), but are frustrated because they feel beleaguered and simply don’t know how to proceed.

—Andropov’s statement of September 28 was virtually unprecedented and is a reflection of the leadership’s current frustration.<sup>2</sup> It was intended primarily for the Soviet audience (to warn them that they could not expect an easing of tensions with the U.S. and had to be prepared to tighten their belts) and to “our friends in Europe” (the anti-nuclear movement). But the leadership is convinced that the Reagan Administration is out to bring their system down and will give no quarter; therefore they have no choice but to hunker down and fight back.

—Their frustration is heightened by a recognition that the President is in fact successful in achieving his objectives. His defense budgets get passed; the NATO Alliance is holding; the U.S. economy is picking up. And he constantly outmaneuvers them: the President’s handling of the KAL “incident” was “absolutely brilliant”: it left the Soviet leaders “wallowing in the mud.”

—The Soviets know that we will succeed in starting INF deployments, and are convinced that the President is very likely to be reelected next year. He implied, however, that their current mood was so truculent and their prestige so much at stake that they are unable to draw the logical conclusions from these convictions.

—As for the future, his parting words were that, in his opinion, the Soviets would stonewall all our proposals this fall and would have to react in some fashion to INF

deployments, which would require a stonewall well into 1984. However, “about six months into the next year” they might be willing—since the domestic economy remains the priority issue for them—to reassess their stance.

*Matlock Comments:* Vishnevsky did most of the talking during lunch, but I pointed out repeatedly that the Soviet predicament, as he described it, was the direct result of their own actions and their own aggressive policies, and not of propaganda manipulation on our part. (He did not disagree.) I told him they could not have handled the KAL massacre worse. (He agreed.) I stressed that, despite everything, we were still prepared to negotiate seriously to lower arms levels and had made proposals which should interest them, if they indeed do desire a reduction of tension. (This elicited his comments implying that the Soviet leadership, at the moment at least, is incapable of considering them rationally.)

In response to his comment that the Soviet leaders are convinced that they could not deal with this Administration, I told him that Soviet actions across the board created grave doubts that we could deal with the Soviets. All Soviet actions and their propagandistic and one-sided “proposals” seemed designed to acquire or perpetuate Soviet military superiority. There could obviously be no agreements on this basis, and so long as these Soviet policies persisted, we could not take seriously Soviet professions of a desire to improve relations.

*Comment:* Vishnevsky has held key positions with *Pravda* for many years, so he clearly has sound Party and (almost certainly) KGB credentials. His trade is propaganda and his specialty the U.S. We must assume that, in general, he was conveying a series of messages someone in the regime wants us to hear. He was so intent on getting his comments

off his chest that he carefully avoided debating any points I made, either agreeing with them or letting them pass. There is obviously a heavy potential here for disinformation, and his comments must be treated with caution. Nevertheless, I would summarize the real messages he tried to convey as the following:

—Expect a Soviet stonewall for about nine months, but do not conclude from this that we cannot do business at all in 1984.

—There are still powerful incentives in Moscow to deal realistically with us, but these may not be evident in the months ahead because of the psychological and prestige factors cited.

—Andropov is not in complete control: he shares power with Ustinov (the military) and Gromyko (a stalwart of traditional Soviet foreign policy with a large personal stake in it). Changing policies will not come easy.

If this was the intended message, then it may well be essentially accurate, since there is much corroborative evidence. And if this is the case, it means that we are on the right track and must make sure we stay the course, while keeping channels of communication open.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron October 1983 [10/11/1983–10/24/1983]. Secret. According to a typed notation from Matlock, the meeting took place at “The Buck Stops Here” cafeteria. A covering memorandum from Matlock to Clark on October 14, is stamped “RCM has seen,” indicating that McFarlane saw the memorandum of conversation.



<sup>2</sup> See [Document 120](#).

**126. Memorandum From the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)  
to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 12, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Active Measures

The attached special unclassified report, published by State, depicts the boldness and intensity by which the Soviets pursue a broad range of deception ("active measures") against us.

Significant examples include:

—Fabrication of two US Embassy Rome telegrams portraying press coverage of the possible "Bulgarian connection" in the assassination attempt against the Pope as a US-orchestrated campaign.

—Implicating Ambassador Thomas Pickering, by means of a forged US Embassy Lagos document, as ordering the assassination of a principal Nigerian presidential candidate.

—A forged West German document by which Ghana accuses the US of plotting to overthrow the Rawlings government.

—A fabricated audiotape of an alleged transatlantic conversation between you and Prime Minister Thatcher.

We continue to closely monitor Soviet active measures and employ appropriate counterintelligence to lessen their

impact and expose their deceptive techniques.<sup>2</sup>

### *Recommendation*

That you read the enclosed Department of State special report.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Kenneth deGraffenreid Files, Subject File, [Active Measures: 1983-1985]. Confidential. Sent for action. Prepared by deGraffenreid. Reagan wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "Could I have the attached for possible use in Sat. Radio broadcasts? RR." On an attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote to Linhard: "Bob, See President's note. Judge would like to have a radio address prepared for Pres that talks about Soviet active measures in a general way. JP."

<sup>2</sup> In an October 19 memorandum to McFarlane from Sims, Lehman, and Fortier, they commented that with pending INF deployments and European demonstrations, a more appropriate focus for Reagan's Saturday address would be arms control. They suggested that "deGraffenreid's 'active measures' theme should be saved for another talk, when it could be fully developed as the main theme." (Ibid.) Reagan did not give a Saturday radio address on active measures and counterintelligence activities until June 29, 1985. For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, page 885-886.

<sup>3</sup> Reagan initialed the "ok" option. Department of State Special Report No. 110, "Soviet Active Measures, September 1983," is attached but not printed. For the text, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1983, pp. 60-67.

## **127. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, October 19, 1983, 1245Z

13169. For the Secretary. Please Pass to Under Secretary Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary Burt. Subject: Ambassador's Call on Gromyko October 19.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: I called on Gromyko today to get a reading of his views of the bilateral relationship prior to my departure tomorrow. The discussion very quickly became a philosophical one; in fact, he had nothing new to say on the one specific issue—INF—that we touched on. But he did go to great lengths in arguing that the major problem the Soviets have with the Reagan administration is that they believe we are not prepared to accept their legitimacy and therefore that we constantly intrude ideological considerations into issues of war and peace.<sup>2</sup> Even allowing for his well-known thespian qualities, Gromyko was passionate on the subject, frequently correcting his interpreter to make sure that exact nuances were being conveyed and even keeping me fifteen minutes beyond our allotted hour to emphasize his points. While a lot of this is obviously self-serving, at least it's a problem we should talk about in-house; I hope we can discuss the issue when I see you next week.<sup>3</sup> End summary.

3. Gromyko received me in his MFA office. He looked none the worse for wear following his rigorous travels and conversations. Gromyko was accompanied by USA Department Chief Bessmertnykh; I brought with me my

DCM, Zimmermann. While Gromyko had some hard things to say, his tone was more reflective than polemical—a striking contrast from the pyrotechnics at Madrid.<sup>4</sup>

4. I began by saying that I had come primarily to listen, and wanted to get his sense of the state of relations before my consultations in Washington. Beginning with INF, I wondered what the Soviet objective has been. If it has been to stop deployment, it won't succeed. If it has been to limit our deployments, our negotiations should be more serious. I told Gromyko I was puzzled.

5. Gromyko responded by noting the low depth to which our relations have sunk and saying that this was the product of the policy of the U.S. administration. He claimed that in INF the administration's negotiating position was not serious and that we were just killing time in order to mislead people and use the negotiations as a sort of smoke screen for deployment. He said the Soviet Union does not seek dominance, but will take measures to assure that its position is not weakened. The Soviet Government is in favor of parity and equality. It has made proposals based on parity. But parity can be on various levels; it is one thing to have parity at a lower level but another thing to have parity at a higher level leading to major nuclear arsenals.

6. An unproductive discussion ensued regarding the British and French forces. Gromyko called our assertions that they are not part of NATO systems a "fairytale". If we wanted someone to believe such a fairytale, then we'll have to look for someone other than the Soviet Union. I tried to pull Gromyko back to the situation he envisages following our deployments. He refused to be drawn asserting simply that our action would lead to new twists in the arms spiral. I stressed the President's willingness to continue negotiations, but added that in doing so we had to take



account of the interests of such non-nuclear powers as the FRG. Gromyko said that our latest proposal was a mockery of common sense and that neither in INF nor in START had our recent proposals moved even one small step in the direction of agreements.

7. Gromyko then moved on to his primary message. He said that U.S. policies and statements are based on deception and are unworthy of trust. Our ways of dealing with the Soviet Union showed no vestige of elementary propriety. Ideology was being mixed into policies involving world security and issues of war and peace.

8. I argued that Soviets, of all people, should not be surprised at ideological combat. I myself had heard Brezhnev, at the height of détente, say that the ideological competition would continue. And I heard Andropov less than a year ago—in a speech in the Kremlin—devote the first half to ideological considerations and the second half to a discussion of arms control.<sup>5</sup> The Soviet Union has a party apparatus and newspapers that can make the ideological case while the government leaders can concentrate on state policy; the President of the United States does not have such possibilities. President Reagan has strong ideological beliefs; the fact that he holds them does not mean that he does not desire to pursue arms control or to discuss regional problems seriously with the Soviet Union.

9. Gromyko claimed that, in negotiating with three U.S. Presidents, Brezhnev had never put ideology on the negotiating table. He said it would be one thing if President Reagan went to a club and gave a lecture on the differences between socialist and capitalist ideology. He could outline the advantages of capitalist ideology; he could argue the virtues of idealist philosophy over material



philosophy; and, in the field of political economy, he could note his preference for Adam Smith over Karl Marx. But it's something else when he attacks the legitimacy of our social system, our constitution, our party and government, and our leadership. With such rhetoric being used, Gromyko continued, it is difficult to discuss political issues, indeed to discuss anything at all.

10. I countered that there was no way to define our competition purely in terms of philosophical debates. The competition goes on in many areas, in part because both of us are free to promote our competing ideologies and this is bound to bring us into conflict. We have to maintain a state-to-state relationship, exercise restraint, and talk more. I denied that our major problem with the Soviets was the existence of their system; our major problem was that our security interests and those of our friends were affected by Soviet activities. I recalled for Gromyko that our current problems with the Soviet Union took root at the time of a Democratic President and a Democratic Congress.

11. Gromyko then launched into a long plea for the separation of ideological and security problems, arguing that ideology should not be a factor when issues of war and peace are being discussed. Saying in speeches on nuclear armaments and security that socialist representatives don't believe in God or in life after death and have different moral values is not a correct approach to security problems. Whether this is a conscious approach on your part or a careless approach, it's equally bad in either case. Gromyko cited three examples of the "correct" approach: the overcoming of ideological differences to establish diplomatic relations 50 years ago; the collaboration in World War II; and the SALT I and II agreements.

12. I told Gromyko that the ideological approach of which he complained had not been present on our side in the high-level exchanges we have had with the Soviet leadership. Gromyko, somewhat oddly, said he found this remark very interesting. I followed up by telling him to take these private exchanges extremely seriously because they show what the President hopes to accomplish in the relationship.

**Hartman**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830010-0138. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In a memorandum to McFarlane, October 28, forwarding him a copy of the telegram, Matlock wrote: "The major thrust of Gromyko's comment was that the Soviet leaders are convinced that the Reagan administration does not accept their legitimacy, and that therefore it is not prepared to negotiate seriously with the USSR, but is actually dedicated to bringing down the system. There is a large self-serving element in such argumentation, but I believe that it is an argument used in policy debates among the Soviet leadership. Given the present signs of uncertainty in the Soviet leadership, and the indirect evidence of debate, it probably serves our interest to do what we can (without changing our policies) to undercut the force of this argument." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet-Diplomatic Contacts (6/8))

<sup>3</sup> Hartman was in Washington and met with Reagan on October 24. In his diary, Reagan wrote: "Ambas. Hartman (Russia) came by. He confirms what I believe: the Soviets wont really negotiate on arms reductions until we deploy

the Pershing II's & go forward with MX. He also confirms that Andropov is very much out of sight these days." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 279)

<sup>4</sup> See [Documents 104](#) and [105](#).

<sup>5</sup> This is possibly a reference to Andropov's June 15 speech to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and Supreme Soviet. See [footnote 4](#), [Document 65](#).

**128. Information Memorandum From the  
Assistant Secretary of State for European and  
Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State  
Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 25, 1983

SUBJECT

Soviet Reactions to U.S. Protective Actions in Grenada

While Soviet reactions to today's events on Grenada are still in an early stage and will doubtless be further shaped as the situation on the island becomes clearer, we would offer the following preliminary thoughts on the outlines of the Soviet Union's likely response.<sup>2</sup>

*A Sharply Critical Public Line:* Not surprisingly, Moscow will see this as an opportunity to reinforce their current public diplomacy campaign attacking the U.S. policies as militaristic and an increasing threat to peace. This afternoon's TASS commentary sets their general theme —“an act of direct, unprovoked aggression . . . taking advantage of a complicated situation that had taken shape within the country . . . and with the fig-leaf of involvement by pro-American puppet regimes.” We can expect a high volume of this over the coming days with the Soviets particularly trying to tarnish our image in Europe as the INF deployment debate reaches its peak and to divert attention from their own post-KAL image problems. Our Embassy in Moscow notes that we may also see “protest” demonstrations in the coming days.

*. . . But More Realistic in Private?:* Despite this public outcry, however, the Grenadan revolutionary movement

does not represent either a Soviet vital interest or high investment (Perhaps characteristic of Soviet unhappiness and ambivalence about the local factional infighting, Arbatov is reported as saying in London that the Grenadans had not been blameless in letting the situation so develop as to enable to the U.S. to intervene). In his meeting with Chargé Zimmermann this morning, Bessmertnykh of the Soviet MOFA was critical of our actions, but used the phrase “in your backyard”—suggestive of a long-standing Soviet tendency to view such matters in “super-power spheres of influence” terms.<sup>3</sup> The Embassy’s Acting DCM Isakov did not even feel the need to make a *pro forma* complaint with me this afternoon. While unwelcome, the U.S. protective actions in the Caribbean were perhaps not that unexpected in the Soviet *realpolitik* consciousness.

For that reason, we doubt at this time that the Soviets will take any major and dramatic counter-action beyond intensifying particular anti-U.S. propaganda themes. At the same time, however, there are potential problem areas which could influence their response.

—The fate of Soviet personnel on Grenada was a primary concern of both Bessmertnykh and Isakov. (We estimate there are perhaps 10 Soviet diplomats and 35 economic technicians on Grenada along with 15 Eastern European advisors). Initial reports suggest that our forces have over thirty Soviets “safe under protection” on Grenada. Repatriating these Soviets could become an issue in coming days.

—Should an incident develop in which it appeared that Soviet lives were lost or Soviet national dignity flouted by deliberate US actions, we could expect a much sharper Soviet reaction and perhaps even retaliation in specific cases. In this latter regard, we should be sensitive to the



anomalous situation in which our Embassy in Kabul must operate.

—While the Grenadan revolutionary movement may not be a major loss to the Soviets, the loss of life and prestige by Cuba, its surrogate in the region, could become another matter. Apart from republishing Cuban communiques about “heroic Cuban fighters resisting US imperialism”, the Soviets have thus far avoided comment on the Cuban role in Grenada. In addition, both Bessmertnykh and Isakov avoided any mention of the Cubans (We would also note in this regard the apparent differences between Soviet and Cuban approaches to the past week’s political infighting on the island; the Cubans supported Bishop while the Soviets apparently assumed a more distant posture). When the Cubans ultimately tally their losses, however, wounded pride may yet prompt them to press for a sharper Soviet response.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 10, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chronology (10/22/1983–10/31/1983); NLR-775-10-25-5-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Tefft; cleared by Pascoe and Niles. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley’s handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 26. In the upper right-hand margin is a typed note to Burt from Shultz: “An excellent memo. Pls turn into a Sec-Pres, undated, to send over on Friday. G.” An undated, unsigned copy of a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan is *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> On October 25, President Reagan made the following statement on Grenada: “On Sunday, October 23rd, the United States received an urgent, formal request from the



five member nations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada. We acceded to the request to become part of a multinational effort." He continued: "Early this morning, forces from six Caribbean democracies and the United States began a landing or landings on the island of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean." He explained that the "U.S. objectives are clear: to protect our own citizens, to facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave, and to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada."

(Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1983, p. 67)

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 13462 from Moscow, October 25, reported: "Acting DCM Kamman presented text of a non-paper on Grenada (as transmitted reftel) to Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Chief of MFA USA Department, at 1500 local time."

(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N830010-0333)

**129. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. Secretary:

Washington, October 28, 1983

Attached is a “point paper” for use during your lunch with Dobrynin today.<sup>2</sup> It gives you a brief background on the likely topics that could arise in your discussion—Grenada, Lebanon, INF, etc.—and suggests some points you might make.

As you know, Larry has suggested an “unbuttoned” approach to the lunch, with you beginning by simply noting that in difficult periods it is important to talk and then letting the conversation proceed in an unstructured manner. Art, on the other hand, favors a more formal probing approach in which you would initiate the conversation by saying that we are genuinely perplexed by recent Soviet behavior—KAL, reneging on human rights commitments, etc.—and wonder whether Dobrynin can shed some light on Moscow’s thinking.

I tend to favor Larry’s approach, although I do not believe the conversation should be a completely unstructured bull session. I think that if you adopt Art’s approach it would invite Dobrynin to launch into a diatribe against the Reagan Administration. In this case, it could be hard for you to get a word in edgewise.

My recommendation is that you begin the lunch with a very simple statement along the following lines:

In the last two years, we have not made a great deal of progress and have been quite critical of one another. At the same time, we have not been involved in any grave confrontations. In fact, in some areas we have accomplished a few things. Unfortunately, the trend now appears to be running in such a way that we could be moving into a dangerous period. From our point of view, we are concerned about your lack of military restraint, your actions in Syria, and your threats to respond to the deployment of INF in Europe. Furthermore, there are regional conflicts such as Iran-Iraq war which pose great dangers. In times such as these, it is critically important that we talk to one another and exercise restraint.

This kind of presentation is designed to avoid an extended Dobrynin diatribe. We can, of course, expect him to be quite critical of our policies. He will blast us on Grenada,<sup>3</sup> the President's discussion of the Soviet role behind events in the Caribbean and the Middle East, and—his favorite theme—on the Reagan Administration's supposed lack of interest in "real communication" with the Soviets.

You should respond calmly to these criticisms, reminding Dobrynin of their performance during the KAL episode, the discovery of huge amounts of Soviet/Cuban arms in Grenada, their dangerous actions with Syria, their threatening behavior on INF, and the problems their lack of compliance on arms control issues causes for ongoing negotiations. The point to emphasize is that although we may not be able to make great progress at present—though, of course, the U.S. stands ready for progress—the United States and the Soviet Union have an overwhelming responsibility to ensure that things do not get out of control.

The atmosphere you should try to create is one that encourages an informal, candid exchange about real concerns, not one in which the exchange will be set-piece restatements of current policies. In such an atmosphere, you will want to see whether Dobrynin provides any real openings worth exploring. If he engages in his familiar tactic of filibustering, you might tell him bluntly that time is short, that you want to engage in a real dialogue not speeches, and then ask directly what message he has from the Soviet leadership that he wants to convey to the United States.

**Rick<sup>4</sup>**

## **Attachment**

**Point Paper Prepared in the Department of State for Secretary of State Shultz<sup>5</sup>**

Washington, undated

### *CHECKLIST ON US-SOVIET ISSUES*

*Grenada:* The Soviets have taken an extremely critical public line of U.S. protective actions in Grenada and formally protested our action. However, the Soviets have been fairly perfunctory in their private criticism—suggesting a tendency to view this episode in “spheres of influence” realpolitik terms—concentrating instead on the safety of their personnel.

—Our objectives in Grenada are clear—protection of U.S. lives, restoration of peace, stability and democratic process on island. U.S. troops will be out as soon as objectives accomplished.

—We have made quite clear we will take every effort to ensure safety of Soviet personnel. We remain prepared to assist their safe evacuation.

*Korean Airliner:* While continuing their basic line, the Soviets have invited the ICAO Secretary General to visit Moscow in early November and outside representatives to “observe” their investigation. We have protested maneuvers by Soviet vessels that endanger our search efforts. We are considering ending our naval search effort shortly.

—Must understand the intense and understandable feelings generated within the U.S. by the shooting down of unarmed civilian airliner. Soviet handling of the issue only intensified the adverse reaction.

—Want positive Soviet action on claims and a full and honest explanation of the shootdown. Important step in this direction would be positive Soviet cooperation with ICAO investigation. Hope Soviet invitation to ICAO Secretary General is in this vein. Noted Soviet invitation for U.S., Japan and South Korea to observe Soviet investigation and are considering our reply.

—Both nations share interest in avoiding frictions during naval search operations in Sea of Japan. We have instructed our commanders to exercise great care; Soviet side must do the same.

*INF:* After dismissing all three of our new proposals, the Soviets launched their own new initiative on October 26.<sup>6</sup> New Soviet position offers some forward movement on geographic scope and aircraft, but still provides no basis for agreement on the questions of non-deployment of U.S. missiles and compensation for UK/French forces. Making a



strong pitch for deferral of the U.S. deployment dates, Andropov on October 26 flatly ruled out continuation of INF negotiations after the NATO deployments.

—Time has come for serious negotiation, not political posturing or intimidation. In September, we made major new U.S. moves responsive to Soviet concerns, which Soviet Union has chosen to dismiss out of hand.<sup>7</sup>

—Latest Andropov proposal holds out promise of some movement forward which we hope will be seriously followed up with specifics at negotiating table. It does not, however, address central U.S. concerns.

—It also sets unacceptable deadline for Soviet walk-out from negotiations. Soviet responsibility for such an interruption of talks would be clearcut. As for any postponement of deployment, would note U.S. has been negotiating for two years while Soviets continue to deploy.

—If Soviet Union really wants agreement, must drop insistence on direct compensation for British and French forces which ignores fundamental difference in role of U.S. and UK/French forces. This is issue of principle for Western alliance.

*START:* The situation in START is colored by impending showdown over INF. Soviets remain unwilling to acknowledge the flexibility we have displayed in response to their concerns, criticizing the “build-down” concept both publicly and in Geneva. [Dobrynin has complained that our public release of build-down before giving them a “heads up” demonstrated our “lack of seriousness.”] The Soviets



continue to see U.S. position as attempt to gut their existing ICBM force structure.

—As in INF, U.S. has made substantial modifications to its position that respond to expressed Soviet concerns.

—We will continue to seek an agreement for real reductions in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile systems, as measured by their warheads, and in the overall destructive power of strategic forces.

—We do not, however, insist on identical force structures and are willing limit forces where U.S. has advantage. If Soviets agree to meaningful reductions in ballistic missile destructive power, U.S. is prepared to accept more stringent limits on heavy bombers and ALCMs. Build-down proposal should be seen in this light.

—If USSR is seriously interested in such a trade-off, we can be flexible in developing common framework to carry out reductions.

*Compliance:* The McFarlane Group is still developing a gameplan for handling the cases of possible Soviet non-compliance with SALT II, the ABM Treaty, and other agreements. We have raised both the new Soviet radar and the SS-X-25 [a.k.a. PL-5] ICBM in the current SCC round, but have received little satisfaction from Soviets.

—Soviets should not underestimate the gravity of our concerns over possible Soviet non-compliance with the ABM/SALT II.

—More is at stake than whether SCC has competency to consider non-ratified agreement. Failure to resolve uncertainties created by ambiguous Soviet actions will have corrosive effect on efforts to negotiate new agreements.

—Detailed diplomatic exchanges on the subject of the ICBM first flight tested on February 8 and initial exchanges on the new radar near Krasnoyarsk have not in any way alleviated our concerns.

—Our ability to assess information you provided on the new missile is severely impeded by your expanding practice of encrypting telemetry on missile test flights.

—Hope you will be more forthcoming in the current session of the SCC. Not encouraged by initial weeks' discussions.

*CBMs:* We held constructive exchanges in Moscow in August, but the Soviets have yet to agree to discuss anything other than Hotline upgrade.<sup>8</sup> We are now preparing for a second round of talks in Washington in December. The White House has yet to approve the details of our initiative for a multilateral convention on nuclear terrorism.

—August discussions in Moscow on ways to enhance communications were useful. Pleased we will be working together to improve "Hotline." Urge Soviet government to reconsider position on our other ideas for improved and expanded communications.

—We are considering another round of such bilateral discussions of communications measures in

Washington this early December. Would hope to see broader participation on Soviet side than just technical experts.

*CDE:* The CDE opens in Stockholm on January 17; preparatory conference is underway in Helsinki. We are now coordinating a Western position and have little to say to the Soviets on substance.

—U.S. attaches great significance to businesslike CDE. We hope early progress can be reached on meaningful measures.

*MBFR:* No recent progress on our verification probe; the Soviets have said they would be prepared to continue the bilateral exploratory talks if we agreed to discuss all issues and not just verification.

—We are seriously interested in making progress toward an agreement to achieve more stable conventional balance in Central Europe at reduced levels.

*Non-Proliferation:* We have had two rounds of productive exchanges with the Soviets; in general, this has been a fruitful area of dialogue, insulated from the broader strains in the relationship.

—We value highly exchanges we have had on nuclear non-proliferation and hope for continued cooperation. Will soon propose next round of exchanges in Washington in mid-December.

*Soviet Arms Control Proposals:* The Soviets may press us to provide a more considered response to their Outer Space Treaty proposal and laundry list of propagandistic proposals presented at the UNGA. They may also complain

about our unwillingness to reestablish negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban [CTB].

—Still studying your Outer Space Treaty proposal. We remain concerned about serious problems in verifying any meaningful limits on military activities in space. Would welcome specific Soviet ideas—as opposed to general assertions—on outer space verification.

—Have your other various proposals presented at the UNGA under review. Generally believe it is far preferable to concentrate on the specifics of arms reduction in the Geneva and Vienna talks, rather than wasting time on essentially declaratory approaches.

—On nuclear testing, regret your repeated refusal to engage in discussions on ways to improve verification provisions of TTBT/PNET that would have permitted us to ratify the treaties.

*Human Rights:* The human rights situation continues to worsen. Since Madrid, Soviets have put on trial three prominent dissidents and peace activists; virtual cut-off of Jewish and Armenian emigration continues. Moreover, the Soviets have reinforced unequivocal “nyet” Gromyko gave on Shcharanskiy, insisting that there was never any deal. On a trade involving Shcharanskiy, Vogel told us last week that the Soviet response was “not yet.”

—Human rights will remain central issue in 1980 as it was in 1970s. Need to find a way to take practical steps.

—Gromyko said in Madrid we had no deal on Shcharanskiy. We cannot accept this, as both Kampelman and Kondrashev are responsible men, who had done business on a number of cases.

—You must understand our concerns and feeling that question of good faith involved. Not asking you to contradict yourselves, but to explore other ways this issue can be resolved.

*Third World Regional Tensions:* Although the Soviets have expressed support for the cease-fire in Lebanon, their overall policy, particularly unqualified support for the Syrians, promotes continued instability in the Middle East. The Iran-Iraq conflict may be moving into dangerous stage. In a period of extreme turbulence in Asia—including the KAL massacre and the Rangoon bombing—the Soviets have thus far been unhelpful.

—On the Middle East, we remain convinced that the reconciliation process is the only alternative to a dangerous and unpredictable escalation of tensions. Recent Beirut tragedy has not diminished our determination to support such a solution.<sup>9</sup>

—We note your statement of support for the ceasefire. You must urge Syria to exercise greater restraint. Return to direct Israeli-Syrian confrontation is in neither of our interests.

—On Iran-Iraq, you understand the West's interests in continued flow of oil. We will protect those interests if necessary, but far prefer a peaceful solution of this dispute. We do not want a conflict in the Gulf and are working to avoid it. We trust Soviet Union will take no actions to exacerbate situation.

—Are particularly concerned that you understand the need for restraint on the Korean peninsula after the Rangoon assassination attempt.

*Bilateral Issues:* In the wake of the KAL shoot-down, most elements of our “small steps” strategy [consulates, exchanges agreement] are now on hold. Dobrynin has stressed the need for more high-level dialogue. Gromyko told Hartman that key problem is U.S. insertion of ideology into our statements, raising questions about whether we accept legitimacy of Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup>

—Soviet actions, not American words, are responsible for the downturn in relations and our inability to pursue at this time some of the steps initiated earlier this year.

—Soviet leaders, including Andropov, always have stressed that ideological competition is essential and consistent with peaceful coexistence. Soviets can't have it both ways.

—This Administration has not injected ideology into our diplomatic discussions. We are prepared to deal with the Soviet Union as a major power and to strive for agreements based on equality and mutual interest.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 1, Executive Secretariat Super Sensitive Chronology (10/28/1983-11/14/1983); NLR-775-1-58-3-4. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe on October 25. McKinley's handwritten initials are in the upper-right corner, indicating he saw it on October 29.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 130](#). Attached with the point paper, but not printed, are talking points on the “Soviets in Grenada” and a memorandum drafted by Pascoe on “Dobrynin's Comments to FRG Ambassador Hermes.”

<sup>3</sup> See [Document 128](#).



<sup>4</sup> Burt initialed “RB” above his typed signature.


<sup>5</sup> Secret; Sensitive. Brackets are in the original.

<sup>6</sup> On October 26, Andropov gave an interview in *Pravda* and discussed new INF initiatives. In telegram 9901 from the Mission in Geneva, October 27, the Mission reported on Nitze’s dinner conversation on October 26 with Kvitsinskiy: “Kvitsinskiy asked Nitze whether he had heard the reports of Secretary General Andropov’s press interview. Nitze said he had not and asked Kvitsinskiy what Andropov had said. Kvitsinskiy said that Andropov had said the Soviet side was prepared to talk about aircraft limits, was prepared to reduce its SS-20s in Europe to 140, was prepared to freeze its SS-20 deployments in the eastern Soviet Union as of the time that an agreement might go into effect. He further said that Andropov had said that the Soviet side would break off the talks if U.S. deployed.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830626-0553) The INF delegation in Geneva reported further on the proposal and the statement by the Soviet delegation in telegram 9922 from the Mission in Geneva, October 27. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830627-0272) For the text of Andropov’s interview, which was published in the October 27 edition of *Pravda*, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1983, pp. 910-914.

<sup>7</sup> NSDD 104, “U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations—II, was issued on September 21 and provided instruction to the INF negotiating team. It is scheduled for publication in [\*Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977-1983\*](#).

<sup>8</sup> Discussions were held in Moscow on the Hotline and other confidence-building measures on August 9 and 10.

<sup>9</sup> On October 23, a vehicle loaded with explosives destroyed the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, killing over 200 Marines. For documentation on the barracks bombing,

see [\*Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. XVIII, Part 2, Lebanon, September 1982-March 1984\*](#) .

<sup>10</sup> See [Document 127](#).

## **130. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 28, 1983

### **SUBJECT**

My Lunch Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I had a wide-ranging discussion at a private lunch with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Rather than dwell on details, I focused the conversation on the nature of our dialogue and whether, in fact, discussions at a high level serve a useful function for the two countries.

Dobrynin said that it appeared to Moscow that the U.S. wants confrontation rather than to solve problems. He claimed we had handled the KAL incident in a provocative way and complained about your blaming the Soviets for everything, including Bishop's death in Grenada<sup>2</sup> and the Beirut tragedy.<sup>3</sup> I told him that, from our perspective, our response on KAL had been restrained. Furthermore, I emphasized our shock over the apparent Soviet decision to renege on its commitment to Max Kampelman on Shcharanskiy. I added that the two sides clearly differed substantially on ideological issues and that we were prepared to compete in that area. I also said that we are ready for real discussions, but these had to focus not only on arms control but also on issues of importance to us such as Soviet regional misbehavior and human rights. Dobrynin did not really argue with my points, but he did grouse that on some issues such as the Middle East we had been reluctant to talk.

Dobrynin seemed to have explicit instructions only on INF. He went through Andropov's latest proposal in familiar terms, adding a complaint about the "double standard" in which the U.S. asserted its right to deploy missiles in the FRG "only eight minutes from the USSR" while insisting that the Soviets have no missiles in Cuba. This was said matter-of-factly rather than as a threat.

I summed up with Dobrynin by suggesting that we think about our conversation and meet again after the Asian trip.<sup>4</sup> I said we both needed to consider whether it was useful to continue a high-level dialogue and how we should go about it, adding that the past experience of several American administrations has been that efforts at a U.S.-Soviet dialogue always seem to be derailed by Soviet actions.

I hope the session will give the Kremlin food for thought. Incidentally, Dobrynin told me he had been reporting to Moscow that you will stand for reelection and win and that the Soviet government must be prepared to deal with the Administration for the next five years.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83-10/31/83); NLR-748-24-38-10-9. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was overthrown and executed during a coup on October 19.

<sup>3</sup> See [footnote 9, Document 129](#).

<sup>4</sup> Shultz accompanied the President on State visits to Japan from November 9 to 12 and to South Korea from November 12 to 14.

**131. Memorandum From the President's  
Assistant for National Security Affairs  
(McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 1, 1983

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Dobrynin, October 28

George Shultz has sent you the memorandum at Tab A regarding his luncheon meeting with Dobrynin last Friday, at which only the two of them were present.<sup>2</sup>

When he briefed Jack Matlock and some members of his senior staff after the lunch, he made the following additional points, which were not included in the memorandum because of their sensitivity:

—In response to George's mention of their assurances on Shcharansky, Dobrynin said that there had been a misunderstanding, since Kondrashev (Max Kampelman's KGB interlocutor in Madrid) had never been authorized to give assurances on Shcharansky's release.<sup>3</sup>

—Dobrynin asked specifically what you had in mind in your reference to "confidential contacts" in your handwritten letter to Andropov.<sup>4</sup> Shultz said that you meant restricted contacts through normal diplomatic channels to which only a very few officials would be privy, in order to maintain strict confidentiality.

—When George suggested that communication had to be a two-way street, and that more regular contact must be provided to Art Hartman in Moscow, Dobrynin merely shrugged.



Even though Dobrynin was unresponsive on the matter of Hartman's access, you should note that Gromyko did in fact receive Hartman on October 19, just before Hartman's departure for the U.S., and spent an hour and fifteen minutes with him. In that conversation, Gromyko argued that the Soviet leadership is convinced that you are not serious in your efforts to negotiate since you do not recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet Government and seek only to bring it down. Hartman responded vigorously to these allegations. While self-serving (in the sense that they are advanced to "explain" Soviet truculence), such ideas may in fact be held by some members of the Soviet leadership.<sup>5</sup>

Whether or not that is the case, however, I believe it is important to continue efforts to activate the dialogue, since our public diplomacy will be undermined if the Soviets can argue plausibly that we are unwilling to communicate with them.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/26/83-10/31/83). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. With the resignation of Clark, Reagan appointed his deputy, Robert "Bud" McFarlane to the position of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs on October 17.

<sup>2</sup> Tab A is printed as [Document 130](#). This meeting was on Friday, October 28.

<sup>3</sup> See [footnote 2, Document 104](#). Telegram 291811 to Moscow, October 13, summarized a meeting between Dobrynin and Eagleburger in which they discussed this misunderstanding between Kampelman and Kondrashev.



(Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet-Diplomatic Contacts, (6/8))

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 70](#).

<sup>5</sup> See [Document 127](#).

**132. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the  
National Security Council Staff to the  
President's Assistant for National Security  
Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Soviet Efforts to Establish Contacts

I have been struck by the accumulating evidence that the Soviets may be attempting to establish an unofficial, confidential means of communicating with the White House. In recent weeks, several apparent attempts to send "messages" indirectly have occurred, and although all are possibly explicable in other ways (including attempts to sow deceptive information), I believe we should view them as possible parts of a pattern. The approaches known to me include:

—[1 line not declassified] (TAB A)<sup>2</sup>

—The two approaches last week by Soviet and Hungarian intelligence officers to a private American citizen (reports at TAB B).<sup>3</sup>

—The contact I had earlier this month with *Pravda* correspondent Sergei Vishnevsky (memcon supplied earlier).<sup>4</sup>

—An invitation to me for lunch by Soviet Minister-Counselor Isakov over two weeks ago (I told him I was too busy at the time, but would call if I could find time).

—The renewal of a long-standing invitation to Ty Cobb to visit Moscow as the guest of the USA Institute (repeated to an American visitor to Moscow following the KAL shoot-down).

—Repeated comments by Soviet officials to recent American visitors (e.g. Suzanne Massie)<sup>5</sup> regarding the need for a better dialogue.

—Dobrynin's question to Shultz last Friday as to what the President meant when he proposed "confidential contacts" in his letter.<sup>6</sup>

Only the first of these probes included a specific appeal for an unofficial channel, but all would be typical of Soviet behavior if they were groping for one. [*1½ lines not declassified*], but the report indicates that the request was for a channel "between our two sides," which could imply one between governments. Indeed, unless there were further indications not mentioned in the report, I consider this the most likely interpretation.

I believe that, from the very beginning of the Reagan Administration, the Soviets have sought some means of communicating directly with the White House. There were several such probes when I was Chargé in Moscow in 1981, but they came to nothing—in some instances because we turned them off explicitly, on Secretary Haig's instructions. Later, of course, we had something of a dialogue going by the Kampelman-Kondrashev channel, but we blew the channel by discussing it elsewhere (Shultz to Dobrynin and Palmer to MFA in Moscow, along with briefings of Allies) so that its failure to achieve an arrangement regarding Shcharansky may have been, at least in part, our fault.<sup>7</sup> (An implicit "ground rule" of these dialogues is that matters discussed in special channels are confined entirely to that

channel, unless there is mutual agreement to go elsewhere.)

The result of all of this is that the Soviets probably continue to feel the need of some means of totally frank and non-committal discussion of issues, but are frustrated over how to do it. All their attempts up to now have, in effect, blown up in their face, and sometimes become public knowledge. If this hunch is correct, then it may explain why they are confining most of their current probes to ambiguous and vague "messages." In addition, Shultz's answer to Dobrynin's direct question would not encourage them to think that we are amenable to establishing a private channel.

### *Can a Private Channel be Useful?*

If it is handled properly, I believe it can. Principally because it permits a more direct input into and feedback from the Soviet decision-making process than are possible in formal exchanges. This flows from the nature of Soviet bureaucratic politics and the psychological mindset of the Soviet leaders.

—Though largely shielded from outside view, Soviet bureaucratic politics are enmeshed in a truly Byzantine maze. If a political leader wants to chart a new course on a key issue, he needs to have the ability to maneuver in the system which is denied him if proposals come through formal channels and evoke strong resistance from the outset from a powerful interest group.

—The Soviets are conditioned to disbelieve what is said publicly (*their* public statements are largely propagandistic, so they assume those of other countries are as well). They assume that we, like they, speak strictly in

private when we are really serious. And they are most likely to believe statements they receive through intelligence channels. [*3 lines not declassified*]

—We ourselves have great difficulty conducting a formal dialogue completely in private, because of leaks. And we face at least some of the same bureaucratic problems as they do in dealing with formal Soviet proposals.

### *Handling it Properly*

There are of course dangers in such private and unofficial communication:

—They can be used as a weapon in bureaucratic in-fighting, to the detriment of policy cohesion and with the danger of creating damaging fissures in the Administration; and

—They can be misleading if relied upon for binding agreements.

However, I believe these dangers can be avoided if we make sure that those cabinet officers with direct responsibility for the matters discussed (that is, the Secretaries of State and Defense) are kept in the loop, and if we use such a channel to clarify attitudes in advance of formal agreements in regular channels, and not as a substitute for the latter.

The mechanics are important. Ideally, such a channel should not be maintained by the most senior officials, since what they say is hardly separable from the US official view, and it is important to be able to float, without attribution, ideas to obtain a reaction. Essentially, the interlocutors are instructed to tag the “messages” to indicate the degree of authority. If he presents something as his “personal idea,”

then this is a signal that we are willing to think about it but not yet willing to commit ourselves to it. If he says that he can convey something on specific authority, then—if the channel is working right—it means you’ve got a deal, and the question to be nailed down is how it is handled formally. (Unless it is self-executing—“when you do x, we will do y”—no deal should be considered definitive until it is in fact negotiated formally. But even then, the unofficial channel can be helpful in specifying procedures which minimize bureaucratic problems on both sides.)

From our point of view, it would be preferable to conduct the exchanges in Moscow, since we would probably get a more direct feel for Soviet attitudes that way. And it might be easier to control dissemination on our end. I did some thinking on the subject for Bill last August and attach (TAB C)<sup>8</sup> my memo which describes one possible modality.

### *Is This the Time?*

I think it is, since we need informal communication most during periods of tension. And unless we establish a channel and work it a bit, we cannot be confident of the status of “messages” when we really need frank communication (as during a possible crisis). The Kennedy Administration had great difficulty, for example, in assessing the value of the messages they were receiving through John Scali during the Cuban missile crisis.<sup>9</sup> It turned out, of course, that they were in fact more accurate than the formal messages received from Khrushchev.

If the President decides he would like to have an unofficial channel, we should discuss the precise modalities and also how we go about setting it up. I suspect the Soviets feel that the ball is in our court at this point.



But whatever the decision is on this particular point, I believe we should take steps to activate the diplomatic dialogue in general. We lose nothing from talking privately (so long as we are reasonably careful about what we say), and refusal to do so only encourages a Soviet stonewall—and perhaps worse.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1983 (10/20/1983–11/07–1983); NLR-362-3-14-1-0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Although undated, the memorandum was likely sent on November 3 or 4.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. [*text not declassified*]

<sup>3</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>4</sup> See [Document 125](#).

<sup>5</sup> Suzanne Massie, author of *Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia*, a cultural history of tsarist Russia, traveled fairly regularly to the Soviet Union during the 1980s and had contact with various Soviet officials and Russians.

<sup>6</sup> Dobrynin and Shultz met on October 28. See [Documents 130](#) and [131](#).

<sup>7</sup> See [Document 75](#) and [footnote 3, Document 131](#).

<sup>8</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>9</sup> John Scali, an ABC News reporter, was used as a back channel during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. See [Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Documents 80](#) <sup>↗</sup>, [85](#) <sup>↗</sup>, [137](#) <sup>↗</sup>, [195](#) <sup>↗</sup>, and [197](#) <sup>↗</sup>.

### **133. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, November 9, 1983, 1744Z

14070. Geneva for USINF, USSTART. Subject: Soviet Foreign Policy After a Year of Andropov. Ref: Moscow 12501.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C—Entire text).
2. This is one of two cables assessing Andropov's first year in office. A second examines his record on internal affairs.<sup>3</sup>
3. Summary: A year after Yuri Andropov's succession to the leadership of the USSR, expectations that Soviet foreign policy would be more moderate, dynamic or competent under his tutelage remain unfulfilled. The substance of Moscow's approach to the major issues today is not significantly different than during the last months of Brezhnev. But there have been differences of emphasis and style which, if Andropov remains in office, could have significant implications for his leadership, for the international situation in general, and for US-Soviet relations in particular.
4. Unlike Brezhnev, Andropov has limited his personal involvement in foreign policy almost exclusively to arms control. Even a purported "special interest" in Eastern Europe has failed to manifest itself in his first year. Andropov has proven to be a competent, sometimes original, spokesman on arms control issues, with a special flair for public relations. There is no evidence, however,

that he has sought to put his own stamp on Soviet arms control policy thus far.

5. Andropov's preoccupation with arms control has largely determined his approach to US-Soviet relations. He has shown no interest in improvements for their own sake and has resisted a dialogue on non-arms control issues. Instead he has sought to bring the US around to his arms control agenda by direct appeals to Western audiences and by encouraging perceptions in the West that the Kremlin has "written off" a Reagan administration unwilling to accept Soviet "legitimacy." Such complaints may reflect high-level preferences here to wait out the administration. But they are best viewed as tactical devices and do not in our view represent Andropov's last word. Once the INF drama is played out,<sup>4</sup> the Soviets will have less reason than they have had over the last year to play hard to get, and sound reasons for moving toward engagement.

6. Andropov's focus on arms control has left Gromyko, with the help of a few experienced lieutenants, the Soviets' point man on regional issues. A major reorganization of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus, the subject of rumors last spring, has failed to materialize. The result has been drift and stagnation in Moscow's approach to the major international issues, and a year of few successes abroad.

7. The regional balance sheet shows genuine gains for Moscow only in the Middle East, but even these are qualified and tenuous. The Caribbean and Latin America are a decidedly mixed picture, particularly after Grenada. Sino-Soviet relations have not developed at the rate Moscow appears initially to have expected. The past year has brought a series of political reverses in Western Europe, which will culminate in the INF deployment. Ties with Japan and Iran are at recent lows. Moscow's approach



to the developing world has been timid and resource-constrained. Worst of all, Andropov in the KAL affair has conspicuously muffed his first major foreign policy crisis.

8. Such a record cannot be expected to put Andropov in political trouble (his health, of course, is another matter). The policies he has followed have been consensus policies. A victory on INF would put everything right. A Soviet defeat on INF deployments, however, cannot help but be a personal one for Andropov, given his personal involvement in the issue. While Andropov will not stand or fall on the outcome of the INF battle, in its wake the leadership may feel a need to improve upon what may by then be perceived as a lackluster foreign policy record. This could result in a more pragmatic and innovative approach than we have seen during Andropov's first year. Should Andropov's health continue to worsen, however, the months ahead could produce more of the "caretaker" approach we have seen thus far. Part of the reason for the unimaginative and essentially unsuccessful foreign policy year—in addition to personal health weakness—is more than likely that Andropov spent most of his energy on structural party matters and domestic policy. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

**Hartman**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830658-0555. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad, Beijing, Bonn, London, Paris, USNATO, USUN, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Tokyo, and the Mission in Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> See [Document 122](#).

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 14266 from Moscow, November 15, the Embassy provided an analysis of Soviet domestic politics, attempts at economic reforms, and ideological considerations. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830666-0872)

<sup>4</sup> INF deployments to Western Europe were scheduled to begin on November 23, assuming an agreement could not be reached beforehand.

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